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The Problem of Unfreedom 
Yarran Hominh 
 
Can unfree people make themselves free? Some people are unfree because of the social and 
political conditions in which they find themselves. To become freer would require changing those 
conditions; yet changing them requires the exercise of freedom. So it seems like they must already be 
free in order to become free. Drawing on John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and B.R. Ambedkar, I argue 
that the unfree can make themselves free. Unfreedom involves external constraints and how those 
constraints shape people’s agency. Becoming freer involves coming to know, from the inside, how 
our agency has been shaped. We can change that shaping and in turn the social conditions. The 
problem of unfreedom is a vicious cycle. Social conditions constrain agency, which in turn further 
entrenches the social conditions. A virtuous cycle is possible. Agents can change their conditions, 
reducing the constraint on their agency, in turn enabling greater change. Conditions are unstable, and 
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This dissertation addresses a fundamental philosophical problem that I call the problem of 
unfreedom. Put most simply, the problem of unfreedom can be summed up in the question: Can those 
who are unfree make themselves free? To this question I answer yes. 
I approach this problem primarily drawing on three philosophers in the global pragmatist 
tradition: John Dewey; W.E.B. Du Bois; and B.R. Ambedkar. I focus mostly on their writings from 
the interwar period, particularly the 1920s and 1930s. This is not a dissertation in the history of 
philosophy, which has two consequences. The first is that my concern is not merely to elucidate their 
thinking, but to see what parts of it are philosophically sound. Although I take my lead from them, 
the use to which I put their work is my own – though no doubt informed heavily by their ways of 
seeing things. The second consequence is that this dissertation does not develop a view about the 
influences and fertilisations that might comprise what I have too easily called here the global 
pragmatist tradition. I will say very little about why it is useful or justified to group these thinkers in a 
tradition – though as a matter of intellectual influence the connections between the three thinkers 
have been explored elsewhere – and I will say less about which other figures might properly be taken 
to be also part of this tradition.1 The historical scope of my project is further limited by my focus on 
 
1 For pragmatism’s reception in the Americas more widely, see the essays in Gregory Fernando Pappas, ed., Pragmatism in 
the Americas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011). For Dewey’s reception in China after his visit in 1919-1921, see 
Jessica Ching-Sze Wang, John Dewey in China: To teach and to learn (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012); Sun Youzhong, "John Dewey 
in China: Yesterday and today," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35, no. 1 (1999). See also the work of Sor-Hoon 
Tan, for example "China's Pragmatist Experiment in Democracy: Hu Shih's pragmatism and Dewey's influence in China," 
Metaphilosophy 35, no. 1‐2 (2004). For European reception, see Cheryl Misak, Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to 
Ramsey and Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For a focus on the (geographical) continent, see the papers 
in the special issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (2019) XI-1 on “European Pragmatism”, 
edited by Giovanni Maddalena and Friedrich Stadler, and on Italy specifically, see Giovanni Maddalena and Giovanni 
Tuzet, The Italian Pragmatists: Between allies and enemies (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020). The (social, Jamesian-Deweyan) 
pragmatist strands on which I focus can be found later in strands of the Black radical and Marxist anticolonial traditions 
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those thinkers who take up pragmatist themes for political purposes, particularly for anti-oppressive 
(anti-colonial, anti-racist) political purposes. But again I will say little about why pragmatism as a 
tradition lends itself to those purposes or about how pragmatism relates to other, closely related 
traditions in left-Hegelian and Marxist critical theory, or other anti-colonial traditions, for example 
those following Paolo Freire and Enrique Dussel.2 
The dissertation is driven by two overarching and synthetic commitments. The first is that our 
social and political philosophy must be connected to our moral psychology, using “moral” in its 
capacious early modern sense as pertaining to the entire human being – how human beings see, engage 
with, and relate to the world and each other, and using the terms “social” and “political” similarly 
capaciously, to pick out the forms of collective organisation and group relation in which individual 
human beings find themselves. Too often philosophers treat these areas separately, or assume a 
simplistic picture of one in examining the other. No doubt there are sometimes good reasons for 
doing so. Model-building is useful, and simplifying assumptions need not be distorting assumptions. 
Philosophising can be in response to different questions and thus rightly, for the sake of inquiry, 
bracket off other considerations. But, nonetheless, it is one important philosophical task to treat 
phenomena in their fuller shape and in their messy complexity. 
So, by contrast with this tendency to isolation and simplification, this dissertation treats social 
and political philosophy and moral psychology together. The social and political conditions shape our 
ways of thinking and feeling, and are also shaped by those ways of thinking and feeling. This is, of 
 
in, for example, the Johnson-Forest Tendency (C.L.R. James, Grace Lee Boggs). Tracing these lines of influence is a task 
for another time. 
2 On the relations, for example, between Gramsci and Dewey, see Brendan Hogan, "Pragmatic Hegemony: Questions and 
convergence," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2015). The literature on pragmatism and the critical theory 
tradition is too large to list; for a recent collection of essays, see Michael G. Festl, ed., Pragmatism and Social Philosophy: 
Exploring a stream of ideas from America to Europe (New York: Routledge, 2020). For Dussel’s comments on pragmatism, see 
Enrique Dussel, Ethics of Liberation: In the age of globalization and exclusion, trans. Eduardo Mendieta et al., ed. Alejandro A. 
Vallega (Duke University Press, 2013), §3.1 and §3.2. 
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course, an old philosophical theme. I do not go so far as to say, in the spirit of G.E.M. Anscombe, 
that we ought lay aside doing social and political philosophy until we have an adequate philosophy of 
psychology.3 But I do say that we (or at least some of us) ought develop them both together and not 
separately.  
The second overarching commitment is that social analysis and moral psychological analysis 
ought themselves be in a sense systematic. I mean this not in the Wissenschaft sense, of a unified 
system derived from or driven by a set of principles, but in the much more limited sense that there is 
an important kind of understanding that comes from seeing deep connections between phenomena.4 
In the case of social institutions, this manifests in the way in which those institutions operate together. 
In order to understand how and why democracy has failed, we have to look to its interconnections 
with the market. In order to understand capitalism, we have to look to the way racism functions. And 
to understand the persistence of caste, we have to look to the law. And so on. These institutions work 
together in a system such that to understand them we must see them together. In the sphere of moral 
psychology, this systematicity manifests in what I call an orientation – the way that discrete parts 
(particular attitudes etc.) of an agent’s moral psychology fit together to express how that agent is 
fundamentally oriented to the world and others. The practical upshot of this systematic approach is 
that effective social or moral psychological change cannot simply be piecemeal (reform this law here, 
change that belief there), but must have in mind the transformation of the whole system. 
These commitments are reflected in the shape of this dissertation, which proceeds via 
examination of particular paradigm, interconnected fundamental institutions of unfreedom and the 
 
3 Adopting, of course, the opening thesis of G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33, no. 124 
(1958). that “it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have 
an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.” 
4 Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001), §122. “[T]hat understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’ [Zusammenhänge sehen].”  
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moral psychologies they foster. But in another sense there is not, perhaps, as much systematicity as a 
philosopher of a certain stripe might want. These case studies are admittedly not (and could not be) 
exhaustive nor complete, and they are not representative of all forms of unfreedom. There are other 
studies that would have served just as well – the prison, or educative institutions, for instance. So to 
that thoroughly systematic philosopher, I must say that the argument provided in this dissertation 
does not amount to a deductive argument that, in general for any instance of the problem of unfreedom, the 
unfree can make themselves free.  
I have chosen to take this tack despite (what some may see as) this lack because I think it is 
important to look at particular institutional and moral psychological dynamics; that is, to begin with 
particular forms of unfreedom and not with “unfreedom” überhaupt, if there were such a thing. I am, 
in saying this, fully aware that some may think that the particularity could be pursued even further at 
lower levels of abstraction, while some may think that there is something useful to be said at higher 
levels of abstraction. Nonetheless, I sit where I sit, at the risk of pleasing neither camp. I hope that 
the level of analysis will be somewhat vindicated by the interesting similarities and analogies between 
the different forms of unfreedom that I examine in this dissertation, connections which may be 
fruitfully pursued in a more generalised and overarching vein later. I say more about these directions 
for future work in the conclusion to this dissertation. 
The dissertation comprises three parts. The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) set up the problem 
of unfreedom. In Chapter 1, I formulate the problem of unfreedom, situate it in a broader intellectual 
history, and set out, through some methodological remarks, the approach I will take to that problem 
in the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 2 continues some of the arguments in Chapter 1 and situates 
the social kinds of unfreedom that are my focus against the backdrop of what I call the tragedy of the 
human condition – a naturalised metaphysics of unfreedom that sets the scene for these social kinds.  
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The second part (Chapters 3 to 5) comprises case studies of paradigm modern institutions of 
unfreedom. Each case study examines how those institutions stabilise themselves through shaping the 
moral psychology of people within those institutions, and briefly examines how that diagnostic might 
be taken up in strategies for transforming those institutions. In Chapter 3, drawing on Dewey’s 
political works, primarily The Public and its Problems and Liberalism and Social Action, I examine how 
institutions of political democracy fall into oligarchy because of the way in which democracy operates 
with an individualistic moral psychological orientation fostered by capitalist market society. In Chapter 
4, drawing on aspects of Ambedkar’s social and political philosophy in Annihilation of Caste and other 
works, I argue that hierarchical institutions like caste stabilise themselves by creating structures of 
graded inequality, and that such structures foster a moral psychology of group interest that stabilise 
the system, in part through the interconnection between caste and legal forms. In Chapter 5, through 
a reading of Du Bois’s Darkwater along with other of his texts, I argue that racism facilitates the spread 
and entrenchment of capitalism and is in turn stabilised by it, and that a self-interested orientation 
plays an essential role in both relations between racism and capitalism. Chapter 5, in addition to its 
standalone merits, plays also a transitional role in the dissertation. It connects the more institutionally-
focused analyses of Chapters 3 and 4 to the solely moral psychological analysis of Chapter 6. 
The third part (Chapter 6) turns to an analysis of the metaphysics and epistemology of the 
moral psychological notion of an orientation. This notion of an orientation captures how one 
fundamentally relates to and engages with the world – how one is oriented with respect to the world. 
It comprises how one’s particular attitudes fit together to express this fundamental relation. I argue 
that coming to know one’s own orientation is a process of self-interpretation that results in what I call 
hermeneutic self-knowledge. There is a first-person practical (as distinct from epistemic) privilege that 




In the conclusion to this dissertation, I say a little more in a general and theoretical direction 
about unfreedom, how such a theory might point towards a theory of freedom (though I do not 
provide one in this dissertation), and further directions (both political and moral psychological) for 
inquiry into the problem of unfreedom to take. The dissertation and whatever further directions of 
thinking that result from it reflect a fundamental commitment to the idea that philosophical 
understanding of human beings and the situations they are in can help alleviate the problems they 






Chapter 1: Dimensions of the Problem of Unfreedom 
Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak.1 
Yet after the war they were still not free; they were still practically slaves, and 
how was their freedom to be made a fact?2 
…there are others which have not attained [the “sufficiently advanced state to 
be fitted for representative government”], and which if held at all, must be 
governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose 
by it… There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a 
vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the 
people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher 
civilisation.3 
 
These epigraphs give us a sense of a problem that faces communities attempting to engage in 
political action worldwide in different ways and in different forms; a problem that I will call the problem 
of unfreedom. The problem, pithily formulated, is this: some people are unfree, because of the social and 
political conditions in which they find themselves. To become freer would require changing those 
conditions, but changing those conditions requires the exercise of freedom. So it seems like they must 
already be free in order to become free.4 I should at the outset dispel any sense of conceptual paradox 
that one might feel upon reading this pithy formulation of the problem. The problem is first and 
foremost a practical problem to be addressed through action. It is not just a conceptual or theoretical 
problem about (say) the nature of freedom, to be resolved by more clearly defining one’s terms.5 But, 
 
1 Catherine Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 45. 
2 W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: Toward a history of the part which black folk played in the attempt to reconstruct 
democracy in America, 1860-1880, ed. David Levering Lewis (New York: Free Press, 1998 [1935]), 189. 
3 John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in Three Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 408-9. 
4 The subject of this generally formulated problem is intentionally left imprecise. It could be (indeed, in my view is), the 
case that all people are in this situation; “some” does not imply “not all”. The hope is that something general can be said 
about the very contextually situated problems that variously placed emancipatory political subjects face.  
5 Compare Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert 
C. Tucker (W.W. Norton, 1972), 128. 128: “This conception of history… comes to the conclusion that all forms and 
products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by resolution into “self consciousness” or 
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nonetheless, it may be that theory can help us to understand that problem better, and thereby to get a 
handle on how it might be addressed practically.6  
The task of this chapter will be twofold. The end goal is to motivate a general kind of response 
to the problem that is internalist and transformationist. It is internalist insofar as it is those who are unfree 
who can, by exercising their own agency, make themselves freer. It is transformationist insofar as it 
involves a thoroughgoing transformation of the social conditions of unfreedom and of the moral 
psychologies of the agents who are unfree, while accepting that this process of transformation happens 
by degrees, not overnight, and cannot be determined fully in advance.  
This kind of response will be exemplified in the following chapters by an extended argument 
that will draw primarily on ideas (both methodological and substantive) from the global pragmatist 
tradition, as exemplified in John Dewey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and B. R. Ambedkar. It will also, however, 
draw selectively on a wider set of thinkers, philosophers, and activists from the analytic, critical theory, 
and decolonial traditions.7 Some ground-clearing is necessary as a precursor to this argument. I will 
need to provide some sort of conceptual explication of the problem of unfreedom, so that it can be 
seen as a compelling diagnosis of the practical situation that many agents seeking freedom through 
political means face. So the intermediate goal of the chapter will involve articulating two conceptual 
dimensions along which we can understand responses to the problem of unfreedom. This will enable 
 
transformation into “apparitions,” “spectres,” “fancies,” etc., but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social 
relations which give rise to this idealistic humbug.” 
6 Compare bell hooks, “Theory as Liberatory Practice,” in Teaching to Transgress (Routledge, 1994), 59. “I came to theory 
because I was hurting—the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting 
to comprehend—to grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go 
away. I saw in theory then a location for healing.” 
7 Although I will be reading these thinkers, which to many would belong to distinct and varied traditions, as pursuing the 
same problematic, I do not intend thereby to occlude the real and substantive differences between, e.g., the pragmatist and 
decolonial and critical theory traditions, though one ought not thereby underplay the real and substantive connections 
(both historical and philosophical) between them. I will not engage in the larger scholarly task of tracing and showing the 
connections and influences between those traditions, important as that task is. 
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me to locate my preferred kind of response along those dimensions. Each dimension can be articulated 
initially through a prima facie distinction that will, as the dialectic proceeds, be complicated and 
nuanced.8 I will label these distinctions externalism/internalism and revolution/reform.  
I will begin with some methodological preliminaries in section 1. Those preliminaries will help 
in setting out and responding to what I will call the challenge from externalism in sections 2 and 3, against 
which my internalist response to the problem of unfreedom that will animate the rest of this dissertation 
will be set. Sections 4 and 5 will set out the revolution/reform distinction within which I will articulate 
the transformationism that will animate this dissertation. I will use that distinction to clarify some of the 
commitments on which the argument of the following chapters will rest. By the end of section 5, 
therefore, we will have in view the fundamental commitments on which the view that I will articulate 
in the rest of the dissertation will rest. Section 6 will conclude by returning to some of the claims about 
the relation between the problem of unfreedom and modernity made in section 1 to suggest that the 
externalism/internalism and revolution/reform distinctions are not arbitrary, but essential to the 
problem of unfreedom in its modern form. 
1.1 Some methodological preliminaries 
I will begin with some methodological remarks raised by the pithy formulation of the problem. 
A useful question is: why the problem of unfreedom? Why am I emphasising this nonstandard negative 
term, which is seemingly merely the converse of the positive term “freedom”? Why not describe the 
problem, as is more often done, in positive terms by using one of the many other widely available 
words such as oppression, domination, and tyranny that might seem to have similar meanings?  
There are three reasons why I begin with this non-standard term. 
 
8 By using the qualifier “prima facie”, I intend to warn against taking these distinctions as strict binaries, for reasons that 
will become apparent. 
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The first reason behind my use of the term “unfreedom” is similar to that of Judith Shklar’s 
reason for focusing on “injustice” rather than on “justice”. Like injustice, unfreedom is a “primary 
experience”. It is the normal state of affairs that is right before our eyes. We have a much clearer grasp 
of it than its converse. But precisely for that reason we have a tendency to lift our eyes from it, to 
direct them at the distant goal about which we know much less – “freedom”, or “justice” – and to 
take the negative state simply as the absence of that less known and theoretically contested positive 
state. But, as Shklar argues, we ought to theorise the negative state in itself, to begin from the 
imperfect, the unfree, the unjust.9 That way we may be able to avoid some of the interminable debates 
about the positive ideal. We may also be able to avoid seeing our present state in light of and as 
coloured by those ideals, which may be false ideals.10 My project is thus in that tradition of “non-ideal 
theory”, of which Shklar is one representative, that takes as its starting point the non-ideal.11 This 
tradition puts center stage the negative state (unfreedom, injustice) as a problem to be addressed 
practically.  
My centring of the term “unfreedom” is also informed by the pragmatist method, according 
to which inquiry begins when one is faced with a problem.12 The problem drives the inquiry – “a 
 
9 Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 15. 
10 Cf. Shklar: “At the very least one might begin to shorten the distance between theory and practice when one looks at 
our actual wickedness, rather than only at pictures of what we ought to be and do.” "Giving Injustice Its Due," Yale Law 
Journal 98, no. 6 (1989): 1136. 
11 See, on this form of non-ideal theory,  Charles W. Mills, ""Ideal Theory" as Ideology," Hypatia 20, no. 3 (2005); Elizabeth 
Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Amartya Sen, "What do we want from 
a theory of justice?," The Journal of Philosophy 103, no. 5 (2006). Other forms of non-ideal theory focus on criticising the role 
of idealisations, or on the assumptions made in order to build abstract models: see Onora O'Neill, "Abstraction, 
idealization and ideology in ethics," Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 22 (1987). Yet another conception of non-ideal 
theory conceives of it as the theory of transition to the ideal. See, generally, Laura Valentini, "Ideal vs. Non‐Ideal Theory: 
A conceptual map," Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012).  
12 Cf. Philip Kitcher, "Pragmatism and Progress," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American 
Philosophy 51, no. 4 (2015). The general locution here – “the pragmatist method” – does not mean that I deny the differences 
between different pragmatists and their different conceptions of method.  
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problem well put is half solved.”13 Following this pragmatist dictum, one ought to begin with 
unfreedom as the problem to which freedom is the response. The diagnosis of the problem guides 
and helps to characterise the shape of the response to be given to that problem, mitigating (though 
not, of course, fully avoiding) the familiar pitfalls of unnecessary and distorting idealisation and 
abstraction that pragmatism seeks to avoid. On the non-ideal theoretic approach and the pragmatist 
approach, the inquiry does not begin by assuming a conception of freedom, but rather with a diagnosis 
of unfreedom. The pragmatist method also recognises that just because we begin from unfreedom 
does not mean that we have unfettered or perfect epistemic access to that present state. Part of 
beginning with unfreedom involves clarifying and better framing that starting point so that we can 
bring it more properly into view.14 
Following the non-ideal theorists and the pragmatists, then, how can we initially understand 
unfreedom? One place to start is with the experience of unfreedom, analogously to where Shklar 
begins in understanding injustice. Shklar characterises injustice as what gives rise to (justified) anger 
and indignation at a wrong; the response to injustice is a cry of “that is not right” and “that is not 
fair.”15 Injustice is characterised by a feeling of unfairness and of indignation at that unfairness. The 
experience of injustice is instructive. It reveals to us, at least in broad scope, the connections between 
injustice, wrong, unfairness, and so by correlation between justice, right, fairness.  
We could say of unfreedom, by comparison, that it is an experience of constraint or denial – 
there is something I should be able or want to do or to achieve – an experience that gives rise to 
 
13 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1938), 112. 
14 See Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 109-12. Compare Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, 1-3. “The perceptions of victims 
and of those who, however remotely, might be victimizers, tend to be quite different. Neither the facts nor their meaning 
will be experienced in the same way by the afflicted as by mere observers or those who might have averted or mitigated 
the suffering… To take the victims’ views seriously, does not, however, mean that they are always right when they perceive 
injustice.” 
15 Shklar, "Giving Injustice Its Due," 1138. 
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frustration. Of course, not all experiences of this sort are true cases of unfreedom, and not all cases 
of unfreedom are felt in this way. We may not have a full grasp of our present state of unfreedom. 
Nonetheless, the experiential aspect gives us some handle on the kind of thing unfreedom is. The 
experience reveals to us, in broad scope, the connection between unfreedom, constrained action and 
agential capacities. Unfreedom is not just a matter of a state of the world, but how it affects our agency. 
This connection between unfreedom and agency leads to the second reason for beginning 
with unfreedom. Beginning with the problem rather than a purported solution focuses our attention 
on the agential and political tools necessary to deal with the problem. These tools, as I will argue in 
more detail in what is to follow, include elements of our moral psychology not necessarily visible from 
the perspective of freedom, for example hope, anger and blame, fear, anxiety, apathy, solidarity, and 
distrust. These are all responses to constraint and impeded desire that may not have any use or place 
in some ideally free society.16 So, too, there may be institutional forms of various kinds that are direct 
responses to present kinds of unfreedom that are just stepping stones and would be superseded in 
some ideal society. 
Third, conceiving of freedom as the response to the problem of unfreedom also helps to 
explain why I do not (in the first instance) use “oppression” or “domination” or “tyranny” to describe 
the problem. Those terms are too specific, insofar they are all particular forms of a more general 
category of unfreedom that includes other forms of unfreedom; for example, what is sometimes called 
“voluntary servitude”, or what is called “false consciousness”. 
 
16 So, too, Rawls’s conception of ideal justice does not by definition (though his non-ideal theory might, in principle) deal 
with the tools necessary to deal with present racial and gender-based (for example) injustices. Though, see Tommie Shelby, 
"Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations," Fordham Law Review 72, no. 5 (2004); Charles W. Mills, "Retrieving 
Rawls for Racial Justice? A critique of Tommie Shelby," Critical Philosophy of Race 1, no. 1 (2013); Tommie Shelby, "Racial 
Realities and Corrective Justice: A reply to Charles Mills," Critical Philosophy of Race 1, no. 2 (2013); Charles W. Mills, Black 
Rights/White Wrongs: The critique of racial liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Mills, ""Ideal Theory" as 
Ideology."; Tommie Shelby, Dark Ghettos: Injustice, dissent, and reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
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That more general category may only be specifiable in the abstract, following the connection 
between unfreedom and agency, in relatively thin terms as something like “impoverishment of agential 
capacities or their exercise.” That thin and abstract notion of impoverishment of agential capacities 
can of course be filled out in various thicker ways: as simple quantitative impoverishment (having 
fewer options to which our agential capacities can be put); as being actively denied certain relevant 
options; as lacking certain capacities (for whatever reason) to pursue particular things that nonetheless 
one wants, as lacking the capacity to imagine particular things that one would want, and so on. To 
particularise that abstract notion in any of these ways is to engage in a normative project of specifying 
why that particular kind of impoverishment of agential capacities ought properly be considered an 
instance of unfreedom.17 People may disagree about cases for all sorts of reasons, and it may be that 
particular forms of unfreedom may not be immediately visible to those subject to them.  
Some general ways of fleshing out those impoverishments, as I will argue further in Chapter 
2, are native to the human condition. They constitute the kind of agency that we have and are general 
standing features of the types of creatures we are. Yet some others – the kind on which I will focus in 
this dissertation – are created and maintained, however indirectly, by human agency and by the social 
structures that we have built. If these kinds of unfreedom are the result of human agency, then, it 
stands to reason, they can be addressed or redressed by the same. In the conclusion to this dissertation 
I will say some more in general terms about these humanly-created kinds of unfreedom, drawing on 
the particular analyses of the intervening chapters. 
This more capacious, because thin and general, conception of unfreedom allows us to see the 
possibility of these more subtle forms of unfreedom than the standard vocabulary of coercion, 
tyranny, oppression and so on. It will also enable us to see more clearly the connections between the 
 
17 Compare Nancy J. Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty: Toward a feminist theory of freedom (Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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more standard and explicit forms of unfreedom picked out by those terms and the more subtle forms, 
as will become apparent in later chapters of this dissertation. Indeed, I will focus more heavily on 
those more subtle forms in this dissertation. These forms better characterise the maintenance of 
unfreedom in largely liberal democratic societies where there is some commitment (however much it 
is a matter of lip service) to non-violent and procedural ways of resolving disagreements and conflicts, 
as opposed to the kinds of directly and violently coercive unfreedom that characterise authoritarian or 
totalitarian states. One could say, as a shorthand, that I focus on societies in which Gramscian 
hegemony plays a larger role in social coordination than the coercive apparatus of the state. This is 
not to say, of course, that direct coercion plays no or only a little role in liberal democratic societies, 
that totalitarian states rely solely on violent coercion and not also on ideological and intellectual means 
of maintaining unfreedom, or that there are not deep interconnections between the subtler 
psychological forms, maintained by media and church and educative institutions, and the more explicit 
forms of unfreedom, connections which are mirrored also between liberal democracy and 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism.18 But it nonetheless provides some initial delimitation of the 
subject matter of this dissertation. 
Finally, I do not use terms like “oppression”, “domination”, and so on in the first instance 
because those terms, understood as practical problems that agents face, do not wear their solutions 
clearly on their linguistic surface. “Unfreedom” is naturally paired with “freedom” where these other 
terms do not have a natural converse. Conceiving of the problem as “unfreedom” with “freedom” as 
its solution captures the dual sense in which freedom is both a state and a capacity to be exercised. 
Freedom is an end state (something to be achieved – though not necessarily a final or idealised end), 
 
18 This last point is captured empirically – though the diagnosis is deep and disputed – in the literature on “democratic 
backsliding” or “democratic deconsolidation”. See, e.g. Nancy Bermeo, "On Democratic Backsliding," Journal of Democracy 
27, no. 1 (2016); Roberto Stephan Foa and Yascha Mounk, "The Signs of Deconsolidation," Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 
(2017); David Waldner and Ellen Lust, "Unwelcome Change: Coming to terms with democratic backsliding," Annual Review 
of Political Science 21, no. 1 (2018). 
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the means to which is the exercise of freedom as a capacity. It is no accident that freedom has these 
two senses – the second of which comes clearly into view when one begins with the experience of 
unfreedom as constraint and frustration – and I want to take seriously at this early stage the intuition 
that they are connected.  
1.2 The challenge from externalism 
There is another initial and very closely related challenge that must be met, and met again 
through the course of the dissertation. Given the distinction between freedom as ends and freedom 
as means, why it is not possible for those two senses of freedom to belong to different agents? Why 
is it the case that, as I have put it in the pithy formulation, the people who are unfree are to be the 
ones that deliver themselves to freedom? 
In other words, why can’t freedom (as an end goal) be delivered from outside, by the means 
of someone else’s freedom (as a means)? Let’s call this view externalism, insofar as freedom is delivered 
from outside the state of unfreedom.19 In describing externalism as the view that freedom is delivered by 
those outside the state of unfreedom, I accept, of course, that there are weaker forms of externalism 
corresponding to different ways in which those outside a particular case of unfreedom can contribute 
through solidarity and support to resolving that case of unfreedom. But I focus on externalism of this 
wholesale sort initially here for the following reason. If it were a plausible position, then much of the 
difficulty of the problem of unfreedom as I have formulated it would evaporate. Wholesale externalism 
is thus a tempting view. It is even more tempting if one were to think (contrary to how I intend the 
formulation) that the problem of unfreedom is a paradox, that people must indeed be free in order to 
 
19 It would be an interesting and perhaps important task to consider the relations between this political distinction between 
externalism and internalism and other forms of that distinction in epistemology, theory of reasoning, and so forth, although 
I will not do so here. 
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become free and thus that the unfree cannot make themselves free. If the difficulty of the problem is 
insurmountable, then we must find a way around the formulation of the problem.  
A crucial formulation of this temptation to externalism, for my purposes, is in terms of the 
stability of unfreedom. If one is highly impressed by the stability of unfreedom – the way in which it 
resists attempts to undermine it, then one might think that the only way to undermine unfreedom is 
for some other group who is already free to undermine it. The theme of stability will concern us 
heavily in the analyses to come. 
A closer examination of this challenge from externalism will thus be a good way to begin the 
inquiry of this dissertation. This holds especially since if externalism of this wholesale sort were shown 
to be either impossible or undesirable, then our inquiry would gain a certain direction towards thinking 
of ways in which freedom might come from within unfreedom; namely, an internalist response to the 
problem.  
Externalism and internalism are of course not a simple binary, but a spectrum. For the 
dialectical reasons just articulated, I will argue strongly against a simple or wholesale externalism on 
which those who are free deliver freedom to those who are unfree, leaving open the possibility of 
weaker forms of externalism (to which I will return later in the dissertation). The rejection of wholesale 
externalism will mean that room is made for my positive argument, which is that internalism ought be 
adopted as a methodological lens. With respect to any particular case of unfreedom, inquiry into that 
situation should be undertaken at least initially from the perspective of those who are unfree, and that 
it is their agency that should take the lead in addressing that situation. That methodological internalism 
leaves room for a variety of middle ground positions on which the agency of those who are external 
to any given situation of unfreedom can contribute to addressing that situation, while still not being 
the sole or main agency of that redress. 
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As I have said, externalism can come in different forms. A simple externalism can be found 
in the Mill epigraph above: the people of the colonies are unfree, but since they are, at least at present, 
incapable of freedom (else, presumably, they would have led themselves to civilisation of our kind) they 
must be subject to a “vigorous despotism”, at least until the stage when they have been made capable 
of freedom through an imperialist pedagogy enabled by that vigorous despotism. We find this familiar 
(and widely noticed) line of thought in colonialist thinking worldwide: the Haitians are incapable of 
freedom (even when they revolt and thereby show their capacity for freedom); black slaves in the 
Americas are incapable of freedom because incapable of reason (even when they show themselves 
able to reason and to argue); Indigenous peoples in the Antipodean colonies are incapable of freedom, 
because they do not have individual property on the same model as “Enlightenment” Europe (even 
where they clearly did); women are incapable of freedom because they are irrational; Ethiopia and 
Liberia are incapable of being fully self-determining members of the League of Nations and thus must 
be governed by mandate from abroad, because they could not eradicate slavery within their own 
borders, and so on.20 All these peoples must, to misuse further Rousseau’s already often misused 
words, be “forced to be free”.21 I will take for granted that an externalism that rests on that kind of 
false assumption is undesirable and unjustified.22  
 
20 See, e.g., C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, Second ed. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989); Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2019 [1855]); Bruce 
Pascoe, Dark Emu: Aboriginal Australia and the birth of agriculture (Magabala Books, 2018); Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication 
of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints, ed. Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); Adom Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The rise and fall of self-determination (Princeton University Press, 
2019). 
21 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), I.vii.8; OC II: 364.  
22 I do not thereby claim that the assumption is necessarily false. There may be the usual philosophical cases of individuals 
whose will is wholly overborne, or who are helpless in the face of certain chronic addictions, who would be properly 
describable as facing a problem of unfreedom in these terms. But it is not clear that such cases arise at the political, 
collective level, nor is it clear what kinds of “natural” incapacities could in fact ground such a collective case, at least for 
human agents. Some may argue – though I take no stand on the question here – that such a case properly describes the 
unfreedom that some non-human animals face. 
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Nonetheless, Mill’s quote shows us something true about the problem of unfreedom: that 
unfreedom is very often maintained actively by the denial of certain forms of freedom (in the case of 
colonial India, forms of collective self-determination and self-governance; in the case of slavery and 
other forms of colonisation, freedom of movement and association and labour). The denial of those 
forms of freedom constricts the capacities that people have to bring about change. In the end or in 
extreme cases this denial may lead to people actively maintaining their own unfreedom. In Rousseau’s 
words, “[s]laves lose everything in their chains, even the desire to be rid of them; they love their 
servitude, as the companions of Ulysses loved their brutishness.”23 In such cases, externalism may not 
rest on any such false assumption either of natural incapacity (in the cases of, for example, settler 
colonialism and slavery) or cultural backwardness or racialised cultural hierarchy (in the case of, for 
example, “the Orient”). It may be the case that, given histories of unfreedom, externalism is now an 
undesirable necessity. If it were the case that a people could will themselves to freedom, then by all 
means go for it, but unfreedom is, by the institutional agencies just mentioned, unfortunately, more 
stable than that. This point about the seeming stability of unfreedom will concern us repeatedly in the 
chapters to come. 
The considerations just raised show that the stability of unfreedom may rest on external 
imposition and external maintenance, or it may be that there is something about unfreedom itself from 
inside (which Rousseau figures as “coming to love one’s own chains”, though of course there are forms 
this may take other than loving what enchains us) that is self-maintaining. These forms of unfreedom 
are often products of the shaping of psychologies by the effects of external imposition and 
maintenance – one subtler form that unfreedom as the general impoverishment of agential capacities 
takes. An account of unfreedom must thus be sensitive to the various forms that unfreedom takes. 
 
23 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, I.ii.8; OC III:353. 
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Externalism – at least of this simple kind – presupposes that whatever form unfreedom, as a problem, 
takes, it can be solved from outside. But in cases where unfreedom involves some kind of internal 
maintenance (in the form of what we have come to call ideology or false consciousness or self-hatred, 
for instance) it seems at the least simplistic to assume that such things can be undone from the outside. 
Externalism is thus insensitive to the sources of unfreedom. 
Such an attitude is in addition disrespectful in a philosophical sense; it denies the agency of 
those who are unfree and treats them simply as victims of circumstance. Or, at the least, it assumes that 
the agency of those who are unfree exists merely as a potential, one that must be evoked from outside, 
by the Platonic philosopher-king, the Rousseauean Lawgiver, or the Leninist Party. This disrespect 
can be understood as driving Isaiah Berlin’s qualms with positive liberty. Berlin was worried that 
adopting a positive theory of liberty would enable that theory to be imposed on a people from without, 
in the name of their “true selves”. We need not adopt the rest of Berlin’s machinery nor his insistence 
on a pure negative conception of liberty to recognise this important point.24 There are political dangers 
in denying the agency of those who are unfree. By contrast, the converse of that point – an insistence 
on the existing agency of those subject to forms of unfreedom, even where that unfreedom is self-
maintained in some form – and the capacity of that agency to make itself free is a theme echoed again 
and again in liberatory literature and culture, and for good reason.25  
What I have said here is of course not meant to deny certain obvious facts, like the fact that 
the existing agency of the unfree, like that of all people, is shaped by the social conditions and 
circumstances in which they have developed their agency. One could call those conditions for the 
 
24 And, after all, Berlin recognised that a negative conception of liberty also allows for this slide to totalitarianism in the 
name of the “real self”. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969). 134. 
25 A direct analogy is to student-centred learning. It is true that teachers play an important role in the education of students. 
But to focus on the agency and the superior knowledge and skills of the teacher would be both hubris and an educational 
mistake. This is true no matter how common that hubris is and those mistakes are. 
20 
 
development of agency “external”, but the agency, once developed, is nonetheless still the agent’s and 
not external to them. By “externalism” and “internalism” I am referring to the locale of agency and 
not to the causal conditions under which that agency is developed or exercised. It is also not meant to 
deny that others can provide helpful insight into specific conditions of unfreedom, perhaps through 
their own distinct experiences of unfreedom. The kind of agency I am concerned with here is practical 
(captured in my use of “delivering freedom” above) and not simply epistemic. Those who are unfree 
still have to do something with the information gained. 
Wholesale externalism’s denial of agency to the unfree has consequences for the kind of praxis 
counselled in response to the problem of unfreedom. One way to put it is that it ignores the fact that 
the problem of unfreedom is a practical problem for those subject to it, one that they must actively 
address. From the perspective of those subject to unfreedom, however, accepting the externalist 
framework is tantamount to rendering oneself passive. In this sense, externalism is a response to the 
problem of unfreedom that is implicitly made either from the perspective of the purported liberator 
or from an abstract theoretical perspective distanced from the problem as it grips those subject to it. 
If it is made from the perspective of the unfree for whom the problem is a practical one, externalism is 
likely to be either (in a backward-looking mode) the result of despair (at, say, the futility of struggle as 
it has been experienced), or (in a forward-looking mode) to have the likely effect of inhibiting the kind 
of participatory and agential role that would contribute to the resolution of the problem of 
unfreedom.26 Internalism, by contrast, points us towards this moral psychology (of despair, hope, 
anger, trust) that comes with conceiving of the problem of unfreedom as a practical problem. 
 
26 Compare María Lugones’ argument that various theoretical accounts of oppression “leave[] the subject trapped 
inescapably in the oppressive system.” This may be factually correct, Lugones suggests (though implicit is the claim that it 
is not and cannot be). But it is also “a desideratum of oppression theory that the theory be liberatory… If oppression 
theory is not liberatory, it is useless from the point of view of the oppressed person. It is discouraging, 
demoralizing.” “Structure and Anti-Structure,” in María Lugones, Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing coalition against multiple 
oppressions (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 54-55, emphasis added. 
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Finally, externalism also requires and presupposes that there is an “outside” which can be a 
source of freedom. This may not be the case. Consider, for example, citizens of many modern liberal 
democratic societies. They are unfree insofar as, given the imperfect democratic institutions presently 
in existence and the way in which such institutions are beholden to interests other than those of the 
citizens they are supposed to serve, they do not have the effective capacities – at least through ordinary 
political means – to change the political conditions under which they live and labour. At least within 
those democratic structures, there is no “outside” that is has the recipe for delivering freedom nor the 
capacities to deliver it. That task is really up to those citizens themselves.27 
Or, if one still wishes to maintain that there is an “outside” to liberal democracy, consider the 
conditions of modern financialised global capitalism. For any given national economy within that 
constellation, everyone is nearly all unfree (excepting, perhaps, the global owners of capital – and they 
cannot be relied upon to help solve the problem of unfreedom), in the sense that the tendencies of 
global capital largely determine, within the present economic system, what actions states and domestic 
and global institutions take, most often not to the benefit of the people that those states and 
institutions are purportedly meant to serve. States have direct legislative control only over internal 
matters, but the root causes of the difficulties afflicting those internal matters are themselves not 
internal to any one state. To change those conditions thus requires precisely those capacities and 
resources for transnational self-determination that the present global crises rule out in favour of short-
term state-based technocratic “solutions”. This is just to say that where unfreedom becomes global, as 
perhaps it may have under present conditions where there is no alternative (or at least no existing 
alternative) to capitalism, there may be no external place from where freedom could be 
unproblematically conceptualised and delivered. 
 
27 Increasingly it is seen as the task for technocrats. Thus the dynamic of externalism continues. I address this case in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
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In short, externalism is normatively undesirable, is insensitive to the sources of unfreedom, is 
philosophically disrespectful to those who are subject to unfreedom, if taken by those subject to 
unfreedom leads to despair, and presupposes (in important cases falsely) that there are some who are 
free “outside” the scope of unfreedom. 
1.3 The motivation and grounds for externalism 
Given these concerns with externalism, what is its appeal other than the ease with which it 
provides a theoretical answer to the problem of unfreedom by, in effect, undoing the terms of the 
problem? Positively, externalism’s appeal rests on the seeming (and I emphasise here that this is merely 
a seeming) stability of unfreedom in the face of practical attempts to resolve it; that is, from a 
recognition of the depth and therefore difficulty of the problem of unfreedom, which may incline one 
towards an answer that undermines some of this difficulty. Let me explain what I mean by beginning 
with an observation about the cases of the problem of unfreedom that I have mentioned.  
Those cases (colonialism, racialised slavery, global capital) suggest that the form of the 
problem of unfreedom with which we are concerned is particularly conditioned by modernity, including 
the rise of the modern state and the associated developing conceptions of modern individualism, the 
spread of those ideas and the social forms that underpin them across the world through colonialism 
and imperialism, and the commerce of goods, ideas, and people that come along with trade 
developments and an increasingly worldwide market economy.28 There are two features of the 
historical conditions of the problem of unfreedom that become significant when one couples the 
 
28 These forms no doubt have historical antecedents. It would be an interesting project to provide a genealogy of these 
historical antecedents, though not one I can pursue here. My suspicion is that one genealogy (a “European” one) would 
be a broadly Platonic one: we could begin with certain readings of Republic as an answer to the conjoint problem of a) how 
to create a rational society given a state of general irrationality, and b) how to lead people to reason given that their souls 
are controlled by the non-rational parts. We might continue to trace this genealogy through post-Augustinian religious 
meditative traditions, some aspects of which develop meditative techniques and texts as a means of bringing about conjoint 
change in the self and change in society, or through Jewish and Arabic traditions perhaps to a text like Spinoza’s Ethics. 
See, for a far more comprehensive genealogy that situates the movements I have gestured towards in this footnote in a 
larger world-historical analysis, Dussel, Ethics of Liberation: In the age of globalization and exclusion.. 
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problem of unfreedom to modernity, features which are in some tension with each other. Exploring 
this tension will shed light precisely on the depth and difficulty of the problem of unfreedom, in a way 
which explains the appeal of externalism at the same time that the tension might, if worked through 
in a bit more detail, in fact problematise externalism. 
The first is that it is only after the historic revolutions of the end of the long 18th century that 
we have a clear articulation of (and attempt perhaps to implement, ab initio, as it were) a conception 
of human freedom (and, indeed, of human unfreedom) that does not rest on a transcendent or divine 
order, one in which all social hierarchies and statuses were sought to be levelled, and one which 
proceeds on the negative basis that such hierarchies and statuses constitute human unfreedom and 
are, on that ground, illegitimate.29 Human unfreedom and human freedom are thus taken to be secular 
in the sense that they are caused by or can be achieved through human effort. That secular attitude is 
necessary to formulate the problem of unfreedom in its modern sense insofar as that problem requires 
both that we understand unfreedom to be a result of (conventional) social and political practices and 
that we understand the response to that unfreedom also to be a matter of human action. We cannot, 
that is, rely on a god or gods to save us; there is no Kingdom of Christ that redeems the Kingdom of 
Man.30 Modernity undermines the general appeal of transcendental forms of externalism that rely on 
the intervention of divine agency. It is in this sense, in modernity, that the problem of unfreedom 
arises as a practical problem for agents that is neither a millenarianism nor an attempt to overthrow, by 
daemonic effort, the natural or divine order.  
 
29 One may find precursors of such a view in Hobbes, but the wider rejection of such a view (and thus its failure to have 
full political uptake) is clear from the use of his name as a pejorative for the following century, and, in any case, the role 
of divine and natural law and the conception of a Christian Commonwealth in Hobbes are not merely (at least in my view) 
a sop to the church or a piece of rhetoric, but essential to his considered view. 
30 This is not to say, of course, that religious commitments cannot inform one’s understanding of the problem or of the 
possible responses to the problem; but it is to say that the problem for the first time could be articulated without those 
explicit commitments, however much they may linger even where they are unexpected. 
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The second is the tendency to totalisation that many have argued is characteristic of modernity, 
both in its negative forms and in its more benign manifestations. This tendency to totalisation has a 
number of causes. The first is the kind of linear and upward temporality associated with modernity, 
characterised by a set of normatively loaded distinctions between (say) the “modern” and the 
“premodern”, the “progressive” and the “retrogressive”, the “developed” and the “developing”, and 
so on.31 That temporality was spread throughout the world from the European Enlightenment by 
colonialism, imperialism, and the spread of a market economy, and carried with it the creation of a 
(perceived) need to “keep up”, not to be “left behind”.32 Second, the institutions of modernity carried 
with them both the sole means to progress and development, such that all societies ought to go through 
the same development, and certain ideals of what progress and development consisted in. So, the 
spread of those institutions and associated ways of thinking, feeling, and being cast, pejoratively, other 
possible social forms as “backward”, “uncivilised”, and “retrogressive”.33 And, third, given the 
simultaneous squeezing out of alternative social forms within European modernity due to the same 
processes, it may be the case overall (given these three causes) that the institutions of the modern 
world, institutions that are central to the social and political conditions of unfreedom, have entrenched 
themselves as the only option (or, at least, the only option that isn’t a return to an uncivilised or a 
romanticised past). That is, since the totalising tendencies of modernity mean that there are no longer 
 
31 See, for example, the “end-of-history” interpretations of Hegel and views of neo-Hegelians that center his claim that it 
is in the modern age that Spirit has become conscious of itself, hence that modern institutions are the expression of Spirit’s 
self-consciousness; Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols, ed. Allan Bloom (Cornell 
University Press, 1980); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). See 
also Perry Anderson, The Ends of History (Verso, 1996).  
32 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global futures, decolonial options (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 
2011); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008). 
33 On the sole means, see Amartya Sen, "Prohibiting the Use of Agricultural Land for Industry is Ultimately Self-
Defeating," The Telegraph (Kolkata), July 23, 2010. See also, for comments on this article, Akeel Bilgrami, “Gandhi (and 
Marx),” in Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 122-74, 45. 
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any alternatives to the institutions we now have, some kind of externalism is now a necessity, albeit 
an undesirable one.  
These two features of the linkage of the problem of unfreedom to conditions of modernity, 
as I mentioned earlier, are in some tension. Given the first feature, the problem of unfreedom is a 
problem of human (rather than divine) action. But given the second feature, human action (in any 
particular case of unfreedom) is always so deeply conditioned by unfreedom that it is tempting to 
think that freedom can only come from outside, from some deus ex machina. I say this not 
immediately as a critique of externalism – both features, although abstractions, are roughly true and 
so it may well be that this is merely a correct diagnosis of our situation – but to point out a form of 
double-bind that will recur at various times in the analysis to follow and which is metonymic of the 
problem of unfreedom.34 One natural response to that double-bind is to be pessimistic about the 
chances of freedom arising from within unfreedom while at the same time recognising that freedom 
and unfreedom are purely human matters; that is, one natural response to the double-bind is 
externalism. 
One point to press against externalism is in the second feature, namely the idea that the 
totalisation of the institutions of European modernity leads to the absolute stability of those institutions 
and thereby to the absolute stability of the forms of unfreedom that those institutions constitute. I’ve 
spoken so far of the seeming stability of unfreedom. But, given that these institutions (from the first 
feature) are of human making, their stability must be a feature of their internal tendencies; it cannot 
be a metaphysical point that they are necessarily stable. No doubt it may be the case that those tendencies 
are so strong as to amount to necessity. But that conclusion must be the result of argument – perhaps 
 
34 Again, see Lugones, “Structure and Anti-Structure”. 
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an inductive historical argument from the continuance of unfreedom despite the many attempts to 
overcome it – and not a direct inference from the mere appearance of stability those institutions have.  
Two points follow for the direction of our inquiry. First, there is a burden of proof on the 
externalist to show that the actual tendencies of the forms of unfreedom amount to absolute stability 
and not merely the appearance of absolute stability. Second, as a corollary, if one is to argue against 
externalism, then, the argument might usefully target precisely the claim that unfreedom is necessarily 
absolutely stable. But – and this is essential – it must do so without denying the genuine de facto 
stability of the forms of unfreedom that face communities. The kinds of constraints under which 
people live persist and reproduce themselves over generations even despite concerted and repeated 
attempts to change them.  
This is a narrow and difficult path to walk. The task of the internalist is to explain something 
more complicated than the phenomenon confronting the externalist. The internalist must explain both 
the seeming stability of the conditions of unfreedom, and at the same time show that those conditions 
have features that allow for the possibility of change. (This point holds for any view along the spectrum 
short of wholesale externalism, but the burden is particularly acute the further along toward a 
wholesale internalism one gets.) So, the kind of internalism that is characteristic of the problem of 
unfreedom as I have formulated it – that it is precisely those agents who are unfree who can make 
themselves freer, that freedom is the end and the exercise of freedom the means to that end – must 
rest on a diagnosis of the instability (though still accepting the seeming stability) of the social and political 
conditions that make those agents unfree. That is one part of the challenge for the response to the 
problem of unfreedom, inspired by Dewey, Du Bois, Ambedkar, and the other thinkers mentioned 
earlier, that this dissertation will develop. The other part of the challenge is to ground a practical hope 
in the possibilities of human agency to shift those institutions – a moral psychological aspect to 
correspond to the political and institutional aspect of instability. 
27 
 
One might worry that these claims are only true of externalism taken wholesale. But aren’t 
there different kinds of freedom that come in different degrees, and different groups that are unfree 
in different ways? So mightn’t externalism be true of some forms of unfreedom, even if it is true of 
others? And, additionally, mightn’t it be true that, even if there is an necessary role for those inside 
the state of unfreedom, that there may also be ways in which those “outside” the state of unfreedom 
might nonetheless contribute? 
To respond in the fullest terms to these concerns would take me into a different set of 
theoretical questions. I want to stay focused on following the lead of beginning from unfreedom as a 
practical problem. So it is sufficient for those purposes that this examination of externalism as a 
wholesale position has brought into view that concern with stability and the larger historical context 
in which the problem arises. To respond briefly, however, it is true that there are different kinds and 
degrees of unfreedom. But the problem of unfreedom is that these kinds tend to interact and the degree 
tends to deepen. That is, as I will argue more fully in the next section, the problem of unfreedom is 
not just that there is a state of unfreedom, but that there is a dynamic of unfreedom, a vicious cycle that 
deepens and spreads.35 It is true that, for some kinds of unfreedom, those who are “outside” that 
unfreedom in the sense that they contribute to the unfreedom of others have a role to play. The 
argument here is not meant to rule out solidarity and allyship. But even in such cases there are good 
reasons to think (as I will argue in later chapters of this dissertation) that the lead must come from 
those who are subject to unfreedom, because they have a better grasp of it, and that even those who 
contribute to the unfreedom of others are, to quote Rousseau, no less a slave than they. The 
 
35 See Annette Martin, “Explaining Oppression with Social Structures,” (unpublished manuscript) for an argument as to 
the systematicity of oppression – that it is domain-insensitive. See, for the related claim that for an epistemic harm to be 




oppressors suffer their own form of unfreedom and so, even in such cases, there is no true “outside” 
to unfreedom. 
That is to say that the distinction I have made here between externalism and internalism will 
be complicated as the dissertation progresses, and that the focus on a wholesale externalism broadened 
to include other forms of contribution. I do not want to deny that, with respect to certain forms of 
unfreedom, there are some who are not subject to that form of unfreedom (though they may be 
affected or afflicted by it in other ways). And so, consequently, I do not want to deny that there is an 
important role that those external to the form of unfreedom can and indeed should play in addressing 
those forms of unfreedom. I do want to insist on two things, however. The first is that a wholesale 
externalism suffers from the critical points I made at the end of section 2 and that even a more 
complex conception of the role of any externalism must be cognisant of those points. The second is 
that, even accepting some role for externalism, internalism ought to be the methodological lens by which 
we approach the problem of unfreedom. 
The externalism/internalism distinction as I draw it here ought also be distinguished from 
another set of questions to do with burdens and duties. It might be argued that internalism is unfair, 
insofar as it places further burdens on those who are unfree to remedy their unfreedom, or insofar as 
it wrongly places the duty to remedy unfreedom on those who are unfree rather than on those who, 
it might be colloquially put, make them unfree.  
Let me take these in reverse order. My view does not imply anything about duties. Some have 
argued that there is a duty on those who are oppressed to resist their oppression.36 And so it may be 
 
36 See, e.g., Bernard R. Boxill, "The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist Their Own Oppression," Journal of Social 
Philosophy 41, no. 1 (2010); Jean Harvey, "Victims, Resistance, and Civilized Oppression," Journal of Social Philosophy 41, no. 
1 (2010); Carol Hay, "The Obligation to Resist Oppression," Journal of Social Philosophy 42, no. 1 (2011); Ekow N. Yankah, 
"Whose Burden to Bear? Privilege, Lawbreaking and race," Criminal Law and Philosophy  (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09503-x; Ashwini Vasanthakumar, "Recent Debates on Victims' Duties to Resist 
Their Oppression," Philosophy Compass 15, no. 2 (2020); Serene J. Khader, "Self-Respect under Conditions of Oppression," 
in Respect: Philosophical Essays, ed. Richard Dean and Oliver Sensen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).  
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that there is a duty on those who are unfree to make themselves freer (though, if one accepts that 
ought implies can, one would first have to establish that those who are unfree can make themselves 
freer), and there may be duties of solidarity on those who are freer to help those who are unfreer. 
Those are important questions. But beginning from the perspective of those who are unfree, the 
question of duties is perhaps a little abstract. I am inclined to think that there is a duty on oppressors 
not to oppress, whether actively or passively, and to act in solidarity with those oppressed, for instance. 
But not all cases of unfreedom are cases of oppression, and, even in those cases, that there is a duty 
seems both obvious and of little practical help for those who are oppressed in ending their oppression. 
If the oppressors accept the existence of the duty then they would cease oppressing and the oppressed 
would be fine, and if they don’t, then the oppressed claiming there is such a duty is of little help. The 
question, to adopt a slogan, is more “what is to be done” rather than “what ought to be done, by 
whom”. It is an immediate practical question rather than a question asking for an answer at a degree 
removed.37 
It may also be true that internalism places burdens on those who are already burdened. And 
so if internalism is true, then there may be an injustice here. But the injustice or otherwise is a distinct 
issue from answering the problem of unfreedom, and it may just be another feature of the double-
bind in which those who are unfree are placed that they also face this injustice. If so, then that injustice 
is part of the practical situation that is described by my formulation of the problem of unfreedom, and 
in a way this is unsurprising, given the many other injustices faced by those in such situations. That 
there is this injustice is not a reason to change one’s understanding of the situation, though it is no 
doubt a reason to change the situation. 
 
37 The way I have phrased the question of duties here is of course not the only way of phrasing that question. It may be 
that, within a particular movement, there are important and immediate questions of the distribution of certain roles within 
the movement. And there the question of duty may arise in a more immediate form. 
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1.4 Overcoming unfreedom – “revolution” 
The externalist/internalist distinction, as I have drawn it, is a distinction about the sources of 
freedom. An issue that runs orthogonally to the sources issue has to do with the means of overcoming 
unfreedom: how is the relevant agent (whether it is an external agent or those who are unfree) to change 
the conditions and become freer? The conceptual space here can be understood initially in terms of a 
distinction between revolution and reform. This distinction has frequently been drawn in different ways 
for different (sometimes purely rhetorical or ideological) purposes. One person’s radical reform might 
be another’s revolution. What I am concerned with here is the substance I give to the terms – which 
I use therefore quite stipulatively – rather than where lines are drawn between the positions, or with 
the ideological freight which these terms carry in the extensive literature on these issues.   
The distinction is sometimes taken to be a strict dichotomy, often for rhetorical purposes. If 
one is not a revolutionary, then one is a mere reformist; or, contrarily, if one is not a sensible reformer, 
then one is an idealist revolutionary. In avoiding these rhetorical and ideological uses of the terms, 
particularly so that I can outline my preferred transformationist position which is neither reformist nor 
revolutionary (as I will use those terms), I propose to understand the revolution/reform distinction in 
terms of two conceptual dimensions: what I will call scope and speed.  
Scope concerns how deep the proposed changes need to go. This point can be put in terms of 
fundamentality. The revolutionary view, in the stipulative sense that I give to that term here, holds that 
the fundamental institutions of a society (whatever they may be) are restrictive of human freedom and 
must be abolished. So what are the fundamental institutions of a society? 
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I take fundamental institutions to be those that most thoroughly co-ordinate and organise 
human social action and define and determine the shape of human lives.38 What I mean by 
fundamental institutions is similar in this respect (and in motivating spirit) to Rawls’s specification of 
the basic structure. But this conception of the fundamental institutions is wider than Rawls’s basic 
structure insofar as it is not limited by or focused on considerations of distributive justice, with the 
associated focus on formal (often legal or political) institutions, and is not limited to institutions within 
a state.39 It is motivated also in the spirit of non-ideal theory, and thus focuses on the institutions that 
are presently fundamental (such as race and capitalism), even if those institutions would not be part 
of any ideal social structure.  
Let me explain further with some examples. The French revolutionaries of 1789 saw the 
monarch and the court as fundamental institutions. They were fundamental insofar as they were the 
main co-ordinators of human social action and structured deeply life prospects. The monarch and 
court determined the laws and state policy, and did so in a way which was largely blind to the issues 
faced by, and therefore consolidated the unfreedom of, the Third Estate. And one’s life chances (not 
only material chances, but the kinds of capacities one could develop and exercise, the kind of powers 
one could have) were hugely influenced by the station of one’s birth. Two caveats are in order. The 
first is that what I have referred to here as “the monarch and the court” is shorthand for a variety of 
institutions, including the overall structure of the Three Estates, the role of feudal nobility and the 
 
38 We could of course extend this definition to include effects on non-human lives and the environmental systems in which 
these lives are lived. Since my focus is on human unfreedom, I stick with the narrower – though admittedly incomplete – 
characterisation. In any case, the two characterisations are likely to be roughly coextensive. 
39 See also Samuel Scheffler, "Is the Basic Structure Basic?," in Equality and Tradition: Questions of value in moral and political 
theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Iris Marion Young, "Taking the Basic Structure Seriously," Perspectives in 
Politics 4, no. 1 (2006); Olufemi O. Taiwo, "States Are Not Basic Structures: Against state-centric political theory," 
Philosophical Papers 48, no. 1 (2019). The little that Rawls says about a global or international basic structure is solely about 
principles and not about institutions, namely that whatever that structure comprises, it must be characterised by “mutual 
respect” between peoples, including nonliberal decent peoples. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 61-62. 
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idea of social hierarchy that the nobility embodied, a prestige economy, and so on. (We might also 
think it leaves out other structures that would become clear only during or after the Revolution, 
including the distinction between urban and rural workers and other class distinctions even within the 
Third Estate.) Second, the influence of these fundamental institutions on one’s life chances was not 
deterministic. One could buy one’s way into the nobility, for instance, if one was part of the haute 
bourgeoisie. But the important point is that freedom, for the French revolutionaries, required the 
abolition of these fundamental institutions precisely because they were fundamental and the creation of a new 
society along the lines of liberty, equality, fraternity. 
In our time, we might take capitalism to be a fundamental institution. Capitalist markets are 
the main co-ordinator of social action, and capitalism structures all aspects of social life and activity, 
from work to leisure time to family structures and indeed the shape of states and other forms of 
association. Again, of course, “capitalism” is here shorthand for a variety of institutions, including 
markets for land and labour and other goods and services, concentrated private property ownership, 
the state regulations and legal frameworks that enable and support these markets and this ownership, 
the financial and banking systems that underwrite the transmission of capital across the globe, and so 
on.  
There are two general points that arise from these examples, one substantive and one 
methodological. The substantive point is that claims to fundamentality involve claims of systemic 
interconnection between institutions that tie those institutions together into a system (like “capitalism” 
or “the monarch and the court”). So, for example, relations of production and consequent structures 
of labour under capitalism drew on older gender roles to form the institution of the nuclear family. 
And the nuclear family became heavily institutionalised through laws and policies that protected and 
privileged that family structure. So too do those relations of production strengthen conceptions of 
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merit that tie merit to “ability” and to “hard work”, hence fostering other ideas like the “undeserving 
poor” and the present social meanings of “disability”.  
This systemic interconnection need not be so strong or deterministic as to amount to a claim 
that the system is thoroughly unified. Roberto Unger argues, for instance, that while what he calls 
“deep-structure” analyses maintain correctly that there are fundamental institutions that act as 
frameworks for ordinary and routine life, they maintain (in his view) incorrectly that these institutions 
form unified types (whether arranged stadially or otherwise), and that those types are each explicable 
by appeal to deep lawlike structures.40 Against the latter two claims, Unger argues that we ought be 
sensitive to the slippages and tensions between different systemically interconnected institutions, and 
that such sensitivity is important politically for seeing possibilities of change. But the revolutionary sees 
quite correctly that fundamental institutions are systemically interconnected, and that this 
interconnection gives them a greater stability. This theme of stability through interconnection will be 
a key theme for much of the argument in this dissertation. 
The methodological point is that there are levels of institutional analysis, that different levels of 
analysis may be fruitful for different forms of inquiry, and that moving between and holding together 
different levels of analysis may be particularly fruitful. The revolutionary’s correct claim about the 
fundamentality of institutions of unfreedom, for instance, only becomes visible at a certain level of 
generality. Yet the tensions between some of the institutional parts of that system may be best 
understood at a lower level of generality. This is a general pragmatist point about the appropriate level 
of understanding a set of phenomena that will guide the inquiry in further chapters. 
I turn now to speed. Speed concerns how quickly the institutional changes can and should be 
made. The revolutionary, on my stipulative conception, is committed to the claim that this shift must 
 
40 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Politics: The central texts (Verso, 1997), 33-37. He takes as his example of “deep-structure” 
classical Marxism’s use of “capitalism”. 
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occur quickly, as in July and August of 1789. There must be not only a clean break, but also a swift 
break with the past.41 Scope and speed are separable; one can have total change in fundamental 
institutions that happens slowly and over time, without there ever being a swift break.42 Revolution, 
however, holds scope and speed together. 
What motivates the revolutionary position? I think there is a similar motivation to the 
externalist position, namely a recognition of the seeming stability of unfreedom. Whereas for 
externalism, such stability means that unfreedom must be overcome from outside, for the 
revolutionary view, this stability (grounded in particular in the interconnection – perhaps amounting 
to unity – of the fundamental institutions of unfreedom) means that unfreedom must be overcome 
quickly and absolutely so that it is not possible for the conditions of unfreedom to be reasserted. Let’s 
assume that if it were possible, revolution would be desirable – it is better, after all, to get the job done 
quickly and once and for all than to have to fight multiple and prolonged battles in what Du Bois calls 
the “long siege”.43  
The question that must be posed for the revolutionary view is therefore to explain what ties 
together scope and speed. On what grounds can the revolutionary assume or assert that both 
conjuncts can be held at the same time? We might think that small institutional changes to non-
fundamental institutions can be made quickly. But why think that fundamental changes could also be 
made quickly? One argument that challenges the possibility of holding both together is what we might 
call a Burkean argument. Burke argued, against the French revolutionaries, that in overthrowing all the 
 
41 It’s important to note that this idea of a clean break is not necessarily only a modernist impulse; recall that the 
philosopher-king must exile all children over the age of ten. 
42 Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012). Some may want to call this 
a slow revolution, or a permanent revolution (at least in one sense of that term). I have no quibble with people who want to use 
this terminology; the point is substantive and not terminological. 
43 Though let’s remember Toni Morrison in Beloved (New York: Vintage International, 2004). “Freeing yourself was one 
thing, claiming ownership of that freed self is another.” 
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“prejudices” (in the sense of pre-judgments; traditions and customs) that underpinned people’s sense 
of themselves, the revolutionaries left people bereft of the stock of “latent wisdom that prevails” in 
tradition and reliant only upon their “private stock of reason” – something far smaller and wholly 
indeterminate.44 In doing so, they destroyed the very possibility of everything they fought for – 
freedom, dignity, rights; all of which depend for their actualisation on human action, which in turn 
requires a certain stability of tradition and custom that form the basis of action. If revolution destroys 
everything, then it also destroys the habits and customs that form the basis for thought and action. 
We might also utilise the metaphor of Neurath’s boat to illustrate this argument. One has to preserve 
enough to stand upon to make change – even if all in the end will be changed, it can’t all be changed 
at the same time. If the Burkean argument is correct and the metaphor of Neurath’s boat apt, then 
wide scope fundamental institutional changes cannot be made quickly. 
What might ground a response to the Burkean argument that enable a speedy and total 
revolutionary break? Revolutions consist in the overthrow of an established institutional order which 
has become unmoored from the larger social structures of feeling in which institutions find their life, 
and the institution of a new order. So speed is enabled by the fact that an institutional order (usually 
a more or less centralised, formal, and governmental order like that of the monarch and the court) can 
quickly be overthrown and a new order immediately set up in its place. (One reason why scientific 
“revolutions” are slower to happen – and hence, for my purposes, are not included in my stipulative 
sense of “revolution” – is that there is no centralised authority structure that can be dethroned.) 
Revolution might then be thought to rest on this possibility of quick overthrow of centralised 
institutions.  
 
44 Edmund Burke, Revolutionary Writings: Reflections on the Revolution in France and the first Letter on a Regicide Peace, ed. Ian 
Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 90. 
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There are two assumptions that might explain this thought and hence might underpin the 
revolutionary view. I will call these naïve structuralism and natural freedom. Both of these assumptions 
enable revolutionary speed but do not necessitate it. One can hold either or both of these assumptions 
and still consistently think that political change takes time. But if one is going to respond to the 
Burkean argument, then one or other of these assumptions is required. Both assumptions focus too 
heavily on one side of the problem of unfreedom, either the institutional or the moral psychological, 
and do not see the reciprocal relations between the two sides. 
Naïve structuralism 
What I will call naïve structuralism serves as an objective condition for revolutionary speed. It is 
the idea that changes to the institutional structure of society brings about immediately ideational and 
cultural change. By “institutional structure” here I mean something broader than what Marx meant by 
the “base”, namely the economic relations of production as opposed to the legal and political 
“superstructure” (after all, the superstructural is still structural), and something narrower than what is 
meant in contemporary social philosophy by “structure”, namely something like “whatever is not 
individual”.45 The referent might best be put via a contrast with the moral psychological, which, as I 
have said, I take in a large sense to include the ways in which agents think, feel, and act, and thus the 
ideas and cultural resources on which they draw when they do so.  
One instance of this view might be found in European and American attempts to institute 
“democratic” orders by (more or less) fiat. Freedom consists in certain kinds of representative 
institutions, along with (say) certain legal and economic institutions (the law of corporations and the 
 
45 On different interpretations of Marx on base and superstructure, see Steven B. Smith, "Considerations on Marx's Base 
and Superstructure," Social Science Quarterly 65, no. 4 (1984). I must admit that I don’t find the contemporary notion of 
“structure” when it is defined against “individual” very helpful. I say something more about how I see “structure” at the 
start of Chapter 5 in relation to racism, and more in Chapters 3 and 4 about how I see the “institutional” as relating to the 
“moral psychological”, which I find perhaps a more helpful way of putting one such distinction. I could have called this 
view “naïve institutionalism”, but that rings even more false given the use of “institutionalism” to refer to a set of 
methodological views and objects of study in sociology and political science. 
37 
 
law of contract are prime examples), and so “we” can just parachute these laws and institutions into 
the Pacific or into Latin America and voila – they will become immediately free.46 If “we” institute 
formal democratic structures, then the people will immediately become democrats in way of life also. 
If “we” institute Western institutions of education, then the colonised will immediately become 
educated in “our” ways.47 We find this view also in some perhaps unexpected places, for example 
some contemporary social psychology that holds that simply changing environments will lead to 
changes in the expression of people’s implicit biases.  
Naïve structuralism can underpin the revolutionary view by justifying the claim, contra Burke, 
that taking away the habits and customs of a people will not leave them bereft of the capacity for 
action, because the temporal length of those habits and traditions are not necessary for agency. The 
changed structural conditions in the form of the establishment of new institutions will lead 
automatically and without lag to new capacities for action.  
Natural freedom 
Natural freedom, by contrast, serves as a subjective condition for revolutionary speed. It is the 
view that freedom lies innate within individuals, ready to reassert itself immediately, and is merely 
constrained externally by the conditions of unfreedom.48 It responds to the Burkean argument by 
 
46 The more cynical analysis of this imperialism is, well, imperialism in more strictly economic terms – to make the colonies 
amenable to corporate depredation and to open them up as dependent markets for export. 
47 The counter-examples to this are legion, which is why there ends up in practice being a normative and hierarchical rider: 
“if they don’t do so, then they are recalcitrant and their unfreedom is their own fault.” Outside colonial contexts, this rider 
might be found in the French Revolution, used to justify the Terror when it turned on the Jacobins: since the Revolution 
has occurred, any who still fall short of virtue must be purged. Cf. Saint-Just’s paeans to death upon recognition of the 
impossibility of virtue, e.g. in his Letter to Daubigny, July 1792: “O Gods! must Brutus languish forgotten by Rome! My 
mind is made up however; if Brutus does not kill others, he will kill himself.” And in Sur les institutions Republicaines: “The 
day when I become convinced that it is impossible to give the French people morals which will be gentle, energetic, 
sensitive, and inexorable toward tyranny and injustice I shall stab myself.” Both lines are quoted in Carol Blum, Rousseau 
and the Republic of Virtue: The language of politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 167. 
48 Cf. Thesis 29 of The Appeal From the Sorbonne, June 13-14, 1968, in The New Left Reader, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: 
Grove Press, 1969), 267-73.: “The bourgeois revolution was judicial; the proletarian revolution was economic. Ours will 
be social and cultural so that man can become himself.” (emphasis added) 
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rejecting the idea that freedom requires some stability of social traditions and by insisting that each 
person’s “private stock of reason” is in fact far larger than (and is indeed not as private as) Burke 
imagined. So, when the existing institutions of unfreedom are overthrown, our nature will be free 
immediately to reassert itself. This view can be detected, for instance, in some of the claims made by 
the French Revolutionaries, who took seriously Rousseau’s proto-Romantic “great principle” that 
“nature made man happy and good, but that society depraves him and makes him miserable.”49 
Robespierre, for example, claimed that that “[t]he first thing the legislator must know, is that le peuple 
is good: the first feeling he must experience is the need to avenge the people’s insults and give the 
people back all its dignity.”50 Similarly, for Saint-Just, “[e]ach people is right for virtue… corruption is 
not natural to peoples.”51 Both Robespierre and Saint-Just (especially the latter) thus fully expected 
natural virtue (both in themselves and in the people more generally) to reassert itself immediately upon 
the revolution. Both, unfortunately, were disappointed.  
This assumption of natural freedom is, however, in one respect a deeper view than the naïve 
structuralism outlined above. It takes seriously the idea that freedom is a matter of the expression and 
flourishing of human capacities for thought and action. It grounds the revolutionary view insofar as it 
explains why the overthrow of an established order would be sufficient immediately for freedom. If 
freedom lies within us merely externally constrained, removing those constraints will allow freedom 
to reassert itself naturally. Or, if natural freedom still needs to be expressed through institutions, the 
assumption of natural freedom can ground revolutionary claims to know in advance what an ideal 
 
49 Dialogues. Rousseau also articulates this claim in a letter to Malesherbes describing his “illumination” on the road to 
Vincennes, where he first read the Academy of Dijon’s question in response to which he wrote the First Discourse: “that 
man is naturally good and it is from those institutions alone that men become wicked.” Letter to Malesherbes, Jan 12, 1762, 
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions and Correspondence, Including the Letters to Malesherbes, trans. Christopher Kelly, ed. 
Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2013), 575; 
I:1136. Compare with the Platonic metaphor of the body as a prison of the soul in Phaedo, 82e. 
50 Cited in Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The language of politics in the French Revolution, 161. 
51 Cited in Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The language of politics in the French Revolution, 164. 
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institutional order that is consonant with freedom might be, one that can be quickly instituted after 
the overthrow of the old order. Natural freedom grounds the positing of the ideal. We might say, for 
example, that natural rights are those rights that are necessary for the protection of natural freedom. 
Or, we might say that the terms of the social contract are wholly determined by the desideratum that 
“each… nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before.”52 Natural freedom can be used 
thus to explain either the immediate sufficiency of a purely negative praxis for the establishment of 
freedom, or to give content to the positive institutional forms that would allow for the full expression 
of that freedom after the revolution. 
The view I articulate rejects both naïve structuralism and natural freedom. It rejects them on 
the common ground that both assumptions have an incomplete or distorted view of the relations 
between the individual and the social and between the institutional and the moral psychological. Let 
me take each in turn.  
Against the assumption of naïve structuralism 
Naïve structuralism correctly sees that large ideational and cultural changes are often the effect 
of changes to social structures that are not simply matters of individual volition. That insight is a 
proper response to a philosophic tendency to prioritise overmuch ideas and thought. The naïve 
structuralist picture is incomplete in two respects. First, that diagnosis of the origins of the ideational 
does not yet say anything about the reasons why or how particular ideas are maintained. The ideational 
in both psychological and cultural forms has some degree of autonomy; ideas, even if they have 
structural causes, take on a life of their own. Changes to these aspects of life do not necessarily nor 
quickly follow straight from institutional change, but require intervention on their own terms. Even if 
 
52 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, I.vi.4; III:360. 
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one accepts the claim that moral psychological change can come directly from institutional change, 
there is often a lag while those habits and ways of thinking are readjusted.  
Second, naïve structuralism treats institutions as largely formalised, centralised and top-down, 
or at least as amenable to top-down transformation. But not all institutions are like this. Informal 
institutions (let us say, customs and traditions) are not centralised and are not so easily amenable to 
top-down amendment. To put this point another way, while institutions (to differing degrees) a formal 
and explicit norm-based structure, there is also a part of their functioning which is embedded in agents’ 
moral psychologies. Change to the former, formal aspects – especially where that formality is such as 
to create a separate sphere of, say, “the law” or “government” – does not immediately, if at all, lead 
to change in the less formal aspects.  
Following this thought through, the naïve structuralist assumption, if we take it literally and 
not just as a corrective to a philosophic tendency, also lends itself to a technocratic impulse towards 
top-down control. We (the revolutionaries, the Party, the economists) know what material levers to 
pull to bring about the desired social change; if we but do this and that, the masses will follow. In this 
sense the naïve structuralist assumption has another affinity with externalism other than being 
motivated by the stability of unfreedom.53 
Naïve structuralism, as I invoke it here, also tends to conflate the social or institutional with 
the material. But, of course, the social is not limited to the material; it includes (e.g.) norms, 
identifications, conceptual resources, narratives, images, and associations. Changing these aspects of 
the social will of course involve material change but cannot be reduced to such change.54 
 
53 This is not to say, of course, that all externalists assume the unimportance of the ideational. For example, Rousseau’s 
Lawgiver, whose task is to form a people such that they have a general will, does so through bringing those individuals to 
a fundamental transformation of their psychology. Although the Lawgiver is sensitive to the material levers that he has 
available to pull, the important task is internal individual psychological and cultural transformation – to make of each a 
citizen. 
54 Cf. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). 
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Against the assumption of natural freedom 
I accept that there may be some capacities inherent in an individual’s natural endowment that 
one might refer to with the term “natural freedom”.55 That is, there may be a natural basis or natural 
bases for freedom. Nonetheless, there are good reasons not to assume that natural freedom exists in 
a form sufficient to underpin the view that I have here labelled with the term ‘revolution’, namely a 
kind of capacity for action that lies merely dormant under the constraints imposed by the conditions 
of unfreedom.56 There are three reasons why we ought not so assume. 
First, such an assumption falls into what Dewey calls the “celebrated modern antithesis of the 
Individual and the Social” – that the individual is the locus of all value and society constrains that 
individual.57 This conception of the relation between the individual and society is distorted insofar as 
it assumes a static conception of both the individual and society and then proceeds to put the two in 
opposition. In doing so it fails to recognise how social conditions form individuals. Whatever our 
capacities for freedom may be, like all capacities they are developed and can be developed to greater or 
lesser extent and in better or worse ways. It fails also to recognise the effect that individuals can have 
 
55 Compare the more thoroughgoingly social constructivist argument advanced by, e.g., Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty: 
Toward a feminist theory of freedom. I don’t need to make that larger argument here. 
56 Compare Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Notebook 13, §20, extracted as “Machiavelli and Marx,” in Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Gregory Nowell-Smith (New York: 
International Publishers, 197), 133. “The basic innovation introduced by the philosophy of praxis into the science of 
politics and history is the demonstration that there is no abstract ‘human nature,’ fixed and immobile (a concept derived 
from religious thought and from transcendentalism) but that human nature is the ensemble of historically determined 
social relations; that is, it is a historical fact which can be ascertained, within certain limits, by the methods of philology 
and criticism.” 
57 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1925-1927), 289-90. See, of course, Rousseau’s famous opening line of 
Social Contract: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” And compare Emerson in “Self-Reliance”: “Society 
everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members.” For good measure, Paine in Common Sense: 
“government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil”. Of course, Paine distinguishes between society and government, 
but it is sheer complacent optimism to think that “natural societies” are free of the kinds of constraints that Rousseau and 
Emerson more deeply and accurately diagnose. 
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on society through the exercise of their agency. The two categories (individual and society) are not 
static, but are in dynamic and mutually affecting relation.  
Second, even granting that there is something that could properly be called “natural freedom” 
inherent in, say, the human species, and granting that such freedom does not require socialisation for 
its actualisation, it might not be the case that this kind of freedom can be simply recovered (let alone 
immediately recovered) by the merely negative move of abolishing institutions. It could be the case that 
society denatures us; that our nature is a fragile thing that requires, from an early age, protection through 
education and cultivation. That is, if we accept that unfreedom not only acts on us externally but also 
changes us psychologically, those psychological changes may go deeper than merely covering over that 
natural capacity for freedom. Removing the external constraints may not be sufficient to reverse the 
psychological forms of unfreedom. 
So, for example, Rousseau – who, as we have seen, holds a proto-Romantic view of human 
natural goodness – nonetheless thinks, at least in one of his guises, that European corruption, 
ownership of property and attendant inequality, the division of labour and the arts and sciences have 
so denatured human beings that being naturally free is now almost impossible.58 Emile – Rousseau’s 
natural man, with the ideal Rousseauean education and acculturation intended to protect and allow 
that natural freedom to flourish – nonetheless cannot in the end find happiness in modern decadent 
Europe. He leaves his idyllic Neufchatel and he and Sophie destroy their marriage in Paris. And 
Rousseau’s solution to the problem of unfreedom in Social Contract is not to recover one’s natural 
freedom, but to create a fully social self, a second nature, that of the citizen. The terms of the contract 
ensure that “each… nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before”; but the kind of 
 




freedom one has is no longer natural freedom but social freedom.59 For Rousseau, at least on Judith 
Shklar’s reading, the denaturing effects of corrupt socialisation mean that one cannot be both natural 
man and social citizen. We must achieve one or the other; the two ideals are irredeemably opposed. If 
one is not educated in the proper way from birth, maintaining our natural freedom is impossible. The 
best one can do in such cases is to replace that natural freedom with a new form of freedom that is fully 
social. 
A proponent of natural freedom could, however, accept both of these points, but nonetheless 
still insist that it is important to have a conception of the particular “natural” human capacities that 
are constrained by, or whose development is prevented by, conditions of unfreedom, otherwise we 
would not properly be able to talk of those conditions as constraining. Such a proponent might say, 
with the early Marx (for example), that human freedom consists in the full articulation of our creative 
capacities, which are inhibited under capitalism. Thus, overthrowing capitalism is necessary for the 
flourishing of that natural capacity for creative expression.  
The response to that kind of view is to say that it, without more, does not yet ground the 
revolutionary view. It merely provides a necessary condition for that view, without establishing that 
revolution will be sufficient for bringing out those natural capacities. The sufficient conditions for the 
flowering of those natural capacities may only be knowable after the presently constraining conditions 
have been overcome, and there may be additional (and presently unforeseeable) kinds of constraints 
that arise in the absence of those conditions.60  
 
59 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, I.vi.4; III:360. Cf. Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel's 
Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), Ch 2. 
60 Following this thought further, I think, leads us to what Philip Kitcher, drawing on Dewey, calls an idea of “progress 
from” or “pragmatic progress” as opposed to “progress to” or “teleological progress”. See Kitcher, "Pragmatism and 
Progress."; Philip Kitcher, "Social Progress," Social Philosophy & Policy 34, no. 2 (2017). 
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These three points – the rejection of the static opposition of individual and society, Rousseau’s 
internal criticism of the assumption that natural freedom is sufficient for revolution, and the thought 
that the specification of natural capacities, while it may be necessary to ground the revolutionary view, 
is not sufficient for it – are all consonant with the methodological starting point, articulated in section 
1, that we are to begin with unfreedom as the problem to which freedom is the response. That 
methodological starting point avoids altogether beginning with assumptions about the nature of 
freedom. It rather will leave the content of “freedom” more or less open until we have a fuller 
diagnosis of unfreedom, of the forms that it takes and how it affects human powers and capacities. Given 
that the particular forms that unfreedom takes are contingent and historically situated, would it not be 
less theoretically fraught to take the content of “freedom” to be whatever capacities would help people 
facing the practical problem of dealing with those contingent forms, rather than assuming some kind 
of natural catch-all capacity with the power to deal with all forms of unfreedom? Not all problems are 
nails and not all tools hammers, such that any capacity for solving some problems could address all.61 
So, without more to be said for assuming a substantial enough conception of natural freedom such 
that it can resist the kinds of pressures and changes caused by conditions of unfreedom, the view that 
I will articulate rejects it.62 
 
61 The argument here is a highly domesticated version of that offered first by Chomsky and then taken up by Carol Rovane 
on the necessary limitations of cognitive capacities. See Carol Rovane, "Why Scientific Realism May Invite Relativism," in 
Naturalism and Normativity, ed. David Macarthur and Mario De Caro (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Akeel 
Bilgrami and Carol Rovane, "Mind, Language, and the Limits of Inquiry," in The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky, ed. James 
McGilvray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
62 This is consistent with a view of human nature as comprising potentialities and not just actualities. Such a view would 
also presumably have to include among those potentials those for various forms of evil as well as good. So it will be 
insufficient to cite potentialities to vindicate the revolutionary view. Mencius has a competing view linking human nature 
with the potential only for goodness. See Irene Bloom, "Human Nature and Biological Nature in Mencius," Philosophy East 
and West 47, no. 1 (1997); Eric Schwitzgebel, "Human Nature and Moral Education in Mencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau," History of Philosophy Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2007); Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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These responses to the assumptions of natural freedom and naïve structuralism have a wider 
methodological import. They show the necessity raised by the problem of unfreedom of connecting 
our moral psychology – our account of what it is for agents to act and how agency can be undermined 
– to our social and political philosophy – our analysis of social and political structures, practices, and 
institutions. This ought not be controversial. Social and political structures affect agents, and one way 
in which agents exercise agency is through social and political structures. But the way in which the 
problem of unfreedom views the connection runs deeper. It raises the possibility of the following two 
dynamics: a vicious cycle and a virtuous cycle. The vicious cycle consists in the possibility that the 
more we are constrained by our social and political conditions, the less freedom we have to change 
them, which means in turn that the conditions become more strongly entrenched. The virtuous cycle 
is the reverse. The more freedom we gain within unfreedom, the more we can change the social and 
political conditions, which in turn makes us more free. The very interdependence between our moral 
psychology and the social and political conditions that creates the problem of unfreedom is the 
possibility of responding to it. But since, on the revolutionary account, unfreedom must be overcome 
quickly and all at once, these dynamics are easily lost from our theoretical view. 
1.5 Overcoming unfreedom – “reform” 
To get those dynamics back into view, let’s consider what I have given the label reform – again, 
keeping in mind that this term gets its meaning from the substantive use I make of it here, and not 
from the ideological weight attached to it in the larger literature as a whole. Reform, as I will use the 
term, denies the revolutionary view about the scope of institutional change that is necessary to overcome 
unfreedom. On the reformist view, the fundamental institutions of society are sound, and any 
restrictions on freedom come from those institutions not enjoying their full and proper scope. The 
path to freedom does not involve abolishing those fundamental institutions, but instead making 
whatever small changes are required to meet exigent demands while keeping the essence of those 
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institutions intact. The central idea of reformism is that the principles on which those fundamental 
institutions are based are, at least in embryo, those of freedom.  
So, for example, the reformist view (proposed by prior to July and August of 1789, proposed 
separately by Necker and Mirabeau, was for the monarch and the court to remain the central governing 
institution with some secession of ministerial oversight to the Third Estate, thus forming a strong 
constitutional monarchy. Reformism is thus not necessarily equivalent to conservatism, since both 
Necker and Mirabeau (especially the latter) took very seriously the egalitarian concerns of the Third 
Estate and the charges of abuse and corruption levelled at the First and Second Estates. Mirabeau’s 
fundamental thought was to keep the fundamental institution of royal authority intact while directing 
it toward and balancing it with the principles of the revolutionaries.63 
Reformist views of capitalism as a fundamental institution include calls for a “humane” or 
“decent” capitalism, one based on liberal and egalitarian principles. Such calls treat markets and the 
profit motive as drivers of growth and freedom, and seek to restrain the inequalities and injustices that 
follow from minimally regulated markets through a strong counterbalancing public sector and 
regulation of firm and market.64 What needs to be done here, according to the reformist capitalist, is 
to put in places conditions that allow the market to play the freedom-delivering role that in principle it 
can. We need to remove the dross, the accidental features of the system that inhibit that internal 
principle of freedom from its full manifestation. 
Now I don’t want to suggest that such reforms would be misplaced or that they would not be 
a huge improvement (seen from the perspective of justice and material equality) on existing systems. 
 
63 See J. J. Chevallier, "The Failure of Mirabeau's Political Ideas," The Review of Politics 13, no. 1 (1951). 
64 See, e.g., Sebastian Dullien, Hansjörg Herr, and Christian Kellermann, Decent Capitalism: A blueprint for reforming our 
economies (London: Pluto Press, 2011); Robert B. Reich, Saving Capitalism: For the many, not the few (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2015). On what I later call the teleological “upward trajectory”, see Reich’s introduction, where he hearkens back 
to the 1950s and the “norm” of the increase in the “middle class”. 
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And such reforms might be understood as important first steps in a larger program. But to see those 
reforms as a sufficient goal would be, I suggest, complacent, insofar as it assumes that freedom is more 
or less already in place; human action consists just in the bringing out of what is already implicit in our 
institutions. Reformism has a dynamic, one of the simple unfolding of whatever internal principle of 
freedom is already inherent in our existing institutions. 
This kind of complacent reformism is in an interesting but limited way analogous to natural 
freedom: on both, freedom exists (at least in embryo) already internal to something that already exists 
(whether it be individual agents or existing institutions), and the task of action is to remove that which 
prevents freedom from fully manifesting.65 But compared to the revolutionary view, the complacency 
of this reformism is evident. On such a reformist view, the actualisation of freedom does not even 
require action that has the depth and power of revolutionary action. Instead, for the complacent 
reformer, freedom will either actualise of its own accord, or needs only to be brought out by action 
that continues the upward trajectory implicit in our institutions.  
Such a reformism is undesirable for a number of reasons. First, as I have just suggested, it 
does not seem to recognise the depth of the problem of unfreedom. If externalism and revolution are 
driven by a rightful recognition of the seriousness of the problem, of the stability of unfreedom and 
thus of the need for radical action, complacent reformism by comparison seems to skate along the 
surface. It implies that we’ve discovered the recipe, that everything is at heart really just fine; we just 
need to do better what has been done before, to take a little more time and to identify the barriers that 
stand in the way of the potential of our present institutions.  
 
65 It undoubtedly matters what freedom is taken to be internal to, whether an agent of some sort or a set of institutions. 
It’s not necessary to get into the assumptions of social ontology that underlie, respectively, natural freedom and the 
complacent reformist view. 
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Second, complacent reformism is tied to what Philip Kitcher has called a model of 
“teleological progress”.66 Progress, on such a model, is progress towards a goal, such that one is better 
off the closer one is to that goal. If a principle of freedom is implicit in our institutions such that the 
task of political action is to remove the barriers to that freedom, then we are better off the fewer 
barriers there are; that is, we are better off the closer we are to that principle being fully actualised. 
There is a trilemma for such a view. The first option is that the relevant principle to be actualised is 
transcendent. It is then not a solution for the problem of unfreedom in its modern guise, given the 
secularism that I relied on earlier to define the problem. For we secular moderns, freedom and 
unfreedom are human phenomena. This is not to say that the transcendent principle must be false. It 
is rather to say that for it to be a live option for us, very many things would have to change. The 
second option is for the principle to be immanent, that which all along animated that institution. Here 
there is a certain hubris (that we have grasped the truth), but more importantly, as I will argue in more 
detail in following chapters, it misunderstands the logic of human action and human institutions. 
Human action is taken under conditions of unpredictability and ignorance, and human institutions are 
responses to particular problems that do not necessarily embody one guiding principle. Third, it may 
be an immanent principle that is as yet ungrasped by human agents. But then it is of no practical use 
in guiding action – it amounts to a faith in an invisible hand. 
The specific relevance of the complacent reformist view for this dissertation is that a common 
reading of Hegel has him as such a complacent reformer. Whether or not this reading is correct, the 
figures I mainly draw on in this dissertation (Dewey, Du Bois, Ambedkar) all imbibed and articulated 
some element of this kind of complacent Hegelianism in their intellectual development, and later set 
 




themselves precisely against it.67 In all three of them there is a shift (roughly to be located in the years 
around the First World War, reaching some kind of fruition in the 1920s) away from this complacent 
reformism to a deeper appreciation of the depth of the problem of unfreedom. In following, in broad 
strokes, the trajectory of their thought, I also reject this complacent reformism.  
So far I have examined and argued against only the reformist’s views on the dimension of 
scope. The reformist’s view about the dimension of speed is a little more open. Some smaller changes, 
mere extensions of the reach of fundamental institutions, may be possible quite quickly. To that extent 
reformers, because they deny the revolutionary’s view about scope, are able in principle to accept 
quickly those changes that are in keeping with the principles of existing institutions.68 But reformists 
are often in temperament opposed to speed, preferring instead slower, measured developments of 
existing principles where the contrast is with abrupt departures from them. This was, for example, 
Burke’s view – his opposition to the French Revolution was not substantively against the revolutionary 
principles themselves (as if he thought them the wrong principles), but that they were imposed quickly, 
from above, against the grain of existing traditions. And there is a good ground for this tendency – 
Burke’s point, made earlier, that institutions are the ground for agency, and that where those changes 
are made too quickly, agents are left bereft. 
This characterisation of a reformist tendency opens up the following possibility: accepting the 
revolutionary’s view of the scope of necessary change and combining it with the reformist recognition 
of the connection between institutions and agency that counsels a slower speed of change. Such a 
view need not be complacent in the way of reformism. It can fully accept that the fundamental 
 
67 I will deal with this issue in relation to Dewey’s views in more detail in Chapter 3. Du Bois, prior to the First World 
War, had a similar modernist faith in the power of education and scientific reason, and Ambedkar prior to the late 1920s 
in liberal political institutions. I deal with their views in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
68 Mirabeau might exemplify this view. He was quite willing to make immediate changes to the French Constitution that 
left intact, as far as possible, royal prerogatives. 
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institutions of a given society are constraints on freedom and thus all need to be transformed or 
abolished, thus taking seriously the seeming stability of unfreedom, while holding the view that such 
a radical transformative change cannot be undertaken overnight. Call this view transformationism.69  
One might worry that, surely, speed matters. And this is true. Speed is a matter of degree, and 
so the transformationist who denies speed need not be a piecemeal reformer, one who accepts a priori 
that changes can only occur at any one time here and there, and that the kind of total change aimed at 
must be the sum of these kinds of tinkering changes. Such a piecemeal reformer is complacent in a 
different sense: they accept that the status quo allows only these small changes without having a vision 
about how those small changes connect up to the wider systemic change envisaged. For example, we 
might think of critics of large scale redistribution solely on the grounds that it is presently 
democratically infeasible. Nor must a transformationist think that the speed of change is unimportant. 
One may fully accept the important point that some changes must follow on quickly on the back of 
other changes, and that certain conditions allow for quicker changes than others. Indeed, the capacity 
to deal with and to understand and utilise speedier and more thoroughgoing change may be an 
important capacity that can be cultivated. 
Such a transformationism takes seriously the means by which those institutions stabilise 
themselves and each other. It avoids being piecemeal by seeing even small changes as part of and in 
light of that larger transformation; those small changes must therefore be incorporated into the 
dynamic of the virtuous cycle mentioned earlier, and it may be that certain changes need to be made 
in concert and simultaneously. Transformationism realises that even small releases from unfreedom can 
be put to the task of further undoing the forms of unfreedom that still constrain us. They can create 
the possibility of and set the stage for larger scale transformations of the conditions of unfreedom. 
 
69 Only at the end of the writing of this dissertation did I discover that Roberto Unger has used roughly the same typology 
of reform, revolution, transformation. See Unger, Politics, 61-63. 
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1.6 Modernity and the problem of unfreedom 
One might ask at this stage why these two sets of distinctions of internalism/externalism and 
revolution/reform are the right sets of distinctions for understanding the problem of unfreedom. Is 
their choice not simply arbitrary? In one sense their aptness will be shown through the use to which 
they will be put; the proof is in the pudding. But I do want to suggest in closing this chapter that these 
distinctions are not wholly arbitrary. They were distinctions that arose precisely at the juncture at the 
end of the long 18th century when the problem of unfreedom in the modern form with which we are 
concerned arose.70 
I suggested earlier in section 2 that it was only after the political revolutions at the end of the 
18th century not only in France and in northern America, but in Haiti and across Latin America, that 
the conditions under which we could speak of the problem of unfreedom in the modern secularised 
sense in which I have been speaking of it arose. The claim I am making now is that it is at precisely 
this time that those two sets of distinctions gain the meaning that I have tried to elucidate here. 
Although there were revolutions in some sense prior to the historic revolutions of the Age of 
Revolution, as Hobsbawm was later to call it, they were for the most part coups d’etat, the aim of which 
was a change in government or ruler rather than change in system.71 It is only really after those historic 
 
70 Cf. Conal Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty in Early Modern England: A question of ideology?," Parergon 28, 
no. 2 (2011): 7. “…ideology is not just an isolated conceptual label. It developed and has meaning in a context of conceptual 
relations, many of which were as alien to the political vocabularies of Europe before 1789 as ideology itself: conservatism, 
radicalism, industrialism, socialism, liberalism were all weak neologisms invented between 1790 and 1820.” See also Conal 
Condren, The language of Politics in Seventeenth-Century England (Springer, 2016), 141-43. 
71 There were of course slave revolts in the Americas prior to 1776 that were not attempts at coups d’etat. And the Maroon 
revolutions in Jamaica and also elsewhere in the Caribbean were not of this stripe either; they were true claims to self-
government, though in the case of the Jamaican Maroons they were settled first by treaty followed by, in usual British 
fashion, breaking the treaty and outright violent suppression. It may be the case that beginning with these (largely 
understudied) cases might shift some of the analysis, though I suspect the conceptual points would remain largely 
unchanged. For the general and consensus point that the 18th century revolutions were new in aiming not at simple regime 
change, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin Classics, 2006). Cf.  Condorcet, “On the Meaning of the Word 
‘Revolutionary’” [1793], in Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati, Condorcet: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 190. “[T]he word revolutionary can be applied only to revolutions whose purpose is freedom.” See also the 
papers in NOMOS VIII: Revolution, particularly Carl J. Friedrich, “An Introductory Note on Revolution,” and Eugene 
Kamenka, “The Concept of a Political Revolution”. 
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revolutions that revolution in the sense of overthrowing the system, to invoke what is now a modern cliché, 
comes to be seen as within the realm of possibility and, perhaps more importantly, comes to be seen 
as a tool to be used, as a piece of political strategy. It is only against the possibility of a directed revolution 
that reform in that same direction (albeit perhaps complacent or piecemeal or as a sop to the 
revolutionaries) comes to be an alternative to revolution. That Burke – a Whig and a keen and cutting 
critic of colonialism – can come to be seen as a conservative (indeed, that Burke can be taken rightly 
to have inaugurated modern conservatism as an alternative to liberalism) is possible only in contrast 
to that new revolutionary possibility. 
In turn, this new distinction between revolution and reform gave new meaning to the 
distinction between what I have called here internalism and externalism. The latter distinction exists, by 
implication, whenever there is a concept (such as that of a particular “society”) that picks out a group 
in contradistinction to others. Whenever there is such a concept, we can make sense of the idea of 
political change coming from inside the group as opposed to outside. However, that distinction could 
only have the meaning given here when that general concept (whatever particular form it may take) is 
conjoined with the idea of self-determination, yielding the idea that can be described, in terms familiar 
from a different discourse, as constituent power or popular sovereignty. That conjunction of “the people” 
and sovereignty as “self-determination” in the idea of popular sovereignty, as Andreas Kalyvas has 
argued, although presaged by the Levellers and other Dissenters, and then by Lawson and Locke in 
England a century earlier, and with earlier roots in the Monarchomachs and the Roman juristic 
tradition, found its earliest full practical expression only in the American and French revolutions, in 
Jefferson, Madison, Paine, and Sieyes.72 That is, it is only where democracy becomes a possible political 
 
72 See Andreas Kalyvas, "Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power," Constellations 12, no. 2 (2005); 
Daniel Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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mode for the expression of a group will that “internalism” (and consequently “externalism”) can have 
the meaning that I have given them here.73  
These distinctions are therefore not arbitrary, but are grounded in the same historical 
conditions that give rise to the problem of unfreedom in its modern form. There is one final point to 
be made about the transformative reformism that I have sketched here and will flesh out in the rest 
of this dissertation. Given the stability of unfreedom, whether in the form of the counter-revolutions 
to the European revolutions and the decolonial revolutions in Haiti and Latin America, or in the shifts 
in form that patriarchy, slavery, and colonialism took and are taking in the face of concerted attempts 
to undermine them, there is a tendency to vacillate in responding to the problem of unfreedom 
between revolutionary optimism and pessimism.  
We can see this tendency, just to take one example, in Rousseau, who prophesied in Emile 
that “we are approaching a state of crisis and the age of revolutions”.74 On the one hand, Rousseau in 
the beginning of Social Contract seems to espouse (and was taken by the French Revolutionaries to 
espouse) revolution against feudalism, oligarchy, and monarchy. On the other, especially in his later 
works, Rousseau gives vent to a deep pessimism about the possibilities for human freedom. His 
writings on freedom, read in this pessimist vein, are ideals meant only as yardsticks against which to 
 
73 What I have said does not imply, of course, that we are limited to the content of the relevant distinctions of 
revolution/reform and internalism/externalism as they were articulated at the end of the long 18th century. For example, 
the doctrine of constituent power, as it was used by Sieyes, Paine, etc., is closely related to the assumption of natural 
freedom that I argued against earlier in this chapter: an originary, instituting force ontologically independent of and at best 
expressed in particular political institutions. So it would be quite contradictory for me, given what I have said earlier in this 
chapter, to say also that such a notion (or other notions like, for example, Burkean “conservatism”) could form the basis 
for the response to the problem of unfreedom as I articulate it. My claim – that the concepts (picked out by my use of the 
distinctions between revolution/reform and internalism/externalism) that I have used to elucidate the problem of 
unfreedom arose at the same time that the problem of unfreedom in its modern form – is just a claim about the 
appropriateness and non-arbitrariness of using those terms to characterise that problem. It does not, of itself, imply 
anything about the proper response to the problem of unfreedom. 
74 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Or, On Education: Includes Emile and Sophie, or, the solitaries, ed. Christopher Kelly, Roger D. 
Masters, and Allan Bloom (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2010), 194. See Arthur M. Melzer, "Rousseau's 
"Mission" and the Intention of His Writings," American Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2 (1983): 302-03. 
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measure the failings of present societies, by which one “will be cured of a chimera… console[d] for 
an inevitable unhappiness”.75 His novels, which he describes in his Dialogues as “the last form of 
instruction that can be given to a people so corrupt as to be incapable of receiving any other”, were 
written to the European states solely in the hope of “retarding their decadence which they accelerate by 
their false valuations.”76 This pendulum in attitude between optimism and pessimism, mirrored 
perhaps in the similar movement in history between revolution and counter-revolution, arises precisely 
from taking as real and absolute the seeming stability of unfreedom, in turn connected to the modern 
tendency I noted earlier towards totalisation.  
Transformationism hopes to avoid this pendulum through the dynamic of the virtuous cycle. 
But the possibility of that virtuous cycle rests on establishing two claims. The first is that unfreedom 
is not in fact totally stable; that, no matter how bad things may seem, there is a necessary instability of 
those institutional constraints on freedom that can be utilised to create further freedom. The second 
is that the exercise of agency is always possible, that that instability can be utilised so as to increase the 
scope of our agency. This second claim amounts to a hope in human agency, in one’s own agency and 
the agency of others. This hope, as I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, describes a 
perspective that avoids the pendulum between optimism and pessimism. It reorients those theoretical 
attitudes of expectation for the future into a practical attitude that can motivate action. These two 
claims of necessary instability and hope in human agency are two faces of the same coin, one viewed, 
let’s say, from the perspective of constraint, the other from the perspective of freedom. From a 
 
75 Rousseau, Emile, Or, On Education: Includes Emile and Sophie, or, the solitaries, 457-8.Emile, 457-8. Though compare 
Rousseau’s ninth Letter from the Mountain: “If I had only made a System… Social Contract would have been cheerfully 
consigned to the land of fantasies along with Plato’s Republic and More’s Utopia… But I portrayed something that exists; 
people wanted to change its face.” Lettres ecrites de la montagne, IX, 244/810. See generally Ethan Putterman, "Realism and 
Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica," Political Studies 49, no. 3 (2001). 
76 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie, Or, The New Heloise: Letters of Two Lovers who Live in a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps, trans. 
Christopher Kelly, ed. Christopher Kelly and Roger D. Masters (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques - Dialogues, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press 
of New England, 2012). Quoted in Melzer, "Rousseau's "Mission" and the Intention of His Writings," 314. 
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theoretical perspective, one of those faces is the task for a social philosophy and the other is the task 
for a moral psychology. 
The difficulty is that these two faces must be seen together. I aim to achieve this in the 
following chapters through what we can call a moral psychology of politics. By this term I mean to 
pick out how social and political institutions foster a particular moral psychology in order to function, 
one involving ways in which agents conceive of themselves and ways of seeing the world, the fostering 
and direction of certain emotions, both negative (fear, anxiety, anger, ill-will) and positive (generosity, 
hope, trust). That is, I am taking “moral” here in the wide and capacious early modern sense of having 
to do with the entire human being. I will argue in the rest of this dissertation that, through coming to 
understand how this moral psychology functions from the inside, that is, through coming to a 
particular kind of self-knowledge, agents can act with others so as to change their conditions, starting 




Chapter 2: Dewey and the Tragedy of the Human Condition 
The point of departure of the movement lies in the people themselves. But 
since people do not exist apart from the world, apart from reality, the 
movement must begin with the human-world relationship.1 
 
Unfreedom comes in many guises. Understood at its broadest, any restriction of our agential 
capacities is a kind of unfreedom. My focus in this dissertation is on socially created forms of unfreedom: 
forms of unfreedom that arise from human action and interaction. Since we have created these forms 
of unfreedom, so the thought goes, together we can transform them. The last chapter ended with that 
hope. But what if this is not the case? We might think, in a pessimist vein, that there is something 
deep in human nature that inhibits this possibility, something in the nature of human action of this 
sort that dooms it to failure. This thought is another way of taking seriously the stability of unfreedom 
by metaphysicalising it – not in the form of a divine or daemonic order, but in the form of a claim 
that unfreedom is, as it were, in the nature of things. And this thought might be another way to despair 
or to externalism. 
One traditional way to figure this theme of the limited and self-defeating nature of human 
agency is through the notion of tragedy. This can of course be externalised in the shape of more than 
human metaphysical forces like Fate or Necessity, but, at its deepest, tragedy is a view about the place 
of human beings in the world. This view of our place can motivate different responses. It can result 
in resignation (as in Schopenhauer), in a glorification of the potentialities of human agency (as in the 
early Nietzsche), or in a resort to faith in contrary beneficial divine forces (as in forms of Christian 
tragedy), among other options. What I will argue in this chapter is that a recognition of tragedy can 
result in and ground that practical hope in others with which I ended Chapter 1. A proper recognition 
 




of the limits and place of our agency (and thus the stability of unfreedom) does not lead to a 
glorification of our capacities nor to despair and resignation, but to the kind of hope that can motivate 
action in response to unfreedom. I will make this argument through naturalising tragedy, in the specific 
sense of “naturalisation” that involves placing the insights of the tragic tradition in a fundamentally 
humanist and non-supernaturalist conception of our place in the world. Such a project of 
naturalisation is an attempt to recognise what is valuable and correct in the pessimistic or resignatory 
response to unfreedom and to utilise it for my own positive view, to turn the conditions of despair 
into those of hope. 
I do so through a reading of Dewey’s later works from the mid-1920s onward. I identify in 
the later Dewey a sense of what I will call the tragedy of the human condition, one which grounds a practical 
hope in the agency of others. My reading of Dewey pushes against a purely instrumentalist reading of 
Dewey, one on which he is insensitive to the depth and, perhaps we can say, existential seriousness of the 
hazards and challenges of the human condition, reading them merely in neutral terms as “problems” 
to be solved through the application of scientific methods. Instead, I read these aspects of Dewey 
(which I do not deny) in light of what I argue is his sense of tragedy. Indeed, I suggest, situating these 
progressivist parts of Dewey in the light of tragedy gives us a deeper and truer sense of the force of 
that practical hope, one that Dewey himself held in the face of the suffering and horrors of the first 
five decades of the twentieth century, through two world wars, the Great Depression, and the vast 
increase in the exploitation of peoples in the United States and across the world even as human 
collective capacities for agency increased equally as dramatically. 
Articulating this sense of tragedy serves three more particular purposes with respect to the 
social and political forms of unfreedom which are my focus. First, it provides further reasons against 
adopting the revolutionary and reformist responses to the problem of unfreedom that I outlined in 
Ch 1. Tragedy, many have argued, undermines utopian longings. This is true also for the prelapsarian 
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utopian longings of revolution and the Hegelian utopian longings of complacent reformism. In this 
way the view of tragedy I articulate in this chapter completes some of the argument of the previous 
chapter. In doing so, it creates space for a hope in the possibilities of human agency that underpins 
and motivates a transformative approach to the conditions of unfreedom. 
Second, the structure of social and political forms of unfreedom in certain respects mirrors 
that of the tragedy of the human condition. The structure of the latter is that our agency is shaped by 
its interaction with the world. The structure of the former is that our agency is shaped by the particular 
social and political forms under which we live. They both set us the same shape of problem: how do 
we use the capacities that have been so shaped to change that which is doing the shaping? 
Third, it helps us to understand the social and political forms of unfreedom to see them as 
responses to the human condition. We build the institutions that now constrain us in order to try to 
come to grips with the fundamental tragedy of our condition, to try to gain some measure of control 
over the world that pushes back on us. Part of what underlies these forms of unfreedom is hubris: a 
desire to control an uncertain environment, and the consequent tempting belief that we have achieved 
guaranteed methods of control. That desire and belief support our attempts to hold onto the 
institutions we have even where they render us unfree. Our understanding of these institutions is 
improved if we can recognise that this desire for some degree of control is one that is part of an 
appropriate response to our situation, but that the consequent belief in guarantees is not. 
I will draw out this conception of the tragedy of the human condition from John Dewey’s 
major late works, those published from the middle of the 1920s onwards.2 The tragedy of the human 
condition, as Dewey figures it, is the general feature of our relation to the world that a) necessitates 
 
2 The First World War, as Robert Westbrook notes, was a turning point for Dewey. Not only the war itself, but particular 
criticisms of Dewey’s supportive position for American participation in the war by (e.g.) Randolph Bourne, were significant 
for Dewey’s rethinking of some of his deep philosophical commitments. See Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American 
Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), Ch 7. Other important turning points include Dewey’s visit to 
China in 1919-21. See Wang, John Dewey in China: To teach and to learn. 
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human agency, b) enables that agency, while c) constraining that agency. Because it is a feature of our 
relation to the world – what Dewey would later call the transactional – it cannot be located solely in 
features of human agency or in features of the world taken independently.3 In that sense, tragedy 
involves seeing agents and the world together holistically. But, I will argue, Dewey’s notion of tragedy 
secondarily refers to specific features of our agency that flow from the primary relational meaning of 
tragedy, features that have traditionally been given the name hubris. The recognition of the first, 
transactional kind of tragedy helps agents resist the second, hubristic kind – though, of course, it is 
not a complete antidote.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In section 1 of this chapter, I’ll draw out some specific 
themes from the tragic tradition in order to situate Dewey’s conception of tragedy. In section 2, I’ll 
provide an historical, that is to say a chronological, placing of Dewey’s sense of the tragic, arguing that 
Dewey’s sense of the tragic arises fully only in the middle of the 1920s – roughly from Experience and 
Nature (1925) – but is pervasive from then on in his corpus. This will lay the ground for the substance 
of that conception of tragedy that I’ll set out in section 3. In section 4, I’ll briefly examine and respond 
to some of the criticisms that have been made of Dewey for not having a sense of the tragic. 
Responding to these criticisms will allow me to emphasis the practical nature of Dewey’s sense of the 
tragic: the way in which it delimits a sphere of human action. I’ll conclude in section 5 by spelling out 
the consequences of this conception of tragedy for the revolution/reform discussion and the analogy 
with the social forms of unfreedom. 
 
3 Dewey has a clear statement of this concept in "Conduct and Experience," in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The 
Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1929-1930), 220. “The structure of 
whatever is had by way of immediate qualitative presences is found in the recurrent modes of interaction taking place 
between what we term organism, on one side, and environment, on the other. This interaction is the primary fact, and it 
constitutes a trans-action. Only by analysis and selective abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two 
factors, one called organism and the other, environment.” 
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2.1 Tragic themes from the tradition 
It would be both foolish and unnecessary for me to provide a reading of the entire history of 
Western tragedy from, say, Sophocles to Brecht, in order to contextualise my reading of Dewey. It 
would be foolish because it is unclear whether there are any common threads that tie together all the 
different periods of that history. It would be unnecessary because my claim is relatively modest: I am 
claiming only that Dewey’s conception of tragedy evinces a number of themes that one can find 
repeated at various places in that history, themes that are central enough that one is justified in thinking 
that conception to be a conception of tragedy.4  
I insist on two definitional claims at the outset. The first is that tragedy is not only to be 
understood as a description of certain (high) works of art, but that it also refers equally to the lives 
and experiences of ordinary people. Tragedy may be an aesthetic term, but aesthetic terms do not only 
describe works of art.5 The second is that tragedy is not only to be understood as a property of 
particular events or actions, whether in a work of art or not. It is true that certain deaths are tragic, that 
certain losses and illnesses are tragic, that actions (both in the sense of a person’s action, like Lear’s 
demand for the expression of love, and in the sense of a whole narrative action, like how Lear’s 
demand ramifies to the many deaths that occur in that play) are tragic. But it is also true that we 
describe situations and relations between people as tragic, that, more generally, we see tragedy as a 
general feature of human experience which forms the backdrop for tragedy in the more particular 
 
4 Here I follow Raymond Williams in thinking of the tragic tradition “not [as]… a single body of work and thinking” but 
as “works and ideas which have certain evident links, and which are associated in our minds by a single and powerful 
word.” Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy, ed. Pamela McCallum (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006), 53. There are no 
doubt particular exemplary tragedies that do not manifest all of the relevant themes, or interpretations of various tragedies 
that do not emphasise the themes that I foreground here. On such grounds one might quibble with my use of the term 
“tragedy” in relation to Dewey. But it is, for better or worse, the philosopher’s prerogative in such contested situations to 
play Humpty Dumpty and use words how one pleases, so long as the substance is clear enough. 
5 Dewey makes this identical point in affirming Diderot’s call for “bourgeois tragedy” as against the tragedy of princes. 
John Dewey, Art as Experience, in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1934), 192. 
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sense and to which those particular tragedies alert us. It is in that latter vein that I elucidate the tragic 
themes that will be my focus. 
There are three themes that I want to draw out from the tradition in order to situate Dewey’s 
conception of tragedy.  
The first is what we can call the vertical dimension of tragedy, that tragedy is a general or formal 
feature of a fundamental human relation to the world that manifests in particular events and actions in 
individual lives. Tragedy connects individuals to some larger notion of what it is to be a human being 
in the world, a connection that clarifies and structures our everyday lives. 
I’ll sketch, briefly, two examples of this vertical dimension, the first in the ancient tragedies, 
and the second in Schopenhauer. I’ll start with the second choral antistrophe of Sophocles’ Antigone 
– the famous “Ode to Man”. There, Sophocles has the chorus claim that “Of the many strange 
wonders, / none is more wondrous than man”, that despite our technological control of the oceans 
and of the earth, of flora and fauna, and of each other, despite our creative daring in the creation of 
cities and laws, yet our mortality and our “clever[ness] beyond imagination” still lead us sometimes 
towards evil and wickedness. The human condition is such, Sophocles suggests, that despite all our 
ingenuity and our cunning, we do not yet understand ourselves; indeed, the tragedy consists in the fact 
that those capacities precisely get in the way of our self-understanding. Here we have a description of 
an orientation to the world, one which defines the kinds of creatures we are, and which becomes 
particularised in the specific conflict between Creon and Antigone – Creon’s attempt to control affairs 
(which is in some sense justified, as Hegel notes, by the need to stabilise Thebes after civil war) and 
Antigone’s pride result, in ways which exceed the imaginings of those characters, in the tragic deaths 
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of Antigone and of Haemon and Eurydice.6 To be human, Sophocles suggests, is to be blind to the 
larger effects of one’s actions, and yet nonetheless to feel the necessity of acting. 
A similar generalised conception of tragedy can be found in Schopenhauer, for whom tragedy 
is “the pinnacle of literature”.7 Schopenhauer finds in tragedy “a significant intimation of the nature 
of the world and of existence”, which “becomes visible in human suffering… brought about in part 
by chance and error, and in part… by humanity itself”.8 Raymond Williams claims that in 
Schopenhauer we find a conception of tragedy as the “secularisation of Fate… rooted in the nature 
of man”.9 
Importantly, this kind of suffering, for Schopenhauer, can be found in the mundane and the 
everyday.10 Tragedy equalises. The truest form of tragedy, Schopenhauer suggests, is that which is 
caused just “by means of people’s positioning with respect to each other… in such a way that their 
situation forces them knowingly and clear-sightedly to cause each other the greatest harm without the 
injustice falling on one side or the other.” This kind of action shows tragedy “not as something 
brought about by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but rather as something that develops 
effortlessly and spontaneously out of people’s deeds or characters, almost as if it were essential”.11  
 
6 This is of course a hugely partial and incomplete reading. A fuller reading here would need to emphasise the ways in 
which the Creon-Antigone conflict is a result of a certain historicised natural human unnaturalness – Oedipus’s incest and 
his consequent blindness, etc. 
7 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, ed. Christopher Janaway, Judith Norman, and Alistair 
Welchman (Cambridge University Press, 2010), Book 3, §51, 279.  
8 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, §51, 280. 
9 Williams, Modern Tragedy, 59. 
10 This everydayness is true of poetry in general, for Schopenhauer: “In fact, from the only point of view we are considering 
here, namely the inner significance of what appears, it makes absolutely no difference whether the objects that action turns 
on are, viewed relatively, trivialities or matters of importance, farmyards or kingdoms.” Schopenhauer, 274. 
11 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, §51, 281-2. 
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Thus, for Schopenhauer, tragedy is an aspect of the general human condition that is not 
reserved for special occasions or for the high or noble, but infuses the everyday lives of ordinary 
people. This emphasis on the mundane nature of tragedy can be found in much of modern tragedy, 
in Ibsen, in Miller, and in Brecht, for example.12 It is a rejection of the Hegelian idea that tragedy 
requires a tragic hero, that tragedy consists in the fall from grace of the noble born, and that, 
consequently, one must be a particular kind of person or live in a particular kind of society in order to 
experience tragedy.13 So, the first tragic theme that Dewey’s conception of tragedy will draw on is that 
tragedy is simultaneously a general matter of the human condition and a matter of particular events 
and actions in individual lives.  
This vertical dimension of tragedy can be contrasted with the second theme, which we can call 
the dimension of depth. By “depth” here, I mean that tragedy focuses our attention both inwards, 
towards a self-understanding of the kinds of creatures we are, and outwards, towards the world.14 This 
dual movement takes different particular forms. In the second antistrophe of Antigone it takes the form 
of a tension or conflict – our outward focus on controlling the world means that we lose sight of the 
kinds of creatures we are. In some of the Shakespearean tragedies it takes the form of a deep 
explanatory or elucidatory connection between our situatedness in the world and the ill-effects that 
follow from the kinds of creatures we are. Our particular situatedness explains why it matters that we 
are that kind of creature. Lear’s blindness would not matter (at least in the way it did) if he were not 
king; Macbeth’s pride would not matter if he were not in a position where circumstances both worldly 
 
12 Cf. Arthur Miller, "Tragedy and the Common Man," New York Times (New York), February 27 1949. George Bernard 
Shaw once remarked of Ibsen that he “supplies the want left by Shakespeare. He gives us not only ourselves, but ourselves 
in our own situations. The things that happens to his stage figures are things that happen to us.” See G. B. Shaw, The 
Quintessence of Ibsenism (New York: Brentano, 1922 [1913]), 230. 
13 Compare Williams, Modern Tragedy: “In an ordinary life, spanning the middle years of the twentieth century, I have known 
what I believe to be tragedy, in several forms. It has not been the death of princes; it has been at once more personal 
and more general” (emphasis added, 33), on Hegel, 54-55, and on the death of the hero, 78-79. 
14 Compare Dewey’s connection of tragedy to the nature of experience in Art as Experience, 197-98. 
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and otherworldly offered him the opportunity to achieve his ambitions. It is through tragic 
confrontations with the world that we learn more about the kind of creatures that we are. In this way, 
this dimension of depth intersects with the vertical dimension. Any mundane event or action can 
become the scene for this kind of confrontation with the fact of our creatureliness; in Deweyan 
language, threats to our equilibrium can arise at any moment. 
The third theme is that tragedy is deeply intertwined with human agency. Tragedy reveals the 
fact that we often must act; it emphasises the actor rather than the spectator perspective. A. C. Bradley 
captures this well; it is not any old suffering that is tragic, no matter how “pitiful or dreadful”, but 
suffering that “spring[s] in great part from human agency, and in some degree from the agency of the 
sufferer”.15 Here we have a direction from agency to tragedy. But the relationship between tragedy 
and agency also runs in the opposite direction, from tragedy to agency. Tragedy, when recognised, 
reveals our agency. I mean this in two senses. The first is the roughly Nietzschean sense that a 
confrontation with tragedy sparks a certain joy in the necessity of activity. Contra the Schopenhauerian 
pessimist response of resignation, Nietzsche argues that our response to tragedy ought be one of 
action and imagination: “in this supreme jeopardy of the will” only tragedy can turn “fits of nausea 
into imaginations with which it is possible to live.”16 The second sense is that a recognition of tragedy 
involves a sense, from within the agent’s perspective, that there are possibilities open. Williams, in his 
discussion of Brecht’s Mother Courage, argues that Brechtian tragedy shows us that “choices are made 
in a dimension that is always potential… [that things] could genuinely go either way, at any time.”17 In 
 
15 A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London: MacMillan and Co, 1965 [1909]), 81.  
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1872]), 52. See 
also Miller, "Tragedy and the Common Man." “The tragic right is a condition of life, a condition in which the human 
personality is able to flower and realize itself.” 
17 Williams, Modern Tragedy, 236. 
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that sense tragedy, in being deeply connected to the agent’s perspective, reveals a practical openness 
to the possibilities that human action may create. 
There are of course other aspects of tragedy that are closely related to these three themes that 
I do not treat in detail here. Foremost among them are value conflict and human interdependence. By “value 
conflict”, I mean the inevitable conflicts between the goods we seek, in those situations where choice 
and action are necessary but any particular choice will lead to the sacrifice of some good or other. This 
non-compossibility of all goods in a life is characteristic of our human condition as agents. By “human 
interdependence”, I mean the fact that our agency is tied up with that of others, for better or for 
worse. Feminist thinkers foremost among others have made this fact of interdependence central to 
their conception of the human.18 We are all dependent on others at various stages in our lives. We 
develop as agents only through the support and example of others. Our achievement of individual 
goals is often dependent on the help of others, and there are certain goals which we share with others. 
In these ways we are vulnerable to others, and this vulnerability is part and parcel of our condition. 
But so too in these ways our agency is constituted and enhanced by these relations to others; as 
Rousseau puts it in Emile: “from our infirmity is born our frail happiness.” These are important tragic 
themes – themes that form an essential part of Dewey’s philosophical vision – that intersect with those 
that I have outlined from the tradition so far.19 I have little to add to the literature that already identifies 
and extends these themes in Dewey’s work. But these themes are better illuminated, in my view 
(though I will not argue to this effect here), when they are connected to the three tragic themes that I 
 
18 For this theme with respect to freedom and unfreedom, see Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty: Toward a feminist theory of 
freedom. See also Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and social co-operation in politics, economy, and society (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
19 Sidney Hook has argued that Dewey has a sense of tragedy in the sense of recognizing the intractability of value conflict; 
see his Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Compare Hilary Putnam’s argument that 
Dewey’s views do not fully allow for individual existential choices in "A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy," in 
Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). See Dewey, "Three Independent Factors in Morals." 
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identify here. So, in this chapter I focus on what is less appreciated in Dewey’s work. As distinct from 
value conflict, I focus on where Dewey locates value. And as distinct from the self-self relations of 
interdependence, I focus on the self-world relation. 
So, these three themes – the generality of tragedy manifest in specific shapes and guises in 
particular events in a life; the simultaneous inward (self-oriented) and outward (world-oriented) 
focusing of attention; and the relation between tragedy and agency – define the space in which I will 
situate Dewey’s conception of tragedy. These three themes play a particular role in Dewey’s thought. 
I will call that role “metaphysical”, in the sense that it concerns a fundamental structure of the way 
things are.20 But, given Dewey’s well-known critique of metaphysics and the particular connotations 
that the term has in contemporary analytic philosophical discourse, that name might be misleading in 
at least the following way (assuming, of course, that one accepts the particular connotations of 
“metaphysics” in contemporary analytic philosophy): tragedy is not a formal structure that is 
discoverable a priori independently of experience; it is, rather, a feature of experience and discovered 
in experience. (This is what I mean by a “naturalisation” of the metaphysical.) If one has such concerns 
about the term, one could call it “anthropological”, insofar as it is a claim about the human condition. 
That, however, risks being misleading in precisely the opposite direction, as if it were merely an 
empirical claim, one that might be disconfirmed if we were one day to discover a group of beings in 
all other respects like us who lacked that condition.21 Whatever the name we give to the kind of claim 
it is, the role that it plays is methodological in that it helps delineate a particular sphere of inquiry, that of 
 
20 Compare Dewey’s use of “metaphysics” as dealing with “the nature of the existential world in which we live” or 
“cognizance of the generic traits of existence”. Experience and Nature, 45; 50. See also the introduction by Sidney Hook, 
viii-ix; also xvi, where he describes Dewey’s metaphysics as a “philosophical anthropology”. 
21 A third option might be to see it as a claim on the level of what Wittgenstein called a “form of life”. This may well be 
true – indeed, I am inclined to think that it is true – but since I am myself unclear what a claim at that level amounts to, it 
would be also (in my mouth) almost entirely unhelpful. See, for an attempt to make sense of the term, Jaeggi, On the Critique 
of Forms of Life. 
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human action, which includes (but is not limited to) the social and the political, which in turn includes 
the problem of unfreedom as I have conceived of it.22 
2.2 Periodising Dewey’s sense of the tragic 
It is important to provide some words of explanation as to why I am limiting my analysis to 
Dewey’s later works. I do not mean to deny that some aspects of the conception of tragedy that I 
attribute to the later Dewey can be found in his earlier works.23 Against some critics who have argued 
that (at least) the early Dewey is an unrepentant Whig, I think it is relatively clear that he – at least 
after his shift away from his explicit St Louis neo-Hegelianism in the early 1890s – was not such a 
character.24 In an 1894 review of Lester F. Ward’s The Psychic Factors of Civilization, for example, Dewey 
criticises Ward for having “fallen into the old pit of a continual progress towards something.”25 And, in 
the middle of the First World War, Dewey begins an article entitled “Progress” with a criticism of the 
“fools’ paradise… a dream of automatic uninterrupted progress.”26  
I do think, however, that there was an important shift in what is known as Dewey’s “late 
period” thought towards a recognition of something deeper about the human condition that might be 
 
22 In this sense I think Dewey’s conception of tragedy is essential for the different – but of course related – Deweyan 
project of extending, in a suitable way, the methodology of the natural sciences to the social sphere for the purposes of 
social progress. See Kitcher, "Social Progress." 
23 In particular, the transactional or biological element in Dewey is there as early arguably as “The Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology” in 1897 and definitely from his early logical works in 1903, let alone before his Darwin essay in 1909. On the 
general claim about a sense of tragedy, I disagree with Raymond Boisvert and other critics who view the earlier Dewey 
(and elements of the later Dewey) as an unrepentant Whig. I will address these criticisms in more detail in section 4. 
24 Though for an important Whiggish neo-Hegelian strand in his political thinking, see “The Ethics of Democracy”. 
25 John Dewey, "Review of The Psychic Factors of Civilization," in The Early Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works 
of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1893-1894). 
26 John Dewey, "Progress," in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1916). 
68 
 
called tragedy.27 Many intellectual historians have argued – in my view persuasively – that Dewey’s 
thought underwent a significant shift after the horrors of the First World War.28 As it did for a number 
of important thinkers, the war initiated a shift in Dewey’s thought. In Dewey’s case, I will argue that 
this took the form of an increased appreciation for the tragic dimension of human existence. Limiting 
my argument to his works from after WWI, then, I suggest that we can see a shift at least in Dewey’s 
explicit framing of fundamental philosophical issues in this period. 
One significant fact about Dewey’s major mature works is that they all begin with one or two 
framing chapters that set out the context in which the problem he is addressing arises. For example, 
the first version of Ethics, published in 1908, begins with an anthropological genealogy on the “origin 
and growth of moral life” in human groups. How We Think, published first in 1909, begins with a 
chapter on the nature of thought.  
Starting from Democracy and Education (1916), however, we see a shift to a particular theme in 
these starting chapters: what Dewey would later call the “transactional”.29 The idea of the 
“transactional”, in short, is that the basic unit of inquiry is the whole situation, which comprises in 
 
27 Though see, on periodization, Jo Ann Boydston, "The Collected Works of John Dewey and the CEAA/CSE: A Case History," 
The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 85, no. 2 (1991): 126. “Within the chronological framework, we divided the 
edition into early, middle, and late series; this division was based more on expediency than on intellectual considerations”. 
28 Dewey makes some mention of this himself. See Experience and Nature, 45, where he writes that “[s]uch an incident as 
the last war and preparations for a future war remind us that it is easy to overlook the extent to which, after all, our 
attainments are only devices for blurring the disagreeable recognition of a fact [the fundamental hazardous character of 
the world], instead of means of altering the fact itself”. Compare Bertrand Russell: “The world seemed hopeful and solid; 
we all felt convinced that nineteenth-century progress would continue, and that we ourselves should be able to contribute 
something of value. For those who have been young since 1914 it must be difficult to imagine the happiness of those 
days.” “My Mental Development,” in Bertrand Russell, Basic Writings (Routledge, 2010), 13. See also James A. Good, "John 
Dewey's "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" and the Exigencies of War," Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 2 (2006). The 
war was not the only factor in this shift in Dewey’s thought. A fuller story here (that I cannot tell at the moment) would 
take into account his time in China and events on the home front, including the effect of the Supreme Court’s Lochner-
era decisions and his labour organising at Columbia. 
29 See John Dewey, Knowing and the Known, in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1949-1952). 
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relation both subject and object, agent and world, organism and environment.30 While we may separate 
in thought the two poles of this relation in inquiry for particular analytic purposes, to do so is already 
to step back from the more fundamental layer of experience in which they form a whole. So, the first 
chapter of Democracy and Education is on the concept of Life, which (Dewey says) is distinguished from 
inanimate objects on the basis that it draws on the material of its environment to sustain itself: 
“Continuity of life means continual readaptation of the environment to the needs of living organisms.” 
(DE, MW9:5)31 That we are living beings that grow in an environment and must therefore learn how 
best to act and survive in that environment is the necessary condition that gives rise to education. In 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), the opening chapter is on emotion, memory, and past experience – 
the ways in which an organism learns from its interactions with its environment and uses those past 
interactions to change the present ways in which it interacts with and changes that environment. Again, 
that we are beings that live in an environment and must cope with that environment through 
experience in better and worse ways sets the task for the reconstruction of philosophy that is to follow. 
 
30 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Compare Dewey on the empirical method: “empirical method is the only method 
which can do justice to this inclusive unity of ‘experience.’ It alone takes this integrated unity as the starting point for 
philosophic thought.” And, of course, experience “is ‘double-barrelled’ in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no 
division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality.” Experience and 
Nature, 18-19. The notion of the transactional is not limited to the biological domain, as can be seen by the fact that Dewey 
refers to history, ethics, aesthetics, psychology, and the logic of inquiry generally in transactional terms. The surrounding 
text to the quotation in this footnote is indicative, for example. See the equation between “experience”, “life”, “history”, 
and “culture” in John Dewey, "Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thought," in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The 
Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1921-1922), 351. Recall also that Dewey 
later wished to rename Experience and Nature “Culture and Nature”; see Sidney Hooks’ Introduction. This wider application 
of the “transactional” is consistent with the claim that these other domains are continuous with the biological. See Logic, 
Chs 3-4. 
31 Of course, this theme is not new with the post-WWI works. It is present at least in his work on the reflex arc; it is 
present in Studies in Logic (1903), and is arguably an inheritance from his earlier Hegelianism. I don’t have the space to draw 
out this thread here, and it is not immediately relevant to the point at hand. The point for present purposes is that it begins 
to take on a more fundamental structuring role in his thought. 
Cf. Dewey’s comment in "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," 156. that “Democracy and Education was for many years 
that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully expounded.” (emphasis added). If Dewey said in 1930 that 
Democracy and Education was for many years the fullest exposition of Dewey’s philosophy, then by that stage it must have 
been overtaken by something fuller. I suggest that, at the least, Dewey is pointing to a significant shift in his thought; more 




And in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) the opening chapter is on habit, which “requir[e] the 
cooperation of organism and environment”. Habit is, for Dewey, the fundamental agential structure 
– our “human nature” – that explains our “conduct”, our ability to act on the world and to be 
influenced by the world. 
Already in these three works we see a major theme that is to form an essential part of Dewey’s 
conception of tragedy: that the fundamental human condition involves the fact that we are living 
creatures in a world that both limits our action and provides us the means for action. Whatever the nature of 
human agency, for Dewey, including how it is cultivated, the capacities in which it consists, and its 
ends or purposes, our theoretical understanding of our agency must take into account that 
fundamental relation we have to the world.  
But Dewey’s full sense of the tragic had not yet developed. Of his major works, it is Experience 
and Nature (1925) that first captures more fully Dewey’s growing sense of the tragic. In Experience and 
Nature, Dewey begins to describe our existence – that transactional relation between agents and the 
world – as “precarious and perilous”, as “aleatory… a scene of risk… uncertain, unstable, uncannily 
unstable”, in which the “sacred and the accursed are potentialities of the same situation.”32 We will 
see later more precisely what these descriptions amount to, though I note for now that Dewey’s use 
of “thick” concepts like “perilous” and “uncanny”, and even his use of “aleatory” (as compared to, 
perhaps, “probabilistic” or some similarly neutral close synonym) ought not be taken as mere rhetoric, 
but as signifying a certain weight to these descriptions which would be lacking in a more neutral or 
less evaluatively laden vocabulary.33 The point for now is that such descriptions occupy the same 
 
32 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1925), 43. 
33 Again, I point to the effect of the war and its aftermath on Dewey, especially the criticisms leveled at his rather more 
optimistic pre-war pragmatism by Randolph Bourne and others. His connection to Franz Boas and the new anthropology 
at Columbia and the endorsement he gives of those anthropological descriptions in the first chapters of Experience and 
Nature is further support for taking this language seriously. 
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framing opening location in the work as the organism’s relation to the world and transactionalism did 
previously, and as an analysis of “thought” did in a work on thinking, or a genealogy of the growth of 
morals did in a work on ethics. 
That chapter of Experience and Nature also contains several direct mentions, particularly in the 
early chapters, of the term “tragedy” and its cognates. Dewey had given some space to the lessons of 
Greek tragedy for a conception of the human in his Ethics. That the language of tragedy resurfaces in 
this more metaphysical work (at least, a work that is among Dewey’s more abstract and less 
immediately practical) is to be taken seriously. 
We find again similar opening chapters in both The Quest for Certainty (“Escape from Peril”) 
and Art as Experience (“The Live Creature”). In both opening chapters, Dewey describes life – the 
organism’s fundamental relation to the world – as involving “perils”, “dangers”, “needs” and “lacks”, 
“resistance”, “things that are indifferent and even hostile to life”, and so on.34 Similarly, the Logic also 
begins with an extended discussion of the place of the inquiring organism in an environment, and 
treats inquiry as a form of agency that arises from and is made necessary by that environment. 
Importantly for my purposes, this time period (~1922-1938) is also the time in which we get 
Dewey’s major social and political works, not only Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and The Public and 
its Problems (1927), but also Individualism, Old and New (1930), the revised Ethics (1932), and Liberalism 
and Social Action (1935) – works which were inspired by the fecund interwar period and the deep 
changes that were occurring in the United States and globally. The social and political works in which 
Dewey most clearly identifies and tries to deal with the problem of unfreedom are thus written 
alongside the works in which he most clearly identifies tragedy as this fundamental condition of human 
agency. Given the close connection Dewey sees between human agency and social and political 
 
34 Dewey, Art as Experience, 20. 
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philosophy, this simultaneity is perhaps no surprise. It is worth noting, in closing, that this concern 
with tragedy extends until Dewey’s later writings. A manuscript unpublished in Dewey’s lifetime and 
now reconstructed by Philip Deen and published as Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, which 
was begun in 1939 and rewritten through January 1942, contains a recapitulation again in the first 
chapter of the theme of tragedy – with references directly to the anthropological tradition, to the 
hazards of the human condition, and to hubris – more or less identical to that of The Quest for Certainty 
and Experience and Nature.35  
So, although my elucidation of Dewey’s conception of tragedy will draw mainly on the opening 
chapters of QC and EN (with support from other of Dewey’s late writings), I think it is justified to 
claim that these chapters are representative of a more general theme of Dewey’s mature thought after 
WWI – one that structured his thinking on a fundamental level and had also a deep influence on his 
social and political writings of the time.36 With both the general thematic of tragedy and this 
chronological placing in hand, I turn now to the substance of Dewey’s conception of tragedy. 
2.3 Dewey’s conception of tragedy 
I will argue in this section that Dewey has a sense of the tragedy of the human condition, 
which is that we are limited creatures whose agency depends on and is constrained by a world that is 
often hostile, hazardous, perilous, and uncertain. This fact of our limitedness and dependence is a 
condition on human agency, in three senses: 1) it necessitates action; 2) it acts as a general constraint on 
action; and 3) it defines and enables the kind of agency we have. Call this the primary sense of tragedy, 
 
35 The story of this manuscript and its relation to Dewey’s earlier works is outside the scope of this chapter. The full 
manuscript was either lost or stolen in 1947, and this earlier and incomplete version of the manuscript was found in the 
Dewey archives at Southern Illinois University and reconstructed by Phillip Deen in the late 2000s. See John Dewey, 
Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, ed. Phillip Deen (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), xiv-xvii. 
36 What is now Ch 1 of Experience and Nature was added as an introductory chapter after the first publication of the Carus 
lectures as Experience and Nature in 1925. It is justified, therefore, to treat Ch II as the first chapter and thus as playing the 
same role as the first chapters in my chronological argument. 
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one which attaches to the transactional relation between us and the world. It is tragic first insofar as 
this condition of our agency itself leads to particular instances of tragic suffering and loss in which we 
did everything we could, and still we suffer, still things break down.  
This primary sense of tragedy also gives rise to a secondary sense of tragedy, what has traditionally 
been called hubris: 4) that in our response to the primary sense of tragedy conceived of as a relation 
between agents and the world we often desire to transcend the conditions of our agency and gain a 
kind of certainty in action that is impossible for us.37 Hubris exacerbates the effects of the primary 
sense of tragedy, which are the specific tragic instances of loss, breakdown, blockage, and suffering 
that people experience in their lives, including systematic instances of unfreedom and injustice. How 
we respond to the primary tragedy of the human condition may thus worsen the constraints on our 
agency.  
It is important to be clear about what I am not arguing for in attributing this general sense of 
tragedy to Dewey. I am not arguing that Dewey thinks that life is nothing but tragic, in the narrower 
sense of “tragic” that refers to particular experiences of loss, suffering, death, evil, and breakdown. 
There are of course joys and completions and satisfactions and progress in life, and these arise from 
and gain their meaning set against the same background condition that I have here described as the 
tragedy of the human condition.38 This general sense of tragedy leaves room for successes and the joy 
 
37 In the distinguishing of these two forms of tragedy, Dewey pre-empts Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy, 77: “There is 
an evident variation in the nature of tragic disorder. It can be the pride of man set against the nature of things, or it can 
be a more general disorder which in aspiration man seeks to overcome.” In connecting them as he does, however, Dewey 
goes beyond Williams. Of course Dewey accepts that there are specific tragedies and particular tragic events and actions. 
These are, however, to be understood in light of this more general sense of tragedy that is a property of the human 
condition. 
38 “The union of the hazardous and the stable, of the incomplete and the recurrent, is the condition of all experienced 
satisfaction as truly as of our predicaments and problems… when a fulfillment comes and is pronounced good, it is judged 
good, distinguished and asserted, simply because it is in jeopardy, because it occurs amid indifferent and divergent things.” 
Experience and Nature, 57. A sense of tragedy as I want to use it also insists differently but consistently on the tragedy of 
politics: that what successes are won and achievements and enjoyments had are won and had on the backs of others’ 
suffering and loss. 
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of completion and achievement. So, not every situation is tragic in the particular sense that it is a 
situation of loss and suffering, though any situation, due to the general sense of tragedy of the human 
condition, can fall into this more specific sense of tragedy. 
I am not arguing either that Dewey’s general sense of tragedy precludes his general belief in 
progress and in better methods for achieving progress. If one can, consistently with a sense of tragedy, 
accept that experience contains joys and completions which gain their meaning from our limitations 
and our losses, so too one can, again consistently with a sense of tragedy, hold that there are methods 
of alleviating the ills we face and achieving some security in the face of the hazards and precarity we 
face. 
So why call this a conception of tragedy? I do so for three reasons. The first is the proximity of 
Dewey’s articulation of this conception in his major works to references to and uses of the tragic 
tradition. These references I think are direct evidence for the influence of the tragic tradition on 
Dewey’s thought.39 I have already mentioned that the opening chapters of Experience and Nature 
repeatedly describe certain forms of hazard and suffering arising from our relationship with the world 
as “tragic”. Dewey says there, of course, that “[c]omedy [by which he means luck in dealing with 
hazards] is as genuine as tragedy.” But he then in the next sentence, in a tone of endorsement of 
recognising tragedy, that “it is traditional that comedy strikes a more superficial note than tragedy.”40 
We might also adduce a passage from Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, a later work, where 
Dewey repeats his articulation of these themes in the same paragraph, again in the opening chapter of 
the work. That passage is worth extracting in its entirety: 
 
39 Consider the long discussion that Dewey has of the classical Greek tragedies in both editions of Ethics. Dewey also uses 
the term “tragedy” repeatedly to describe particular large-scale practical situations, such as the fact that we have vastly 
increased our powers of control of ourselves and nature, yet there is still widespread poverty and unemployment. He 
speaks also of “the tragedy of moral progress”. What is this but a repetition of themes from Aeschylus and Sophocles, as 
he points out in Ethics? 




Tension between the reinforcement which the world, natural or supernatural, affords 
and the menace of withdrawal of its support is the universal state of man [what I have 
called the primary sense of tragedy]. When man most relies in his action upon 
knowledge and insight he acts also in ignorance and at his peril [what I have called the 
secondary sense of tragedy]. This tension displays itself spontaneously in pathos, 
humor and tragedy; it is the stimulus to belief in what lies beyond the senses, and 
philosophy, working with the material provided by unreflective beliefs, is its reflective 
expression.41 
 
The second reason is, as I have said, that Dewey’s conception of the tragedy of the human 
condition evinces the three themes from the tragic tradition that I explicated in section 1.42 Tragedy is 
both a general feature of the human condition and one that manifests in particular ways in individual 
lives, thus connecting individual human agents to some general features of what it is to be human. As 
a transactional feature of our relation to the world, it ties together our outward focus on the world 
and our inward focus on the kinds of creatures we are. Finally, tragedy draws our attention to the 
conditions of our practical agency and how the exercise of our agency can lead to forms of unfreedom 
and concomitant systematic forms of suffering and loss, in ways that I will make clearer in what 
follows.  
Third, my use of “tragedy” in this general sense is consistent also with a Deweyan view of 
aesthetic concepts. Dewey argues in Art as Experience that aesthetic terms do not narrowly apply to 
works of art, but to the events and experiences of everyday life. Works of art – and certain other 
experiences – condense and intensify those aesthetic aspects of experience, emphasise them, bring them 
 
41 Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, 13. 
42 I reiterate the point that “tragedy” in the sense of great works of tragedy ought be understood as continuous with 
“tragedy” in the sense of a dimension of ordinary experience. Compare Williams, Modern Tragedy, Chapter 1. 
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to our attention so that we can see them more clearly in their less refined and intense forms in ordinary 
experience. So too my use of the term “tragedy” in the general sense – an aesthetic term – is to be 
understood. With that term, I am emphasising and drawing out a fundamental aspect of ordinary life 
and experience, the individuated experiences of suffering and loss and breakdown that are endemic to 
and cannot be removed from the totality of our experience in the world, and connecting those 
experiences to general features of our condition.  
Dewey is specifically sensitive to the way in which tragedy, understood as a mode of art, has 
this larger significance for ordinary experience. He argues in relation to Greek tragedy that it provided 
“opportunities for every citizen to consider the larger significance of life”, and of modern tragedy, 
particularly Ibsen, that it reveals a modern “spiritual selfishness”.43 Not only was Dewey, I suggest, 
influenced in no small part by the tragic tradition both classical and modern, but this influence is 
expressed specifically in his understanding of the human condition, and his reading of the works in 
that tradition are of a piece with his conception of art as condensing and making explicit central 
features of ordinary experience. 
Tragedy as a transactional relation between human agents and the world 
Dewey takes the tragedy of the human condition, as I have said, to begin from the fact that 
we are limited creatures in a world that is not always hospitable to us. The tragedy of the human 
condition is, as I have already suggested, a property of the relation between humans and the world 
taken holistically; it is only derivatively a property of the world and of humans taken separately. In that 
sense it is “transactional”; it inheres in the whole “situation”, comprising together, as a whole, agent 
and world. This transactional quality of the whole situation can, derivatively and for analytic purposes, 
be taken to imply certain properties of the world and of agents. In this insistence on seeing together 
 
43 Dewey, Ethics, 111; 276, fn 19. 
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agent and world, Dewey undermines an old philosophical dichotomy between the actor and spectator 
perspectives. He does so by locating the spectator perspective within the actor perspective; the kind of 
disinterestedness and distance characteristic of the spectator perspective is something we can develop 
for particular practical purposes that we may have.44 This version of the primacy of the practical is 
essential to my diagnosis of the problem of unfreedom as I outlined it in the last chapter: the problem 
is, at heart, a practical one and not a mere theoretical paradox.  
A useful starting place from which to elucidate Dewey’s sense of the tragic is the beginning 
sentence from The Quest for Certainty: “Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for 
security.” This sentence encapsulates the three main aspects of the tragedy, as I now explain. 
The world is hazardous to us in a few senses. First, it contains dangers to which we must 
respond. The hazardous nature of the world thus necessitates action; if the world were not hazardous, 
then we would not need (would not be “compelled”) to act. Given that we must act, second, the world 
is nestedly hazardous in two other senses. First, it interrupts and gets in the way of our action – “the 
world pushes back” – and, second, given our human cognitive limitations, we do not and cannot know 
all the consequences of our actions, which outrun our intentions. For Dewey, “[t]he distinctive 
characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be eliminated, is the 
uncertainty which attends it.”45 The second hazard – epistemic uncertainty – rests on the first, 
metaphysical hazard: the instability and precariousness of our situation in the world. 
Working through the way in which epistemic uncertainty depends on the hazardous nature of 
our fundamental relation to the world will help us understand a little better what Dewey means by the 
 
44 Though, of course, like all human possibilities, we can then come to take that perspective for its own sake, or for 
purposes other than practical ones; indeed, for no purpose at all. See Joseph Raz, "The Guise of the Bad," Journal of Ethics 
& Social Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2016). We can read Dewey here as naturalising in a pragmatist vein what Nietzsche says in 
The Birth of Tragedy about the development of the spectator perspective in Euripides, though I am not aware of any evidence 
that Dewey read Nietzsche. 
45 Quest for Certainty, 5-6. 
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transactional nature of tragedy. One might be tempted to treat this fundamental relation to the world 
in one of two un-Deweyan ways. First, one might, following a certain (mis)interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, think of that fundamental relation as simply necessitating thought, as merely the “bumps 
that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language.”46 The kind of 
agency that is necessitated by tragedy here is a kind of intellectual action, a kind of realisation or 
perception of where we tempt ourselves into thinking and talking nonsense which has practical effects 
only downstream. Or, second, one might think of the fundamental relation as practical, but as calling 
for action only in the form of problems that we must solve, rather than hazards we must confront. The 
difference between problems and hazards can be put like this: problems are departures from a 
fundamental at homeness in the world, and the necessity for action arises only when we are temporarily 
pulled away from this home. Hazards, by contrast, are not temporary departures, but enter into how 
we fundamentally experience the world. Recognition of hazard means that the world can no longer be 
conceived of as primarily our home and only secondarily something that must be confronted. Rather, 
home must be made and protected; and it can fall away and become unhomely without our expecting 
or predicting it. 
Now, of course, there are elements of both of these lines of thought in Dewey. We do face 
problems that pull us up short and which call for us to inquire, and thought is both a necessary part 
of this practical responsiveness to the world, and one which can lead to further problems when it (in 
some cases rightly) becomes reified and separated from action. But they are, in my view, derivative 
phenomena of the underlying tragedy of the human condition that I am trying to capture here. To 
take one or both as fundamental would be to underplay the hazardousness of the fundamental relation 
of agents to the world. It would be to miss the weight of Dewey’s descriptions from Experience and 
 
46 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §119. 
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Nature, of the precariousness and perilousness of that relation, of the uncanniness of its instability and 
uncertainty. 
Against the first reading, the world is not merely “that which cannot be fully grasped in 
thought”, but that with which we fundamentally practically engage – it is quite literally dangerous to 
us; there are “sacred and accursed” powers that we do not control; it is “risky”, “precarious”, 
“perilous”, “awful”, and “fearful”.47 We ought to take these descriptions seriously and not either as 
mere rhetoric or, in a detached anthropological sense, as an expression of an older superseded 
metaphysics, especially given Dewey’s philosophical endorsement of the present aptness of these 
anthropologies: “The voice is of early man; but the hand is that of nature, the nature in which we still 
live… These things are as true today as they were in the days of early culture.”48 
So, against the first reading, then, it can be said that the world is immediately value-laden, not 
merely concept-laden. Against the second, it can be said that the value-ladenness of the world means 
that the world includes which we ought and must avoid as well as that which we must seek. It would 
be “optimistic in a complacent way”, Dewey says, to think that the world contains only values and not 
also disvalues.49 “Nature is characterized by a constant mixture of the precarious and the stable.”50 To 
put things in biological terms, Dewey does not think that our natural state is one of equilibrium with 
our environment; rather, our place in the world is one of more or less constant loss of equilibrium 
 
47 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 44-48. As Dewey puts it at the start of The Quest for Certainty, 7: “it is not uncertainty per se 
which men dislike, but the fact that uncertainty involves us in peril of evils. Uncertainty that affected only the detail of 
consequences to be experienced provided they had a warrant of being enjoyable would have no sting. It would bring the 
zest of adventure and the spice of variety.” 
48 Experience and Nature, 44. 
49 “Popular teleology like Greek metaphysics, has accordingly been apologetic, justificatory of the beneficence of nature; 
it has been optimistic in a complacent way.” Experience and Nature, 87. 
50 Quest for Certainty, 194. Dewey makes similar remarks throughout Experience and Nature. 
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and therefore attempts, through the exercise of our agency, to bring about a new and different 
equilibrium.51 
These considerations help explain why the kind of epistemic uncertainty that Dewey mentions 
is a function of the deeper instability or precariousness of our situation in the world. It is not merely 
that our human cognitive limitations mean we cannot fully understand what is right to do, but if only 
we could know more we could return permanently to our fundamental at-homeness. Rather, a 
constitutive part of our fundamental relation to the world is being not at home, being out of 
equilibrium. Our agency is called upon so that we can make the world more homely, more stable. But 
our action is thus not always successful or even appropriate to our ends or fully within our control, 
and each time we act to achieve a relative equilibrium, our world changes in ways that we could not 
intend or control. We may not take the right means to our ends; our ends may turn out not in fact to 
be the right ends; and we may cause things to happen that we did not intend: “The best laid plans of 
men as well as mice gang aglee… Men always build better or worse than they know, for their acts are 
taken up into the broad sweep of events.”52 In that sense the tragic condition functions as a general 
constraint on our agency – a kind of unfreedom. 
Yet that constraint is necessary for and enables the kind of agency we have. Our agency is defined 
by the fact that it is so limited. In Dewey’s words, “[t]he situation is not indifferent to man, because it 
 
51 The difference of each new equilibrium point from the previous is a general biological point that one can find in James 
and as far back as Herbert Spencer’s definition of life as “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external 
relations”: since the environment of each organism is constantly changing, to be in equilibrium with that environment 
requires each time internal changes that reflect the external changes. See Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology, vol. 1 
(New York: Appleton 1866), 80. Compare Dewey in Art as Experience, 19: “Life itself consists of phases in which the 
organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through effort 
or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched 
by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed.” (emphasis added) For further 
comparisons between Dewey and Spencer, see Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Spencer and Dewey on Life and Mind," in Artificial 
Life IV: Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the synthesis and simulation of living systems, ed. Rodney A. Brooks and 
Pattie Maes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
52 Human Nature and Conduct, 143. 
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forms man as a desiring, striving, thinking, feeling creature.”53 In other words, for Dewey, it is only 
because we lack things, that things threaten us, that we can desire anything at all (to avoid the threat, 
to have the thing that we lack), that we must strive for things, that we must sometimes think about 
what to seek and how to achieve it, and that we feel our lack, the fear of threat, the strain of thinking. 
It is of course the case that the satisfactions of achievement feel like home, and these satisfactions and 
moments of equilibrium are therefore what we seek. But our seeking of them is conditioned by this 
striving and this lack.  
Emphasising the negative state, as Dewey does, is a way of drawing out a primacy of the 
practical. What comes first is the practical capacity to deal with the world and its hazards. The capacity 
to reflect theoretically on the uses and deliverances of that capacity and thereby to act better come 
only secondarily: “[t]he ultimate evidence of genuine hazard, contingency, irregularity and 
indeterminateness in nature is thus found in the occurrence of thinking.”54 It is essential, then, for the 
particular aspects of the tragedy of the human condition to be derivative of the fundamental 
hazardousness of the relation between humans and the world and not merely a subjective projection 
of our own capacities onto the world.55 
One may argue that in these passages and in similar others Dewey is merely giving voice to 
old superstitions, to a conception of the world and our place in it that has been superseded by the 
methods of the modern sciences. We now have (at least the beginnings of) the tools for recognising 
that what was previously understood in terms of the sacred and the accursed are now merely to be 
 
53 Experience and Nature, 67 (emphasis added). 
54 Experience and Nature, 62-3. 
55 “Empirically, then, active bonds and continuities of all kinds, together with static discontinuities, characterize existence. 
To deny this qualitative heterogeneity is to reduce the struggles and difficulties of life, its comedies and tragedies to illusion: 
to the non-being of the Greeks or to its modern counterpart, the ‘subjective.’” John Dewey, "The Need For a Recovery 
of Philosophy," in The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1916-1917), 12. 
82 
 
understood as “problems” that can be addressed through the application of method. Again, I don’t 
want to deny the importance of science and methods of inquiry, either in Dewey’s thinking or in the 
very real forms of control and power that we have developed. But to think that these powers supersede 
the “superstitions” of the tragedy of the human condition would be an expression of hubris. I leave a 
fuller discussion of this claim for later in this section and the next. Here, I will just repeat a sentence 
or two from the start of the second chapter of Experience and Nature: 
 
We may term the way in which our ancestors dealt with the contrast [between what is 
known and controllable and what is unknown and uncontrolled] superstitious, but the 
contrast is no superstition. It is a primary datum in any experience. 
We have substituted sophistication for superstition, at least measurably so. But the 
sophistication is often as irrational and as much at the mercy of words as the 
superstition it replaces…Through science we have secured a degree of power of 
prediction and control; through tools, machinery and an accompanying technique we 
have made the world more conformable to our needs, a more secure abode… But 
when all is said and done, the fundamentally hazardous character of the world is not 
seriously modified, much less eliminated.56 
 
Tragedy and the primacy of the actor perspective 
I will now explain the importance of Dewey’s conception of the primacy of the actor 
perspective, and the role that Dewey gives to theoretical thinking within that perspective. I will do so 
through a particular dialectic that Dewey sets up in The Quest for Certainty between what we can call a 
loosely “Platonist” view, according to which value, in its ideal form, is located outside the physical 
 
56 Experience and Nature, 45. Dewey continues: “What has been said sounds pessimistic. But the concern is not with morals 
but with metaphysics, with, that is to say, the nature of the existential world in which we live. It would have been as easy 
and more comfortable to emphasize good luck, grace, unexpected and unwon joys, those unsought for happenings which 
we so significantly call happiness. We might have appealed to good fortune as evidence of this important trait of hazard 
in nature. Comedy is as genuine as tragedy. But it is traditional that comedy strikes a more superficial note than tragedy.” 
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world, and what we can call a “bald” naturalism, according to which the methods of passive 
observation characteristic of the physical sciences as they were developed in the early modern period 
reveal to us the world as it truly is, a world where value and normativity can only be found if they are 
reduced to quantities acceptable to these methods.57 Both these views, which Dewey takes to be mirror 
images of each other, begin from a detached and spectatorial conception of agency. Against them, a 
sense of the tragic reveals the primacy of the engaged, actor perspective. 
The dialectic begins from the recognition that the tragedy of the human condition means that 
our agency is necessarily limited by the world. One may wonder why it is not possible for there to be 
what we might call an intuitive agency for which this constraint does not hold. One such intuitive 
agency might be the God of Genesis. Dewey’s response is just to say that this is not our agency, which 
“is done with the body, by means of mechanical appliances and is directed upon material things.”58 
We must work through and in the material world. Our agency involves using the things that push back 
on us for our own purposes.  
Dewey here rejects the Platonist thought that “‘mind’ is complete and self-sufficient in itself… 
it needs no external manifestation.”59 In doing so, however, he does not accept its normal converse, 
what I have called the bald naturalist view: that mind is just another thing in the world like other 
things, to be understood through the methods of passive observation that characterise the conception 
of the natural sciences that we inherit from Galileo and Newton. For Dewey, the Platonist 
 
57 I call this naturalism bald insofar to contrast it with what David Macarthur and Mario de Caro call liberal naturalism, 
according to which “nature” is to be contrasted not with value but with the supernatural, and thus includes also the 
manifest image of the world, itself including values, agents, artworks, artifacts, and so on. Dewey would be this kind of 
naturalist. See David Macarthur, "Liberal Naturalism and the Scientific Image of the World," Inquiry 62, no. 5 (2019); Peter 
Godfrey-Smith, "Dewey, Continuity, and McDowell," in Naturalism and Normativity, ed. David Macarthur and Mario De 
Caro (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). See also Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Dewey on Naturalism, Realism and 
Science," Philosophy of Science 69, no. S3 (2002). 
58 Quest for Certainty, 4. 
59 Quest for Certainty, 7. I use the term “Platonist” here dialectically, to pick out a certain (caricatured) position that Dewey 
is criticising. I do not mean thereby to make any claims about the views of the historical Plato or historical Platonists. 
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transcendent view and bald naturalism are two sides of the same coin. Both first take the natural world 
to be devoid of value and agency and then need to “place” value and the human agency that responds 
to value somewhere.60 The Platonist, realising truly the constraints of the natural world on us and 
wishing to preserve value against those constraints, places value outside nature, in a transcendent 
world. The bald naturalist, confident in the powers of the quantified natural sciences to capture the 
world as it really is, asserts that values are myths or merely our projections onto the denuded world, 
or that we will be able to find them again in that world, transmogrified into probabilities or statistical 
functions that hold in lawlike fashion.61 
The connections between Platonism and bald naturalism run deeper than this shared 
assumption that the world is initially devoid of value, which then requires that value must be “placed” 
in that world. The force of bald naturalism depends on Platonism, insofar as its plausibility rests on 
the “injection of an irrelevant philosophy” – by which Dewey means the idea, inherited from the 
Platonist view, that what is most real is unchangeable and fixed – “into interpretation of the 
conclusions of a science”.62 It is only given the assumption that the world must be something eternal 
and unchanging (say, as comprising the fixed causal laws according to which matter moves) that we 
could take the deliverances of the natural sciences to give us that which is eternal and unchanging.63 
 
60 See the contemporary literature on various “placement problems”, e.g. Simon Blackburn, "Realism, Quasi, or Queasy?," 
in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Huw 
Price, Naturalism Without Mirrors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
61 I am here of course compressing and simplifying a central issue in metaethics. My purpose is not to do injustice to the 
different ways of treating that issue, but just to locate (and not to argue thoroughly for) Dewey’s view within that wider 
frame. 
62 Quest for Certainty, 83. It is striking that we moderns (or at least I) do not find the Platonist view forceful in contrast to 
the failures of bald naturalism. 
63 See also R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford University Press, 1960). Collingwood traces what he calls the 
Pythagorean conception of nature (that nature consists in the fixed and mathematically-describable formal structure of 
matter) through Plato and the Renaissance to the scientific revolution. Collingwood argues that the 20 th century process 
philosophies of nature we find in Whitehead and Bergson are a move beyond this Pythagorean conception. We need not 




And without supposing that the natural sciences reveal the world to us “as it really is”, we no longer 
feel the need to “eliminate qualities and values from nature”. “Drop the conception that knowledge 
is knowledge only when it is a disclosure and definition of the properties of fixed and antecedent 
reality”, Dewey writes, “and the supposed need and problem vanish.”64 
The correlative of this shared commitment to the equation of the real to the unchanging, on 
the level of agency, is a conception of our relation to the world first solely in terms of knowledge and, 
specifically, in terms of a passive observer conception of knowledge. The Forms are to be contemplated; 
the Book of Nature read. Both exist outside the practical sphere in which agents attempt to better 
their situation. It is this passive observer conception of our relation to the world which means that 
the Platonist and the bald naturalist cannot fully register the tragedy of the human condition.65 
Instead, Dewey’s transactionalism begins instead from the idea that the fundamental situation 
comprises agents in practical relations with their environment: “knowing is not the act of an outside 
spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social scene.”66 Knowledge and thought are 
derivative of that fundamental practical relation, although essential for the kinds of intentional 
interactions with the world that agents like us have. The procedures of the natural sciences, for Dewey, 
need to be understood within this framework. Those procedures result in knowledge insofar as they 
“substitute[] data for objects”; they abstract away from the qualitative parts of experience to establish 
 
64 Quest for Certainty, 83. 
65 Cf. Williams on naturalism and tragedy, Modern Tragedy, 93-4: “It [naturalism] seems now the true child of the liberal 
enlightenment, in which the traditional ideas of a fate, an absolute order, a design beyond human powers, were replaced 
by a confidence in reason and in the possibility of a continually expanding capacity for explanation and control… But the 
literature of naturalism, finally, is a bastard of the enlightenment. Characteristically, it detached the techniques of 
observation and description from the purposes which these were intended to serve. What became naturalism, and what 
distinguished it from the more important movement of realism, was a mechanical description of men as the creatures of 
their environment, which literature recorded as if man and thing were of the same nature. The tragedy of naturalism is the 
tragedy of passive suffering, and the suffering is passive because man can only endure and can never really change his 
world.” Williams’ “naturalism” is akin to what I have called “bald naturalism” and not the post-metaphysical 
“naturalisation” that I am making in this chapter of tragedy. 
66 Quest for Certainty, 157. 
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controllable causal relations that facilitate agency by linking together all objects into a single causal 
domain.67 In that sense the procedures of the natural sciences recognise that the world exists as “a 
challenge, rather than a completion”, that it “provides possible starting points and opportunities” for 
agency.68 But the deliverances of those procedures ought not (and precisely for that reason!) therefore 
be accepted as determinative or revelatory of what the world is.  
This dialectic of the Platonist and the bald naturalist interestingly mirrors that of the pessimist 
and optimist from Chapter 1. The Platonist’s transcendentalisation of value (to turn, perhaps unfairly, 
a philosophical position into a subjective process) can be seen as a response to a certain pessimism, 
that this world is solely one of constraint, that we are fallen creatures, locked into this material world, 
hence, to protect and enshrine value, we must see it as apart from this world. The bald naturalist’s 
confidence in the methods of detached observation to grasp the world “as it really is”, is by contrast 
perhaps naively optimistic insofar as the thought is that by so knowing the world, we can thereby 
come to have a blueprint for how to achieve our ideals. If we but knew all the facts, we could pull all 
the right levers, adjust the relevant variables, and there would be our solution. Action (in its ideal form) 
follows knowledge as if by a recipe.69 
Dewey does not think, however, that the Platonist and the bald naturalist have nothing right. 
With the Platonist, Dewey shares a sense that the world restricts and constrains one’s agency (recall 
the images of the body as a prison in the early Socratic dialogues), even if the Platonist registers this 
constraint as “disappointment” and retreats to mere contemplation. With the bald naturalist, Dewey 
 
67 Quest for Certainty, 79 (emphasis in original). See further Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Ch 6. 
68 Quest for Certainty, 80-81. 
69 One contemporary example of this position might be the kind of neo-Humeanism found in Michael Smith or Peter 
Railton, according to which what we normatively ought desire to do is defined in terms of what we would desire after a 
process of full idealisation performed over our present dispositional base. If we could but know everything, then… See 
Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," The Philosophical Review 95, no. 2 (1986); Michael Smith, "Realism," in A Companion to Ethics, 
ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 151-77. Cf. W. V. 
O. Quine, "On the Nature of Moral Values," Critical Inquiry 5, no. 3 (1979).  
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shares a sense of the importance of understanding the world from an abstracted, objective point of 
view, even if they disagree precisely about the nature of that importance; the bald naturalist thinks 
they are thereby getting to things as they are rather than facilitating better and more expansive agency. 
So, with the Platonist, Dewey accepts the unsettledness and contingency of the existing world, and 
with the bald naturalist holds both that there are parts of the world that are “settled and uniform” and 
thus more amenable to our agency, and also that there is value in taking a particular abstracted, 
objective point of view in order further to stabilise our environment, to extend the “settled and 
uniform”.70  
Recognising the tragedy of the human condition as a transactional feature of the relation 
between agents and world requires that we reject the assumption that motivates both Platonism and 
bald naturalism: that the world as it appears to us is devoid of value. Dewey’s transactionalism is 
impossible to get in view if one thinks of agency and value as needing to be “placed” in a denuded 
world. Conversely, neither the Platonist nor the bald naturalist, because of that commitment, can get 
the tragedy of the human condition fully in view, though both, albeit through a glass darkly, can pick 
up on part of the tragedy. The Platonist can in some form recognise the fact that we are not naturally 
fully at home in the world, that it constrains us and limits us, though the Platonist does not recognise 
that what agency we have is material and immanent.  
The bald naturalist is the more interesting foil for Dewey, since the bald naturalist takes 
seriously the possibilities for the procedures of natural science to deliver us knowledge, but takes 
knowledge (since it is revelatory of the final and unchanging) to be the end goal of inquiry. Bald 
 
70 Experience and Nature, x: “the things of ordinary experience contain within themselves a mixture of the perilous and 
uncertain with the settled and uniform.” This theme of extending the stabilised and uniform can be found in various 
places, for example Nancy Cartwright’s notion of “nomological machines” – artificially stabilised arrangements of factors, 
“shielded” (as much as possible) from interference, that enable us to find regularities of behaviour that we can describe in 
terms of laws. The further we can extend these nomological machines, the more we can utilise those stabilised and isolated 
causal invariances to control (parts of) the world. Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A study of the boundaries of science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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naturalism inherits the Platonist view that what is most real and the object of knowledge is fixed and 
unchanging. It secularises that view so that the object of knowledge is not a transcendent world but 
this world. It thus in spirit encourages (though, of course, it does not necessitate or imply) the Faustian 
idea that if we could but know everything, then we could fully control all the workings of this world. 
Or, if this sounds too extravagant, it encourages the idea that more is always better, that the more we 
know, the more fully we will be able to control the world. This Faustian hubris is itself a further kind 
of tragedy, a tragedy more firmly located in the agent, that compounds the more fundamental 
transactional tragedy of the human condition. This kind of hubris, I will suggest, is connected to a 
blind optimism that recognition of the more fundamental transactional tragedy of the human 
condition may help to mitigate. 
Tragedy as a feature of human agents 
The Faustian hubris is located in the agent insofar as it is an attitude of an agent that takes as 
its object our own capacities: we “desire to get beyond and above” ourselves, and given the 
technological achievements that the procedures of natural science have given us, in a “juvenile 
assumption of power and achievement” we think that we have in fact gotten beyond and above 
ourselves.71 This desire and the concomitant thought that we have in some form achieved that desire 
arise, as I have argued, from a rejection of the underlying transactional tragedy of the human condition. 
We may do so for many reasons, not only philosophical. Dewey thinks we have deep motivations to 
attempt to transcend our limitations. Living with uncertainty in a world of hazards is difficult; we 
“dislike the dis-ease which accompanies the doubtful and [are] ready to take almost any means to end 
it.”72 Fearing those dangers, lacking in confidence and self-esteem, we may seek security at any cost. 
 
71 Quest for Certainty, 6; Experience and Nature, 313. See also Unmodern and Modern Philosophy, 23: “[that] excess, or passing 
beyond set bounds, was the one unforgivable sin of hybris, I need not remind you.” 
72 Quest for Certainty, 181. 
89 
 
The point here is similar to Peirce’s in “The Fixation of Belief”. Belief is the cessation of doubt, and 
there are many means other than intelligent and rational inquiry to stop doubt, among them (in 
Dewey’s words) “acceptance of belief upon authority”, “intolerance and fanaticism” and 
“irresponsible dependence and sloth”.73 The desire to transcend is born of our original tragedy, as is 
the thought that we have satisfied that desire. Of course, Dewey wants us to resist this hubris, and 
developing methods and skills of proper inquiry is one way in which we can do so. But he thinks that 
to do so properly one must diagnose the roots of hubris in our human condition, so that we can better 
recognise it and address it in the different forms in which it arises. 
Whatever the motivations, hubris arises when we take ourselves not to be first and foremost 
practical agents in an uncertain world, but theoretical agents whose thought is prior to and distinct from 
action such that we can first grasp in thought the world (or at least the relevant parts) in order that we 
can then control its workings (from outside, as a puppeteer controls a puppet).74 This general tendency 
can take many specific forms. To illustrate that general tendency, it is worth focusing first on one 
concrete example of Dewey’s, namely laissez-faire economics, which he argues rests on  
 
the theory of ‘natural laws’ in human affairs… These natural laws were supposed to 
be inherently fixed; a science of social phenomena and relations was equivalent to 
them. Once discovered, nothing remained for man but to conform to them; they 
were to rule his conduct as physical laws govern physical phenomena. They were 
the sole standard of conduct in economic affairs; the laws of economics are the ‘natural 
laws’ of all political action… Laissez-faire was the logical conclusion.75 
 
73 Quest for Certainty, 181-2. Compare Peirce on the methods of tenacity, authority, and the a priori. 
74 It is perhaps possible for hubris to arise internal to the practical point of view. It is unclear to me what this might look 
like, if endemic to the practical point of view is some lack to be addressed under uncertainty and incomplete knowledge 
75 Quest for Certainty, 169 (bold emphasis added). We should keep in mind that Dewey was writing this and similar works 
while at Columbia in the Lochner era, and much of his activism at the time was devoted to labour organising. It ought 
also be noted that Dewey here is describing a hubristic and ideological train of thought and not making any claims about 




Here we see the hubris of bald naturalism clearly displayed. We take true knowledge to be 
knowledge of the fixed underlying natural laws of a domain. Applying that model (inherited from early 
modern natural philosophy) to the social domain means that we treat human agents as objects in the 
world like other objects, governed by economic laws as “physical laws govern physical phenomena.” 
That knowledge grounds the perceived possibility of predicting and thus of controlling human 
phenomena – “exact knowledge and exact prediction”.76 In Dewey’s view, laissez-faire is the result of 
“the idea that reason in man is an outside spectator of a rationality already complete in itself.”77 Our 
role is “simply to copy”.78 The contrast is with knowing that is part of action, that consciously aims at 
“humanly conceived ends”, and which is intertwined with other modes of engagement (democratic 
deliberation, workplace education) and thus recognises the role of human agency in determining its 
own ends.79 
The hubris described here can be at a first pass understood as thinking we know when we do not – 
after all, have we really discovered the natural laws of human action? And, indeed, is the model of 
natural law even the right theoretical model to apply to human action?80 This kind of hubris can come 
in other, lesser forms than the imposition of a particular model or mode of knowing onto a subject 
matter unsuited for it. One may be wrongly certain about the grounds upon which we act, and thus 
act disproportionately. Or one may overestimate the reliability of certain beliefs, and thus be 
 
76 Quest for Certainty, 170. 
77 Quest for Certainty, 169. 
78 Quest for Certainty, 169. 
79 Such an economic science may at various stages treat human beings as objects, as conforming to various statistical 
measures and so on. But due to its embedding in the wider sphere of action, it would not solely treat them as such. 
80 Dewey’s claim is, of course, that it is not – at least as a final mode of dealing with that sphere. It is inapt precisely because 
it leaves no room for human doing. Instead we need a theory where “knowing and doing are intimately connected with 
each other.” Quest for Certainty, 171. 
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vulnerable to the manifold ways in which the world pushes back on our ways of categorising and 
organising it. 
Hubris comes too in other forms. One fundamental form involves turning scientific 
knowledge into “a kind of sanctuary”, investing it with a “religious atmosphere, not to say an 
idolatrous one”.81 Hubris in this form involves prioritising knowledge as a specific kind of engagement 
with the world over other engagements, thinking that “scientific ways of thinking of objects give the 
inner reality of things, and that they put a mark of spuriousness upon all other ways of thinking of 
them, and of perceiving and enjoying them.”82 Doing so involves a “derogation of the things we 
experience by way of love, desire, hope, fear, purpose and the traits characteristic of human 
individuality”.83 Dewey’s mention of emotions and “human individuality” here is important. Hubris 
in the sense of prioritising a detached form of knowledge because of the power that it grants us can 
mean we end up treating agents as just like other things in the world, things to be observed and 
controlled. Dewey notes in passing – and I will return to this theme in Chapter 3 – how 
industrialisation (at least as it is at present, without a concomitant increase in social and moral 
intelligence) has led to the “worker in a factory” becoming merely “an attachment to a machine for a 
number of hours a day.”84 Far from praising technological advance as an untrammelled good as some 
have suggested, Dewey is very sensitive to the specific human tragedies that it has brought in its train, 
tragedies that are a surface reflection of the hubris that comes from ignoring the tragedy of the human 
condition.85  
 
81 Quest for Certainty, 176. 
82 Quest for Certainty, 109. Of course, this is not to say that hubris requires this kind of prioritisation of knowledge. 
83 Quest for Certainty, 175. 
84 Quest for Certainty, 159. 
85 On Dewey’s use of the word “tragedy” to refer to the modern industrial system and its connection to (the lack of) 
democracy in the industrial system, see John Dewey, "Needed - A New Politics," in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, 
The Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1935-1937). See also John Dewey, 
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These two senses of tragedy, the primary and the secondary, are not of the same kind; after 
all, one is a property of a relation and the other is a property of agents. This fact gives rise to a concern: 
aren’t they in principle separable? And, the thought might further run, haven’t I overstepped in 
locating this desire for and belief in achieved guaranteed control over the world in something so 
fundamental and metaphysical as the human condition? Doesn’t this misplace the origins of this desire, 
which we might instead want to locate in a particular historical juncture under particular social 
conditions?86 And, even if there is some truth to the claim at the grand level at which I have advanced 
it here, what is gained by its assertion in understanding the particularly modern forms of unfreedom? 
The description of hubris that I have given here is not intended to deny that specific historical 
and social circumstances give rise to their own forms of hubris.87 The kinds of hubris with which 
Dewey is mostly concerned, for example (those of the particular objectifying kind characteristic of 
modern scientism, applied to human issues) come to prominence with the scientific and perhaps also 
the industrial revolutions – though it is worth noting the similarity to the vision of the human as 
nature-conquering deinon in the “Ode to Man” in Antigone. These are different desires for control 
(through material and technological means) than, say, the desire to control others through authority, 
 
"The Jobless - A Job For All Of Us," in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1931-1932). 
86 So, for example, Nietzsche locates it in Euripides’ placing of the spectator on the stage, which he argues was “the death 
of tragedy” and the beginning of the “Socratic thinker” who has thoughts instead of visions, emotions instead of raptures 
– all at a distance, that render the scene something intelligible that can then be mastered. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Chs 
11 and 12. Others like Gandhi and Carolyn Merchant locate it in the institutional connection between modern science, 
religion, and commercial interests in 17th and 18th century England. Walter Mignolo locates it slightly earlier, in the 
invention of the concept of the “human” as distinct from nature. Dipesh Chakrabarty and others might argue that it arises 
whenever it was that humanity became a geological force in the “Anthropocene”. 
87 We might recall Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s claim that one of the conditions for Athenian tragedy 
was Athenian democracy: Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1988). 
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through law, or through love, that we find in Creon or Lear, which in turn require certain social 
structures like law or the family.88  
Nonetheless there is utility in seeing these different desires for control as manifestations of 
hubris, as a response to the tragedy of the human condition. Doing so helps us understand these 
desires as not accidental or wholly unmotivated, as daemonic overweening ambition to be set apart 
from nature, but as expressing a natural response to the challenges and the hazards that our place in 
the world raises for us. It helps us to see possible connections between these desires for control and 
mastery in light of our general condition, connections that may help us see other and better ways of 
responding to that condition.89 Hubris arises from the transactional sense of tragedy as a standing 
temptation that runs so deep as to be – like the transactional sense of tragedy – a fundamental 
dimension of human action, one which manifests in different forms in relation to different 
conditions.90  
Understanding this desire for control as hubris also counsels a certain humility. To see hubris 
as a response to our human situation shows it to be a constant standing concern for agents like us. 
Recognising the tragedy of the human condition in the primary, transactional sense helps to inoculate 
us (though, of course, imperfectly) against hubris while nonetheless recognising a ground for agency 
(the need to respond to this world that provides both hazards and opportunities) that can be exercised 
to better our condition.91 In doing so, it provides an alternative to the kind of optimism that is one 
side of the pendulum between optimism and pessimism that I noted at the end of Chapter 1. It 
 
88 And there are other interpretations of hubris that see it less in terms of a desire for control than a prideful inability to 
listen to others, for example Cassandra’s curse or Tiresias. 
89 Compare William Connolly: “the general human predicament and specific historical situations surge and flow into each 
other.” "The Human Predicament," Social Research 76, no. 4 (2009): 1123. 
90 Thanks to Michael Holmes for raising this point. 
91 Hubris does not require that one ignores the transactional tragedy of the human condition. Even one who recognizes 
that deeper tragedy may still fall to hubris. Such a recognition is no guarantee. 
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grounds the possibility of building something through human action, even if what is built is always 
fragile.92 
This close thematic connection between hubris and the primary sense of tragedy is, to reiterate, 
a theme that Dewey picks up from the tragic tradition. Dewey’s repeated explicit emphasis on hubris 
is another reason to read him as having a sense of tragedy. Without such a sense in the background, 
to speak of hubris would be out of place, especially for a thinker like Dewey who draws on the tragic 
tradition in many of his works.  
This analysis, setting out the grounds on which Dewey, rightly understood, has a deep sense 
of the tragic, raises the question of why there have been so many critics (including sympathetic readers) 
who have denied this fact about him. In the next section I will consider the criticisms of three such 
critics: Raymond Boisvert; Reinhold Niebuhr; and Cornel West. Examining their criticisms more 
closely will allow me to bring out more clearly the practical as opposed to theoretical sphere in which 
Dewey locates tragedy. This examination will also allow me to elucidate the deeper connections 
between tragedy and the problem of unfreedom. 
2.4 Tragedy, pessimism, evil 
Critics who claim that Dewey has no sense of the tragic mean different things by that claim. 
I’ll consider three such critics here. First, Boisvert argues, against my reading of Dewey, that Dewey 
is hubristic in precisely the way I have articulated above. Therefore and a fortiori, Dewey lacks a 
recognition of the tragedy of the human condition. Against Boisvert, I argue that he fails to locate 
tragedy in the right place in Dewey; Boisvert fails to recognise the transactional nature of tragedy. 
Second, Niebuhr argues that Dewey ought, if he is to be a consistent naturalist, also be a pessimist. 
But, I argue, tragedy ought be distinguished from pessimism. That distinction allows us to articulate 
 
92 One might recall here Kant’s B Preface. 
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hope as a moral psychological alternative to the dichotomy between pessimism and optimism. Finally, 
West claims that Dewey does not grapple with the problem of evil. I argue that, while West has gotten 
something right here, it is important to distinguish human evil in the intentional sense from tragedy, 
not least so that we can understand better the relation between them.  
Boisvert and necessity 
Raymond Boisvert has argued that Dewey does not recognise the limitations on human 
freedom that come from “necessity”, insofar as he – at least at times – falls into a “Baconian” scientism 
by taking “the scientific method” as it is derived from the natural sciences to be the solution to all 
social problems.93 Boisvert’s criticism is a useful starting point insofar as he directly accuses Dewey of 
the hubris that, on my reading, Dewey is at pains to diagnose. For Boisvert, Dewey’s hubris consists 
in “the belief that a new method will be found that will move us forward in the social/moral sphere 
the way science moved forward after Galileo, so that some better recipes than those available to, say 
Elizabethans, for confronting tragic situations will manifest themselves.”94 Boisvert recognises the 
turning point in thought that was the First World War, but, drawing on some comments that Dewey 
makes in Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), argues that the war did not have the effect on Dewey’s 
thought that I have suggested it did in section 2 of this chapter. For Boisvert, then, Dewey has a naïve 
optimism, a complacency in the powers of “the scientific method” to deliver constant progress that 
fails to recognise “a sphere of activity over which humans have no control”.95 
 
93 Raymond D. Boisvert, "The Nemesis of Necessity," in Dewey Reconfigured: Essays on Deweyan Pragmatism, ed. Casey Haskins 
and David I. Seiple (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). Admittedly, Boisvert is careful to say that his interpretation of Dewey is 
an interpretation of parts of Dewey’s corpus. 
94 Raymond D. Boisvert, "Updating Dewey: A reply to Morse," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37, no. 4 (2001): 
576. 
95 Boisvert, “The Nemesis of Necessity,” 153. 
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Boisvert here is reprising a criticism earlier made of Dewey by Dewey’s student Randolph 
Bourne. In “Twilight of Idols”, published in October 1917, Bourne tore into his former mentor, 
attacking “the inadequacy of his pragmatism as a philosophy of life in this emergency.”96 Dewey’s 
pragmatism, Bourne claimed, “has never been confronted with the pathless and the inexorable, and 
that, only dimly feeling the change… goes ahead acting as if it had not got out of its depth.”97 
Pragmatism had been co-opted by the “war-technique”; its disciples had “subordinate[d] idea to 
technique” in service of undemocratic ends. Dewey himself, Bourne charged, was moved by a “high 
mood of confidence and self-righteousness… a keen sense of control over events”.98 These criticisms 
pick out precisely the aspects of hubris noted above: the prioritisation of technical knowledge over 
other forms of engagement with the world; the desire to control from above and beyond; of thinking 
one knows what is to be done to solve a problem when one is merely reiterating the terms of the 
problem. 
The importance of Boisvert’s reprise is his insistence that this tendency of Dewey’s persisted 
after the war, after Dewey’s realisation of the correctness of Bourne’s criticisms, and through Dewey’s 
recognition of the “precariousness” and “contingency” of the world. On Boisvert’s reading, although 
Dewey came to recognise the hazardous background against which humans act, he nonetheless 
maintained that intelligence as a technical discipline could overcome those limitations. In principle, 
Boisvert argues, Dewey does not think there is a “sphere of activity over which humans have no 
control”.  
There’s a lot one could say in response to Boisvert’s interpretation of particular passages in 
Dewey. Instead of engaging in that enterprise, however, I will give a more general diagnosis of where 
 
96 Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," in Untimely Papers (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1919), 115. 
97 Bourne, 117. 
98 Bourne, 127.  
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Boisvert goes wrong. He goes wrong, I suggest, in locating tragedy solely in the world, in that “sphere of 
activity over which humans have no control.” He fails to recognise the shift that also occurred in the 
war years, where Dewey more explicitly began to take the transactional relationship between agents 
and the world as primary. Boisvert’s metaphysics begins with the world and then places us (as limited, 
fragile agents) in that world. Our impact on that world is puny; we are beset on all sides by the world 
in which we find ourselves. This starting point means that Boisvert cannot appreciate how the tragedy 
of the human condition also necessitates and makes possible agency; as Dewey puts it: “necessity is the 
mother of invention, discovery and consecutive reflection.”99 Intelligence is not only a response to 
tragedy, but is enabled by it. If one is committed to this view (as I have argued Dewey is) then one 
cannot think that intelligence can overcome tragedy; in doing so, it would overcome its own 
precondition. 
Responding in this way to Boisvert is important because it helps stave off one response to the 
problem of unfreedom, namely quietism. The quietist responds to circumstances of unfreedom by 
withdrawing from political activity. If the circumstances always outrun our action, then the best mode 
of responding to those circumstances may well be passivity. And one may find some solace in quietism 
if one takes Boisvert’s line about the overwhelmingness of tragedy – we are beset on all sides, there 
can be no decent response, and so the best thing we can do is withdraw. Against quietism, Dewey’s 
conception of tragedy supports political action. In focusing on how the limitations we face necessitate 
and enable human agency, Dewey reminds us of the fact that human action can make a difference. 
Tragedy grounds a kind of hope in the capacities of human agency to bring about change. To flesh 
out this connection between tragedy and this kind of practical hope, I turn to another criticism of 
Dewey by Reinhold Niebuhr. 
 
99 Experience and Nature, 100. 
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Niebuhr and pessimism 
The great American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr was one of Dewey’s staunchest critics 
during the 1930s. Among other things, Niebuhr accused Dewey of the (in his view) quintessentially 
American belief that “an astute social and psychological science can overcome or ‘redirect’ [quasi-
biological and deterministic impulses and inheritances] to what are known as ‘socially approved’ 
goals.”100 Niebuhr’s criticism is not only of the idea of untrammelled progress or of definitive 
resolution of human ills, but more fundamentally of Dewey’s reliance upon solely human means – 
such reliance is pride, a form of sinful self-love. For Niebuhr, the world taken by itself demands 
pessimism, and beginning from pessimism is the necessary starting point for inquiry:  
 
The world is not only a cosmos but a chaos. Its harmonies are disturbed by discords. 
Its self-sufficiency is challenged by larger and more inclusive worlds. The more men 
think the more they are tempted to pessimism because their thought surveys the 
worlds which lie beyond their little cosmos… All profound religion is an effort to 
answer the challenge of pessimism.101 
 
As the last sentence indicates, Niebuhr relies on religion to avoid pessimism: “An adequate 
religion is always an ultimate optimism which has entertained all the facts that lead to pessimism. Its 
optimism is based upon a faith in a transcendent center of meaning”.102 Niebuhr also relies on his 
religious views to ground his faith in human individual freedom. But to rely on that freedom 
optimistically without acknowledging its transcendent source is to sin: our individual freedom without 
 
100 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Scribner, 1952), 80. Niebuhr continues: “This belief which 
has found classic expression in the philosophy of John Dewey, pervades the academic disciplines of sociology and 
psychology.” See also Boisvert, “The Nemesis of Necessity,” 155. 
101 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Optimism, Pessimism, and Religious Faith," in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. Robert McAfee 
Brown (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 4.  
102 Niebuhr, “Optimism, Pessimism, and Religious Faith,” 6.  
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God’s grace is only sufficient to lead us further into error. A consistent naturalism (in the sense of 
anti-supernaturalism), Niebuhr argues, thus requires pessimism. 
Niebuhr’s criticism of Dewey is therefore that, given Dewey’s own naturalistic commitments, 
he must be a pessimist, if he is not to fall into hubris. But to have a sense of the tragic is not identical to 
pessimism, and not being a pessimist does not make one a complacent optimist.103 Melvin Rogers has 
argued that Dewey’s A Common Faith is an attempt to come to terms with Niebuhr’s critique on 
religious grounds. He defends Dewey’s sense of the tragic against Niebuhr’s criticisms, arguing that in 
A Common Faith Dewey attempts to refigure religious faith as a response to contingency in naturalistic 
terms.104 My topic here is not Dewey’s philosophy of religion, but, like Rogers, I want to hold that 
recognising the tragedy of the human condition does not require pessimism. Instead, for Dewey, 
recognition of the tragedy of the human condition is precisely the ground for hope in the capacities of 
human agency.105 
Indeed, this discussion of tragedy, I think, implies that the spectrum of optimism and 
pessimism is not even the right conceptual space in which to locate tragedy.106 One way to put this 
 
103 Cf. Miller, "Tragedy and the Common Man." “There is a misconception of tragedy with which I have been struck in 
review after review, and in many conversations with writers and readers alike. It is the idea that tragedy is of necessity allied 
to pessimism.” 
104 Melvin L. Rogers, The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, morality, and the ethos of democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009), Ch 3. 
105 It is true that one can say everything I say here about pessimism, optimism, and hope without grounding it in the 
conception of tragedy that I attribute to Dewey. So if one disagrees with my interpretation of Dewey’s sense of tragedy, 
one could simply jettison it and retain all of this. I think that to do so would be to miss the depth and connectedness of 
Dewey’s thinking on these issues, and perhaps then to have a shallower conception of hope than is necessary to do the 
political work that I think it must play. Thanks to Philip Kitcher for pushing me on this issue and more generally on the 
arguments in this chapter. 
106 See Antonio Gramsci, Notebook 9, §130: “Optimism and pessimism. It should be noted that very often optimism is 
nothing more than a defense of one's laziness, one's irresponsibility, the will to do nothing. It is also a form of fatalism 
and mechanicism. One relies on factors extraneous to one's will and activity, exalts them, and appears to bum with 
sacred enthusiasm. And enthusiasm is nothing more than the external adoration of fetishes. A reaction [is) necessary which 
must have the intelligence for its point of departure. The only justifiable enthusiasm is that which accompanies the 
intelligent will, intelligent activity, the inventive richness of concrete initiatives which change existing reality.” 
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thought is that while optimism and pessimism are theoretical attitudes one can take to the world, tragedy 
in Dewey’s transactional sense and its concomitant attitudes of (say) hope, humility, faith, and despair 
are practical attitudes. By this I mean two things.  
The first is that hope in the sense I mean is a Strawsonian participant attitude. Unlike optimism 
and pessimism, which can be expressed in terms of expectations or probabilistic judgments about future 
states of the world: “I expect the world will become a better place”, or “it’s likely that the world will 
become a worse place”, hope and despair are attitudes towards agents and their capacities. Hope – in the 
sense with which I am concerned – is hope in agents to make things better; to despair is for action to 
become impossible, to see no way for one to act to bring about one’s ends.107 The kind of hope that 
is grounded in a recognition of tragedy is not hope for a desired state of affairs, but hope in people.  
The second is that hope informs action in an open-ended way broader than a narrowly 
deliberative notion of the practical. The kind of hope I have in mind is practical not in specifying a 
desired outcome for which the agent acts – hope in is not practical in the telic sense – but providing 
an explanation, nonetheless, for why the agent acted in the way they did. One can say, for example 
that they acted out of hope, or with hope. Hope in the sense with which I am concerned opens up 
practical possibilities for an agent and shapes the actions they take, without needing to be the reason 
for which they acted in the strict sense of that phrase, namely the end to be achieved by acting. Hope 
understood in this way is a kind of orientation that operates at a deeper level than intentional 
explanation. It shapes the way in which we see the world and others; it directs and refigures our 
 
107 I am perhaps being a little unfair to Niebuhr here. Optimism and pessimism for him clearly have practical import. But 
insofar as the application of that distinction requires a transcendent source of value, it is essential to it that while it affects 
one’s action, that action is in a sense not one’s own, but is an effect of God’s grace. One could say that there is a first-
personal existential aspect, but not yet a true first-personal agential aspect. There is a much larger story here to be told about 
the Augustinian roots of this view and the analysis of optimism/pessimism and faith/despair that I’ve sketched here. 
Thanks to Michael Holmes for pushing me to think through this issue. 
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attention and underpins the interpersonal interactions with have with others. In this way one can have 
a hopeful orientation towards others. 
That hope rests on an understanding of how human agency is bound up with tragedy in the 
Deweyan transactional sense that I have explicated in this chapter. It is important to conceive of hope 
in these terms because it provides an alternative to the pendulum between revolutionary optimism 
and pessimism I identified in the last chapter. It is an alternative not merely as a middle ground 
between the two, but because it occupies a different conceptual frame. Optimism and pessimism are 
theoretical attitudes that a) take as their object states of the world and b) conceive of our relation to that 
world in primarily observational terms. But hope, in the sense that I have outlined here, is a practical 
attitude that takes as its object human agential capacities and conceives of our relation to the world in 
agential terms. Whereas optimism and pessimism pull us apart from the world, hope grounded in the 
recognition of tragedy begins from our necessary transactional entwinement with it. It rests on a 
different kind of possibility, not the probabilistic kind that grounds theoretical inference central to 
optimism or pessimism, but on the practical kind – what it is possible for agents to achieve.  
West and evil 
This last connection between the recognition of tragedy and a hope in the capacities of human 
agency and the kind of practical possibility implicit in that hope is central to Cornel West’s criticism 
of Dewey. West claims precisely that a sense of the tragic is necessary to “keep alive some sense of 
possibility. Some sense of hope. Some sense of agency. Some sense of resistance in a moment of 
defeat and disillusionment and a moment of discouragement.”108 But he criticises Dewey (and the 
pragmatist tradition generally) for lacking that sense of the tragic, which he figures as comprising two 
 
108 Cornel West, "Pragmatism and the Tragic," in Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, Vol.1: Prophetic Thoughts in 
Postmodern Times (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993), 32.  
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ideas: first, “the heroic action of ordinary people in a world of radical contingency”; second, “a deep 
sense of evil that fuels a struggle for justice”.109  
West contrasts Dewey to Josiah Royce, who, according to West, has a deep sense of the tragic 
that comes from his engagement with Schopenhauer and pessimism. West’s criticism on that level is 
similar to Niebuhr’s – West situates his “prophetic pragmatism” in the tradition of “Protestant 
Christianity wedded to left romanticism” – insofar as West thinks that having a sense of the tragic 
requires an existential confrontation with pessimism that, at least for West, rests in the end on 
Christian salvific self-understanding.110 But West recognises that tragedy can be found in secular 
traditions too, as long as they grapple with “the irreducible predicament of unique individuals who 
undergo dread, despair, disillusionment, disease, and death and the institutional forms of oppression 
that dehumanize people.”111 A recognition of and confrontation with these phenomena, as phenomena 
caused by human agency and that affect directly human beings, are part of what West means by a 
sense of the tragic. 
What West is pointing to here, correctly in my view, is that grappling with unfreedom requires 
attention to individuality and personality alongside and within an institutional analysis of the “forms 
of oppression that dehumanize people.”112 Part of West’s “deep sense of evil” is the fact of conscious 
human evil, action that intentionally treats some human beings as lesser than others, action that 
 
109 West, “Pragmatism and the Tragic,” 32. West connects the tragic to the problem of evil as early as Cornel West, Prophesy 
Deliverance! An Afro-American revolutionary Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), 151, fn 9. 
110 There is also of course a political reason for West’s religious pragmatism, which is that the communities of struggle 
with which he is concerned are largely religious communities. See Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A genealogy 
of pragmatism (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), 233-35; Cornel West, "The Political Intellectual," in The Cornel West Reader 
(New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999), 293. “Except for the church there are few potent traditions on which one can fall 
back in dealing with hopelessness and meaninglessness.” 
111 West, American Evasion, 228. 
112 See also American Evasion, 228: “tragic thought… confronts candidly individual and collective experiences of evil in 
individuals and institutions”. 
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oppresses, dominates, and degrades. And it is true that Dewey does not think that the evils that 
afflicted and afflict Black and Native American communities in the United States, or the effects of 
U.S. imperialist foreign policies in the earlier part of the 20th century in Latin America and the 
Philippines, were intentional.113 Dewey’s tendency in such matters is to view these phenomena as 
unintended consequences of well-intentioned actions, of unintentional neglect or oversight. This is an 
important oversight that might rightly be criticised as a kind of blindness on Dewey’s behalf, though 
it is important not to swing too far in the other direction and think that all human ills are intentionally 
caused.  
But that oversight should not be conflated with failing to have a sense of the tragedy of the 
human condition as I have outlined it here. It is, rather, a downstream failing at the level of the 
diagnosis of specific ills and not at the level of understanding the fundamental human condition which 
is the background for those ills.114 In other words, specific human evils and the wrongs we do to each 
other are social and not metaphysical (in the naturalised sense of metaphysical) forms of unfreedom. 
Evil, unlike tragedy, is not something baked into the fundamental human relation to the world. That 
is so even if evil very often results from tragedy, as a human response to it. 
2.5 Tragedy and the problem of unfreedom 
What I’ve done in the previous sections is to elucidate Dewey’s conception of the tragedy of 
the human condition and explain how recognition of that tragedy grounds the moral psychological 
aspect of my response to the problem of unfreedom; namely, a hope in the possibilities of human 
 
113 See John Dewey, "Imperialism is Easy," in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1927), 158-60. “Imperialism is a result, not a purpose or plan.” And later: 
“The ease with which imperialism follows economic exploitation is indicated by the almost unanimous sentiment of 
Americans resident in Mexico… They would deny, and as far as their conscious intent is concerned, deny sincerely, for 
the most part, any imperialistic taint. What they want is simply ‘protection’ for American rights.” 




agency. That tragedy is first of all an aspect of the transactional situation comprising the agent and the 
world that a) necessitates agency, b) enables agency, and c) limits agency. Second, tragedy comprises 
a more clearly subjective aspect: the hubris of thinking that we can transcend the limitations of the 
primary transactional sense of tragedy. I have suggested that certain practical attitudes linked to 
recognition of this tragedy can play an important role in responding to the problem of unfreedom. What 
I will do in this final section is to draw out some of the connections between tragedy and the particular 
social forms of unfreedom we face. In particular, I will argue that the metaphysics of the tragedy of 
the human condition undermine the grounds for revolution and reformism, that there is a helpful 
structural analogy between the tragedy of the human condition and the problem of unfreedom, and 
that we can understand some forms of social unfreedom as arising from hubristic responses to the 
tragedy of the human condition. 
Tragedy, revolution and reform 
The tragedy of the human condition makes the fact of some limitation on our action necessary, 
even if no one particular limitation is necessary. Each method of acting in the face of this condition, 
Dewey says, “brings with it new and unexpected consequences having perils for which we are not 
prepared.”115 So, it provides a principled justification for the claim that there is no final overcoming of 
unfreedom, no utopian ideal state of being, no form of social freedom that could be known 
beforehand and put in place to hold for all time. To think that there is such a final state would be a 
form of hubris. It would be to assert the possibility of knowing beforehand that ideal and being able 
to control all the relevant features of the world so that the ideal could be fully sustained and 
maintained.  
 
115 Quest for Certainty, 7. 
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Let me return to the discussion of revolution and reform from the previous chapter with this 
conception of tragedy in hand. Recall that revolution and reform were two ways of responding to 
unfreedom. On the revolutionary view, overcoming unfreedom involves total change to fundamental 
social institutions (“scope”), quickly (“speed”). Reformism, by contrast, holds that the scope of change 
is more limited, involving just the proper extension of the principles already embedded in our current 
institutions.  
The tragedy of the human condition provides grounds against both those poles of revolution 
and reformism. Let me take each in turn. Recall that the case for revolution in conjoining scope and 
speed might rest on one of two views: natural freedom or naïve structuralism. On the first, human 
beings are naturally free such that removing the constraints will liberate their innate capacities. 
Revolution is a return to our pure, pre-Fall state. But if one accepts the tragic view of the human 
condition, it is part and parcel of our fundamental relation to the world that it be one of limitation, 
hazard, and uncertainty. It is only given those features of our relation to the world that our agency is 
called upon at all. So our “natural” state is not one of absolute freedom, but rather of the difficult and 
hazardous use of our agency necessitated by what the world throws at us. 
Naïve structuralism holds that change in the objective institutional structures of society would 
be sufficient for change in ideas. I suggested in the previous chapter a connection between naïve 
structuralism and technocratic responses to unfreedom, according to which those in positions of 
knowledge and power change the conditions to liberate the rest of us. We can see more clearly now 
how that naïve structuralism rests on a hubristic conception of human action: that we can grasp what 
needs to be done, we can grasp from above the causal pattern of the disorders of the world and act to 
make only the necessary changes. But the effects of our actions outrun our intentions, the world is 
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not so easily graspable by us, and the illusion of top-down control is a reflection of that “desire to get 
above and beyond” ourselves that Dewey criticises.116  
Reformism rests on the claim that our present institutions embody, in germ, certain ideals of 
freedom. But that is to assert that there is a final form of freedom, and that we have it already (at least 
in embryo). So reformism too is hubristic: why assume that we have grasped those final ideals? 
Recognising the tragedy of the human condition counsels that we keep an eye out for how what we 
have built may come, through unexpected changes, to constrain and restrict us, and responding to 
those constraints may in turn require drastic and transformative changes to those institutions.  
Getting in view the tragedy of the human condition thus helps clarify and expand the 
arguments I made in Chapter 1 against revolution and reformism. In doing so it helps clear the ground 
for the transformationist view I proposed. 
Analogy between tragedy of human condition and social forms of unfreedom 
There is a structural analogy between the tragedy of the human condition and the problem of 
unfreedom. In both, we find ourselves as agents in a situation that consists in certain constraints and 
challenges. We want to act so as to address those constraints and challenges, and we must do so in 
medias res, without full fore-knowledge of either an end goal or the precise means to achieve that 
goal, under circumstances where our action could lead to further unexpected circumstances. What this 
structural analogy reveals is something like an overall attitude with which to approach the problem of 
unfreedom, one which takes seriously the contingency of even those limitations that seem most 
permanent and pressing.  
 
116 Niebuhr is good on this critical theme: “generally it is assumed that some group of men has the intelligence to 
manipulate and manage the process [of history]. The excessive voluntarism which underlies this theory of an elite, explicit 
in communism and implicit in some democratic theory, is encouraged by the excessive determinism, which assumes that 
most men are creatures with simple determinate ends of life”. The Irony of American History, 80. 
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That attitude has several features. First, it is a practical attitude that takes as its starting point 
the problems we as situated agents face and asks what we can do to address those problems. It 
recognises the limitations that are part and parcel of human agency and does not seek for some 
external Archimedean point from which we could survey everything. (In that way it is tied up with an 
internalist response to the problem of unfreedom.) In recognising those limitations and finding ways 
to act within them and to change them, it evinces a hope in the capacities of human agency – in what 
we can achieve as fallible, limited agents, if we work together. And, taking into account West’s critique 
of Dewey, it is clear-eyed about human evil – how we can and do act explicitly and intentionally to 
oppress and dominate and demean others for some perceived benefit of our own. In later chapters of 
this dissertation, I will examine (drawing on Du Bois and Ambedkar) institutions of unfreedom which 
embody that kind of evil. And, as West insists, the kind of practical attitude of hope in the capacities 
of human agency, despite that evil, is central to how Du Bois and Ambedkar address those institutions. 
Institution-building is a response to tragedy 
The final point to make is that the problem of unfreedom arises out of the tragedy of the 
human condition. We create structures of social organisation – institutions – as ways of pooling and 
extending our agency in order to help us cope with the threats and hazards the world poses to us. And 
those institutions in turn come to constrain us in various ways, whether deliberately or accidentally. 
Institutions are the products of human agency that in turn shape the possibilities for agency. 
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey makes this point with a speculative genealogy. For our 
purposes, it does not matter whether the genealogy is a true one or not; it is, at the very least, 
incomplete and emphasises certain anthropological and sociological themes over others. The point is 
to get in view the formation of institutions as a response to the tragedy of the human condition. 
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Dewey proposes that humans respond to hazard in two ways. The first is by “changing the 
self in emotion and idea”, and the second by “changing the world through action”.117 Changing the 
self in emotion and idea is the impulse embedded in religion and philosophy. In the early religious 
disposition, Dewey suggests, we try to ally ourselves with the unknown forces of the world, with the 
holy and the mysterious, by conforming ourselves to their demands through ritual, omen, and magic. 
Philosophy took up this general cultural disposition and rationalised it. It turned the distinction 
between the holy and the profane into hierarchies of Being. The philosophical rendering of changing 
oneself, in Dewey’s mind, is most clearly exemplified in a turning away from the irrational and 
incomplete world towards the rational, complete-in-itself Absolute.118 We localise hazard by orienting 
ourselves towards that which is essentially non-hazardous, because outside this world. But since 
hazard and conflict are not merely subjective projections onto the world, the mere changing of oneself 
leaves the hazard itself untouched: it is, for Dewey, a “withdrawal from reality”.119 Whereas in the early 
religious disposition, the holy and the powerful attended and elevated the practical arts, in philosophy 
the two become two realms. Change of self as a means of response to tragic situations becomes merely 
a pessimistic quietism that leaves everything as it is.  
Changing the world through action is the mode of response found in the various arts and in 
modern science as it grew out of those practical and technological arts. Those arts gave humans some 
 
117 Quest for Certainty, 3. This distinction is schematic only; literally taken, it is inconsistent with Dewey’s own 
transactionalism, on which the world and the self cannot so easily be pulled apart. In putting forward this distinction, 
Dewey is concerned to criticise a certain philosophical tendency to prioritise the ideal over the material. We can take that 
point, however, without accepting a strict distinction between changing self and changing world. It would be more in line 
with Dewey’s own commitments to understand the ideal and the material as in interaction. Ideas can come to exert a force 
of their own on the material situation, and changing those ideas can be essential for changing the material situation. 
118 “Philosophers have celebrated the method of change in personal ideas, and religious teachers that of change in the 
affections of the heart. These conversions have been prized on their own account, and only incidentally because of a 
change in action which would ensue… The honorable quality associated with the idea of the ‘spiritual’ has been reserved 
for change in inner attitudes.” Quest for Certainty, 4. 
119 Logic, 110. 
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agency over nature; they allowed us, through connecting together events in chains and networks of 
meaning, to determine to some degree the course of events.120 These arts required forms of social 
organisation. The arts had to be learnt and thus passed down through generations; thus they required 
structures of apprenticeship. And as they became more complicated, the arts required co-ordination 
between many agents. All of this required a certain stability in social form that would enable these 
practices to continue and to reproduce themselves. That is, action in the form of the various arts and 
sciences, as exercises of human agency, are responses to the tragedy of the human condition, and that 
action requires and also contributes to the creation of institutions – forms of social organisation – that 
enable and foster the exercise of human agency.  
For analytic purposes, we can divide institutions of unfreedom into two categories (though 
there are no doubt other ways to divide them up). The first category comprises those institutions that 
promise (we think) to foster freedom for all, but for various unexpected reasons come to constrain 
us. The second category comprises those institutions that we make that deliberately render others 
unfree in order to protect something of ours, or that we take to be ours. Dewey’s genealogy reveals 
that he thinks of all institutions as belonging to the first category. If we develop institutions to foster 
agency in response to worldly hazards, then all institutions have a positive function, even if they then 
come to fall short of that function. As I will argue in the next chapter, this model of institutional 
function gives us insight into how political democratic institutions come to constrain freedom by 
falling into oligarchy. 
But recall Cornel West’s critique of Dewey as not properly cognisant of human evil. There is 
no reason to rule out from the outset institutions that have as their deliberate function the unfreedom 
of some. So in Chapters 4 and 5 I move away from Dewey to Du Bois and Ambedkar in order to 
 
120 Compare Logic, Chs 3-6. 
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understand paradigm institutions of the second category. But even in the face of such institutions that 
deliberately constrain freedom, Du Bois and Ambedkar have something of the same attitude as that 
which arises from the Deweyan tragedy of the human condition – that practical attitude of hope in 





Chapter 3: Dewey’s Critique of Political Democracy in Market 
Society 
the marketing mind contained the seeds of a whole culture – with all its 
possibilities and limitations – and the picture of inner man and society induced 
by life in a market economy necessarily followed from the essential structure 
of a human community organized through the market.1 
 
In this chapter, drawing on John Dewey’s political thought from the 1920s and 1930s, I 
examine one kind of unfreedom, that which arises from institutions that promised to foster (indeed, 
some think, have actually achieved) freedom for all.2 The two institutions that I will take as paradigm 
in this respect are political democracy and our existing capitalist market society.3 Political democracy 
is thought to provide a kind of collective freedom, a way for a number of people to decide together 
what they will do.4 Capitalist markets are thought to promote individual freedom of choice, by creating 
more options between which people can choose, more resources for them to pursue those options, 
and thereby better enabling them to satisfy their desires.  
However, I will argue, following Dewey, that these institutions have not lived up to that 
promise. Dewey is rightly known as a staunch proponent of democracy. Yet in The Public and Its 
Problems, the same work where he so vehemently defends democracy against Walter Lippmann’s 
technocratic and epistocratic arguments, he provides a deep and scathing critique of the present 
 
1 Karl Polanyi, “The Economistic Fallacy,” in Karl Polanyi, Economy and Society, ed. Michele Cangiani and Claus 
Thomasberger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 267. 
2 Or, at least, all who live under such institutions. 
3 From here on I will use “market society” and cognates to refer to “capitalist market society”, in the specific sense that I 
define later in this section and in more detail in section 3.4. 
4 By “collective freedom” here, I mean to be as neutral as possible – something like “an increase in agential capacities of a 




institutional forms of democracy, forms which Dewey collectively refers to with the term “political 
democracy”. Dewey argues that political democracy has fallen into oligarchy, which serves only the 
economic and political interest of the few, consigning the rest to varying degrees of material constraint 
and political disempowerment. And the reason why it is difficult for us taken collectively to change 
that situation is because political democracy operates with a double-sided moral psychology fostered 
by capitalist market society, one characterised by (on the positive side) hope and desire for self-
achievement and (on the negative side) fear and anxiety. That moral psychology renders difficult forms 
of trust, community, and solidarity that are required for the proper functioning of political democratic 
institutions. Democracy is corrupted by the ways in which market society shapes our ways of thinking 
and feeling.5  
By “market society”, I mean a society in which a) markets, through pricing mechanisms, are 
the main means of social co-ordination, b) there is an interconnected market system centrally involving 
the private ownership and commodification of essential aspects of life (for Dewey, land, labour, and 
what Dewey broadly calls the means of the development of personal powers), and c) the means of 
transaction (money) are commodified through a financial and banking system that underwrites and 
supports the commodification of life through increasing the possibilities of using capital in new ways 
(for example, by collateralising property and debt, or by creating new financial instruments to make 
money off money).6 This target of criticism extends beyond “laissez-faire”, or minimally regulated 
 
5 Dewey is not alone in making this critique at this time in the United States. W. E. B. Du Bois, in Darkwater (1920) and 
works continuing through to Black Reconstruction (1935) and Dusk of Dawn (1940), makes a similar argument against the 
oligarchic tendencies of “democratic despotism” under capitalism in favour of “industrial democracy”, which involves 
democratic control over the means of production and small-scale consumer co-operatives. There is a much larger story to 
be told about these kinds of visions and the decolonial movements in Africa, Latin America, and Asia after the Second 
World War. I address this aspect of Du Bois’s thought briefly in Chapter 5. 
6 Two qualifications are important. First, this is not an exhaustive list of the features of capitalist market society that Dewey 
criticises or that are worth criticism. But they are those which are central to my analysis here. One might, for example, 
want to add the profit motive, the specification of certain (merely formal) individual rights to property, or – more broadly 
– a certain formalised kind of legal system. I think these either follow from or are necessary for the stability of the features 
of market society outlined here. One might rightly also want to focus more than I do on the financial aspects of 
contemporary capitalism, given the recent large increase in that sphere. See e.g. Samir Amin, The Implosion of Contemporary 
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markets, insofar as this market system could be quite highly regulated by some form of the social 
democratic welfare state and still foster the anti-democratic moral psychology outlined in this chapter.7 
Capitalist markets also stabilise themselves by destabilising social democratic constraints that are placed 
on them. Both sets of institutions – capitalist markets and an oligarchic political democracy – stabilise 
each other. 
The two sides of that moral psychology fostered by market society are in a functional sense 
complementary. They work together to maintain oligarchy. But they are in a psychological sense in 
tension. Fear and anxiety undermine hope and desire. They render us unable to act to achieve what 
we hope for and desire. Together, the two sides manifest in apathy and scepticism about the possibility 
of larger transformative political change. 
At the centre of this Deweyan critique is the general claim that our moral psychology is not 
fixed, but is rather shaped by the social institutions in which we live. So what seem to be naturally 
fixed features of human agency may in fact be features fostered by human institutions like those of 
political democracy and capitalist markets. That claim will also be borne out in the analyses of the 
 
Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, evolution, 
future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital: How the law creates wealth and 
inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019). Second, the criticism I mount in this chapter is consistent with 
claiming (though I do not positively make this claim) that markets of some sort, in some kinds of goods or services, with 
some level of regulation (from whatever agency), could be part of an ideal social order once disembedded from these 
features of a market society insofar as they do not foster the kind of problematic moral psychology criticised here. Such 
markets would have to be embedded in a wider democratic social (and not merely politically or electorally democratic) 
order.  
7 I say “minimally regulated markets” insofar as a modern market economy is never fully free from regulation, since such 
an economy is dependent upon the state for its existence and maintenance. See e.g. Charles E. Lindblom, The Market 
System: What it is, how it works, and what to make of it (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). And the comparison with a 
minimally regulated market is not only with the social democratic welfare state that imposes constraints on the market. 
Regulation may of course – as we see increasingly now – be part of what might broadly be called “ordoliberalism”, by 
which I mean the use of (quite heavy) state regulation to mimic the ideal frictionless and competitive free market – a view 
of the role of the state vis-à-vis the market that we find earlier in Adam Smith, for instance, as well as in some strands of 
Hayek’s thought. See e.g. Walter Bonefeld, "Adam Smith and Ordoliberalism," Review of International Studies 39, no. 2 (2013); 
Walter Bonefeld, "Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism," New Political Economy 17, no. 5 (2012); 
Thomas Biebricher, "Ordoliberalism and the Eurozone Crisis: Toward a more perfect market of jurisdictions?," in 
Ordoliberalism and European Economic Policy: Between realpolitik and economic utopia, ed. Malte Dold and Tim Krieger (London: 
Routledge, 2019). Or regulation may be used to dampen competition and lock in monopoly or oligopoly. 
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institutions of caste and race in Chapters 4 and 5. This Deweyan critique embodies the problem of 
unfreedom. Our institutions have shaped our moral psychology so that democratic institutions do not 
in fact foster freedom. And since we have been shaped in that way, our agency is inept to change the 
institutions, in turn further confirming our unfreedom. So the problem with political democracy in a 
market society comprises a vicious cycle between our social institutions and our moral psychology.  
Here’s how the chapter will proceed. In section 1, I’ll first situate Dewey’s argument in The 
Public and Its Problems with respect to the neo-Hegelian and Lippmanian views to which he was 
responding. Dewey situates his position as a middle ground between those two views. That situating, 
I will argue in section 2, allows Dewey to raise his key theoretical insight: that our moral psychology 
is shaped by our social institutions. Sections 3 and 4 will argue that that insight forms the basis for his 
critique of political democracy, which in turn rests on elucidating the double-sided moral psychology 
fostered by market society. I will illustrate Dewey’s analysis by an analysis of a particular, highly 
regulated market: that of Australian higher education. The upshot of Dewey’s analysis, set out in 
section 5, will be that vicious cycle identified above. Making democracy work will require shifting the 
hold of the market on our society. But the first (necessary, but not sufficient) step in doing that is 
through politically imposed constraints on the tendencies of the market; that is, subsuming the market 
to politics through some form of social democratic constraint, exemplified in Dewey’s time by the 
New Deal. I will close in section 6 with a closer examination of the double-sided moral psychology 
and the political possibilities it leaves open for moving toward freedom. That examination will point 
to the institutional analysis of institutions that deliberately constrain freedom, which will come in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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3.1 Background: Dewey, Hegel, and Lippmann 
Dewey’s arguments in The Public and its Problems must be situated with respect to two views: 
what I’ll call the neo-Hegelian and Lippmanian views of democracy respectively.8 Both views, for Dewey, 
go wrong insofar as they identify the idea of democracy (“democracy as a social idea”) with the 
particular institutional governmental forms that democracy takes (“political democracy as a system of 
government”).9 The neo-Hegelian view uses this identification to vindicate the present institutional 
forms, while the Lippmanian view does so in order to criticise them. Dewey’s first key move in The 
Public and its Problems is to disentangle these two meanings of democracy, so that he can accept the 
critique of democracy and thus the need for extensive if not total reform of the present institutional 
forms of government, while doing so still by appeal to some larger ideal of democracy as a social idea: 
a middle way between the two views.  
Disentangling the two meanings of democracy also allows Dewey to make an important 
theoretical intervention. It allows him to make the point that institutions shape human agency, the ways 
of thinking and feeling by which agents, from their own point of view, engage with others and the 
world. Through that institutional shaping of human agency, broader social institutions and social 
forms (like the market) affect the functioning of the institutions of political democracy. These 
institutions are not normatively separated, but rather systematically interconnected. Let me now 
distinguish Dewey’s view from the neo-Hegelian and Lippmanian views. 
On the neo-Hegelian view, these present institutional forms already embody, at least in 
principle, the idea of democracy: “there is a current legend to the effect that the [democratic] 
 
8 Dewey’s own previous neo-Hegelianism can be found in his John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy," in The Early 
Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1882-
1888). There, he criticises Henry Maine’s Popular Government on neo-Hegelian grounds. See also Richard J. Bernstein, 
"Dewey's Vision of Radical Democracy," in The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, ed. Molly Cochran (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
9 The Public and Its Problems, 325. 
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movement originated in a single clear-cut idea, and has proceeded by a single unbroken impetus to 
unfold itself to a predestined end”.10 The forms of political democracy have been brought into 
existence by the idea of democracy, even if that idea is not yet fully actualised in those forms. Thus, 
the process of institutional reform must be limited and be directed towards revealing and clarifying 
the implicit rational basis upon which those institutions rest. That rational basis, in the circumstances 
in which Dewey was writing, was perceived to be the principle of individual autonomy, self-interest, 
and freedom from constraint – what Dewey calls, in Individualism Old and New, the “old 
individualism”.11 But the same structure (and Dewey’s same critique) could hold for values other than 
freedom and liberty. We might think that political democracy is justified because it intrinsically 
embodies equality or respect for human dignity, for instance. 
The neo-Hegelian view is a reformist view, in the sense I identified in Chapter 1. In holding 
that the institutions of political democracy already embody an ideal of freedom, it denies that 
transformative changes need to be made to the system as a whole. Although Dewey held neo-Hegelian 
reformist views in the later years of the 1890s, he had been moving away from that earlier neo-
Hegelianism at least since the middle of the first decade of the 1900s.12 That move was more or less 
complete by the early 1920s, though there was a remaining “permanent Hegelian deposit” in Dewey’s 
thinking, as he acknowledged.13 Consonant with this shift, Dewey found it untenable to maintain that 
the forms of political democracy contained even in germ the social idea of democracy:  
 
10 The Public and its Problems, 287. I call the view neo-Hegelian as it is neither Hegelian in substance (vis-à-vis the content of 
the state or of freedom) nor in method. I also want to remain as neutral as I can on the extent of Dewey’s departure from 
and continued debt to his earlier Hegelian views, as well as on the precise nature of that departure or debt. 
11 See Dewey, Individualism, Old and New. Dewey’s own earlier neo-Hegelianism was not so individualistic. It rather 
conceived of the form of democracy on the organic model of society. See “The Ethics of Democracy”. 
12 See e.g. Good, "John Dewey's "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" and the Exigencies of War."; James A. Good, A Search for 
Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006). 
13 See also Jim Garrison, "The “Permanent Deposit” of Hegelian Thought in Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry," Educational 
Theory 56, no. 1 (2006); Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 328-29. The 




When these conditions [of democracy as a social idea] are brought into being they will 
make their own forms. Until they have come about, it is somewhat futile to consider 
what political machinery will suit them.14 
 
Dewey’s shift from neo-Hegelianism reformism toward the transformationist view evidenced 
in this quote was confirmed by his reading of Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion and The Phantom Public 
in the early 1920s. Lippmann criticised democracy for relying on a false conception of human nature: 
that of the “omnicompetent individual” whose thoughts and actions are wholly transparent to himself, 
who is capable of grasping all the facts relevant to a decision, and who acts only on what he takes to 
be in his best interest – roughly what we now call perfect rational actor theory. Lippmann’s critique 
of the omnicompetent individual is a familiar one to us now. Human rationality is not perfect, but 
bounded. We make decisions not through a fully rational process, but through the use of cognitive 
shortcuts, stereotypes, intuitions, feelings, and generalisations.15 There is too much information for 
the average time-poor citizen to process.16 And, in any case, our best interests come apart from the 
interests of society taken as a whole. So not only are we ill-equipped psychologically to reason to the 
right answers, we do not and cannot have access to a sufficient information base to deliberate properly, 
and even if we were able so to deliberate, the end goal of each person’s deliberative process would 
likely be too narrowly self-interested to encompass the whole society. In short, for Lippmann, human 
 
Hegel has left a permanent deposit on my thinking. The form, the schematism, of his system now seems to me artificial 
to the last degree. But in the content of his ideas there is often an extraordinary depth...taken out of their mechanical 
dialectical setting, an extraordinary acuteness.”  
14 The Public and its Problems, 327. 
15 Cf. Daniel Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: A perspective on intuitive judgment and choice," Nobel Prize 
Lecture 8 (2002). See also Tversky and Kahneman’s earlier work, e.g. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing 
of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science 211, no. 4481 (1981). For an overview of dual systems or dual processes 
theories, see Keith Frankish, "Dual‐Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning," Philosophy Compass 5, no. 10 (2010): 
and references therein.  
16 Compare the arguments made by Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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beings are naturally short-sighted, apathetic, more committed (and rightly so!) to their private concerns 
than to the public weal, subject to the stereotypes that the media put into their heads, and thus 
incapable of having the depth of understanding of complex affairs necessary for democratic 
citizenship. Human nature is unsuited for democracy. 
Instead of democracy, Lippmann argues, the best form of government would be technocratic 
and epistocratic: rule by experts.17 The only role of the populace would be to keep the experts in check 
through a process of external review that Lippmann imagines would be akin to a popular form of 
judicial review of administrative action. The merits of a policy would not be up for debate; only 
whether the course of action taken by our technocratic overlords is reasonable or arbitrary.18 
For Lippmann, democracy fails because it presupposes the omnicompetent conception of the 
individual, who takes society as a whole as the locus of their deliberation and decision-making. Dewey 
acknowledged the force of Lippmann’s critique, but thought the positive appeal to human nature 
specious.19 What we instead should ask, Dewey thought (here following the neo-Hegelians), is how the 
individual came to have that nature – what are the social conditions that creates that kind of individual? 
If we can change those conditions that limit individual capacities, Dewey argued, then we can perhaps 
foster a different kind of human agency, one on which a better democratic politics could be built. So 
for Dewey, unlike for Lippmann, the critique does not lead to the necessity of technocracy or of 
epistocracy. Rather, it points for Dewey to the necessity of understanding the sources of the failings 
 
17 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Greenbook Publications, 2010 [1922]), Ch XXV. 
18 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993 [1927]), Chs XI and XII. This 
technocracy at the higher level is coupled with some kind of principle of subsidiarity, if not a full return to the town hall 
and local government. See Chs XV and XVI. 
19 One might resituate Lippmann’s concerns in terms of complexity and scale and not in terms of human nature. But if 
the problem is just one of complexity and scale, then that doesn’t imply Lippmann’s managerialism. It may, for example, 
imply exactly what Dewey suggests: better democratic institutions and education. 
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of political democracy. We might then be able to identify present reforms that can be made now that 
might later lead to the realisation of democracy as a social idea.20 
3.2 Political democracy and democracy as a social idea 
I will begin by clarifying the concept of “political democracy” and the relevant contrast to 
“democracy as a social idea.” That clarification will bring out Dewey’s critique of political democracy 
and lay the ground for his important insight into the relation between social institutions like democracy 
and agents’ moral psychology: that institutions rely upon and shape human agency.  
“Democracy as a social idea” refers to democracy as Dewey’s ideal of a self-recognised Public, 
“the idea of community life itself”.21 The full explication of that ideal is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. I will sketch its contours here for the purpose of contrasting it to political democracy and for 
drawing out the relation between institutions and moral psychology.22 There are two broad points to 
make to contrast democracy as a social idea to political democracy, one about the idea itself and 
another about its scope – keeping in mind that these points are merely sketching the contours of the 
concept and are not intended to provide a full characterisation of it.  
The substantive content of “democracy as a social idea” is larger than merely “having a say” 
in how one is governed. We can think of it in terms of intelligent self-determination through public 
processes of inquiry, which requires and in turn fosters the development and growth of individual 
 
20 Dewey’s views are subject to the same critique as all views that deny the revolutionary commitment to scope are: why 
won’t those reforms be limiting rather than enabling of wider social change? A chasm, after all, cannot be crossed in two 
steps, and so on. That critique is important to keep in mind and is why Dewey insists, in a transformationist spirit, that 
the institutions that will comprise in part democracy as a social idea cannot be specified before the fact. 
21 The Public and its Problems, 328. 
22 In any case, Dewey is not very clear about its contours; indeed, all he ends up saying in The Public and Its Problems is that 
there are necessary communicative and moral psychological conditions for whatever that ideal ends up looking like. 
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agential capacities and ways of thinking and feeling that can be put toward that collective process of 
self-determination.23 
In terms of scope, democracy in the sense of a social idea extends beyond merely political 
institutions to the warp and weft of social life and the self-conceptions, ways of thinking and feeling, 
and agential capacities of individual citizens.24 It describes a situation in which that democratic idea 
infuses all social institutions (for example the workplace, the means of production, educative 
institutions), not only those narrowly concerned with state-based politics.25 Democracy as a social idea 
ties together individuals and groups into a community that is able to think and act intelligently in a 
self-correcting way. That community will have its political institutions, but those institutions will be 
expressions of democracy as it encompasses the whole of social life.26 
The theoretical insight contained in this conception of democracy is that political institutions 
must be understood in relation to the self-conceptions, ways of thinking and feeling, and agential 
capacities of members of society. That relation runs in two directions. The first is that the functioning 
of institutions relies on members of society having certain capacities, ways of thinking and feeling – in 
general, having a certain moral psychology. This point is familiar from claims like the following: 
functioning democracies rely on the good will of citizenry, on constitutional patriotism, on trust, on 
 
23 Dewey provides scattered statements of this idea throughout his corpus. Here is but one that connects to the practical 
hope in others that I outlined in the last chapter: “Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the 
possibilities of human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed. That belief is without 
basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human 
being… a belief which brings with it the need for providing conditions which will enable these capacities to reach 
fulfilment.” John Dewey, "Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us," in The Later Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The 
Collected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1939-1941), 226. 
24 See Michele M. Moody-Adams, "Democratic Conflict and the Political Morality of Compromise," in NOMOS LIX: 
Compromise, ed. Jack Knight (New York: New York University Press, 2018). 
25 The Public and its Problems, 325 and following. 
26 Such a community would have to be in fact an overlapping and intersecting set of smaller communities. Ambedkar 
makes this aspect of Dewey’s thought explicit and central to his thought, and Du Bois seems to have a similar “federal” 
structure in mind in his writings on industrial democracy and black self-segregation, especially in the 1930s and 40s. 
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forms of sympathetic mutual responsiveness.27 A corollary of this point is that institutions with the 
same formal structure, by which I mean the same objective roles with the same deontic properties – 
rights, responsibilities, powers, obligations, and so on – can operate in vastly different ways depending 
on the people that populate them. It matters which President and which judges are in office, even if 
the constitutional powers of the President and judges remain the same.28 
The second direction is that institutions shape the agency of the people who occupy 
institutional roles.29 They foster certain capacities and ways of thinking and feeling, in ways which 
cannot be captured on a purely deontic analysis of institutional structure.30 Take two examples. The 
first is the phenomenon of regulatory capture. The regulatory agencies of particular sectors of the 
economy sometimes come to take on the ways of seeing the world characteristic of those sectors, 
which often run contrary to the explicit norms and rules that define the function of the regulator. For 
example, many have argued that one significant cause of recent financial crises, including the 2007 
global financial crisis and the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, was that the regulatory agencies 
which were meant to act as a check on these financial sectors instead facilitated the kinds of financial 
 
27 See e.g. Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Annette Baier, "Trust and 
Antitrust," Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986); Mark Warren, ed., Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Mark Warren, "Trust and Democracy," in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018); Patti Tamara Lenard, "The Decline of Trust, the Decline of Democracy?," Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2005); Patti Tamara Lenard, "The Political Philosophy of Trust and 
Distrust in Democracies and Beyond," The Monist 98, no. 4 (2015); Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On “constitutional patriotism”," 
Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000). 
28 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, “An Achievement Concept of Law,” (paper, NYU Legal, Social, Political Philosophy 
Colloquium, New York, September 3, 2020); "Governance structures, legal systems, and the concept of law," Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 79 (2004). The point here has not merely to do with the scope of discretionary power exercisable by a particular 
official, but also to do with the attitude that a particular person may bring to the official role. 
29 “[S]ocial arrangements and institutions were thought of as things that operate from without, not entering in any 
significant way into the internal make-up and growth of individuals.” Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 30. 
30 By a “deontic analysis”, I mean an analysis of institutional structure in terms of norms that define institutional positions 
in terms of the rights, privileges, powers, duties, and immunities that the occupants of those roles enjoy and exercise. 
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practices that caused the crises.31 They did so because they came to see things from the perspective of 
(e.g.) investment banks and not from the perspective of a regulator intended to serve the wider 
collective interest.32 
The second example is the historical relation between the modern state and nationalism. As 
Ernest Gellner and others have argued, nationalism (understood in broad terms as the feeling that 
one’s political group should be congruent with the political entity to which one belongs) is parasitic, 
historically and conceptually, on the existence of the modern state. An institution (the state), brings into 
existence a new way of being in the world, a new set of emotions and commitments and belongings, that of 
nationalism.33 And nationalism, in turn, had its own effects on the institution of the state. The state 
became a locus for the self-creation of a people, the repository of their self-conceptions. New 
imaginative possibilities were brought into existence. 
This point about the shaping of agency by institutions is less often made or emphasised, 
particularly in contemporary analytic political philosophy, perhaps because there are good theoretical 
reasons to minimise the thickness of the conception of human agency when theorists are engaging in 
institutional analysis. For example, as Sally Haslanger argues, it is a good thing to be able to give an 
analysis of an institution that does not require us to investigate the subjective psychology of every 
participant in the institution.34 We want to be able to give an explanation at a certain level of generality 
 
31 See e.g. Adam J. Levitin, "The politics of financial regulation and the regulation of financial politics: A review essay," 
Harv. L. Rev. 127 (2013); Justin Rex, "Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and 
remedying capture," Regulation & Governance 14, no. 2 (2020); G. P. Manish and Colin O'Reilly, "Banking Regulation, 
Regulatory Capture and Inequality," Public Choice 180 (2019).  
32 No doubt some of these regulatory failings were also failings to carry out the duties associated with the role of regulator. 
There were conflicts of interest, abuses of power, and so on. But there was also capture in this ideological or perspectival 
sense – how regulators came to think of themselves in different ways. 
33 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publishing, 1983). 
34 Sally Haslanger, "What is a Social Practice?," Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (2018): 235; Sally Haslanger, "What 
is a (Social) Structural Explanation?," Philosophical Studies 173, no. 1 (2016). See also Amie L. Thomasson, "Structural 
explanations and norms: Comments on Haslanger," Philosophical Studies 173, no. 1 (2016). 
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that abstracts away from those subjective peculiarities. Something like this reasoning underlies the 
appeal of rational actor theory. It is a useful thing to have a simple yet abstract model of human agency 
that nonetheless has significant explanatory power across different domains. Nonetheless, we should 
realise in our more reflective moments that it is an abstraction.  
Haslanger gives another reason to assume a minimal psychology of a particular sort: one that 
rests on a general and objective third-personal conception of the agent, and not the agent’s own first-
person perspective from which they act. Such an objectified psychology allows the theorist to “look 
behind” that first-person perspective.35 It enables, Haslanger thinks, a critical theory that can judge an 
agent’s perspective from a non-ideological and objective perspective. So to the extent that an 
institution does shape individuals’ agency, that can be discounted as ideology. But there is no reason 
to think that all shaping of agency is ideological in the negative sense, and one might think that ideology 
critique requires rather than rules out beginning from the first-person perspective of agency, to begin 
from the way in which agents see the world.36 
These are two powerful theoretical reasons to assume a minimal and objective moral 
psychology in our institutional analysis, something like a rational actor theory. But to do so is to rule 
out on methodological grounds Dewey’s theoretical insight: that institutions both rely on and shape 
individual moral psychology. That theoretical insight forms the basis for Dewey’s critique of political 
democracy and market society that is to follow. So, while accepting that this theoretical insight requires 
further methodological defence against these other views, I accept it here partly on the basis of the 
examples above, and partly in the hope that it is vindicated by the analysis that follows. 
 
35 Sally Haslanger, Critical Theory and Practice (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum & Comp. bv, 2017). 
36 That is a much larger methodological debate than I have room to engage in here. I point to something like this 
methodology in later chapters of this dissertation, without providing a full justification for it. 
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So what is “political democracy”? That term, for Dewey, refers to the particular institutional 
forms and practices that presently constitute a “mode of government”.37 By “government”, Dewey 
means “public officials” in contrast to “private persons”. Officials represent the public and “look out 
for and take care” of the interests of those private persons affected.38 So, unlike democracy as a social 
idea which encompasses a whole social order, political democracy comprises only those official 
institutions that make decisions on behalf of a public (which is of course not to say that they are not 
held responsible and accountable to that public in various ways and in turn contribute to the formation 
and clarification of that public).39 The institutional forms and practices that comprise political 
democracy include, Dewey says, “[g]eneral suffrage, elected representatives, majority rule…, frequent 
elections, … congressional and cabinet government”.40  
A common way of understanding these governmental forms is in terms of the rights, 
privileges, powers, and responsibilities that agents have by participating in those forms in different 
roles. So, for example, citizens have the right (and perhaps the duty) to cast a vote, the power in casting 
that vote to determine (or at least to influence) which people fill other roles (of representative, say), 
which come with other rights, duties, and powers, say the right to propose legislation, the privilege to 
speak in Parliament, the immunity from defamation while speaking in Parliament, and so on. The 
institutions of political democracy comprise, from this formal and structural perspective, the 
interlocking set of such roles with their concomitant deontic properties.41 
 
37 The Public and Its Problems, 286. 
38 The Public and Its Problems, 246.  
39 See generally Ch 1 of The Public and Its Problems. For a study of the constitutive force of one kind of institution (political 
parties) that is sometimes taken to be solely representative in the sense of reflective of existing interests, see Cedric De 
Leon, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tuğal, "Political Articulation: Parties and the constitution of cleavages in the United States, 
India, and Turkey," Sociological Theory 27, no. 3 (2009). 
40 The Public and Its Problems, 326. 
41 We could extend this skeleton structuralist account in various ways, by distinguishing (following Rawls, Hart, and Searle) 
between kinds of rules that determine the relevant deontic properties of roles, by including rules that define concepts or 
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But in distinguishing between “political democracy” and “democracy as a social idea”, Dewey 
makes room for the following possibility, drawing on the theoretical insight I articulated earlier. 
Institutions are not merely formal normative structures comprising roles that carry various deontically 
defined rights, duties, powers, etc. They also shape and foster the ways of thinking and feeling that 
agents within those institutions have, ways of thinking and feeling that come to determine how those 
institutions function. Dewey critiques the institutions of political democracy on the basis that they 
have come to operate on the basis of a moral psychology fostered by market society, one which means 
those institutions fail to foster the moral psychology necessary for democracy as a social idea. 
3.3 Dewey’s critique of political democracy 
Dewey’s critique of political democracy is that it has fallen into oligarchy. What was intended 
as rule of the many has become rule of the few. The oligarchy that is created is not even an enlightened 
oligarchy. The few do not rule openly for the good of all. Rather, they rule using democratic forms of 
majority rule for their own benefit. This oligarchy enables and contributes to unjust economic and 
social inequalities, exploitation of the many by the few, and (though Dewey did not emphasise this 
aspect of the unfreedom imposed by political democracy) outright oppression and domination of 
certain groups by others – all of which contribute to the incapacity for collective self-determination 
that ordinary citizens face. Political democracy has fallen into oligarchy because of the double-sided 
moral psychology fostered by market society. That moral psychology comprises a positive side of 
(wrongly directed) hope and desire, and a negative side of fear and anxiety. 
In order to get this critique on the table, Dewey must first undermine the neo-Hegelian view 
that that the forms of political democracy actualise a principle of freedom, one that has driven the 
development of these political forms. This negative step is necessary both substantively (because 
 
particular kinds of resources that agents can use in those roles (this piece of paper is now a “vote”) and so on. These 
extensions do not affect the underlying structure, which is of deontic normative concepts. 
126 
 
Dewey’s critique directly contradicts the neo-Hegelian internal justification story) and, let us say, 
epistemically. By the latter, I mean that Dewey’s critique must be understood as ideology critique. It 
removes certain ideological blinders from our theoretical sight. The neo-Hegelian commitment to 
vindicating the present forms of political democracy means that the ways in which political democracy 
has come to constrain freedom are not visible. We ignore them because they do not fit with our prior 
rosy view of democracy.  
Dewey’s critique is genealogical. Since the neo-Hegelian justification of political democracy is 
developmental (political democracy has an intrinsic normative principle which is working its way out), 
Dewey’s genealogy is a direct attack on that neo-Hegelian story. Dewey’s genealogy rejects three 
aspects of the neo-Hegelian view: unity; ideal causation; and progressive tendency. Unity consists in the idea 
that political democracy is the unfolding of a single idea: that of “individual freedom” (again, Dewey’s 
critique would apply also to other ideas that play the same purported justificatory role, like equality or 
dignity). Ideal causation consists in the idea that political democracy is simply the result of the unfolding 
of ideas (particularly political ideas), instead of the largely unintended consequence of our responses 
to material social and technological forces. Since political democracy, according to the neo-Hegelian 
view, is the unfolding of a single idea according to its internal logic, it has necessarily a progressive tendency 
towards human freedom. Against these three aspects of the neo-Hegelian view, Dewey emphasises 
the multiplicity of the causes of political democracy, causes that were both material and – to the extent 
that they were ideal – also outside the realm of the strictly political, and the negative tendencies towards 
unfreedom that were embedded within the forms of political democracy through its reliance upon 
ways of thinking and feeling fostered by the market. Dewey’s critique provides a certain interpretation 
of the institutions of political democracy, one that ties them to certain ways of thinking and feeling 
that we can recognise in ourselves, if inchoately and obscurely. In telling a particular story of political 
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democracy, Dewey’s critique is meant to help us make sense of certain parts of ourselves and the way 
in which we see things. That is also the sense in which I invoke it here. 
Unity 
Dewey first rejects the “current legend” that political democracy is the unfolding of a single 
idea that is its cause.42 Instead of having its cause and its end in an idea of freedom with concomitant 
individual rights, as both wholesale defenders and wholesale critics of democracy allege, “the 
development of political democracy represents the convergence of a great number of social 
movements, no one of which owed either its origin or its impetus to inspiration of democratic ideals 
or to planning for the eventual outcome.”43 It was “a kind of net consequence of a vast multitude of 
responsive adjustments to a vast number of situations”, a consequence that proceeded “step by step… 
each step[] taken without foreknowledge of any ultimate result”.44  
Merely because the institutions were ad-hoc responses to particular problems does not mean 
they were without purpose or goal: “The devices served a purpose; but the purpose was rather that of 
meeting existing needs which had become too intense to be ignored, than that of forwarding the 
democratic idea. In spite of all defects, they served their own purpose well”.45 But those institutions 
were short-sighted and have thus come no longer to serve us: “their very adaptation to immediate 
circumstances unfitted them, pragmatically, to meet more enduring and more extensive needs.”46 
Dewey has in mind here institutional reforms like the expansion of the franchise without concomitant 
 
42 The Public and Its Problems, 287. 
43 The Public and Its Problems, 288. 
44 The Public and Its Problems, 287. 
45 The Public and Its Problems, 326. 
46 The Public and Its Problems, 326. 
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increase in civic education and the formation of political parties in order better to represent group 
interests without considering the factors that set groups against each other. 
Ideal causation 
Not only were the origins of political democracy multiple, but they were for the most part not 
political. Political democracy does not owe its existence to the “far-ranging ideas and ideals [that] arose 
during the course of the movement”, not to “the individual and his rights”, nor “freedom and 
authority, progress and order”, not even to “democracy itself”.47 Instead, political democracy arose 
largely in response to technological and material change, to the “railways, mails and telegraph-wires” 
that “influence more profoundly those living within the legal local units [of district and state] than do 
boundary lines.”48 As Dewey puts it: “Invent the railway, the telegraph, mass manufacture and 
concentration of population in urban centers, and some form of democratic government is, humanly 
speaking, inevitable.”49 The responses to these material developments can be explained, Dewey 
suggests further, by reference to “distinctive religious, scientific and economic changes which finally 
took effect in the political field, being themselves primarily non-political and innocent of democratic 
intent”.50 Dewey here of course does not want to deny the importance and impact of the political ideas 
that arose with the various democratic revolutions. He is merely concerned, as I will later show, to 
deny that they were the original causes of democracy. Their causal impact comes in later in the story, in 
their retrospective justification for and stabilisation of the forms of political democracy. 
Progressive tendency 
 
47 The Public and Its Problems, 288. 
48 The Public and Its Problems, 302. 
49 The Public and Its Problems, 304. 
50 The Public and Its Problems, 288. 
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Against the neo-Hegelian view, then, Dewey claims that the forms of political democracy are 
due to a multiplicity of causes, some largely material and others from outside the political sphere. The 
mere fact of this multiplicity of causes already puts in question the neo-Hegelian commitment to a 
progressive tendency. Why assume this multiplicity points in one direction, or that it is the 
manifestation of some deeper underlying normative principle?  
Here Dewey provides a direct argument against a deep American ideological formation: what 
James Truslow Adams, four years after The Public and its Problems, called “the American Dream”.51 What 
Dewey has in mind here is the idea that each person can succeed through their own hard work, and 
that government’s role is to secure the foundations on which individuals can succeed.52 His argument 
examines two of the central ideas that have formed the moral psychology of political democracy, what 
he calls “fear of government” and “individualism”. These ideas, although “[t]hey did not originate the 
movement toward popular government… did profoundly influence the forms which it assumed.”53 
They were thus not simply epiphenomenal. They were “something more than flies on the turning 
wheels”.54 What they did (combined with the material and technological causes mentioned earlier) was 
to turn political democratic institutions towards oligarchy. Whereas Lippmann’s technocratic critique 
 
51 See James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America (New York: Routledge, 2017 [1931]). Note that Adams, whatever his 
bombasticism about the “frontier” and the fruits of American colonialism, thought that the prominence of specifically 
economic (as opposed to spiritual) prosperity in the contemporary form of the American Dream was a misstep. Americans 
had “surrendered idealism for the sake of prosperity” in a fit of “post-war materialism”. The Epic of America, 400. See also 
Jim Cullen, The American Dream: A Short History of an Idea that Shaped a Nation (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
52 Compare what Du Bois calls the “great American Assumption”: “that any average worker can by thrift become a 
capitalist”. Black Reconstruction, 183. 
53 The Public and Its Problems, 294. 
54 The Public and Its Problems, 294. 
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conceives of an enlightened oligarchy as a solution to the problems of political democracy, Dewey 
argues that oligarchy only further entrenches existing social problems.55  
Fear of government, individualism, and oligarchy 
What are these two ideas, and how did they contribute to democracy’s fall into oligarchy? 
There is one important qualification to be kept in mind in articulating Dewey’s views. The form in 
which he is articulating these ideas is a form more broad and diffuse than a theory, one which Dewey 
describes (rather unhelpfully) as being at the level of “public opinion”, which “is little troubled by 
questions of logical consistency.”56 Fear of government and individualism are “general and obvious 
considerations”, that, to use a pat phrase, are “in the air”.57 Dewey means by this reference to “public 
opinion” something like Raymond Williams’s “structures of feeling” – the social and shared ways of 
thinking and feeling that are not fully articulated or defined by individuals but which give a kind of 
inchoate structure to how people engage with the world.58 Since these structures are not fully 
articulated or defined, but actively lived as comprising people’s attitude or orientation to the world, 
the mode of analysis appropriate to them is not the mode that tries to define by identifying necessary 
and sufficient conditions. So “fear of government” should not be taken to be akin to a theory like 
“libertarianism” or “anarchism”, a fully worked out view of the limits of governmental authority, even 
if various forms of libertarianism and anarchism each express something of this orientation captured 
 
55 The Public and Its Problems, 293-95. Dewey’s critique is not so much a critique of oligarchy under all circumstances. He is 
concerned with the particular economic oligarchy that comes about through political democracy combined with a market 
society. That oligarchy takes a very different form than, say, the oligarchy of nobility in the ancien régime. 
56 The Public and Its Problems, 291. 
57 The Public and Its Problems, 288. 
58 Williams describes a structure of feeling as “a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each 
in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange.” Such structures “do not have to await 
definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and 
on action.” Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford University Press, 1977), 131-32. See also Raymond Williams, 
The Long Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin, 1965), 64-70. 
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in the phrase “fear of government”. Rather it consists in a related set of more or less inchoate ideas, 
feelings, values, meaningful associations, beliefs and so on, which do not yet amount to a fully 
articulated theory. So too for “individualism”. We must be sensitive to the level at which Dewey is 
giving expression to these ideas as they are “in the air”, and not at the more highly theorised and more 
precise level that these ideas take on in particular doctrines. 
We have already seen something of what Dewey meant by “individualism” in the form of the 
“American Dream”. It is the idea that what each person has is solely the result of what they do, with 
the corollary that one expresses who one is in what one has. It is a hope for success, to “make 
something of oneself”, to fashion oneself, which is to be achieved through self-sufficiency and 
autonomy. (This is to give a highly articulated form to what is more often manifested in an individual 
as an inchoate complex of emotions, responses, beliefs, desires, values, and so on that were not 
necessarily understood together as comprising that complex.) One could call this an individualistic 
orientation to oneself, the world, and others.59 This hope to make something of oneself orients one in 
the world; it gives meaning and coherence to one’s desires and cares and beliefs and strivings. 
This hope to make something of oneself is individualistic insofar as it is self-focused, in two 
senses. First, its achievement is uncompromised by the failure of others to achieve that success. If 
they failed to do so, it is because they lacked some virtue, did not work hard enough, had some other 
failing.60 So the hope is not one that a group or community achieves; indeed, the form that community 
takes when perceived through this hope is, by contrast, one of social classes and hierarchies that this 
individualism challenges. Second, the hope is to be achieved through the exercise of one’s own 
 
59 I will provide a more detailed account of an orientation in Chapters 5 and 6. Here, it can be taken in its ordinary capacious 
sense: a way of approaching, or finding oneself with respect to, others and the world. See Daniel Brudney, "Styles of Self‐
Absorption," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, ed. Garry Hagberg and Walter Jost (Blackwell Publishing, 2010). 
60 Compare this sentiment with, for example, Fannie Lou Hamer’s “nobody’s free until everybody’s free”. 
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capacities. If it is achieved through others, then it is not properly achieved. Others only stand in one’s 
way as obstacles or competitors, or at best as temporary and arms-length companions in contract.61  
Individualism arises, Dewey suggests, from a number of sources. The broadest is the assault 
of modernity on tradition, custom, and authority. “Freedom… signified in fact liberation from 
oppression and tradition.”62 Individualism was a revolt against external authority, against the class 
hierarchies of old Europe that sought to restrict an individual’s hope for success in the staid patterns 
of tradition. It was an assertion of “some inalienable sacred authority resident in the protesting 
individuals.”63 In this form, it is expressed in doctrines of natural right and individual autonomy: what 
Dewey called “the old individualism”. This political doctrine of natural right becomes connected to 
an economic conception of the person when these natural rights come to be conceived of as held for 
the purpose of protecting each individual’s economic upward mobility and self-interest.64 But these 
are, for Dewey, particular and concrete expressions of the broader idea of individualism as “public 
opinion”. A person may express individualism in this broader sense – this commitment to making 
 
61 Daniel Brinkerhoff Young suggests in a similar vein that there is a tendency arising from individualistic conceptions of 
freedom to view our relations to others as either negative or instrumental. See Daniel W. Brinkerhoff Young, Freedom, 
Community, and Solidarity: The Normative Foundations of Socialist Politics, unpublished manuscript, October 26, 2020. 
Dewey’s debt to Tocqueville on the origins of American individualism and on the form it takes is an interesting question 
that I cannot examine here. Thanks to Lucas Guimarāes Pinheiro for raising this issue with me. 
62 The Public and Its Problems, 289. 
63 The Public and Its Problems, 289. 
64 Dewey makes this argument explicitly in Liberalism and Social Action. He comes to call this conjunction of political and 
economic individualism by the name of “laissez faire liberalism”. Compare also Dewey’s use of a quotation from John R. 
Commons on the “identification of liberty with laissez faire individualism”, according to which the old individualism’s 
conception of “democratic freedom” is “mechanical principles of individualism, selfishness, division of labor, exchange 
of commodities, equality, fluidity, liberty, and that divine providence which led individuals to benefit each other without 
intending to do so.” Dewey, "Freedom," 250. Dewey’s greater indebtedness to Commons and to Veblen and the school 
of American institutionalism, and thus his broader relation to Lon L. Fuller and other contemporary institutionalists is an 
interesting historical question that I do not have room to discuss here. See Kenneth I. Winston, "Is/Ought Redux: The 
pragmatist context of Lon Fuller's conception of law," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 8, no. 3 (1988); Kristen Rundle, Forms 
Liberate: Reclaiming the jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
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something of oneself through one’s own efforts – without necessarily being committed to these more 
particular economic or political views.65 
Individualism was grounded also in the liberatory effects of the democratic reforms of the 19th 
century. The expansion of the franchise and other institutional reforms, although ad-hoc, had 
nonetheless increased (some kinds of) freedom. They served as a means (however inefficient and 
incomplete) of political education. Along with the material and technological shifts brought about by 
the industrial revolutions and the influx of goods and materials from the colonised world, these 
democratic reforms stimulated in Europe and America individual capacities of “initiative, 
inventiveness, foresight and planning”, at least among the bourgeois middle classes of citizens.66 This 
was “the discovery of the individual.”67  
This increase in individual agential powers carried with it, on a social level, a potential (though 
not actual) increase in the collective freedom of the public. There was an increase in the knowledge 
and collective agency available to the public by allowing a larger number of the members of that public 
to have some sort of input into collective decision-making.68 Admittedly, as Dewey acknowledges, 
fully making use of these new powers would require a more organised set of institutions of education 
and communication.69 Such organisation is essential to bringing about democracy as a social idea as 
 
65 This can be seen by the fact that some forms of Romanticism perfectly express this kind of individualistic orientation, 
but in an aesthetic register rather than an economic or political register; indeed, such forms of Romanticism may be anti-
economistic or anti-political. 
66 The Public and Its Problems, 297. See also “Freedom”, 250: “The time of the heyday of economic individualistic freedom 
undoubtedly promoted invention, initiative, and individual vigor, as well as hastened the industrial development of the 
country.” Dewey goes on, however, to note the downsides: “a spirit of reckless speculation…reckless and extravagant 
exploitation of natural resources… which have reduced vast portions of our national heritage to something like a desert… 
Millions of unemployed, with savings exhausted, who are dependent upon private charity and public relief”. 
67 The Public and Its Problems, 297. 
68 By “collective freedom”, I don’t mean any Rousseauean kind of general will, but merely the capacity of a group of people 
jointly to determine collective ends. See fn.2. 
69 See Liberalism and Social Action, 38-39: “There does not now exist the kind of social organization that even permits the 
average human being to share the potentially available social intelligence. Still less is there a social order that has for one 
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opposed merely to the institutions of political democracy.70 Nonetheless, with the individual energies 
actually released came the potential for those energies to be more properly devoted towards collective 
goals.  
That these collective goals were not pursued was largely due to fear of government. Fear of 
government is the flipside of individualism so conceived. According to individualism, one achieves 
what one is capable of through work and thrift, through the autonomous mutual exchange with other 
similar individuals, free from the constraints of class and social rank and external authority. But how 
can these achievements be protected from the accidental or purposeful encroachment of others? Here 
enters government. Its legitimate role is to facilitate and enable individualism. The role of government 
is to secure legitimate individual gains, through protecting property and holding people to agreements 
freely entered into. Private enterprise was the motor of the individualistic hope of each to better 
themselves, and the role of the public sphere was to oil that machine. But governmental power could 
itself be used illegitimately, either for the purposes of enriching the rulers, or by imposing restrictions 
on individual actions above and beyond those required to grease the wheels of private enterprise. So 
government is rightly something to be feared for its potential encroachments on individual freedom. 
As Thomas Paine put it neatly, “government, even in its best state, is a necessary evil”. In this sense 
fear of government is secondary to individualism, and, as we shall see, Dewey comes to think that 
there are other fears that can play a similar role, even if government itself is no longer to be feared. 
The point for now, however, is that individualism and fear of government are mutually supportive 
ideas. 
 
of its chief purposes the establishment of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate and use what 
is at hand.” 
70 See The Public and Its Problems, Ch 5. 
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Importantly, they are also opposing ideas, as carrot to stick. Individualism is a positive psychology. 
It provides an ideal, an aspiration, a hope, to be achieved through capacities that each individual can 
possess without regard for the constraints of birth and class (though not, ironically, without regard for 
the constraints of race and gender and geography). It is a reassuring commitment to the power of 
individual agency, that each can through their own efforts make something of themselves. But fear – 
whether of government or of something else – is a negative psychology. It provides something to be 
avoided or resisted, an enemy or threat, not an ideal.71 I will return to this opposition in the next 
section. It plays an important role in Dewey’s analysis of the contradictions of market society. 
How did these ideas contribute to the fall of political democracy into oligarchy? Political 
democracy, along with the vast material and technological changes (particularly in Europe and in the 
United States) over the late 19th and early 20th centuries, had increased the agential powers possessed 
by society.72 But fear of government and the ideology of old individualism meant that those powers 
were not by and large exercised to solve social problems – for example, decreasing inequality of wealth 
and power in the capitalist class, or improving the working conditions of industrial workers, including 
children. Instead, it was directed to “suit the desires of the new class of business men.”73 The increases 
in social power (scientific as well as political) that were “the cooperative work of humanity” were 
“appropriated by the few” – by private interests – to serve their own ends, which correspondingly 
allowed that “new class of business men” to have an outsize voice in the political arena in ways which 
are far too familiar to us now.74 At the same time that new possibilities were opened up for the 
 
71 This dualism can be directed outwards; a hope for “people like us” to succeed and a fear of “people like them” taking 
it from us. This opposition is central to Du Bois’s analysis of whiteness, as I will argue in Chapter 5. 
72 In the background of these material and democratic changes, as Du Bois, Lenin, Luxemburg, and others were arguing 
at the time, was of course the new imperialism and the exploitation of vast swathes of the rest of the world. 
73 The Public and Its Problems, 96. 
74 Liberalism and Social Action, 39. Dewey’s point is supported by recent work on the political economy of representation. 
See, e.g., Martin Gilens, "Inequality and democratic responsiveness," Public Opinion Quarterly 69, no. 5 (2005); Larry M. 
Bartels, "Economic Inequality and Political Representation," in The Unsustainable American State, ed. Lawrence Jacobs and 
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direction of social power through democratic means, that power was directed for the benefit of a few. 
The exercise of one kind of freedom – the democratic expression of one’s political will – became a 
means by which one was made unfree. And since the legitimate means of political change then 
becomes through the exercise of one’s political freedoms, this unfreedom becomes the means by 
which it is itself maintained. 
Take a pre-New Deal example of this vicious cycle of unfreedom, one which Dewey explicitly 
analyses. Power imbalances existed between the owners of capital (enriched by the war industry and 
the consequent Depression) and workers. The obvious first step to remedy these imbalances is 
regulation of employment contracts and labour practices, whether through bottom-up unionisation 
efforts or through top-down governmental regulation.75 But individualism in the form of substantive 
due process – an individual right to have their choices respected – meant that contracts that were 
entered into voluntarily but under extreme power imbalances ought not be invalidated. Individualism 
operates to militate against the regulation of contractual practices necessary to redress the power 
imbalances constitutive of oligarchy. And since government is the regulatory agent that would 
invalidate those contracts (say, by instituting minimum wage or workplace safety laws, or laws 
regulating or prohibiting child labour, or, as we see now, in the regulation of certain kinds of financial 
instruments, uses of property, or ways of using and managing debt), fear of government means that 
people are less likely to support that kind of regulation.76  
 
Desmond King (Oxford University Press, 2009); Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
75 Regulation is only the first step, because such a move still contrasts “liberty” with “equality” insofar as it limits liberty 
in the name of equality. Such a move does nothing to reconcile the demands of liberty and equality. It says nothing, in 
Dewey’s words, about the “larger phases of liberty that have to do with freedom of the many to participate in the culture that 
is now possessed by society but not distributed”. See Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism," 258; Dewey, Individualism, Old and New, 
Ch 3. Dewey’s view, which I cannot explore here, is that the enlarging of the notion of liberty would help shift the 
ideological framework in which regulation of contracts is seen as an impingement on liberty. For a different way of 
reconciling liberty and equality, see Bilgrami, Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment, particularly Chs 4-6. 
76 See e.g. Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the origins of our time (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
There is obviously a lot more to say about the particular mechanisms by which decision-makers come to be responsive to 
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That is to say, Dewey at the end of the 1920s argues that laissez-faire liberalism and the 
ideology of a minimally regulated market stand in the way of what we would now call social democratic 
constraints on capitalism, while at the same time stabilising the oligarchic tendencies of political 
democracy. As I will argue in the next section, when he turns more closely to an analysis of these 
market tendencies in the mid to late 1930s (bolstered in the meantime by his reading of Marx and by 
his observations on the development of the New Deal), he comes to see that the critique so far 
outlined here extends beyond minimally regulated markets and to a capitalist market society itself, 
even one regulated “from above” through government intervention. Dewey will make two further 
arguments in the 1930s. The first is that this double-sided moral psychology is fostered even in a 
market society where there are social democratic regulations and welfare. While those regulations may 
alleviate somewhat some of the injustices and inequality, they do not address the underlying tendencies 
of capitalist markets. The second is that there is a tendency in such societies toward the more 
unfettered or even centrally supported “ideal” of a self-regulating market. The conflict between 
democratic ideals and capitalist markets is a deep one that cannot be easily papered over through the 
application of centralised planning.77 That is why Dewey argues in the 1930s for a transformative 
program of full socialisation of the means of production, to be taken stepwise, initially through (better) 
New Deal-type regulation and taxation of the wealthy, as part of instituting democracy as a social idea. 
 
certain sectors of society, and the particular legal mechanisms by which policies are made and implemented. So, for 
example, Dewey’s example of the 1924 proposed Child Labor Amendment, fully fleshed out, would require us to look at 
constitutional amendment procedures. Dewey is more concerned to identify the moral psychology that accompanies and 
facilitates those mechanisms than to do the political scientific work of identifying the mechanisms themselves.  
77 There are two reasons for this that require further elaboration. The first is that there is a conflict in values between (a 
conception of) freedom embodied in the market and (a conception of) equality that is the ostensible purpose of democratic 
regulation. The second is that there is an institutional conflict between true democracy and market tendencies as to which 
will be the fundamental agency for social coordination. The latter can be put this way, with an agential metaphor: since 
markets cannot do away with government (since they depend on government in the form of rule of law, property rights, 
regulation to set up markets, etc.) for ensuring the conditions under which they can exist, the best they can do is control 
government, to subsume government to the market’s own tendencies. And so the forms that democratic regulation of the 




New Deal-type social democratic regulation is only the first step, and by itself will fail to address the 
stability of the forms of unfreedom fostered by the conjunction of political democratic institutions in 
a market society. 
So, to recap the argument so far before turning to Dewey’s extension of the argument in the 
1930s: the negative tendency to oligarchy serves directly to undermine the tendencies increasing 
freedom (stimulation of individual capacities and placing those capacities and their products in a space 
accessible to all, to be used to address the problems that face society) that political democracy had 
provided in the first place. As Dewey writes: 
 
The same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic government, 
general suffrage, executives and legislators chosen by majority vote, have also brought 
about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that demand the utilization 
of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive and fraternally associated 
public.78 
 
Those institutions that we thought to foster freedom have now come to constrain it, because 
of the moral psychology of individualism and fear of government that attend those institutional forms. 
But what are the origins of individualism and fear of government? And how might this situation be 
changed? To answer these two questions, we must turn to Dewey’s analysis of the role of market 
society in fostering this psychology. 
3.4 Dewey’s critique of market society 
In Individualism, Old and New and Liberalism and Social Action, two of his public-facing political 
works written in the decade after The Public and Its Problems, Dewey develops a critique of market society 
that grounds and extends his critique of political democracy. A market society, Dewey argues, fosters 
 
78 The Public and Its Problems, 109. 
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an internally conflicted double-sided moral psychology: “a house divided against itself”.79 That double-
sided moral psychology, in turn, makes more difficult the use of agency to bring about any institutional 
changes that might shift the institutions of a market society, including institutions of political 
democracy when they are embedded in such a society: a vicious cycle.  
Dewey defines the culture of a market society as one in which “[t]he money medium of 
exchange and the cluster of activities associated with its acquisition drastically condition the other 
activities of the people.”80 This is a culture in which market transactions are both fundamental to all 
others and become the model for others, where market price mechanisms, rather than traditions or 
centralised authority structures, serve as the main coordinator of social activities.81 Dewey is both 
describing the material ordering of a society – one in which market transactions play the central 
coordinating role – and the consequent moral psychological features of that society, one where market 
transactions come to be a model for all other human interactions, where people see the world and 
each other in market terms. 
This notion of a market society, as I have said earlier, is a broader referent than that of “laissez-
faire”, or the minimally regulated market. The term “market society” does not refer directly to the 
kind or amount of regulation of the market by the state. Rather, it refers to the centrality of the role 
 
79 This is the title of the first chapter of Individualism, Old and New.  
80 Individualism, Old and New, 44. Dewey also refers to this equivalently as a “money culture” or a “pecuniary culture”. 
Compare Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1957]). Polanyi claims that a “market society” 
is one in which society is an adjunct to the market. The Great Transformation, 60. 
81 These options of tradition, authority, and market price mechanisms are of course not the only possible methods of 
social coordination. Dewey thinks intelligence and its embodiment in a thoroughly democratic society is another. Compare, 
however, Charles Lindblom’s definition of a “market system as “a system of societywide coordination of human activities 
not by central command but by mutual interactions in the form of transactions.” Lindblom, The Market System: What it is, 
how it works, and what to make of it, 4. Lindblom does seem to think that market decentralisation and government central 
planning are two poles of the conceptual spectrum. It’s worth noting that, as Polanyi and Lindblom both point out, a 
market society in this sense is consistent with, indeed requires, centralised state controls and regulation, and indeed and 
increasingly a vast and unmanageable bureaucracy, in order to ensure the “proper functioning” of such a market economy. 
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that certain kinds of markets play in a society. In particular, for Dewey, the existence of a market society 
requires interconnected markets for essential aspects of human life and human activity.  
A comparison with Karl Polanyi’s view may help. Polanyi famously argued that a “market 
economy” comes into existence where there are interconnected and long distance markets for land, 
labour, and for money as the means of transactions in other goods and services.82 For Polanyi, such 
markets are destructive of human social bonds insofar as they commodify things that are not 
commodities (i.e. are not produced for sale), namely human beings themselves and the environment 
that supports them. So, for Polanyi, the marketisation of land, labour, and money triggers a reverse 
regulatory movement to protect those aspects of life from the exploitative effects of the market. 
Dewey does not have a story at the level of historical detail of Polanyi’s. But I think we can infer from 
some of his 1930s writings a similar conception of the essential aspects of human life and activity that, 
when marketised, mean that (in Polanyi’s words) society becomes an adjunct to the market rather than 
markets being embedded in society.  
I argue that a market society in Dewey’s sense requires markets in land (as the basis for 
industrial production, including of agriculture), in labour (in the form of the wage relation), and in a 
broad and open-ended category that includes whatever is essential for the development of personal 
powers – along with a financial sector that enables the effective oligopolisation or cartelisation of these 
markets.83 The category of the means of development of personal powers is open-ended insofar as 
Dewey wants to leave it open what kinds of agential capacities are necessary for social progress and 
 
82 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Chs 6; 11-16. 
83 We might want to extend Dewey’s view to the production also of human life itself through gender relations. Dewey I 
think includes some of this (in the form of care and community maintenance) in his capacious fourth category, but the 
point still stands. See e.g. Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Nancy Fraser, Feminism for the 99 Percent: A manifesto (New 
York: Verso Books, 2019). 
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therefore which activities and products (technological, educative, caring, epistemic) are essential for 
the development of those capacities.  
This conception of a market society leaves open the possibility that markets in goods and 
services that do not concern these essentials of human life and activity could nonetheless play an 
important coordinating role in a society that is not a market society. That is, speaking of a market 
society in these terms does not imply, as Gerry Cohen once said, that “the market, any market” is 
unjust.84 Let me work through places in Dewey’s 1930s corpus where we can find critiques of each of 
these components. 
In a short speech entitled “Socialization of Ground Rent,” from 1935, Dewey argues that the 
socialisation of land, including housing, natural resources, and utilities like water and electricity is a 
necessary but not sufficient part of any democratic program. Land is essential because it is “the final 
source of all productivity”.85 If it is not socially owned, then whoever privately owns it will be in a 
position to “appropriate the socially created new values.” (Dewey means by “values” the things that 
are valuable, not the fact that those things are valuable.) So the distribution of land, widely construed, 
through market transactions, will mean that the benefits of production will flow disproportionately to 
some and not all. The New Deal is fundamentally flawed, Dewey thinks, because it fails to recognise 
this fact. There is not one New Deal measure “that is not compromised, prejudiced, yes, nullified, by 
private monopolization of opportunity.”86 
 
84 G. A. Cohen, "Back to Socialist Basics," in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. 
Michael Otsuka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 219. And, in any case, my concern is not with distributive 
justice. There is no doubt in my mind that the welfare state is a vast improvement on an only minimally regulated capitalist 
market society in terms of remedying distributive and (some) status injustices and inequalities. My concern is with the 
unfreedom that either embody. Further, following Dewey, I do not think that the only alternatives for social coordination 
are decentralised markets or centralised bureaucratic state planning.  
85 Dewey, "Socialization of Ground Rent," 256. 
86 Dewey, “Socialization of Ground Rent,” 256. 
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The commodification of land cannot be understood apart from the commodification of the 
labour that is to work on that land in order to produce (I use that term “work on the land” broadly 
and metaphorically and not in any way linked to a labour theory of value.) Dewey was of course long 
concerned – at least since his years in Chicago and his experience with the Pullman strike in the last 
years of the 19th century – with the exploitation inherent in the wage labour relation. This concern was 
not only with the conditions of labour and the deadening effects it had on human life, conditions 
which could be alleviated somewhat through regulation like that of the New Deal, and which 
contribute directly to the negative side of the moral psychology of a market society, as I argue in more 
detail below. His concern was more fundamentally to do with the unfreedom of workers given the wage 
relation, that workers are barred from “the larger phases of liberty that have to do with the freedom 
of the many to participate in the culture that is now possessed by society but not distributed.”87 Dewey 
means by this that workers do not determine the conditions of their work, its purposes, its form, and 
its social role, and thus do not participate in the direction of their powers to address social problems. 
So, for Dewey, socialisation of the means of production means also democratisation of the means of 
production.88 Where there is a market for labour, workers have at best a very limited say in the 
purposes to which their labour is put. 
Dewey is concerned not only with the elements of production (land and labour), but also with 
the marketisation of other human capacities that could be put to social use and, importantly, the means 
by which those capacities are developed. In “Socialization of Ground Rent,” he labels this 
indeterminate category with the phrase “opportunities to be socially useful and to develop personal 
 
87 Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism," 258. 
88 This statement implies that Dewey would look equally askance at a fully centralised agency that dictated to people how 
and where they are to labour.  
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powers”.89 I think by this general phrase, read in conjunction with his broad conception of one kind 
of liberty as “participation in culture”, Dewey means to pick out the broad range of forms of human 
activity that are not directly involved in the production of material goods for consumption.90 Some of 
what Dewey means is captured by the phrase “intellectual property” – the commodification and 
private ownership of the capacities of human inventiveness and imagination, capacities to which 
Dewey attributes the great scientific developments of the modern period. But the larger part of what 
Dewey means is I think the commodification of things like education, care and sympathy, and human 
aesthetic capacities. These capacities are an essential part of what need to be cultivated for democracy 
as a social idea to be a possibility. It is true that one could include these under the banner of “labour”, 
if one were to think that one’s labour in the narrow sense both ought to include the exercise and 
development of these capacities, and if one were to think that these capacities and their development 
are reduced in a market society to labour in a pejorative sense, through things like the privatisation of 
institutions of education and care, the creation of markets for art, and the commodification of 
“research outputs”, for instance.91 But perhaps even if one accepts all of this (and to argue for it in 
more detail would take me too far afield) there is utility in maintaining a distinction between these 
capacities as forms of labour and the means of development of these capacities in educative institutions 
and in caring contexts (though one no doubt also develops them through their exercise “on the job”).92  
Finally, Dewey inveigles against “finance capitalism”, “captains of finance”, the “finance 
industry” and so on all through his 1930s works, in too many places to list. This ought be unsurprising, 
 
89 Dewey, “Socialization of Ground Rent,” 256. 
90 See also Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 39-40. 
91 For the former claim that labour ought to include these capacities, see the speech from a factory worker Dewey extracts 
in its entirety in "Psychology and Work." On the latter claim that these capacities are reductively understood in capitalist 
labour markets, see Dewey’s comments on the Brookfield incident in Dewey, "Freedom in Workers' Education." 
92 It is no accident, though, that a market in labour narrowly construed leads to markets in the development of capacities 
for labour – how else is one meant to “get ahead” if not by gaining competitive advantage at the earlier stage? 
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given the historical context of the Great Depression in which he was then writing. Dewey is, however, 
never especially clear about the referent of this term. It is clear that he thinks the financial sector has 
taken on an oversize role in determining the shape of society, both through market forces and through 
oligarchic control of political democratic institutions. He seems to have in mind at least the following 
things: a) limited liability corporations, which enable more concentrated forms of investment and 
ownership, especially when combined with b) a distinct banking and credit system whose goal is to 
make profitable investments and thus to move capital to where it would be most efficiently used.93 It 
is not clear whether Dewey has anything more detailed in mind than that, though the important role 
those two features of a financial sector play in supporting other markets is clear.94 
Interconnected markets in these three areas with the associated financial sector that supports 
them create a market society insofar as land, labour, and the development of our personal powers are 
essential aspects of human life. Once those markets are in place, people must participate in them (since 
they concern essential aspects of life) in order to live and in order to act in socially meaningful ways. 
Once there are markets in those areas, other associated aspects of life also become marketised. A 
market for labour, for example, requires development of the skills for labour. So that the labour market 
runs efficiently, the development of skills must match those required by the labour market. So there 
is a need for a market for education in specific skills. A market for land in the physical sense means 
that production can be increased either by increasing the amount of land or using it more efficiently 
through industry. So there develops a market for the industrial means of production. There are other 
mechanisms by which the use of markets spread, but the point is that a market society in which 
 
93 See, e.g.,  the title of Chapter 3 of Dewey, Individualism, Old and New: “The United States, Incorporated”. See also Dewey’s 
comments about “struggle in competition for the command of money, the means of credit” in Dewey, "Needed - A New 
Politics," 278. 
94 See Pistor, The Code of Capital for a more recent analysis of the particular ways in which the financial hubs of New York 
and London determine many aspects of global society through private international law. 
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markets become the primary means of coordinating social action arises from markets in these essential 
aspects of human life and activity. 
What are the effects of a market society, and why was such a society seen as something 
desirable? A market society fosters and supports individualism insofar as it creates the possibility for 
two important kinds of individual freedom. The first is freedom of choice between a wider range of 
alternatives.95 That kind of freedom allows people to satisfy their desires more easily, to have a greater 
range of options open to them, which, at least ideally, is a spur to making something of oneself, of 
self-fulfilment.96 The second is what Jonathan Gingerich calls “spontaneous freedom” – an experience 
of openness, that the future is unplanned and unscripted.97 Having that wider range of options can 
provide one with the space to have these experiences of spontaneity, experiences of the new “sacred” 
separated off from the ordinary and mundane life of work. These two forms of freedom are essential 
to the positive content of individualism. One part of the success that one hopes for, through hard 
work, is to have the time and space to define oneself through one’s choices and to have the leisure 
time to experience spontaneity. These two forms of freedom are connected. Spontaneous freedom 
requires some minimal freedom of choice between alternatives. It may even be increased by having 
an increased number of alternatives open to one. We could say that spontaneous freedom is the 
 
95 Compare Isaiah Berlin, "From Hope and Fear Set Free," in Concepts and Categories: Philosophical essays, ed. Henry Hardy 
(Princeton University Press, 2013), 250-52. “When we speak of the extent of freedom enjoyed by a man or society, we 
have in mind, it seems to me, the width or extent of the paths before them, the number of open doors, as it were, and the 
extent to which they are open… it is the actual doors that are open that determine the extent of someone’s freedom, and 
not his own preferences.” 
96 Individualism, Old and New, 81-2. “Imagine a society free from pecuniary domination, and it becomes self-evident that 
material commodities are invitations to individual taste and choice, and occasions for individual growth.” Individualism, Old 
and New, 116. 
97 See Jonathan Gingerich, “Spontaneous Freedom,” unpublished manuscript. As Gingerich points out, this experience of 
spontaneous freedom is historically conditioned. It arises out of Romantic conceptions of a “free spirit”, of the importance 
of play and indeterminacy. It is both a class-specific notion and a direct reaction against the monotony of industrial working 
life. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (Abacus, 1995 [1975]), Chs 12, 13, 15; Eric Hobsbawm, The 
Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (Vintage Books, 1989), Chs 7 and 9. 
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subjective experiential side of the objective kind of freedom that is the number of alternatives open 
to one.98 
Both of these forms of freedom have to be seen in contrast to the unfreedom against which they 
gain their importance.99 Freedom of choice and having options is a form of freedom precisely because, 
under hierarchical and traditional ways of life, people’s life projects were determined by their station. 
The market, as an essential part of (European) modernity, contributed to breaking those hierarchies 
and traditions. Those options mattered because those options were liberating from prior fixed 
hierarchies.100 So too spontaneous freedom matters against its contrary: a life that is scripted, without 
surprises, determined in its structure and its details from the outset. 
The market promised to foster these two forms of individual freedom by taking over the role 
of coordinating social activities from custom, tradition, or centralised forms of governance. But the 
centrality of the market to social life also fosters the negative side of the double-sided moral 
psychology. And, in turn, the negative features of that moral psychology limit the two kinds of 
freedom that the market promises to foster. We have seen so far how the two sides of the moral 
psychology are mutually supporting. We now turn more closely to their opposition. 
Fear and the market society 
This conception of the society-wide role of the market underpins directly fear of government. 
The effect of market coordination of human activity is “to subordinate political to economic 
 
98 Of course, this correlation has limits. The feeling of freedom may not differentiate between having ten options available 
and having ten thousand. Too much choice can be disabling. 
99 “Liberty in the concrete signifies release from the impact of particular oppressive forces; emancipation from something 
once taken as a normal part of human life but now experienced as bondage.” Liberalism and Social Action, 35. 
100 In this Deweyan line of thought there is a response to Berlin’s claim that simply having more doors open is more freeing. 
There is a limit to how many options can matter to one, and options matter given a comparison to a paucity of options. 
Too many options, as all supermarket connoisseurs know, is limiting. And the point is not merely one about a surfeit of 
options. It is that options compete – the means required for creating some options narrows scope for creating other options. 
See Lindblom, The Market System, Chs 11-12. 
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activity”.101 If the market is the most efficient when it is self-regulated, then government regulation of 
the market can only be understood as exogenous interference in the market. The clearest example of 
this, Dewey argues, is how conceptions of natural law were “translat[ed]… with economic law into a 
form suited to the needs of an industrial community.”102 Natural law became “identified with the laws 
of free industrial production and free commercial exchange.”103 Government regulation of the market 
comes to be seen as unnatural and thus to be rightly feared. The idea of a market society is thus essential 
to making full sense of the ideological origins of fear of government. 
But the negative side of the psychology is not limited to fear of government. This is the 
important extension of his argument that Dewey makes in the 1930s beyond a critique of laissez-faire 
and toward a deeper critique of even a highly regulated market economy. Dewey argues that a market 
society fosters a wider kind of fear, one tied up with conformity, quantification, and standardisation.104 
Fear of government is vertical, in the sense that it is a fear by citizens of officials in positions of power. 
A market society also fosters fear in a horizontal sense; that is, fear of others. It does so, fundamentally, 
because one is in competition with those others for limited resources. In a market society, the market 
becomes a model for all other social activities. Everything is to be measured in terms of gain or loss.105 
Distinct measures of worth and value become commensurate. The market provides an easy measure 
 
101 Liberalism and Social Action, 9. 
102 Liberalism and Social Action, 10. 
103 Liberalism and Social Action, 10. 
104 See Individualism, Old and New, 68: “The most marked trait of present life, economically speaking, is insecurity… 
Insecurity cuts deeper and extends more widely than bare unemployment. Fear of loss of work, dread of the oncoming of 
old age, create anxiety and eat into self-respect in a way that impairs personal dignity. Where fears abound, courageous 
and robust individuality is undermined.” There is a deeper theoretical point here about the dynamics of the emotions. 
Emotions are contagious not only in the sense that they spread between people, but in the sense that they spread between 
objects. And different emotions can reinforce each other and form larger emotional wholes. See, for example, Karen Jones, 
"Trust, Distrust, and Affective Looping," Philosophical Studies 176, no. 4 (2019). 
105 Compare Polanyi, who argues that a market society fosters “the divorce of the economic motive from all concrete 
social relationships which would in their nature set a limit to that motive”. The Great Transformation, 57.  
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for ranking oneself against others: how much money do I make? And so one feels oneself in 
competition with all others, since people in vastly different fields can compare themselves to each 
other. A market society enables Rousseauean amour propre to an extent never before possible.106 And, 
especially under conditions of extreme competition and huge inequality (as Dewey saw during the 
Great Depression, and as we see now), the market fosters fear, anxiety, and insecurity. 
“Early liberalism”, Dewey writes, “emphasized the importance of insecurity as a fundamentally 
necessary economic motive, holding that without this goad men would not work, abstain or 
accumulate.”107 Markets, on this early liberal view, were an innovation to coordinate human activity 
given that scarcity. They allow resources to flow to where they are needed most, without the need for 
a central directive agency. So, the principle underlying our market society, “capitalism[,] is a systematic 
manifestation of desires and purposes built up in an age of ever threatening want and now carried 
over into a time of ever increasing potential plenty.”108 These fears and attendant anxieties and 
insecurities are fostered by poverty, by insecure and temporary working conditions, by all the features 
of the capitalist economy that Marx referred to under the name of the “reserve army of labour”.109 
And since the market underpins all modes of human interaction, there are no alternatives to the market 
for the kind of self-creation, making something of oneself. One cannot escape the rat race. The effect 
of this widespread fear and anxiety is to render impossible the achievement of the individualistic hope 
 
106 This, of course, is Polanyi’s point in arguing that it is only where a labour market comes into existence that we truly 
have a market society. We are now on the market. For Polanyi’s reading of Rousseau, see Polanyi, “On Freedom” and 
“Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Is a Free Society Possible?” both in Polanyi, Economy and Society. 
107 Liberalism and Social Action, 43. 
108 Liberalism and Social Action, 43. 
109 See Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Friedrich Engels (International 
Publishers, 1967 [1867]), Ch 25. 
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that the market has fostered. “Where fears abound, courageous and robust individuality is 
undermined.”110  
This claim about the moral psychology of market society holds even where the injustices and 
inequalities of capitalist markets are alleviated through state regulation. And, in any case, the social 
democratic model of centralised regulation of markets for the protection of welfare is itself unstable. 
It is torn between more wide-ranging transformations in the direction of democracy as a social idea 
and a return to self-regulating capitalist markets. Since the former transformation is for various 
ideological and material reasons seen as off the table (or not even an option to begin with, hence 
recent calls for “humane capitalism”, “social capitalism” and so on), the dominant tendency is for a 
slide back into self-regulating capitalist markets.111 We see this in the breakdown of the post-WWII 
welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s and again in the last decade since the 2007 global financial crisis. 
In other words, part of the stability of the unfreedom of the system of political democracy and a 
market society is due to the fact that it destabilises the social democratic constraints that some seek to 
place on it, in part through the double-sided moral psychology it fosters. Market society does not only 
stabilise the oligarchic tendencies of political democracy, but so too political democracy stabilises a 
market society. 
To illustrate these two points, let me take a contemporary example that would be close to 
Dewey’s heart: the higher education market.112 I will specifically focus on the Australian higher 
education market because it is highly regulated and was created and designed explicitly by government 
 
110 Individualism, Old and New, 68. 
111 The ideological forces are well captured in Thatcher’s quip that “there is no alternative”. See Mark Fisher, Capitalism 
Realism: There is no alternative (London: Zero Books, 2012). 
112 The phrase “higher education market” is of course shorthand for a number of interconnected markets, for 
undergraduate and graduate students, for research outputs, for private contracts with industry – indeed, for land and labour 
as well as for education strictly speaking. 
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action for laudable purposes (vastly increasing the scope of higher education to make it possible for 
as many citizens as possible to have higher education, both to raise their private standard of living and 
for public purposes of citizenship). Yet it nonetheless fosters the same double-sided moral psychology 
I have outlined, and shows tendencies toward a self-regulating market.  
An example: Australian higher education 
Higher education in Australia was largely part of a nation-building project after WWII.113 This 
vision of the central role of higher education in underpinning economic and social development was 
shared by both conservative and Labor governments until the late 1990s, even if there were differences 
in emphasis on whether higher education was primarily a tool of social equality and citizenship or of 
economic advancement.114 University post-WWII was comparatively cheap (from 1974 free with the 
abolition of fees by the Whitlam Labor government), almost fully government funded (90% until 
1974, with the remainder until 1974 coming from nominal student fees) and, importantly, funded 
sufficiently for nearly the entirety of the minority (~15% by 1975) of school leavers who chose to 
attend university to receive bursaries. There was an informal positional hierarchy of universities, based 
on reputation and age, but remarkable equality of teaching and research quality.  
After the fall of the Whitlam government in 1975, government funding was frozen, leading to 
cost pressures. These pressures led to a report by the Labor Education Minister John Dawkins (“the 
Dawkins Report”) in the late 1980s.115 The Dawkins Report set the tone for Australia’s subsequent 
 
113 The following historical sketch draws on the following: Simon Marginson, Educating Australia: Government, economy, and 
citizen since 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Gwilym Croucher et al., eds., The Dawkins Revolution 25 
Years On (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2013); Benedict Sheehy, "Regulation by Markets and the Bradley 
Review of Australian Higher Education," Australian Universities Review 52, no. 1 (2010). I leave aside for reasons of space 
large parts of the story, including the particular party-political machinations and personal characteristics of certain leaders 
that led to certain changes, the role of Australian federalism and other constitutional features in enabling and structuring 
changes, and the global situation, especially Australia’s role in the Asia-Pacific region as an exporter of education.  
114 Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Constituting Market Citizenship: Regulatory state, market making and higher education," Higher 
Education 70, no. 6 (2015). 
115 John Dawkins, Higher Education: A policy statement, Australian Government Publishing Service (Canberra, 1988). 
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higher education policy. It restructured the higher education sector in order to broaden access while 
reducing government contributions. It did so through introducing a user-pays scheme in the form of 
government-backed, deferred, interest-free loans, and by introducing national standards and 
competition for government funding that had the effect of consolidating a double-tiered system of 
universities and colleges into a single-tiered system of research universities. While this restructuring 
did not itself create a market for undergraduate higher education, it introduced market elements of 
competition and bidding into how universities were funded, and, through the user-pays scheme (even 
if it came in the form of deferred interest free government loans), was expressive of the idea that 
higher education was justified on the basis of private individual benefit.  
Over the next two decades, various other market reforms were instituted following the vision 
of the Dawkins Report. Research funding was granted through competitive project grants rather than 
general university-wide research support. International and postgraduate student fees were deregulated 
so that universities could charge what the market would bear, and caps on international student places 
were removed while maintaining a cap on domestic undergraduate student places. And private funding 
was encouraged concomitant with a consistent decrease in levels of government funding.  
These reforms largely achieved the sought-after effects, namely a slow broadening of access 
to higher education without increase in government funding.116 But the cost and student demand 
issues remained, largely due to that significant decrease in government funding, driving further reforms 
 
116 Indeed, with significant decrease in direct government funding, which fell from 90% in 1974 to around 30% now, while 
the percentage of university degree holders aged between 25-34 has more than doubled (15% in 1974 to ~35% now, 
though of course differentially distributed geographically between urban, especially upper class inner urban, and rural 
areas). There are questions about whether the numerical increase has in fact led to widened access to those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds – let alone race-based disadvantages particulary for Indigenous students. See Thomas Putnam 
and Judith Gill, "The Bradley Challenge: A sea change for Australian universities?," Issues in Educational Research 21, no. 2 
(2011); Trevor Gale and Deborah Tranter, "Social Justice in Australian Higher Education Policy," Critical Studies in 
Education 52, no. 1 (2011); Marcia Devlin, "Indigenous Higher Education Student Equity: Focusing on what works," The 
Australian Journal of Indigenous Education 38, no. 1 (2009). But the simple numerical rise in students, especially given 
population increase, is no small feat. 
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in the 2000s and 2010s that further individualised the costs of higher education, placing them on 
students (or at least students’ future selves). In 2005 the neo-conservative Howard government passed 
reforms that enabled universities, in addition to their fixed cap of undergraduate domestic places, to 
recruit additional students who didn’t meet the criteria for a capped place at “full fee” rates (of similar 
amounts to a mid to upper-echelon private college in the U.S.). Other Howard-era reforms further 
stratified fees according to likelihood of private benefit (hence a law subject cost more than a 
laboratory-based science subject, despite the fact that classroom costs are the inverse) and allowed 
universities to charge a “student contribution fee” – an initial move toward creating a direct buyer-
seller relationship between students and universities.117 This alleviated some of the cost burdens on 
universities while aggravating the demand burdens. And the Labor government in 2012 (ideologically 
along the lines of a Third Way Labour government in the UK) introduced changes that were intended 
to make universities more responsive to student demand and further to broaden access, by removing 
caps on undergraduate domestic places and coupling university funding to the number of students 
they “recruit”, in a kind of modified voucher-based system. The idea was that if students don’t like 
what a university offers, they will go elsewhere, taking “their” government funding with them. After 
an initial large rise in domestic student numbers due to the removal of caps, worries about “sub-
standard” students getting into university and rising costs to government led to the reintroduction of 
undergraduate domestic student caps by the Liberal government in 2017, which will be raised yearly.  
These reforms since the Dawkins Report have created a “quasi-market” in Australian higher 
education, one that operates under fairly stringent regulations (in terms of pricing, in terms of product, 
in terms of supply, and in terms of management) and indeed where much of the money flow is 
 
117 Incidentally, the 2005 reforms also abolished universal student unionism, which gutted student communal spaces and 
– the true intention of the reforms – made far less powerful student politics, which was one funnel to left-wing political 
parties. And, as a further aside, the stratified fee system has just been used to double the cost of an arts degree and to 
lower the costs of business degrees, in another blatant ideological move. 
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mediated by government in the form of student loans, while leaving daily operations to universities 
understood as firms. (As an aside, the “firms” in this quasi-market are not by many definitions capitalist, 
since they are publicly owned; indeed, they are set up by legislation.)118 The overall purposes driving 
the creation of this higher education market have been clear from the outset, namely economic 
advancement and preparation for citizenship for a larger number of people, while distributing costs 
fairly between the polity and the individuals who also benefit privately from education and maintaining 
levels of social equality through access to education.  
Although some (including me) may take issue with some of the particular high-level reforms 
sketched here, and with many of the other, lower-level reforms that I have left out of the picture, the 
regulatory changes have been remarkably successful at achieving these aims (and others, including 
making education an important Australian export to the Asia-Pacific region, with the additional 
foreign policy ramifications that entails). If an argument is to be made for a market in the essentials 
of human life and activity, Australian higher education would seem to be that argument. 
Yet, as I will argue, the moral psychological features of individualism and fear and anxiety still 
remain. And there are tendencies within the system that are pushing higher education – even where 
social democratic governments are in charge – toward a more self-regulating model. Let me begin 
with the second feature, which I take to illustrate the claim that social democratic constraints on 
markets are themselves unstable, before turning to the evidence for the first claim. 
Let me focus on the reforms since 2005. Those reforms – whether by governments on the left 
or right – were driven at least in part by the need to reduce costs on the public purse. The only way 
to do that while at least seeming to maintain overall funding levels was to put further costs on the 
“consumers” – the students (coupled, of course, with “efficiencies” – more work for less pay for 
 
118 Of course, one may call this situation “state capitalism” or some other such moniker. I don’t think this is accurate since 
there is limited competition with privately owned entities (of which there are few); in any case, nothing much turns on it. 
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faculty, increases to casualised and precarious labour, focusing on quantity over quality, and so on). 
The result in 2005 was to add a deregulated fee option – essentially a full market pricing mechanism 
that operated on only part of the sector – on top of the regulated undergraduate student quasi-market. 
Since then, many proposals have been made to extend this pricing mechanism to the entire sector. 
(One could read this reform, with only a little cynicism, as the logical extension of the fully deregulated 
market for international students created in the 1980s, in an analogy to the extension of overseas 
imperial military practices to the police on the home front.) 
The 2012 shift (by an ostensibly centre-left government) to a demand-driven system by 
removing student caps was an attempt to achieve both a further broadening of access while placing 
again greater responsibility on the “consumers”. Like with other educational voucher proposals, it is 
an attempt to utilise market dynamics (here, that it is most efficient for supply to follow demand) in 
order to reach some wider distribution of preferred degrees and kinds of education.119 In both 2005 
and 2012, with two different parties in power, regulation is used to promote the ideal of a self-
regulating market. 
These dynamics have to be understood, of course, in the context of the wider market society. 
Where there is a general labour market there is pressure for education that meets the needs of that 
labour market rather than (or at least in preference to) the social and citizenship needs of the society 
at large. So while the background agreement on the public and private value of higher education still 
exists, there is pressure to focus more heavily on the private value.120 That in turn supports the case 
for a market in education – if the purpose of education is private advantage in the labour market, then 
 
119 Importantly, neoconservative governments are not averse to using supply-side dynamics (like setting prices for 
humanities degrees at exorbitant levels while subsidising business degrees) in order to influence that distribution. 
120 Universities now are increasingly offering internships and so on with the private sector. The purpose of education, after 
all, is employment. 
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the costs of education ought be borne by the student. The case for government determination of price 
correspondingly weakens. 
Let me turn now to the double-sided moral psychology of individualism on the positive side 
and competitive anxiety and fear on the negative side. I will illustrate it with two dynamics of the 
Australian higher education market. First, the fact that there is a highly regulated as opposed to 
minimally regulated market does not prevent students from coming to understand themselves as 
consumers (and universities from understanding themselves as producers). Since students are paying 
not insignificant amounts for their education, they (in a sense rightly!) want to see value for that outlay. 
Now it matters that (for example) holders of philosophy degrees earn more than holders of 
comparative literature degrees, and that engineers earn more than both. Grades become a matter of 
competition, since it matters (at the other end) what one’s grades are as opposed to what one has 
learned about oneself and others. The default attitude of students toward other students, as we see 
clearly in the classroom, is one of anxiety about how they appear in relation to others and competition 
rather than cooperation and engagement. These competitive dynamics exist because there is a market, 
not because there is a minimally regulated market.121 
Second, it is true that regulation of prices for domestic students has kept those prices relatively 
low in Australia in comparison to, say, the United States. But this has been enabled by the full 
deregulation of prices for international students. Australian universities are now highly dependent on 
international student fees, which account for nearly a quarter of total revenue.122 This dependence is 
 
121 One may argue that education was a positional good prior to its marketisation, and so it cannot be its marketisation 
that led to these dynamics. There are two lines of response. The first is that the positionality of education was very different 
when it was a matter of status and of political capital as opposed to when it was tied to a competitive labour market. The 
second is that I don’t need to claim that markets of this sort are the only institutions that foster competition (indeed, 
Aristotle’s comments in Book IX of Nicomachean Ethics clearly show otherwise) – only that they do in fact foster 
competition. 
122 Some other statistics put this data point in perspective: even after the 2012 shift to a demand-driven system for domestic 
students that drastically increased government and domestic student contributions, international student fees accounted 
for two-thirds of total increase in revenue from 2012-2017. Education (albeit including education beyond higher education) 
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illustrated by the response of Australian universities to Australia’s COVID-19 border closures. With 
the downturn in international students came huge and immediate top-down cuts to university budgets, 
with consequent job losses and cuts to course offerings and student services.123 This relation of 
dependence (which is often extremely exploitative, though I will not make that argument here) of low 
domestic student fees on high international student fees holds simultaneously with a perception that 
international students are direct competitors, tied into larger racist white Australian narratives and 
understandings. Indeed, international students, particularly given that the majority of them come from 
Asia, are not only politically the target of the usual slurs and worries about immigration, competitive 
advantage in the region, and so on, but within campuses are isolated and discriminated against. The 
double-sided moral psychology is clear: “our” hopes and desires for individual advancement exist only 
on “their” backs, so “we” are of course anxious about “them”.124 As I will argue in more detail in 
Chapter 5 drawing on Du Bois, racism supports and is fostered by exploitative capitalist imperialism.  
The example of the Australian higher education market is intended to support two claims. The 
first is that it is not only laissez-faire or minimally regulated markets that foster the double-sided moral 
psychology that undermines democracy. Highly regulated (and more or less well-regulated) markets 
created intentionally by the social democratic state for social democratic purposes also foster that 
moral psychology, as part of a wider market society. Second, those highly regulated markets as part of 
the social democratic welfare state are unstable. The self-regulating tendencies of capitalist markets 
 
is Australia’s fourth highest export earner, behind some natural resources, manufacturing, and agriculture. See Scott 
Doidge and John Doyle, "Australian Universities in the Age of COVID," Educational Philosophy and Theory  (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2020.1804343. 
123 I don’t mean to suggest that the austerity narrative is justified under these circumstances; merely that it is made easier by 
the circumstances. In fact, the Group of 8 universities (the most prestigious) have all declared profits this year – a difference 
in between budget and forecast of in many cases hundreds of millions of dollars. (Some of this is earmarked, no doubt.) 
Yet the damage to adjunct and casual academic workers has been done. See e.g. https://honisoit.com/2021/06/university-
sees-2020-surplus-increased-student-revenue/.  
124 I return to this theme in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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destabilise constraints placed on them, in part, as I have argued, through the use of political democratic 
institutions themselves.  
Both of these claims lie behind Dewey’s critique of the New Deal as comprising merely 
regulatory relief of injustice, without addressing the deeper undemocratic aspects of market society. 
Higher taxation of concentrated private ownership, the development of the welfare state, and better 
centralised regulation of markets in land and labour are, for Dewey, only the initial steps toward the 
attainment of democracy as a social idea, which, as he says in The Public and Its Problems, will create its 
own institutions.125 So, for both of those reasons, the Deweyan critique extends beyond a critique 
simply of laissez-faire markets to a market society in which market mechanisms are the primary means 
of coordinating social action. 
Alienated desire 
Let me return now to the negative side of the moral psychology fostered by a market society. 
The fears and anxieties fostered by constantly being “on the market” are exacerbated by a 
phenomenon that we can call “alienated desire”. Markets function on the basis that individuals have 
pre-existing desires that they seek to meet through the market. Through the dynamics of supply and 
demand, markets make public in the form of prices what people’s desires are and how much they 
value them. They set a price on the fulfilment of those desires, and thus coordinate activity and 
resources such that those desires are met.126  
 
125 See, e.g., Dewey, "Taxation as a Step to Socialization."; "The Future of Liberalism," e.g. 258. “The policy advanced, 
that of the governmental intervention to redress the imbalances brought about by freedom of business entrepreneurs is 
not connected with any idea of extending the scope of freedom and expanding its meaning. The action recommended is 
rather thought of as a restriction of liberty in behalf of greater social security. No reference is made to the regimentation 
and lack of freedom now suffered by the great mass of workers. Nothing is said about the larger phases of liberty that 
have to do with the freedom of the many to participate in the culture that is now possessed by society but not distributed.” 
126 Of course, they do so regularly and reliably only for those with market power, “the members of the ‘middle class,’ the 
manufacturing and mercantile class.” The Public and Its Problems, 297. See also Lindblom’s critique of unbridled claims to 
market efficiency in The Market System, Ch 11. 
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Alienated desire comes about because markets also determine our desires. We moderns do not 
want, Dewey writes, “for the most part beautiful bodies and beauty of architectural surroundings”, 
but are rather “mostly satisfied with the result of cosmetics and with ugly slums”.127 In contrast, the 
Athenians “did not buy Sunday newspapers, make investments in stocks and bonds, nor want motor 
cars.”128 This is not simply a point about what goods were available – we can still build Athenian-style 
architecture, even if it would not have the same meaning for us now as then (and our wanting it may 
be for different reasons – kitsch was not possible for the Athenians). It is a claim about the social 
malleability of desire; the market does not only serve to provide us more effectively with our pre-
existing “natural” desires, as the “dogma of ‘natural’ economic processes and laws” would have it, but 
contributes to the “artificial” social construction of those desires.129 
That desire is socially malleable is not necessarily a bad thing. How else would we come to 
share the delights that we find in what we desire with others? And, after all, some delights depend on 
their being shared; anyway, it would be a strange state of affairs if we were all iconoclasts. But given 
economies of scale, it is more efficient for all in society to have the same mass desires that are 
satisfiable on a mass level. We come to desire whatever the market provides; “we are mostly satisfied 
with the result of cosmetics and with ugly slums, and oftentimes with equally ugly palaces.”130 
Whatever is produced, is desired. This is in part a matter of “advertising on a vast scale” and “agents 
skilled in breaking down sales resistance” (we might now say: algorithms and nudges and a media 
controlled by private interests). But – and Dewey does not make this point – these technological 
innovations are innovations on a simple psychological mechanism that Hobbes had noted three 
 
127 The Public and Its Problems, 301. 
128 The Public and Its Problems, 300. 
129 The Public and Its Problems, 299-301. 
130 The Public and Its Problems, 301. 
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centuries earlier. We desire things just because they are desired by others; envy and competitiveness go hand 
in hand.131 Our social nature informs in this way our desires. 
Dewey draws a direct connection between conditions of mass production and conformity and 
standardisation. On one level, of course, this is just a material feature of mass production. But Dewey 
suggests that this material feature gets replicated directly at the level of culture, in ways that the 
Frankfurt School would later develop in more detail. Mass production, Dewey thinks, “causes a kind 
of mass education in which individual capacity and skill are submerged”.132 There is a process of 
“quantification of life” that serves directly, given individualism, to foster fear and anxiety (because 
how are we to stand out if we are the same as everyone else?), which, in turn, undermines further the 
possibility of individualism. 
3.5 The vicious cycle 
What is the result of this double-sided moral psychology? And how might it be changed? 
Dewey argues that this moral psychology has two possible consequences, both of which serve to lock 
in oligarchy. It may result in passivity, in political apathy and skepticism. Or it may result in activity 
that is explicitly directed towards maintaining the troubling features of market society.  
“Political apathy,” Dewey claims, “which is a natural product of the discrepancies between 
actual practices and traditional machinery, ensues from inability to identify one’s self with definite 
issues. These are hard to find and locate in the vast complexities of current life.”133 Apathy is 
strengthened by scepticism about the possibility of change: “[t]he confusion which has resulted from 
the size and ramifications of social activities has rendered men sceptical of the efficiency of political 
 
131 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012 [1651]), Ch XIII. 
132 Individualism, Old and New, 60. 
133 The Public and Its Problems, 319 
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action”.134 It is also compounded by the “bread-and-circus” distractions created by the market and by 
the fact that energy is directed into activities governed by the market: “members of an inchoate public 
have too many ways of enjoyment, as well as of work, to give much thought to organization into an 
effective public.”135 The point is not just that entertainment and consumption are distinct activities to 
politics, providing different and competing satisfactions. That is, as Dewey says, “an old story.”136 It 
is that entertainment and consumption are, in our capitalist market society, conditioned by the market. 
They take place through markets, and have been made “easy and cheap beyond anything known in the 
past.”137 Dewey is here critiquing the entertainment industry and not, in some Stoic fashion, the mere 
existence of entertainment. In short, because the action is where the market is, politics becomes a side 
show; or, worse, itself just part of the entertainment market.138 It becomes only that which enables the 
market and enables people to participate more fully in the market. A market society “subordinate[s] 
political to economic activity”.139 
The more interesting and, for my purposes, important feature of Dewey’s analysis is how he 
sees the double-sided moral psychology as working together to stabilise a market society. To draw 
quickly on a different literature, it is often thought that ideology is more effective the more complete 
it is. Ideology aims at complete consistency and complete false consciousness. But ideology, for 
Dewey, need not be consistent to serve its function of maintaining the system. The ideal of 
individualism provides a way in which some people can actively “buy into” the market, to think that 
 
134 The Public and Its Problems, 319. 
135 The Public and Its Problems, 321. 
136 The Public and Its Problems, 321. 
137 The Public and Its Problems, 321. 
138 “Politics thus tends to become just another ‘business’: the especial concern of bosses and the managers of the machine.” 
The Public and Its Problems, 321. 
139 Liberalism and Social Action, 9. 
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(so long as they are “getting ahead”, or think they are) the market and the way in which it is supported 
by political democracy is working for them. Dewey points to the formation of social organisations 
that defend oligarchy in the name of freedom: “Beneficiaries of the established economic regime band 
themselves together in what they call Liberty Leagues to perpetuate the harsh regimentation of 
millions of their fellows.”140 Yet, simultaneously, the fear and anxiety and conformity caused by 
precarity and instability fosters apathy and distraction and the other passive causes of ossification.141 So 
people swing between these two poles, which further undermines the stability of mind necessary for 
developing a considered alternative to these social structures.  
This moral psychology thus fosters a vicious cycle, one that involves market society reinforcing 
oligarchy, and vice versa. The systemic interaction of the market and political democracy provides them 
with their stability. As we have seen, the way in which political democracy falls into oligarchy depends 
on the moral psychology fostered by the market. But the market is also stabilised by the way in which 
it co-opts political democracy. The main possible engine of constraint on the market, as Keynes 
argued, was social democracy and the possibility of subsuming market imperatives to the social good. 
But by making its proper functioning the goal of democracy; that is, by claiming that giving rein to 
market tendencies was necessary for proper social functioning, the market undermines the possibility 
that democratic forms could be used against it. Capitalism stabilises itself by destabilising democracy.142 
So, on Dewey’s analysis, political democracy and market society interact in a vicious cycle. 
Oligarchy cuts off the limited possibilities of action towards collective ends that was made possible by 
 
140 Liberalism and Social Action, 26. Compare Ambedkar’s concept of graded inequality that I use in Chapter 4. 
141 “Why is there such zeal for standardized likeness? It is not, I imagine, because conformity for its own sake appears to 
be a great boon. It is rather because a certain kind of conformity gives defense and protection to the pecuniary features of 
our present regime.” Individualism, Old and New, 84. 
142 This dynamic of course extends beyond the mechanisms I have described here to more directly coercive mechanisms. 
Globalised finance capitalism destabilises democracy by threatening to run capital outside particular states unless 
supportive laws are passed, by holding governments accountable to private international contract law through regional 
and bilateral trade agreements, and, we see increasingly, direct intervention into the processes of electoral democracy. 
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political democracy, and turns the powers enabled by that institution towards the maintenance of the 
interests of the few. It is supported by and supports in turn the negative aspects of market society: a 
vicious cycle whereby changing the functioning of political institutions will require changing our 
market society, but the first step to changing market society is through democratic control over the 
market. Both possibilities are made difficult by the double-sided moral psychology of individualism 
and fear of government. Individualism supports a market society in which it is felt that one’s 
individualism can be best found through the market, and fear of government prevents the institutions 
of political democracy from being used to control the market. 
3.6 The double-sided moral psychology and the possibility of transformation 
So what can be done? Dewey’s overly general proposal is that the Public must come to 
recognise itself as such. I take this to mean two things. First, a public cannot exist if it is divided against 
itself by the old individualism and competition, and if it is prevented from expressing itself through 
its institutions of governance by fear of government. So there must be deep moral psychological 
change. Second, change on a mass scale requires better institutions of communication and education; 
for Dewey, the institutional means by which a public can be formed and maintained – that is, deep 
institutional change. These two changes must happen together, for the impetus for institutional change 
requires the moral psychological change, which to be a mass change requires institutional support. 
Hence Dewey’s call for a radical liberalism: “If radicalism be defined as perception of need for radical 
change, then today any liberalism that is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.”143  
Many have followed Dewey’s lead here in arguing for the need for a large cultural shift and 
for the development of new institutions of democracy as a social idea. And there have been as many 
criticisms of such proposals on various grounds, for minimising other causal factors (oppression, 
 
143 Liberalism and Social Action, 45. 
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poverty), for being too idealistic, and so on. I don’t propose to get into those debates here. What I 
propose to do is to examine more closely the double-sided moral psychology to see what possibilities 
for transformation it contains. 
Let me return to some points made earlier. First, recall that the double-sided psychology is in 
tension. That tension is managed by the positive side of the psychology. One can keep thinking to 
oneself: it’ll happen for me. The fear and the anxiety can be externalised; they are only temporary, just 
obstacles on the way to individual success, or they are for others, those who have lost the rat race, 
those who have given up. The positive side of the psychology hides the existence of the tension. It 
allows it to be put aside. 
This reliance of the system on the positive side is essential, for two reasons. First, while that 
positive psychology exists, though it be co-opted to maintain the system, it can in principle be 
mobilised to change it. Although the hope is presently for individual success in comparison to others, 
that hope can perhaps be shifted in object and form to a hope for a system that doesn’t pit oneself 
against others. A hope that takes oneself as its object might be transformed into a hope in others and 
their capacities for us together to bring about transformative change. Hope is a powerful and 
motivating force, and perhaps it can be redirected away from maintaining the system and towards 
changing it. As Cornel West says, we need to “keep alive some sense of possibility. Some sense of 
hope. Some sense of agency. Some sense of resistance in a moment of defeat and disillusionment and 
a moment of discouragement.”144 We need, therefore, to engage in redirecting individualistic hope and 
desire for self-fulfilment into solidaristic hope and desire for a different system. So, too, the trust that 
is fostered in institutions can be shifted towards other, more worthy individuals and agencies. The 
openness of communication that is necessary for political democracy and the market to function still 
 
144 West, "Pragmatism and the Tragic," 32.  
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allows for connections to form between different people, groups, and ways of life. Even if those 
connections are presently mobilised towards maintaining unfreedom, Dewey has faith in a quasi-
Foucauldian point, that those connections can be turned and used for other purposes. The redirection 
of this positive psychology is Dewey’s main method for transformation. Through education, he thinks, 
the kind of values fostered by economic liberalism – the liberation and sustenance of individual 
potentials – can be rehabilitated, people’s hopes redirected, “the springs of purpose and desire” 
renewed.145  
Such a positive program is admirable and must always be kept in mind. But to clarify its 
possibilities and limits, one must also look at how the negative side of the psychology might function, 
both on its own terms and possibly to strengthen or support the positive program (after all, something 
must redirect hope and trust away from the existing institutions and towards new possibilities). If that 
positive side of the psychology were to lessen, as it is likely to do the greater distance there is between 
the promise of economic liberalism and its actual results, stability would be ensured only by the negative 
side of the psychology, through fear and anxiety.  
Is it possible for the stability of the system to be ensured solely by the negative side? Hobbes, 
as he is generally conceived, thought so. On the standard interpretation, Hobbes is the great theorist 
of social stability through negative emotions. The story of the formation of the social contract in 
Leviathan is an attempt to derive a stable society solely given the (rational) motivations of fear and 
diffidence, and the desire for self-preservation that underlies them.146 Whether or not his account can 
be made to work on its own terms, however, such a psychology is, I think, insufficient under modern 
 
145 Liberalism and Social Action, 25.  
146 Though see, for different but expanded conceptions of Hobbes’s toolkit, Sandra Field, "Hobbes and the Question of 
Power," Journal of the History of Philosophy 52, no. 1 (2014); Sharon A. Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases 
in the law of nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Note also the role that hope plays in achieving peace in 
Leviathan, Ch XIII. 
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conditions to ensure stability. Now that the ideals of autonomy and self-determination and the justified 
desire for something more than mere self-preservation are in the air, they cannot easily be ignored. 
(Although, it is true, we do see in recent times, as well as in times past, some cultural shift away from 
such ideals towards a desire to be passive, to be told what to do and how to be, to be happily subject 
with pleasurable distractions from our fear and anxiety. Peace is easier than freedom.) The positive 
psychology becomes less and less easy to maintain where our hopes are consistently not being met. 
The further away the deliverances of the system from its promise, the more the positive side of the 
psychology will fade and the more the negative side will predominate. At some tipping point, the 
negative side alone will be insufficient to maintain stability. This theme of the need for a positive moral 
psychological reinforcement of the system and not merely the negative side alone will recur in the 
analysis of the following two chapters. 
There are two problems with reliance on the instability of a purely negative psychology, 
however. The first is that it does not itself provide any positive rethinking of the alternatives to the 
present state of affairs. Without any “renewal of the springs of purpose and desire”, a purely negative 
psychology, however much it may provide an opportunity and a motivation to change things, does 
not provide itself any practical guidance about how to go about doing so. Indeed, extreme fear and 
anxiety can debilitate. It can make action impossible. So some positive direction needs to be given; 
merely stoking (for example) anger and blame is not itself sufficient. 
The second is that institutions have a capacity to maintain themselves even when the negative 
psychology is very much predominant. It is fair to say, I think, that our political and economic system 
has consistently, over a period of time, failed to meet people’s hopes, and that fear and anxiety pervade 
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much of modern existence.147 But yet the system persists. This fact points to a further set of 
mechanisms, for an understanding of which we must go beyond Dewey’s arguments.  
This further layer consists in two strategies that can be and are often deployed conjointly. The 
first is the increased use of force (whether by centralised agencies or interest groups) to ensure stability, 
at least on the surface. With minimal violence, this takes the form of silence at the expense of peace; 
with maximum violence, outright civil war. But, in the end, force requires strength of numbers. The 
second, and more efficient, is to direct the negative emotions within the society away from the 
institutions, for example by playing with in-group/out-group dynamics, by scapegoating or otherwise 
creating an Other. “We” fear or are anxious about “them”, and at least, though “we” are not satisfied, 
at least we’re doing better than “them”, that “them” who wishes to take what “we” have. The 
combination of the two, used to maintain stability and avoid outright civil war, directs the use of force 
(both centralised and comprador) against the scapegoated group in familiar ways.148 A group of people 
is singled out to maintain the stability of the society. 
As critics such as Cornel West and Reinhold Niebuhr have pointed out, Dewey does not 
properly recognize the ways in which a market society and the failing institutions of political 
democracy have often relied on outright forms of oppression and domination, both domestically and 
 
147 Exactly what the length of this period of time is depends on who the group of people are, the strength and form of the 
relevant hopes, and on whose backs whatever success exists has been achieved. There is the phenomenon of : “we won’t 
have success, but we will struggle so that our children will.” The possibility of that form of hope in one’s children (which 
often takes the form of hoping that they will have the exact kind of success that we want) is put in jeopardy by climate 
change – though the force of that hope is attested to by the lengths that people will go to deny that anything needs to 
change. See Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Samuel Scheffler, 
"Procreation, Immigration, and the Future of Humanity" (NYU Legal, Social, and Political Philosophy Colloquium, New 
York, September 3, 2020). See also Amia Srinivasan on Scheffler: “it seems to me undeniable that both earthly and religious 
afterlives – and, for that matter, the afterlife afforded by children – are a vehicle for deferred fulfilment.” Amia Srinivasan, 
"After the Meteor Strike," London Review of Books, 25 September, 2014. Thanks to Lucas Guimarāes Pinheiro for pushing 
me to think about the temporal scale of this point. 
148 These are not new developments. As many thinkers from de las Casas onwards have argued, the institutions of modernity 
including democracy and the market have always been tied up with these tendencies to the use of force against an Other, 
both internal and external. See e.g. Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global futures, decolonial options.  
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internationally. He is sensitive, as Melvin Rogers has pointed out, to the importance of power in 
structuring social life, both positively and negatively.149 But he is not properly sensitive to the more 
explicit forms that power can take. We might think this a noteworthy oversight, especially given how 
the development of American political democracy is tied up with colonialism, slavery, and imperialism 
in the Pacific and elsewhere. So we have to understand these dynamics by which a hierarchy of groups 
is explicitly and deliberately established in order to redirect within the system the energies that could 
be used to transform the system. It is these dynamics to which I will turn in the next two chapters. 
I’ve argued in this chapter that political democracy is an example of an institution which 
promised freedom but has come to constrain it by falling into oligarchy. It has come to constrain 
freedom because of its systematic interconnection with capitalist market society, when markets come 
to be the model for all social interactions. Markets – which also promised freedom of a more 
individualistic kind, but which have come to constrain it – foster and exacerbate a double-sided moral 
psychology of individualistic hope and desire, and of fear and anxiety. That moral psychology in turn 
makes it more difficult for us to use democratic institutions to control the tendencies of market society. 
This systematic interconnection means that piecemeal reform is insufficient, and the hold of the moral 
psychology means that change must come from within the state of unfreedom. But there is still a hope 
for change, by thoroughly transforming the institutional structure simultaneously with moral 
psychological change. The moral psychology, because it is double-sided, contains tensions that can be 
exploited to direct our agential powers toward systemic change. But, as I suggested in closing, we must 
take into account the dynamics of hierarchical institutions that explicitly constrain the freedom of 
some to protect something of others – a task to which I turn in the next two chapters. 
 
149 See Rogers, The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, morality, and the ethos of democracy, Ch 6. Rogers, on the basis of his claim that 
Dewey is concerned with power relations, argues that Dewey is a proponent of freedom as non-domination. I think this 







Chapter 4: Ambedkar and the Annihilation of Caste 
Distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility 
tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid.1 
 
I closed the last chapter by pointing to the need to understand the dynamics of those 
institutions that deliberately constrain the freedom of some to render some benefits to others. In this 
chapter, I will first identify two stabilising features of these institutions, drawing on aspects of B. R. 
Ambedkar’s analysis of caste in India in the early part of the 20th century. Second, using this analysis, 
I will analyse how Ambedkar understands the project of shifting these dynamics. For Ambedkar, this 
involves building power through political institutional change in a way that supports moral 
psychological change.  
The first feature of these institutions concerns the relation between their hierarchical structure 
and the moral psychology that the structure fosters and in turn is supported by. In particular, I will 
argue that such institutions are stabilised through having a structure of what Ambedkar called graded 
inequality, on which the hierarchies of exploitation, oppression, and domination that partly constitute 
the relevant kinds of unfreedom are not simply binary but exhibit multiple strata. This multiple 
stratification is rendered clear explicit in the case of caste, though it operates in more or less subtle 
ways in other forms of hierarchy.2 That structure of graded inequality fosters and is itself stabilised by 
a moral psychology of group interest, which manifests in various attitudes and ways of thinking and 
feeling that are explicable in terms of protecting the interests of one’s group against the perceived 
threats of other groups. Ambedkar captures this relation between the structure of caste and moral 
 
1 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §1. 
2 Similar dynamics operate in gender, where degrees of masculinisation and femininisation determine different strata even 
if one takes (as oppressive conceptions of gender tend to take) gender to be a binary system. So too in the case of class 
with the notion of “labour aristocracy” and in colonial dynamics with the figure of the “comprador”. 
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psychology neatly when he says that “[c]aste is a notion, it is a state of the mind.”3 By this he of course 
does not mean to deny that caste is an objective social structure, but to point to the ways in which 
that structure is tied up with the way people think, feel, and engage with the world. His social 
philosophy is connected to his moral psychology.  
The second feature is how such structures are “hardened” or made more difficult to change. 
I will argue that one way these hierarchies are hardened is by being given a legalistic or deontic form, 
where the hierarchies come to be understood in terms of rights, duties, privileges, and other deontic 
concepts. This is one way in which institutions (here, caste and the law) intersect to form a system, as I 
argued in the last chapter with reference to democracy and the market. This occurred with caste 
categories through caste’s imbrication with British colonial structures of legal governance.4 Caste and 
colonial (and post-colonial) law form a system that mean caste cannot be understood without seeing 
it in that larger systemic context. And the same holds for other hierarchical structures and law. 
These two features ground Ambedkar’s transformationism. In order to get this 
transformationism on the table, I will analyse how Ambedkar conceives of the relation between a 
political strategy for responding to the caste problem, through constitutional affirmative action to 
enshrine Dalit legislative representation, and a social and religious strategy, which is to annihilate caste. 
The political strategy addresses the legal hardening of caste. But, in Ambedkar’s view, it can only be 
supplementary to the social strategy, since the political strategy proceeds necessarily through invoking 
those legalised caste categories. One key plank of Ambedkar’s social and religious strategy is the 
concept of conversion. I will argue that conversion plays two roles in Ambedkar’s thinking, both of 
which aim at moral psychological change. In the form of conversion to Buddhism, it plays an 
 
3 B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, ed. Vasant Moon, Writings and Speeches of B. R. Ambedkar, vol. 1, (New Delhi: 
Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 68. 
4 That process has continued in the way in which caste identity has been structured by constitutionalisation and other post-
1950 processes of legal incorporation and protection. I will not analyse these further processes in detail here. 
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“internal” role in building Dalit community and power outside a Hindu frame. And in a larger sense, 
it plays an “external” role in shifting the larger Hindu moral psychology. In both senses it is a 
conversion away from the moral psychology of group interest that characterises caste. 
I will begin in section 1 by situating my reading of Ambedkar and specifying more precisely 
the philosophical purposes to which I put his thought. Section 2 will provide a structural analysis of 
caste, which will ground my arguments in sections 3 and 4 about the moral psychology of graded 
inequality and the hardening of caste through its imbrication with colonial legal governance 
respectively. Section 5 will conclude with a brief analysis of how these two features ground 
Ambedkar’s subsumption of the formal political sphere to that of the social and religious.  
4.1 Preliminaries: situating my reading of Ambedkar 
I begin by isolating and situating the particular theoretical issue in which I am interested: the 
mechanisms of stability of institutions of unfreedom (like caste) that explicitly put some above others 
in hierarchies, whether of oppression, domination, or exploitation. The force of the arguments that I 
give here in response to this question are neutral, at least I think, with respect to particular views on 
certain contested issues. I raise three such issues here in order to flag that I will not be addressing 
them directly.  
The first is the issue of the historical origins and development of caste. I would like, as far as 
is possible, to distinguish the question of how such institutions are maintained from the question of 
their origins.5 Even if questions of origin become relevant to questions of maintenance, my concern 
will be origins only insofar as they are relevant to maintenance. So I will myself not get involved in the 
 
5 For the useful distinction between originating and maintaining causes, see Saray Ayala‐López, "A Structural Explanation 
of Injustice in Conversations: It's about norms," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99, no. 4 (2018). 
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specifically historical debates about the long histories of caste, either on the general level (e.g. debates 
about processes of Aryanisation) or as regards the histories of particular castes.6 
Second, I will only address obliquely the hugely complicated relationship between colonialism 
and caste. I address this point obliquely in examining how colonial law supported caste exclusions, 
which is one small part of how colonial legal categories shaped caste structures. But I take no stand 
on the broader debate about the extent to which modern caste forms are the result of colonial 
Orientalist governance practices as opposed to being pre-modern Vedic practices.7 
Third and finally, even though in this dissertation I draw on W. E. B. Du Bois as well as 
Ambedkar, I will not have much to say about the historical intertwinement of the categories of race 
and caste. The two have a long history that others have examined already in some detail. Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach’s racial classification scheme in On the Natural Varieties of Mankind (1775), which 
first posited that whites – as “Caucasians” – came from the Caucasus mountains, was commonly 
referenced in the 19th century by scholars of race, including the Sanskritist Max Müller. Müller, in 1847, 
claimed that higher-caste northern Hindus were also of Caucasian origin, bound together with 
Europeans as “Aryans”. This claim was taken up by other Orientalists including the colonial 
administrator and ethnographer Herbert Hope Risley, who divided India racially into northern, whiter, 
“Aryans” and southern, darker, “Dravidians” – a division that was taken also to mirror caste divisions.8 
This background was one reason – of course, in addition to the perception of certain commonalities 
in forms of oppression – that activists and thinkers, including Du Bois and Ambedkar, drew 
 
6 For an overview of the different theories of origin of caste, see Anand Teltumbde, Dalits: Past, present and future (New 
York: Routledge, 2020), Ch 1. 
7 Again, Ambedkar has interesting views here – for ideological and political reasons, he places caste in the distant Hindu 
past and as essential to Hinduism – indeed, it is what defines Hinduism, for Ambedkar, as pre-modern, but the legalistic 
structure he discerns there is so quintessentially modern that it runs up against this placing. 
8 See e.g. Justin E. H. Smith, Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference: Race in early modern philosophy (Princeton University 
Press, 2015); Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism (Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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comparisons between race and caste in the 20th century.9 Du Bois often describes the colour line as a 
“caste system”; Ambedkar compares American slavery to Indian caste on a number of occasions, in 
two chapters in Untouchables or the Children of India’s Ghetto, and again in an essay entitled “Which is 
Worse: Slavery or Untouchability?” But this important comparativist project will not be what I engage 
in here. 
Putting this point more generally, my aim in this chapter is philosophical rather than historical 
or interpretive. I want to read Ambedkar as a philosopher speaking at a certain level of generality, one 
who of course is situated in and is responding to various traditions, but who is not limited to those 
traditions. I want to read him and draw on him as a cosmopolitan (in the broadest sense) thinker, one 
who draws on those traditions in order to address human problems and the human condition which 
are not the province of any one particular tradition. 
The other point to raise at the outset is how I situate Ambedkar with respect to the categories 
of revolution/reform and internalism/externalism that I articulated in Chapter 1. Ambedkar is a 
transformationist in my sense. He argues, against the Hindu Social Reformers (in which category 
Ambedkar also includes Gandhi), that surface reforms to caste practices like encouraging interdining 
and intermarriage between castes will not be sufficient to overcome the wrongs of caste. Rather, a 
wholescale annihilation of caste is necessary, which must be systematic in the sense that it involves 
wholescale transformation also of political, economic, and religious institutions. Against Indian 
revolutionary socialists of the time, Ambedkar argued that this is necessarily a temporally extended 
process. It cannot be done overnight, because caste is embedded so deeply into Hindu ways of life 
and agents’ moral psychologies that it cannot be extirpated just with surface level social reforms or 
with political and legal reforms alone.  
 
9 Cf. Oliver Cromwell Cox, Caste, Class and Race: A study in social dynamics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959). See 
also Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism. 
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Ambedkar is also an internalist in my sense. He holds that social change requires those subject 
to unfreedom to act.10 This commitment to Dalit agency and power is one reason that lies behind his 
socio-historical story of the origins of caste, figuring Dalithood simultaneously as identifying those 
who are “ground down” by and excluded from the caste order, and as a new, positive political identity 
that could act as a model for a new kind of politics. As Anupama Rao neatly puts it, Ambedkar 
“convert[s] a negative description into a confrontational identity … a particular sort of political subject 
for whom ‘the terms of exclusion on which discrimination are premised are at once refused and 
reproduced in the demands for inclusion.’”11 It is on this basis that he argues against Gandhi and the 
largely upper-caste Hindu Social Reformers who seek, on their own terms, to grant Dalits inclusion 
into the existing Hindu social order. Instead of this form of externalism, he insisted repeatedly on the 
capacity of Dalits for self-assertion and self-determination.12  
I turn now from the preliminaries to the argument proper. The first question is: what is the 
structure of a caste system? I will then address the relation between that structure and the moral 
psychology it fosters and which stabilises it, before turning to how the metaphysics of that structure 
are shaped by its interactions with the institutions of colonial law. 
4.2 The structure of caste as graded inequality 
A caste system is one divided into distinct, closed, and hierarchically structured groups. The 
groups are distinct, insofar as any one person belongs only to one caste from birth, and their social 
 
10 Ambedkar: “…we ourselves must fight our battles, relying on ourselves.” B. R. Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, 17 vols., 
vol. 17.1, ed. Vasant Moon (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 23. 
11 Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the politics of modern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 1. 
12 Gopal Guru argues similarly, drawing on the Dalit Panthers, that “Dalit” is a “revolutionary category”, one “historically 
constructed through revolutionary struggle of the Dalits.” See Gopal Guru, “Understanding the Category Dalit,” in Atrophy 
in Dalit Politics (Vikas Adhyayan Kendra, 2005), 67. Some part of contemporary Dalit politics has shifted Ambedkar’s 
construction of Dalit identity as a unitary political identity towards a recognition of the many and varied cultural traditions 
of sub-castes, and toward the economic mobilisation of Dalit identity. See, for example, Kusuma Satyanarayana, "Dalit 
reconfiguration of caste: Representation, identity and politics," Critical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2014); Teltumbde, Dalits: Past, 
present and future. 
175 
 
role is defined (at least in large part) by their belonging to that caste. The groups are closed, insofar as 
a person cannot move between castes, the castes are endogamous, and certain interpersonal relations 
between castes are regulated or prohibited.13 And they are hierarchically structured, insofar as castes 
are higher or lower than others.14  
In such a system, castes are defined relationally and in contradistinction to other castes. That 
is, castes do not exist in the singular, but only in the plural. For there to be a higher caste, there must 
be a lower.15 It is this closed, regulated, and hierarchical social structure that theorists mean when they 
describe other systems of subordination and domination (for example, racialised systems of 
domination in the United States, South Africa, or Nazi Germany, or other forms of group exploitation 
and domination in Japan and Korea) as caste systems.16 I do not mean by this structuralist account to 
conceive of caste in purely ideological terms that float free from material conditions. The hierarchy 
and the enclosedness of castes are material, experiential, and political as well as a matter of abstracted 
 
13 Some of the sociological literature distinguishes between structural and interactional approaches to caste and other 
hierarchical systems. See Gerald D. Berreman, "Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction: A comparative analysis of caste," 
in Caste and Race: Comparative approaches, ed. Anthony De Reuck and Julie Knight (London: Little, Brown & Co, 1967).  
14 Ambedkar speaks of the “two aspects” of caste: first, that it “divides men into separate communities” (distinctness and 
closure); second, that it “places these communities in a graded order” (hierarchy). Annihilation of Caste, 72. Many sociologists 
have argued that these aspects of caste can come apart, that one or the other may be more important given different 
contexts (e.g. in rural or in urban settings), and indeed that they can come into conflict. See A. M. Shah, The Structure of 
Indian Society: Then and now, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2019), Chs 1, 5, 8. Compare the focus on hierarchy in Louis 
Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications (University of Chicago Press, 1959). 
15 See B. R. Ambedkar, “Castes in India,” in Writings and Speeches, 17 vols., vol. 1, ed. Vasant Moon (New Delhi: Dr. 
Ambedkar Foundation, 2014). Ambedkar writes elsewhere that “there cannot be caste in the single number. Caste can 
exist only in the plural number. Caste to be real can exist only by disintegrating a group.” B. R. Ambedkar, Untouchables or 
the Children of India's Ghetto, ed. Vasant Moon, Writings and Speeches of B. R. Ambedkar, vol. 5, (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar 
Foundation, 2014), 211. Compare Partha Chatterjee, “The Nation and its Outcasts,” in The Nation and its Fragments 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
16 See, e.g., Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1944). W. E. B. Du Bois, "Caste: That is the Root of the Trouble," in Writings by W. E. B. Du Bois in Periodicals Edited by 
Others: Vol. 1, 1891-1909, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The Complete Published Writings of W. E. B. Du Bois (Millwood, NY: 
Kraus-Thompson Organization, 1982 [1904]). More recently, see Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The origins of our discontents (New 
York: Penguin Random House, 2020). For a critique, see Cox, Caste, Class and Race: A study in social dynamics. For caste in 
Japan and Korea, see the essays in Anthony De Reuck and Julie Knight, Caste and Race: comparative approaches (London: 
Little, Brown & Co, 1967). To identify and isolate this objective structure is not to deny that caste in any one of these 
contexts has certain cultural meanings that are not reducible to this objective structure. 
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status and structure.17 Nonetheless, the structure is important to understanding caste, even if it does 
not give us a complete understanding of it. Indeed, I will argue that this structuralist view of caste is 
tied up with a complex moral psychology – how the structure is experienced by and manifested in 
agents. This structuralist view of caste, that is, is consistent with accepting that the cultural, economic, 
and religious features of a society are not merely incidental or external to the formal structure and 
ought to be taken into account when seeking to understand the structure itself.18 But it is still useful 
to be able to grasp that structure at a certain level of abstraction from the very particular histories and 
cultural and religious features of caste as it operates in specific contexts. 
The word “caste”, in the Indian and more broadly the South Asian context, draws together 
two different categorisations. The first, jati, refers to caste groups defined by occupation and often 
geographical region. These occupation-level castes are themselves grouped into a fourfold division 
according to the old Vedic principle of varna – the second categorisation. This fourfold varna categories 
comprise, from “highest” to “lowest”, Brahmins (priests, intellectuals), Kshatriyas (warriors, 
administrators), Vaishyas (merchants, agriculturalists), and Shudras (labourers). Left outside that 
fourfold division are Dalits or “untouchables”, as well as other avarna (not being part of a varna) tribes. 
While caste hierarchies and divisions can be found in Hindu texts as old at least as the 3rd century 
BCE, the superimposition of varna on jati and the consequent articulated formal structure of caste was 
in significant part due to the effects of colonial governance and the background Orientalist 
assumptions that shaped such governance, particularly after caste became central to the forms of 
 
17 See, for example, Teltumbde, Dalits: Past, present and future; Suraj Yengde, Caste Matters (Penguin Random House, 2019); 
Aniket Jaaware, Practicing Caste: On touching and not touching (Fordham University Press, 2018); Gopal Guru and Sundar 
Sarukkai, The Cracked Mirror: An Indian debate on experience and theory (Oxford University Press, 2018). For an overview, see 
Surinder Jodhka, Caste in Contemporary India, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2018). 
18 As is evident, for example, in Chatterjee, “The Nation and its Outcasts.” 
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governance instituted after the British East India Company was folded into direct imperial rule in 
1858.19  
The caste structure of varna is one of what Ambedkar calls graded inequality between those caste 
groups.20 The castes are unequal, since each of them have differential roles, rights, and responsibilities, 
stretching in a graded hierarchy up to Brahmins. Dalits, as the group at the bottom of the caste 
hierarchy in virtue of their exclusion from the four varnas, are subject to particular forms of 
exploitation, oppression, and domination in all social spheres, forms which differ geographically and 
which have shifted and changed historically. While there are forms of discrimination that occur within 
the four varnas, there is a fundamental division between caste Hindus who belong to one of the four 
varnas and Dalits who are excluded from this order. It is this division that is captured in the idea of 
“untouchability” – caste Hindus refuse to come into contact (even “indirectly”, through contact of 
shadow or sharing of food and drink and space) with the “untouchable” Dalit.21  
This phenomenon of untouchability – the fundamental exclusion of Dalits from the entire 
caste order – is Ambedkar’s main concern. It is untouchability that Ambedkar seeks to overcome. 
One might think therefore that it would be possible, by incorporating Dalits into the caste order, to 
remove untouchability while maintaining some kind of (radically changed) “caste” structure. This was 
 
19 For the oldest extant texts, see Patrick Olivelle, The Dharmasūtras: The law codes of ancient India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). That edition has a useful introduction on the dating of the texts. See also Patrick Olivelle, "Dharmaśāstra: a 
textual history," in Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, ed. Jayanth Krishnan, Donald R. Davis, and Timothy Lubin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). As an historical matter, the British categorised all jatis into the fourfold 
varna categories for census purposes beginning with the 1901 Decennial Census. For this last point see Nicholas B. Dirks, 
Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the making of modern India (Princeton University Press, 2002). 
20 See, e.g., B. R. Ambedkar, The Hindu Social Order, ed. Vasant Moon, Writings and Speeches of B. R. Ambedkar, vol. 3, 
(New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 106 and following. 
21 There are many ways of trying to capture conceptually these forms of unfreedom to which Dalits are subjected, from 
an anthropology of pollution or impurity, to a phenomenology of touch or smell. For pollution and impurity, see Dumont. For 
touch and smell, see Guru and Sarukkai. Although untouchability has been formally abolished with Article 17 of the 
Constitution of India (1950), supported by other anti-discrimination constitutional provisions and the Untouchability Offences 
Act 1955, it is still widely practiced and enforced. See Teltumbde. 
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in essence Gandhi’s proposal – to remove the inequalities associated with caste by recognizing the 
dignity and worth of all kinds of work and the essential role that all work places in Gandhi’s 
reimagining of the Hindu social order as an organic and interdependent whole. Other Hindu social 
reformers proposed a similar removal of untouchability through promoting contact between caste 
Hindus and Dalits while retaining the varna structure. On such proposals, untouchability is 
distinguishable from varna, where the latter is understood as a division of labour and a religious 
acceptance of the sanctity of one’s place in the order of things. 
Ambedkar rejects the claim that untouchability is separable from varna such that it is possible 
to abolish untouchability while retaining fundamental divisions in society. He argues instead that 
untouchability is maintained by the entire caste structure. That is why annihilating untouchability 
requires annihilating the entire caste system and not just encouraging and permitting social interactions 
between castes (through interdining and intermarriage) while leaving the caste structure intact, as 
Hindu social reformers argued.22  
Why is it that untouchability is inseparable from caste? Ambedkar provides grounds for this 
claim from a number of angles. The first is interpretive. He argues that Hinduism is a scriptural 
religion, and that the Hindu scriptures provide sanction for the fourfold varna social order and the 
exclusion of Dalits from that order.23 Hinduism, Ambedkar argues, is the only religion that sacralises 
and thus directly consecrates a given social ordering – that of caste.24  
 
22 “The underlying idea that caste and untouchability are two different things is founded on a fallacy. The two are one and 
are inseparable. Untouchability is only an extension of the caste system. There can be no severance between the two. The 
two stand together and will fall together.” Ambedkar, Untouchables or the Children of India's Ghetto, 101. See also Ambedkar’s 
critique of the Hindu social reformers in Annihilation of Caste. 
23 “…Caste being preached by the Vedas…automatically gets the authority of the written book and the sanctity of the 
divine word.” Untouchables, 183. 
24 “The Hindus are the only people in the world whose Social order—the relation of man to man—is consecrated by 
religion and made sacred, eternal and inviolate. The Hindus are the only people in the world whose economic order—the 
relation of workman to workman—is consecrated by religion and made sacred, eternal and inviolate.” Untouchables, 190. 
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It is on this point that Gandhi challenged Ambedkar in responding to Annihilation of Caste.25 
Gandhi argued that the Hindu texts do not speak for themselves, but require interpretation. So there 
cannot be any “direct consecration” of caste by text, since the texts are always mediated. Further, 
Gandhi claims, since every age has added different texts to the list of scriptures, not every written 
Hindu text (and, Gandhi implies, no text qua text) is central to Hinduism as a religion.26 That is, contra 
the legalist reading of the Hindu texts employed by the colonial state and experienced by (and thereby 
perpetuated by) Ambedkar, Hinduism was at its heart a religion of spiritual practice (in Ambedkar’s 
terms, a religion of principles rather than rules) and not of written law.27 Similarly, against Ambedkar’s 
claim that caste is the only social order that receives direct scriptural consecration, Gandhi notes in 
passing that it is likely that every faith, if interpreted in the hermeneutically suspicious way that 
Ambedkar proposes, could be found to directly consecrate some unjust social order.28 
The proper exegesis of Hindu texts and the underlying interpretive question of the extent to 
which Hinduism is primarily a religion of practice or a religion of the book are issues that cannot be 
dealt with in any satisfactory fashion here (or, indeed, dealt with satisfactorily by me). I thus leave the 
hermeneutic argument aside. Two other arguments, in any case, are more philosophically interesting 
from the view of Ambedkar as a cosmopolitan thinker, insofar as they bear on issues outside the 
specific religious frame in which that dispute between Gandhi and Ambedkar occurred. The first is 
 
25 Gandhi also in this way challenges the modernist/anti-modernist dichotomy that Ambedkar is relying on. It is true that 
Hinduism is anti-modern in the European sense, for Gandhi, precisely because European modernity is not the only path 
open to non-Europeans. But there are other forms of modernity. See Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought 
and historical difference. 
26 M. K. Gandhi, "A Vindication of Caste," in Writings and Speeches of B. R. Ambedkar, ed. Vasant Moon (New Delhi: Dr. 
Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 82.  
27 “Religion does not live by [textual learning]. It lives in the experience of its saints and seers, in their lives and sayings. 
When the most learned commentators of the scriptures are utterly forgotten, the accumulated experience of the sages and 
saints will abide and be an inspiration for ages to come.” Gandhi, 82. 
28 Gandhi, 83.  
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an argument about the moral psychological effects of the caste structure of graded inequality. This 
argument is more philosophically interesting insofar as it bears on more general issues pertaining to 
graded inequality itself as a kind of social structure, whether or not such a structure is embedded in a 
particular religious tradition. The second argument is about that formal structure itself; in particular, 
some ways in which such a structure can become rigidified and difficult to change. I begin with the 
first: the moral psychology of graded inequality and then move to the hardening of caste structure. 
4.3 The “religious sanction” and the moral psychology of group interest 
In Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar describes caste as a “notion… a state of the mind.” It is not 
a notion that is held because Hindus are intrinsically evil or inhuman or irrational. Rather, it is held 
because people are embedded in a larger religious system – “what is wrong is their religion, which has 
inculcated this notion of Caste.”29 Ambedkar here distinguishes between the individual Hindus who see 
the world a certain way, hold certain beliefs, have certain feelings towards other castes, and the caste 
system that shapes them in that way. Individuals will not change, he says, while the system persists, for 
it is the system that fosters that state of mind and not some intrinsic feature of Hindus as individuals. 
This system gives caste what Ambedkar calls the “religious sanction” – one of the two main sanctions 
(the other being the “legal sanction”) that, in Ambedkar’s view, can stabilise a social structure against 
the power of rational criticism.30  
 
29 Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, 68. 
30 Ambedkar argues that caste is maintained by four “sanctions”. The first is the repetition of exclusionary everyday 
practices prohibiting interdining and intermarriage between castes, and the second is the social approbation and 
disapprobation that attends those practices and breaches of those practices. Ambedkar calls the habitual repetition of those 
practices the “natural sanction” and the approbative and disapprobative elements that attend that repetition the “popular 
sanction”. These two sanctions attend any institution and are the surface mechanisms by which that institution reproduces 
itself. According to Ambedkar, by themselves the natural and popular sanctions are not strong enough to maintain an 
institution in the face of reasoned or rational challenge to the underlying normative principles of the practice. For that an 
institution requires either or both of the “religious sanction” or the “legal sanction”, which run deeper than, and in turn 
undergird, the natural and popular sanctions. In Ambedkar’s view, the main failing of (the largely upper-caste) Hindu social 
reformers, who wanted to undermine caste-based social domination and ostracism while maintaining caste divisions by 
encouraging practices of inter-caste dining and inter-marriage, was that they did not recognise that the natural and popular 
sanctions of habit and accompanying social approbation and disapprobation are not the sole means of maintaining caste, 
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What is required to change that system? In his essay “Buddha or Marx,” Ambedkar provides 
a modernist reading of the Buddha’s teachings that draws Buddhism close to Marx.31 I will sketch the 
pertinent points of the comparison here, without getting into exegesis or justification of Ambedkar’s 
reading. For both, on Ambedkar’s reading, the point of their philosophy was to change the world, 
which, for Ambedkar’s Marx, was characterised essentially by class exploitation insofar as one class 
owns property and the other does not, and which, for Ambedkar’s Buddha, was characterised 
essentially by suffering caused by human conflict and exploitation because of avarice. Ambedkar treats 
Marx’s goal as the removal of suffering due to class exploitation and the Buddha’s goal as the ending 
of suffering due to conflict between humans because of avarice (a treatment supported with some 
creative re-reading) as identical.  
Whether or not Ambedkar is right about this fundamental similarity in goal between Buddha 
and Marx, that similarity sets up the important point of difference between Buddha and Marx, for 
Ambedkar, which concerns the means by which such suffering is to be relieved. Ambedkar construes 
Marxism as relying on force as the means of bringing about change, by which Ambedkar means the 
coercive abolition of private property through the dictatorship of the proletariat. He contrasts that 
with the Buddha’s method of “chang[ing] the mind of man” through religion, to “alter his disposition, 
so that whatever man does, he does it voluntarily without the use of force or compulsion.” The point 
 
but themselves rest on these deeper religious and legal sanctions. Ambedkar, Untouchables or the Children of India's Ghetto, 
172. 
31 See also B. R. Ambedkar, The Buddha and his Dhamma: A critical edition, ed. Aakash Singh Rathore and Ajay Verma (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). For a short analysis of Ambedkar’s hermeneutic method, see Knut A. Jacobsen, "Revivals 
of ancient religious traditions in modern India," Temenos 54, no. 1 (2018): particularly 68-73. Ambedkar’s Buddhism is 
heterodox, to say the least. For example, he denies that the Four Noble Truths are essential to Buddhism, since for him 
suffering can be overcome in this life and does not arise from craving but from exploitation. On Ambedkar, Buddhist 
modernism, heterodoxy and authenticity, see Sonam Kachru, “Some Questions for Friends of Buddhism,” in A. Minh 
Nguyen and Yarran Hominh (eds.), “Author-Meets-Critics: Evan Thompson, Why I Am Not a Buddhist,” (Spring 2021) 
APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies 20(2): 29-32. For a deeper analysis of Ambedkar’s 
Buddhism as it relates to his politics, see Aishwary Kumar, Radical Equality: Ambedkar, Gandhi, and the risk of democracy 
(Stanford University Press, 2015), Ch 7, particularly 321-36. 
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of the Buddha’s teachings, for Ambedkar, is a fundamental shift in the way in which agents are 
oriented in the world. And, he argues, that can only come about through a religious change – religious 
in the sense of concerning an agent’s sense of place with regard with others and the world. 
The upshot of this discussion is that religion, for Ambedkar, is both a social structure 
specifying certain roles, rights, duties and so on – one’s “place” in society – and a corresponding moral 
psychology – a “state of mind”. These two aspects of the caste system reinforce each other. The 
structure fosters the corresponding moral psychology, which in turn reinforces and stabilises the 
structure. To annihilate caste is thus to transform the social structure and the corresponding moral 
psychology simultaneously. We have seen how the caste structure is one of graded inequality. So what 
is the moral psychology that is fostered by that structure of graded inequality? And how does it in turn 
stabilise that structure? 
The moral psychology fostered by graded inequality is one based around group interest.32 A moral 
psychology of group interest is one in which members of the group seek to protect their interests 
against what they perceive as the interests of other groups, in which their “prevailing purpose is 
protection of what it has got.”33 Such a moral psychology comprises various emotions, beliefs and 
 
32 This is not to say that the moral psychology of caste is limited to one of group interest. Like with respect to race, there is 
also a “post-caste” moral psychology arising from affirmative action and reservation programs on which “we” are beyond 
this strange pre-modern phenomenon of caste, past injustices have been rectified, caste politics focuses attention on groups 
rather than on individuals, things are getting better for everyone, and so on. See, for a useful description of this orientation, 
Satish Deshpande, Contemporary India: A sociological view (Penguin Books, 2004), 105. Just like the moral psychology of “post-
race” does not mean that the racialised structure of society (and with it the moral psychology of race) no longer exists, so 
too this “post-caste” moral psychology can co-exist with the group interest story I set out here.  
The moral psychology of caste extends beyond group interest in two other important respects, the first which Ambedkar 
captures in the language of “rules” and “principles”, and the second in terms of internalised inferiority. The basic idea with 
the first is that Hinduism fosters an irrational respect for rules and more broadly for fixity, in contrast to principles, free 
thinking, and flexibility. Ambedkar is here again reiterating a rather oversimple pre-modern/modern distinction. The 
second is what Ambedkar calls an “inferiority complex” (see e.g. Untouchables, 413), namely the internalization of Hindu 
norms by Dalits. It is in part this internalised inferiority that Ambedkar seeks to remedy by conversion and by figuring 
Dalithood as being a political subjectivity based on that inferiority. Compare Fanon’s phenomenology of “the misery of 
the black man” in Black Skin/White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008 [1952]). 
33 Annihilation of Caste, 52. 
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desires, ways of seeing themselves and others and the world that are structured around this theme. 
They want for example to emulate those higher than them in the hierarchy, to mark themselves off as 
distinct from those lower. They take pride in their particular position in the caste order, and consolation 
in the fact they are not at the bottom.34  
Ambedkar described the caste system as “an ascending scale of hatred and descending scale 
of contempt.”35 The ascending scale of hatred is tied together, in conflicting ways, also with some of 
the phenomena often grouped under the term “sanskritisation” – the process of emulating Brahminic 
customs and rituals by lower castes.36 Conversely, the descending scale of contempt is often targeted 
by higher castes against lower castes seeking to emulate higher caste customs.37 These emotions and 
attitudes are connected with beliefs about the particular scalar distribution of privileges and duties that 
characterise relations between castes, for example resentment targeted at castes who are getting “above 
their station” and beliefs about the noble genealogy of certain castes as compared to the base origins 
of others that sometimes forms the basis for contempt. So, the structure of graded inequality fosters 
a moral psychology of group interest consisting in this complex of interrelated attitudes. 
Ambedkar argues that this moral psychology of group interest extends beyond the hierarchical 
relations between castes on the level of varna and into the relations between sub-castes (jati). He 
describes, for example, the “anti-social spirit” that pervades relations between Brahmin sub-castes, 
one “quite as marked and quite as virulent as the anti-social spirit that prevails between them and other 
 
34 Annihilation of Caste, 72. 
35 Untouchables, 384. 
36 See M. N. Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization," The Far Eastern Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1956); M. N. 
Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India (Oxford University Press, 1952). Sanskritisation as a process has 
been argued by some to be a larger cultural phenomenon that can and perhaps increasingly has come apart from caste. See 
A. M. Shah, The Legacy of M. N. Srinivas: His contribution to sociology and social anthropology in India (New York: Routledge, 2020). 
37 See, for example, section IX of Annihilation of Caste, where Ambedkar describes in detail two cases of descending 
contempt by upper castes in Maharashtra.  
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non-Brahmin castes.”38 The theoretical point here is that the moral psychology, once fostered, has a 
life of its own and extends beyond the purely structural relations to characterise the system as a whole. 
That is, attitudes that make sense in terms of the hierarchical structure of graded inequality (such as 
wanting to keep down those below you) can come to hold between groups that might not be 
understood in strictly structural terms as hierarchically related.39 The moral psychology spreads 
through various means that are not directly tied to the relations that define the structure itself.  
Ambedkar made a similar structural point about the spread of a cultural phenomenon in his 
analysis of the origins of caste in “Castes in India”. There he argues that caste endogamy began with 
Brahmin self-enclosure and spread through the imitation and adoption of those practices of endogamy 
and related caste rituals by the lower castes. So too in the case of the moral psychology of caste. The 
moral psychology of group interest begins with the Brahmins and spreads throughout the entire 
structure, both along the lines of caste relation and in new directions.40 It is for this reason that 
Ambedkar describes this moral psychology as one that characterises Hinduism generally and not just 
(though he does think it primarily characterises) the Brahmin castes.41 And it is a central point for 
 
38 Annihilation of Caste, 52. 
39 For example, the development of vertical relations that mirror varna divisions within Dalit communities: see A.M. Shah, 
“Untouchability, the Untouchables and Social Change in Gujarat,” in The Structure of Indian Society, 164-175. 
40 Note, for example, Ambedkar’s explanation of why Brahmins participate only rarely in anti-caste activism but often in 
(anti-colonial) political and economic activism: “self interest and collective egoism… dominate.” Untouchables, 375. 
41 Ambedkar does not think it characterizes Dalits, since he figures Dalits as the resistors of caste in virtue of being 
excluded from it. Du Bois makes similar arguments regarding the moral psychology of whiteness and black communities 
until the 1940s, when he starts worrying more about the development of a black middle class that shares some features of 
the moral psychology of whiteness. But it is important that Ambedkar’s understanding of how a social structure fosters a 
moral psychology that itself spreads beyond those specific structural relations is consistent with, indeed provides grounds 
for thinking likely that, Dalit communities will develop their own forms of group interest. See Anagha Ingole, "Enforced 
Loyalties: Caste Panchayats and Caste Politics in India," Social Research: An International Quarterly 86, no. 3 (2019). Ingole 
argues that the splintering of Dalits along jatis in Punjab by state policies led to intra-caste enforcement of Dalit interests 
as against others by caste panchayats. There is of course a larger political context in which such phenomena occur involving 
voting blocs and the distribution of state benefits, the philosophical aspects of which I consider in passing in section 4. 
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understanding how caste-based oppression and discrimination can persist even where (some have 
argued) the formal structure of caste has weakened, if not dissipated.42  
We can compare this moral psychology of group interest with Ambedkar’s Dewey-inspired 
conception of fraternity.43 By this term, Ambedkar does not mean a society with a single will or single 
interest on the model of (the standard interpretation of) Rousseau’s general will, but rather a society 
of “social endosmosis”, of “associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.” A fraternal 
society would be one “full of channels for conveying a change taking place in one part to other parts”, 
one of “many interests consciously communicated and shared”, with “varied and free points of contact 
with other modes of association.”44 Fraternity describes a social structure characterised by common, 
equal association, of communication, flexibility, and flow – if you will, a community of communities 
– one which carries with it a moral psychology of solidarity, sympathy, and feeling-with, of working 
through disagreements. In such a fraternal society, groups are not set against and defined in 
contradistinction to each other; their status and indeed their existence does not depend on comparison 
to other (particularly lower) groups.45 By contrast, group interest describes a structure of hierarchy and 
segregation in which groups are “shut … out from full interaction with other groups”.46  
 
42 See Jodhka, Caste in Contemporary India. 
43 There is some indication that Ambedkar had some unhappiness with this word and its history, though he continued to 
use it. In a speech in May 1936, he replaces “fraternity” with “sympathy”: “Three factors are required for the uplift of an 
individual. They are: Sympathy, Equality, and Liberty”; cited in Kumar, Radical Equality, 316. See, for a different 
unhappiness with “fraternity” and its connotations, Akeel Bilgrami and Prabhat Patnaik, "Belonging," in Rethinking Society 
for the 21st Century: Report of the international panel on social progress, ed. International Panel on Social Progress (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
44 Annihilation of Caste, 57. See also Arun P. Mukherjee, "B.R. Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the meaning of democracy," 
New Literary History 40, no. 2 (2009): 352-53. 
45 For Ambedkar, there is a corresponding moral psychology of fraternity to this structural phenomenon. Fraternity in that 
moral psychological sense is “the disposition of an individual to treat men as the object of reverence and love and the 
desire to be in unity with his fellow beings”, or the “sentiment which leads an individual to identify himself with the good 
of others whereby the good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to like any of the 
physical conditions of our existence”. Cited in Kumar, Radical Equality, 319. 
46 Annihilation of Caste, 57. 
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Ambedkar’s view is not the naïve structuralist view that changing the underlying structure will 
lead to the desired moral psychological change. Instead he thinks that changing the social structure 
already involves moral psychological change, since the moral psychology of group interest works to 
stabilise the caste system by undermining the potentiality for solidarity and commonality across group 
lines. So some moral psychological change is necessary in order to build enough power to change the 
structure.  
That is why Ambedkar argues that political, social, and religious change need to occur 
simultaneously in ways that support the others. The stabilising relation he sees between structure and 
moral psychology is one important basis for his critique of the Hindu social reformers, who sought to 
reform caste to remove untouchability through something like what is now called the “contact 
hypothesis” – that increased contact (for example, through promoting interdining between castes) 
between different groups will break down prejudice and other barriers of discrimination and 
exclusion.47 Against these reformers, Ambedkar argues that untouchability is not simply a matter of 
physical distance or of mere ignorance arising from a lack of interaction. Rather, the moral psychology 
of group interest actively stabilises the caste system such that increased contact is insufficient to 
undermine untouchability.48 
 
47 See Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, ed. Kenneth Clark and Thomas Pettigrew (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co, 1954). For arguments for the contact hypothesis as applied to race in the United States, see Anderson, The 
Imperative of Integration. For an overview of recent work, see Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, "A meta-analytic 
test of intergroup contact theory," Journal of personality and social psychology 90, no. 5 (2006); Shelley McKeown and John 
Dixon, "The “contact hypothesis”: Critical reflections and future directions," Social and Personality Psychology Compass 11, no. 
1 (2017); Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, When Groups Meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact (Psychology Press, 
2013). 
48 Similarly, social psychologists have argued that certain conditions are necessary for contact to reduce prejudice. For 
example, Allport’s initial proposal in The Nature of Prejudice is that optimal contact must be on equal terms, co-operative, 
with common goals, and supported by institutions and norms. See also Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact 
Theory," Annual Review of Psychology 49, no. 1 (1998). The moral psychology of group interest cuts against the second and 
third of these, and the structure of graded inequality against the first and fourth. 
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To see how the moral psychology of group interest stabilises the caste system, let us take 
Ambedkar’s analysis of how Shudras, the lowest of the varna castes, act as the “police force of the 
Brahmins”.49 The Communists, Ambedkar points out, rightly take the Shudras and the avarna tribes 
also to be part of the exploited working class with Dalits. So, theoretically, they ought to be in solidarity 
with the Dalit cause of annihilating caste; after all, they suffer from caste too.50 But, Ambedkar argues, 
the “atrocities that are committed upon the Untouchables, if they commit any breach of the rules and 
regulations of the established order… are all the doings of the Shudras.”51 That is, instead of solidarity 
and identification, we have conflict and the descending scale of contempt – even at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. That is why, Ambedkar fears, one cannot “organise a common front against the Caste 
System.”52 
The lack of solidarity is explicable in terms of the structure of graded inequality.53 While the 
Shudra “is anxious to pull down the Brahmin, he is not prepared to see the Untouchable raised to his 
level.”54 Similarly, in “Annihilation of Caste”, Ambedkar argues that “the artful way in which the social 
and religious rights are distributed amongst the different castes whereby some have more and some 
have less” means that Marx’s slogan “you have nothing to lose but your chains” ineffective, since 
those in the middle gradations do have more to lose than their chains.55 They have their positional 
status to lose vis-à-vis those below them. 
 
49 Untouchables, 115. 
50 Though note the non-Brahmin movement in the Justice Party in the early 20th century, particularly in south India. 
51 Untouchables, 115-6. 
52 Annihilation of Caste, 72. 
53 “Now this gradation, this scaling of castes, makes it impossible to organize a common front against the Caste System.” 
Annihilation of Caste, 72. 
54 Untouchables, 116. 
55 Annihilation of Caste, 72. 
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Ambedkar compares the structure of graded inequality to a system of simple (binary) 
inequality. He argues that the system of simple inequality is unstable, or at least far less stable than one 
of graded inequality. He writes that “[i]f the Hindu social order was based on inequality, it would have 
been over-thrown long ago. But it is based on graded inequality … [and so] there is nobody to join 
the Untouchable in his struggle.”56 Ambedkar’s reasoning is that in a system of simple inequality, those 
who are exploited truly have “nothing to lose but their chains.” And so if (and it is a big if) they could 
be united, the fetters of false consciousness removed and so on, there would be a simple binary 
conflict, one in which “the terrifying power of their numbers” could be used to advantage.57 If this 
were correct (and even if it is not entirely correct vis-à-vis having nothing at all to lose), one obvious 
way for a hierarchical system to stabilise itself more thoroughly is to make divisions among that bottom 
group, to set them against each other, to give advantages to some for supporting the order and to 
suppress those who do not. In this vein we have the figures of the comprador, the “good” colonial 
subject or the “good” woman, the labour aristocracy, the upwardly mobile working class. These are 
all ways of building gradations into a hierarchical structure, gradations which serve to direct energies 
within the structure instead of against it. A caste structure makes particularly explicit and visible this 
technique, which of course is shared in different ways by other kinds of hierarchical structures. 
Graded inequality also enables a second possibility of directing energies within the structure 
instead of against it. I have argued so far that it enables the downward direction of contempt and 
resentment, to keep people in their place. But it also enables an upward direction of mobility – to 
better one’s place in the structure while leaving the structure intact. In the case of caste, the unit of 
 
56 Untouchables, 116. Compare Teltumbde, Dalits, 23: “The structure of the caste system depicts a continuum that obviates 
the neat distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed… The castes contend within their locale with the castes 
who suffer similar oppression as them, for superiority. This eliminates the possibility of any rebellion against the system 
as a whole.” 
57 Untouchables, 115. 
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mobility is not the individual, but the caste, the group. There are many mechanisms by which caste 
mobility is exercised, for example through limited intermarriage, through sanskritisation, through 
other forms of cultural or ritual adoption like westernisation, and through the accumulation of 
wealth.58 And in other systems of graded inequality there are other mechanisms of group upward 
mobility. We may think of, for example, the incorporation of racialised (or previously racialised) 
groups like the Irish, southern Europeans, and now (some) Hispanics into the racial category of 
“white” over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries in the United States.59 The details and dynamics 
of these mechanisms are not my concern here. What is of concern are the following two points. The 
first is that, in the case of caste, Dalits are excluded from this possibility of group mobility.60 Their 
position entirely outside the varna ordering means that there is a distinct difference between the 
possibility of a Dalit jati entering that order and that of (say) a Shudra jati rising up that order. 
Dalithood, as many have argued, is required by the caste system in order that there be a bottom against 
which others can find their (higher) place.61  
The second point is that movement within the hierarchy is implicitly to accept the existence 
of the hierarchy. For it is only within that hierarchy that one’s group can move. So the hierarchy must 
have that fixity in order that there is mobility within it. The question that arises, then, is why the order 
is so fixed? In the next section, I will point to one cause of this fixity – how caste categories became 
 
58 See Shah, The Structure of Indian Society for an overview; for an early study, see David F. Pocock’s work on caste mobility 
in Gujarat: "Inclusion and exclusion: A process in the caste system of Gujerat," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 13, no. 
1 (1957); "The Movement of Castes," Man: Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute 55 (1955). 
59 See Linda Martín Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness (Polity Press, 2015); Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010); David R. Roediger, Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on race, politics, and 
working class history (Verso, 1994). 
60 This is consistent with the limited social mobility in terms of employment and networks that some Dalits have 
experienced since the Mandal commission. See, e.g., Richard Pais, "Scheduled Castes, Employment and Social Mobility," 
in Dalits in Modern India: Vision and values, ed. S.M. Michael (Sage Publications, 2007); P. G. Jogdand, "Reservation policy 
and the empowerment of Dalits," in Dalits in Modern India: Vision and values, ed. S. M. Michael (Sage Publications, 2007). 
61 So too Brahmins are required to be the top of the hierarchy. Only in the middle is there movement. Analogously, the 
claim at the heart of Afropessimism is that Blackness is the constitutive bottom required for the rest of the racial hierarchy. 
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hardened and rigidified through its imbrication with colonial legal governance. The philosophical point 
is to identify that there are contingent features of a social structure that render it more or less amenable 
to the standard formal or metaphysical analysis of it in terms of roles that carry with them deontic 
properties (rights, permissions, etc). Conceiving of a social structure in that standard way is already to 
fix it in ways that shape and limit how we might try to transform it. 
4.4 The “legal sanction” and the hardening of caste 
Ambedkar argues that one important difficulty standing in the way of the annihilation of caste 
is that it is legally sanctioned. He means two things by the “legal sanction”. The first is that 
untouchability is enshrined in Hindu legal texts – a version of the interpretive argument I outlined 
earlier. I will briefly touch on this argument, though it will not be the main focus of this section. I 
touch on it because that argument forms the ground for the second kind of legal sanction: the ways 
in which colonial legal categories hardened and enshrined particular interpretations of those texts. 
Caste received a fixed deontic structure through this imbrication with the colonial legal order, one that 
could be enforced and supported by that order. 
Let me begin briefly with the first conception of the legal sanction, which is through Hindu 
law as contained in the smritis, particularly the Manusmriti or the “Laws of Manu”.62 Ambedkar treats 
Hinduism as akin to the Abrahamic religions in being religions of law. “Hinduism”, he writes in “The 
Philosophy of Hinduism”, “like Judaism, Christianity and Islam is in the main a positive religion… 
the Hindu scheme of divine governance is enshrined in a written constitution and any one who cares 
to know it will find it laid bare in that Sacred Book called the Manu Smriti”.63  
 
62 The Manusmriti was particularly symbolically important for Ambedkar, as can be seen, for example, in the fact that it was 
the document he chose to be burnt as part of the Chavdar water tank satyagraha in 1927. See Untouchables, 172-3; The 
Philosophy of Hinduism.  
63 The Philosophy of Hinduism, 7. 
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The smritis, for Ambedkar, are “law” in the sense that they are written documents that specify 
rights and obligations of particular castes that determine the structure of social relations, enforceable 
through various forms of punishment. Ambedkar is here drawing on a familiar positivist conception 
of law as contrasted with “custom”, or unwritten or informal social norms.64 “Law”, in this sense, 
could be either religious or secular, Hindu or colonial. That is, the law/custom distinction, in 
Ambedkar’s usage, cuts across the religious/secular distinction, in whichever particular way one draws 
that latter distinction. It is true that, on the standard positivist view, the distinction between law and 
custom is drawn in large part to distinguish between the norms posited by the sovereign state 
(particularly the legislative and executive arms of the state) and other, non-state norms.65 But that 
relation between the state and law is not a necessary one, as can be seen by recalling that the distinction 
was inherited from the earlier Christian natural law tradition in which one prime example of “law” 
was divine law, for example as embodied in the Ten Commandments.  
Ambedkar repeatedly returns to the Manusmriti for two reasons. The first is because it indicates 
differential and hierarchical rights, privileges, powers, and duties for the four varnas. It is clear evidence, 
for Ambedkar, that the caste system is at the heart of Hindu law. The second reason is because the 
Manusmriti was one of the key texts used by the colonial government to codify the colonial Hindu 
 
64 The distinction, of course, is not hard and fast. Custom can be “legalised”, either through official pronouncement or by 
being recognised as a distinct source of law in itself. This issue was, of course, central to the controversies surrounding the 
assertion of monarchical sovereignty in England in the 16th and 17th centuries against the common lawyers. See, e.g., 
Harold J. Berman, "The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale," Yale Law Journal 103, no. 7 (1994). For 
a more theoretical way of making this point, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed., ed. Leslie Green (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch 3, 44-48; Ch 5. The positivist distinction between law and custom can be found in 
Hobbes – “Custom of itself maketh no law” (The Elements of Law, Natural and politic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), Ch 29, 
§10.) – and Bacon and other Royalists in the century before the Glorious Revolution, but is most clearly found later in 
Bentham and in Austin. Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 21; John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. Wilfred E. Rumble (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
Lecture 1. See generally Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
65 Of course, the law/custom distinction was early on mobilised against the common lawyers and judiciary (both by the 
executive and by the Church) in England. And one reason for this was the common law’s claim to represent the people 
from time immemorial against the claims of King and Church. 
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Law, which was applied by colonial courts to non-Muslims (including Sikhs and Buddhists as well as 
Hindus).66 This double symbolism of the Manusmriti is one reason why it was the document that 
Ambedkar and other Dalit activists symbolically burnt as part of the Chavdar water tank satyagraha, 
which I will analyse in more detail below. 
This entangling of religious law and colonial law is the second form of legal sanction. Colonial 
law protected and thereby implicitly enshrined a particular interpretation of Hindu law that gave centre 
stage to caste relations. This protection has the effect that challenges to Hindu law would be met not 
only with social force but with the force of the colonial state. The legality of caste relations in the 
second sense of the legal sanction was supported by two features of colonial legal practice. The first 
is the way in which colonial law allocated jurisdiction of English law and Hindu law, and the second 
is the way in which the colonial reading of Hindu law structured the latter in the deontic terms of the 
former. I will take each in turn. 
Jurisdictional application of English and Hindu law 
The jurisdiction of English law was limited to public law and to disputes concerning British 
subjects. In other areas, the colonial courts applied their interpretation of Hindu law, which 
increasingly after the 1860s included not only the English renderings of the smritis, but also Hindu 
custom, which became enshrined in (colonial) judicial precedent. The content of custom was 
determined, according to standard English legal practice, as matters of fact to be ascertained by expert 
evidence, where the strength of that evidence was in part proportional to the length of time the custom 
could be shown to have persisted. Both of these features, in Ambedkar’s view, stacked the deck 
directly against Dalit political claims. The relevant experts in the case of Hindu customary religious 
 
66 See Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996); Rosane Rocher, "The Creation of Anglo-Hindu Law," in Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, ed. Timothy Lubin, 
Donald R. Davis, and Jayanth Krishnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). I don’t want to commit myself 
to any interpretive view about the actual place of the smritis in Hinduism or their relation to the oral srutis, nor to any view 
of the correct place of any notion of “law” in Hinduism. My point here is to give Ambedkar’s analysis. 
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practice were Brahmins (who, for Ambedkar, were the central agents of caste domination), and the 
precise point of Dalit activism was to break with longstanding practice. These features of colonial legal 
practice meant that Dalit political claims were easily conceptualised as purely religious claims, to be sorted 
out within the larger Hindu community, of which Dalits were taken to be a part, and without the 
interference of the colonial state.  
One example of this process is Dalit activism around temple entry. By the 1920s, Dalit activism 
had begun to focus on exclusion from public spaces, including Hindu temples, water tanks and wells, 
and baths. These sites were fertile grounds for activism because they were at least possibly subject to 
colonial legal governance and infused with intense social and religious significance; in other words, 
they were sites at which the legal and religious sanctions intersected.67 This fertility led to tensions; like 
with any social movement, there were multiple and contradictory purposes for which people 
mobilised. For some, including, perhaps, Ambedkar in his early activist years upon returning to India, 
it was an attempt to integrate, to gain greater inclusion into the Hindu social order.68 But for others, 
including Ambedkar (at least by the late 1920s) temple entry was not an attempt to gain equality within 
the Hindu social order, but as a means to consciousness raising with the end goal of annihilation of 
caste. Ambedkar later wrote that he “felt that it [temple entry] was the best way of energising the 
Depressed Class and making them conscious of their position.”69 Temple entry will thus be an 
instructive example by which to bring out Ambedkar’s thinking on the nature of the legal sanction. 
 
67 See Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the politics of modern India, Ch 3; Shabnum Tejani, "Untouchable Demands for Justice 
or the Problem of Religious" Non-Interference": The case of temple entry movements in late-colonial India," Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History 14, no. 3 (2013). 
68 See Christophe Jaffrelot, Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Fighting the Indian caste system (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), Ch 3. 
69 Letter from Ambedkar to Bhaurao Gaikwad, March 3, 1934, cited in Eleanor Mae Zelliot, "Dr. Ambedkar and the 
Mahar movement" (Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1969), 117. See also Ambedkar’s “Statement on Temple Entry Bill,” 
February 14, 1933, cited in What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables, ed. Vasant Moon, Writings and Speeches 
of B. R. Ambedkar, vol. 9, (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 108. 
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The first step in the analysis is to point out that temple governance was organised, at different 
governmental levels, by a number of legal distinctions, two of which are relevant here. These legal 
distinctions created the space in which activism around temple entry was possible. The first, following 
the Religious Endowments Act 1863, was between public and private temples.70 This distinction, admittedly, 
was never a clear one, as the meaning of “public” shifted over time. In explicating the distinction, 
then, it is best to begin with the relevant notion of the private. While all temples were managed by 
trustees, some were “private” in the sense that the temple trust was established for the benefit of some 
specific private party, for example a family, a small community, or disciples of a particular religious 
teacher.71 One might think, therefore that the contrasting notion of the “public” was something like 
“the community at large”.72 But this was not in fact clearly the case, especially since that notion of the 
“community at large” could not mean something as large as “British subject”, since that encompassed 
various religious groups and not only Hindus, nor could it unproblematically mean simply “Hindus”, 
as the case of Dalits (and in some cases, lower caste Hindus) excluded from temples shows.  
“Public” temples, instead, were defined by the criterion that their trusts were directly 
administered by government or the appointment of trustees overseen by government.73 The latter 
category included those temples where trustee appointments were hereditary. However, the notion of 
the public as defining a particular community remained, in part, due to the fact that public temples 
were maintained in part through taxation, which held over a particular community. Colonial law had 
 
70 For other complications in the application of the standard public/private distinction to the colonial context, see 
Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, particularly “Whose Imagined Community?” 
71 Nandini Chatterjee, The Making of Indian Secularism: Empire, law and Christianity, 1830-1960 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 54. The distinction between public and private trusts, though derived from the English law of trusts, differs from 
the English version insofar as all religious and charitable trusts in English law (and in the majority of the other English 
colonies) are necessarily public, in the sense of “for the public”. 
72 Chatterjee, 63. 
73 Religious Endowments Act 1863 s.3. 
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no jurisdiction at all over private temples, but even over public temples jurisdiction was limited, 
according to the second relevant distinction. 
The second distinction was between the funding and management of public temples, which 
were matters for colonial regulation, and the questions of benefit, ownership, and access: who was the 
temple intended to benefit, who owned the temple, and, thus, who was permitted to enter.74 These 
three latter questions, as religious questions of worship, were to be answered by reference to Hindu 
law, particularly (since this was a question relating to specific temples that could not be answered in 
the abstract at the legislative or even the policy level) Hindu custom. Questions of custom were to be 
decided by “inquiry [into] prevalent forms of congregational worship with respect to usage”.75 Temples 
were thus institutions conceived of in a dual way, parts of which were public in the specific, state-
centric sense concerning the management and disbursement of public tax dollars, and parts of which 
the colonial state left alone as part of the purview of religious authority.76 For example, when Nadars 
(now officially recognised as a Backward Class under the Indian Constitution) entered the Meenakshi 
Sunderehwara temple in Madurai in 1897, a suit was brought by the trustee of the temple alleging that 
such entry was against Hindu custom. A Madura judge found for the trustee and imposed a permanent 
injunction against Nadar entry, which was upheld on appeal to the Privy Council (the highest British 
court, which had ultimate appellate jurisdiction) in 1908.77 
 
74 Religious Endowments Act 1863 ss.14-15. 
75 Rao, 92. 
76 Cf. Rao, 90. Rao describes this in terms of the public/private distinction: the religious is the private and the secular is 
the public. This may accurately capture the perspective the colonial state aimed to take – albeit inconsistently – but we 
should resist it on the basis that it is not the case that whatever is outside the purview of the secular state is thereby private. 
In particular – and this is part of Rao’s point – treating the distinction as one of public/private (as the colonial state did) 
conflates multiple senses of the “private”: private law pertaining to interactions between citizens including contract and tort; 
the private sphere as the sphere of individual choice, and private property. 
77 Chatterjee, 65. 
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The customary rights to worship that attached to Hindu temples were extended to more 
strictly public – in the sense of “for the benefit of the whole community” – property like public water 
tanks. After the first Chavdar water tank satyagraha of March 1927 in Mahar, where Ambedkar along 
with thousands of other Dalit activists marched to and drank from the water tank as an assertion of 
their use-rights to public amenities, orthodox Hindus retaliated with violence against Dalit activists, in 
part because a rumour was spread that Dalits were going to attempt to enter the adjoining Vireshwar 
temple. The water tank was then “purified”, which led to Ambedkar and other Dalit leaders 
threatening a second satyagraha later that year. As a pre-emptive move against that second satyagraha, 
orthodox Hindus sought an injunction against Dalit activists including Ambedkar. The injunction was 
sought partly on the basis that the Chavdar water tank adjoined the Vireshwar temple, and that the 
sacrality of the temple extended to the water tank.  
Although this argument was rejected in the end by the Bombay High Court on appeal, it was 
only rejected on the grounds that the caste Hindu petitioners had not in fact shown a sufficient 
connection between the temple and the water tank.78 If such a factual connection (say, on the basis of 
historic customary use) had been shown, then exclusionary use of the water tank would have been 
justified. The failing in the case was one of fact, not of law – or, put in philosophical terms, a 
contingent lack, not one in principle. Dalit activism around temple entry, then, revealed that the 
colonial state could not be relied upon to address caste discrimination; indeed, that it actively, if 
unintentionally, supported it.79 This is, in essence, an argument against externalism. Even where there 
is a countervailing external power that is capable of addressing a form of unfreedom, it is not a 
 
78 See Rao, 87-88. 
79 I’ve left aside many of the complexities of temple entry activism here, including how temple entry was differently 
conceived by Dalit activists and caste Hindu activists, including Gandhi. Ambedkar made his views about temple entry 
clear: temple entry was not a goal in itself, but merely a way to reveal caste injustice and thereby mobilise Dalits. Indeed, 
to take temple entry as a goal in itself would be to re-include Dalits into the Hindu caste order. 
197 
 
sufficient strategy simply to rely on that external power. That is part of the reason why Ambedkar’s 
vision for temple entry turned from the goal of removing overt anti-Dalit discrimination to that of 
building Dalit power and consciousness-raising. 
Orientalism and the rigidified deontic structure of Hindu law 
The temple as a locus of Dalit activism shows also the second feature of colonial legal practice 
that enabled legal discrimination against Dalits. That feature was the deontic structure of law, 
consisting of Hohfeldian directed rights, duties, prohibitions, permissions, powers, and so on. Hindu 
law became understood in deontic terms, as a set of interlocking roles or positions defined in terms 
of deontic properties of those roles. This caste had these rights and entitlements vis-à-vis this other 
caste; correspondingly, this other caste these duties vis-à-vis the first. This treatment of Hindu law 
abstracted away from the wider (non-deontic, historical, cultural, habitual, emotional) features of that 
institution. Furthermore, those norms were treated (on a roughly originalist or textualist model) as 
contained in an authoritative set of written texts like the Manusmriti. Hindu law thus became conceived 
of as a static structure, one that could be easily administered and applied, but one that could not 
thereby change through non-legal or less formal social processes through its natural connections to a 
wider social context. In treating Hindu law in terms of the categories of “law” and “custom” that had 
become constitutive of English legal tradition, the legal became fixed and separated from the social. 
This feature had three consequences, none of which are directly or necessarily entailed by this 
process of deontic structuration, but all of which were enabled by it and which did in fact flow from 
it. The first consequence, one that I have already mentioned, was that custom, in order to be legible 
to the colonial courts, had to be read in the same structural deontic terms as English law. Coupled 
with an Orientalism that treated (and thereby at least partially constructed) Hinduism as an eternal and 
essentially premodern hierarchical form of life, this deontic rendering of custom hardened it into a 
fixed set of rules and prohibitions that were taken to be the essence of Hindu religion. “Custom” thus 
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took the form of rights and privileges exercised by caste Hindus against Dalits, and prohibitions against 
certain uses of property by Dalits. Hindu religious law was thus treated in the form of English law, as 
comprising fundamental written laws (the smritis), which were supplemented by custom, which, however, 
had legal force only insofar as it became recognised as “law” and concretised in the form of precedent 
– all of which was structured in terms of deontic concepts of right, duty, power, privilege, immunity 
and so on. 
The second consequence, due to the separation of the legal from the social, was that the formal 
liberal freedoms (say, freedom of association and freedom of contract) that were sought by Dalits, in 
addition to being insufficient to compel social acceptance, were also used directly against them. 
Ambedkar’s testimony before the Simon Commission in 1928 makes this clear. Ambedkar sets out 
several cases where formal freedoms like freedom of association and freedom of contract were used 
to discriminate against and exclude Dalits. For example, unions and employers would hire and 
recommend Dalits only for certain kinds of jobs, drivers of public transport would not take Dalits, 
villages still insisted on separate water access, whether to wells or to rivers, government employees 
would grant land to caste Hindus and Dalits in formally acceptable but substantively discriminatory 
ways, and caste Hindu doctors would refuse to treat Dalits.80 This kind of caste boycott, or bahishkar, 
which the extension of public rights was meant to solve, nonetheless continued to function as a 
mechanism of discrimination and exclusion despite those rights and, indeed, by using those rights.81  
 
80 See B. R. Ambedkar, "Evidence of Dr. Ambedkar before the Indian Statutory Commission, 23rd October 1928," in 
Writings and Speeches of B. R. Ambedkar (New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 468; 72-74; 81-87. “A Hindu may 
well say that he will not employ an Untouchable, that he will not sell him anything, that he will evict him from his land, 
that he will not allow him to take his cattle across his field without offending the law in the slightest degree. In doing so, 
he is only expressing his right. The law does not care with what motive he does it. … If the Hindu society plays its part in 
maintaining the Established Order, so does the Hindu officials of the State. The two have made the Established Order 
impregnable.” Untouchables, 106-7. 
81 This feature is why Ambedkar argues for the necessity of procedural or representative rights above substantive rights – 
the former enshrined political power whereas the latter, in relying on others to enforce the spirit of the law, did not. We 
might compare the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bakke justification for affirmative action. 
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The final consequence of this deontic structure, when taken in the context of a political-legal 
culture where some kinds of rights were seen as more significant than others, was that competing 
rights-claims fit into pre-existing British normative hierarchies. And this in turn directed Dalit activism 
along certain paths and toward certain political endpoints. Here is one example, with analogies to how 
claims to land sovereignty by Indigenous groups have proceeded and to peasant “rights to glean” in 
England.  
It is a principle of modern law that private property rights take precedence over merely moral 
claims or historically derived equitable claims to use.82 In this context, Dalit claims to temple entry, 
for instance, became easily cast as equitable claims to use, which were powerless against full-blooded 
ownership rights.83 In response to this prioritisation of property rights, seen for example in the 
injunction in the Chavdar water tank case, Ambedkar and other Dalit activists creatively invoked a 
certain strand of historical argument giving priority of natural rights and equity over and above “mere” 
custom, and interpreting their claims in the form of natural right as opposed to the tradition of Hindu 
exclusion from temples.84 In doing so, however, such arguments bought into a universalist rights 
discourse in which there was a natural law that was superior to the particular and historically grounded 
law of a community. This move allied, however temporarily, Dalit activism with the British colonial 
government. This claim to universalism and natural law ran directly counter to Indian nationalists’ 
 
82 See e.g. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996 [1962]), 161-64. Of course 
there are exceptions here, and I am leaving aside a long and complex legal history regarding the place of equity with regard 
to the common law. 
83 So too Indigenous claims to land and sovereignty in various settler colonial contexts have been glossed in the language 
of equity and morality and not law. For a contrary view, see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of 
diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For the “right to glean”, see Peter King, "Legal change, customary 
right, and social conflict in late eighteenth-century England: The origins of the great gleaning case of 1788," Law and History 
Review 10, no. 1 (1992); E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The origin of the Black act (New York: Pantheon, 1975). King 
notes that a 1786 newspaper article on Worlledge v. Manning (an early case on the right to glean just prior to Steel v. Houghton) 
reported that “this was the first time the right of gleaning was ever reduced to a legal question.” King, 5. Here again we 
see the “reduction” of a social question into a legal one. 
84 See, e.g., Tejani, “Untouchable Demands” 
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attempt to recover custom and tradition as sources of collective autonomy and as grounds for self-
determination.85 This in turn led (among other things) to Ambedkar needing to defend himself against 
Indian nationalists claiming that he was colluding with the British, with consequent political effects.86  
The theoretical upshot of this very compressed intellectual history is that the legal structuration 
of caste structured also the kinds of arguments and the form of activism that anti-caste struggle took. 
Combined with the structure of British legal institutions, particularly that of legislative supremacy, this 
legal structuration mean that the simplest path to political redress (avoiding the intricacies of the 
judicial system) was to make a claim to legislative power. And the most obvious model in which to 
make this claim was the familiar model in which a disenfranchised minority makes claims on the 
majority state for inclusion and equality.87  
Thus we get to Ambedkar’s political strategy – to enshrine constitutionally an affirmative 
action policy to ensure Dalit legislative representation – with all its familiar dynamics of permanent 
minority, tyranny of the majority, and special minority rights. These familiar dynamics became those 
of caste politics in part because caste became understood in terms of a deontic structure fixed and 
determined (at least in large part) by state law. We can see a similar process at work in other cases 
where forms of categorisation become legally enshrined, for example in recent debates about the 
 
85 See Chatterjee, “Whose Imagined Community?”, in The Nation and its Fragments. 
86 See Gail Omvedt, Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit movement in colonial India (SAGE 
Publications India, 1994). 
87 See Ambedkar’s testimony before the Simon Commission: “The first thing I would like to submit is that we claim that 
we must be treated as a distinct minority, separate from the Hindu community… Secondly, I should like to submit that 
the depressed classes minority needs far greater political protection than any other minority in British India”. "Evidence 
of Dr. Ambedkar before the Indian Statutory Commission, 23rd October 1928," 465. As Iris Marion Young argues, special 
representation is one logical endpoint of minoritisation. Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A critique of 
the ideal of universal citizenship," Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989). See also Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). As Young does, one may also infer from this minority status the need for 
special rights or special protections, but if one takes self-determination seriously, then specific representation or even 
federalism is the logical end-point. On the latter, see Ambedkar, Federation or Freedom, and Communal Deadlock and a Way to 
Solve It, both in Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, 1. 
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effects of affirmative action on the basis of race and ethnicity in American universities, or in 
immigration quotas. These processes of incorporation into legal form simultaneously render certain 
ills more visible and enable certain means of addressing them as they harden them in that legal form. 
4.5 Transformational strategies for change 
I turn now to Ambedkar’s transformationism and how he understands the possibility for 
change, given the relation between the institutional and the moral psychological. Identifying these two 
features of caste’s stabilising mechanisms help us understand Ambedkar’s strategies for addressing the 
caste problem. I examine these strategies not to endorse them in their particular details as effective 
strategies for responding to the problem of unfreedom, but rather to draw out how an understanding 
of these institutional dynamics of unfreedom can inform, at a relatively abstract level, the shape of 
strategies to address them. Ambedkar’s strategies also evince one way to think about beginning 
transformative change of fundamental institutions with smaller steps that are not thereby piecemeal 
and merely reformist. That is, he shows us a little of the possibility of a virtuous rather than vicious 
cycle between formal institutional change and moral psychological change.  
Ambedkar proposes three strategies for combating the caste problem. The first is the political 
strategy of affirmative action in respect of Dalit governmental representation. The second is the social 
strategy of fundamentally annihilating caste. And the third is the religious strategy of conversion as a 
means of exit from the Hindu caste order. Some scholars have argued that the three are contradictory: 
the first affirms a category that the second seeks to abolish and the third seeks to leave, and the third 
would be unnecessary if the second were to succeed.88 But the identification of the mechanisms of 
stability of caste (graded inequality and the moral psychology of group interest; the hardening of caste 
 
88 With the extension of the political strategy beyond legislative representation to the full breadth of the welfare state, 
individuals taking the third option forewent the benefits of the first by no longer identifying as a relevant Scheduled Caste, 
at least until 1990 when Buddhist Dalits were included in the reservations. We thus see some of those contradictions at 
play in how identity is mobilised within the welfare state. 
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through systematic imbrication with the law) helps draw them together into a unified transformationist 
picture. 
Let me begin with the first: the political strategy. That strategy must be understood in response 
to the legal hardening of caste. A certain interpretation of Hindu law that enshrines caste relations has 
been embedded into the state legal order. That embedding protects and stabilises that interpretation 
as it also clothes it in a stronger deontic and static form which cannot be changed by ordinary processes 
of social change. Caste hierarchies cannot simply be changed “from below”, since it is protected, given 
the legal sanction, “from above”. So, the thought goes, it must therefore be changed “from above”, 
by intervening in the political and governmental sphere to change the law.  
But the political strategy is insufficient in itself, given that it relies on and indeed contributes 
to the process of legal hardening of caste. Ambedkar’s recognition of this is one reason why he sees 
the legal sanction as secondary to the religious sanction. Law, Ambedkar insisted, “plays a very small 
part” in maintaining social structures. It plays a primarily disciplinary role, “to keep the minority within 
the range of social discipline.”89 The larger part was due to “religion as morality”, which must “remain 
the governing principle in every society”.90 This is why, in Annihilation of Caste, he emphasises the 
priority of social reform to political reform.91 Political reform is insufficient in itself for social change, 
and it is not itself equivalent to or a replacement for that wider social change. So why have it at all? 
 
89 Ambedkar, “Buddha and Future of his Religion”, Writings and Speeches, 17 vols., vol. 17.2, ed. Vasant Moon (New Delhi: 
Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014), 104. Ambedkar’s speech prior to the adoption of the Constitution in January 1950 
(cited in Jaffrelot, 114) is indicative: “On January 26, 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics, 
we will have equality and in the social and economic life, we will have inequality… We must remove this contradiction at 
the earliest possible moment, or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy 
which this assembly has so laboriously built.” See also Ambedkar’s reflections on the Constitution he had drafted in later 
life, e.g. those listed in Rajeev Kadambi, "Ambedkar’s Framing of the ‘Political’ Within Ethical Practice," Studies in Indian 
Politics 4, no. 2 (2016): 146. 
90 “Buddha and Future of his Religion,” 104.  
91 “That political reform cannot with impunity take precedence over social reform in the sense of the reconstruction of 
society, is a thesis which I am sure cannot be controverted.” Annihilation of Caste, 68. 
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The answer is that political reform is, for Ambedkar, an important means of social change, a 
way of building power that can aid in the wider process of social change.92 The role of the political 
strategy, for Ambedkar, is to enable and facilitate the process of social change. And as a means, it 
ought not be held onto where it stands in the way of that larger social change. (A fortiori, these political 
institutions are not ideal institutions. They are tools for a purpose in a time and place; not exemplars 
of some timeless ideal of freedom.) That is why Ambedkar said that he was “quite prepared to join 
that body of people who want to abolish the Constitution” if it were to get in the way of annihilating 
caste.93 This conception of political power is part of Ambedkar’s transformationist approach: build 
power in one aspect of the problem (here, the institutional side) that is not a stand-alone solution, but 
which can help with the other aspect (the moral psychological side). Ambedkar’s hope is that this 
could be the start of a virtuous cycle and not merely a repetition of the vicious cycle.  
But for this transformation (the end of which is the annihilation of caste) to have any chance 
of success, there must also be a corresponding moral psychological response. Here we must contend 
with the moral psychology of group interest that stabilises caste. I want to suggest that Ambedkar’s 
notion of conversion plays an essential role here.94 It is a way of transforming moral psychology as a 
means of annihilating caste.95 It does so in two ways.  
 
92 Ambedkar has a longer argument about the insufficiency of other forms of power to effect legal change. Military power, 
he says, “is not free power” and in any case is not easily open to Dalits, though the Dalit Panthers would later disagree. 
Economic power consists, for Dalits as part of the working class, in “the power inherent in the strike.” But such power is 
“maimed by legislation and made subject to injunctions, arbitrations, martial law and use of troops.” Hence it is “not 
adequate for the defence of the interests of the working class.” So, political power is what is left. Untouchables, 399. 
93 Quoted in Kadambi, "Ambedkar’s Framing of the ‘Political’ Within Ethical Practice," 146. 
94 I am here looking at conversion as a general moral psychological process and not the specific action of converting to 
Buddhism. So I will not analyse Ambedkar’s reasons for choosing Buddhism over Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Marxism, 
and all the other possibilities for conversion that he considered at various times in his life. Nor will I evaluate the political 
possibilities or political histories of Buddhism or the consequences of that choice and the political successes or failures of 
Ambedkar’s end-of-life mass conversion.  
95 It is noteworthy that Ambedkar begins explicitly to make moves towards conversion in 1935-1936, right at the same 
time he was writing Annihilation of Caste. He listed his name on a list of Untouchables willing to convert in 1935, and 
committed himself to conversion in May 1936, just months after he published “Annihilation”. So conversion was on his 
mind exactly when social annihilation was. See Jaffrelot, Ch 8; Teltumbde, Dalits, Ch 6. Compare Kumar, Radical Equality, 
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The first is internal, aimed at those who are unfree. It is a means of building community and 
solidarity outside the Hindu order. This is necessary because graded inequality separates and isolates 
castes. It pits them against each other, even where they ought be in solidarity. If isolation is the 
problem, then community is the solution.96 Ambedkar calls this “kinship”, which generates 
“sympathetic resentment by the members of a community for a wrong done to their fellow.” And it 
is “kinship which generates generosity and invokes its moral indignation which is necessary to redress 
a wrong.” That is why “[k]inship with another community is the best insurance which the Untouchable 
can effect against Hindu tyranny and Hindu oppression.”97 Note that the political strategy does not 
generate kinship, given that it relies on categories which divide one group from another. And so there 
must be some other technique that generates kinship: “If for the Untouchables mere citizenship is not 
enough to put an end to their isolation and the troubles that ensue therefrom, if kinship is the only 
cure then there is no other way except to embrace the religion of the community whose kinship they 
seek.”98  
The second is external, aimed at the Hindu higher castes. Conversion in this sense is a 
fundamental transformation in the moral psychological orientation of group interest that characterises 
Hinduism, “a complete change in the fundamental notions of life…a complete change in outlook and 
 
315: “we can immediately acknowledge that Ambedkar sees in the act of conversion—from one faith to another (in the 
religious sense) and from one set of beliefs and attitudes to another (in a secular, constitutional sense)—not a divisive 
strategy but a potential force that possesses the capacity to touch and transform the majority and minority, oppressor and 
oppressed, evil and good, equally.” 
96 Compare Anderson, The Imperative of Integration. Here is one place where graded inequality provides more possibilities 
than a simple binary such as the one Anderson works with in that book. Community need not equal integration. 
97 Untouchables, 415. 
98 Untouchables, 417-18. Conversion, in Ambedkar’s eyes, also helps redress any internalised inferiority complexes. This is 




in attitude towards men and things.”99 How is this moral psychological change to come about, given 
that it is asking people “to go contrary to their fundamental religious notions”?100 It cannot be done 
just by reasoning with people about their particular beliefs, since (as I will argue in more detail in the 
following two chapters) one’s orientation involves more than the particular beliefs that could be 
reasoned about one by one; one’s orientation sets the stage in which rational argument works.101  
Ambedkar argues that what is necessary as a prior step is a “crisis” that reveals to people, in a 
negative light, their own orientation: “The salvation of the Depressed Classes will come only when 
the caste Hindu is made to think and is forced to feel that he must alter his ways. For that you must 
create a crisis by direct action against his customary code of conduct.”102 In Annihilation of Caste, he 
uses the Christian metaphor of a new life to describe this aspect of conversion: “a new life cannot 
enter a body that is dead. New life can enter only into a new body. The old body must die before a 
new body can come into existence and a new life can enter it.”103 “Death” here stands in for a kind of 
moral psychological opening up that enables change in orientation.  
Conversion, on Ambedkar’s description, can be understood as a two stage process. There is 
first a negative step. One must be made open to conversion, through some kind of crisis. Only then 
can there be the positive step of shifting one’s orientation toward something different. Reason is 
powerless to do the first, negative step – even if it can play a role in the second, positive one; as 
 
99 Annihilation of Caste, 78. He continues: “It means conversion; but if you do not like the word, I will say, it means new 
life.” 
100 Annihilation of Caste, 69. 
101 “vested interest may take the shape of feeling of social superiority or it may take the shape of economic exploitation 
such as forced labour or cheap labour, the fact remains that Hindus have a vested interest in untouchability. It is only 
natural that that vested interest should not yield to the dictates of reason. The Untouchables should therefore know that 
there are limits to what reason can do.” Untouchables, 397. 
102 Untouchables, 368. 
103 Annihilation of Caste, 78. 
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Ambedkar writes: “Reflective thought… is quite rare and arises only in a situation which presents a 
dilemma—a crisis.”104 That crisis must call into question simultaneously the structure of caste and its 
moral psychology, and must be of sufficient severity that people cannot just ignore the crisis or push 
it to the back of their minds. That requires organisation and power, which returns us to the role of 
building power and community through the political strategy.  
What Ambedkar describes here is a virtuous cycle between institutional change and moral 
psychological change such that they support each other. If tied into this virtuous cycle, even relatively 
small changes can be part of a larger social transformation. But that cycle is only possible by identifying 
the ways in which institutional structure connects to moral psychology in a vicious cycle – that is, by 
identifying the problem of unfreedom. 
  
 
104 Annihilation of Caste, 73. 
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Chapter 5: Du Bois and the Self-Interested Orientation of 
Racial Capitalism 
All things are double, one against the other…Curses always recoil on the head 
of him who imprecates them. – If you put a chain around the head of a slave, 
the other end fastens itself around your own.1 
 
The notion of self- or group-interest has played a role in the institutional analyses of both 
preceding chapters. In this chapter, I will argue for a more complicated and interesting conception of 
self-interestedness, drawing on W.E.B. Du Bois’s account of self-interestedness that he develops from 
around the First World War. I will do so by arguing for the important role of this more complicated 
and interesting conception in maintaining the stability of racism. 
Racism at the level of social institutions has deep and ongoing effects on the shape of people’s 
lives and the quality of their life prospects.2 In that it is a fundamental institution that coordinates and 
organises human social action and determines individuals’ life chances, akin to Rawls’s “basic 
structure”.3 But, unlike the institutions of Rawls’ ideal well-ordered society, racism in our ill-ordered society 
 
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Compensation," in The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson and Mary 
Oliver (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 162. 
2 From here I will use “racism” to refer to “institutional racism”, following Carmichael and Hamilton. But, as Carmichael 
and Hamilton also acknowledge, the institutional side of racism cannot be understood properly without attending to its 
psychological side. See Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The politics of liberation in 
America (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), particularly Ch 1. I say more about how I use this term in section 1 below. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: A Revised Edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), §2, §10; John Rawls, Political Liberalism: 
Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Lecture VII. See also Scheffler, "Is the Basic Structure 
Basic?."; Young, "Taking the Basic Structure Seriously." See Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
208 
 
constrains the freedom of certain groups for the benefit of others.4 Overcoming that unfreedom 
requires understanding the stability of racism in order to undermine it. 
Some argue that the stability of racism can be explained, at least in part, by people’s self-
interestedness.5 Racism continues to exist because it is in the self-interest of those who benefit from it. 
Such a proposal has a prima facie plausibility. One does not have to look far or hard in our world to 
see self-interestedness at work. But what is self-interestedness, and why are people self-interested? 
These two questions have standard answers.6 To the first, self-interestedness is a subjective motivation 
to act on (what one perceives as) what is in one’s interests.7 To the second, people are naturally self-
interested. Combining these two answers with the equally common assumption of instrumental 
rationality yields the rational actor model of human agency that has long held sway – and still arguably 
holds sway – in economics, philosophy, and the social sciences.8  
 
4 Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The critique of racial liberalism; Mills, ""Ideal Theory" as Ideology."; Charles W. Mills, "W. 
E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal," in A Political Companion to W. E. B. Du Bois, ed. Nick Bromell (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2018). 
5 This claim is made across a variety of literatures. See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009); Mary R. Jackman, The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class, and race relations 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Lawrence Bobo, "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic racism or 
realistic group conflict?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45, no. 6 (1983); James R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, 
"Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of self-interest, racial affect, and stratification beliefs on whites' views," Social Forces 
61, no. 3 (1983); Michael Hughes, "Symbolic Racism, Old-Fashioned Racism, and Whites’ Opposition to Affirmative 
Action," in Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and change, ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport: Praeger, 
1997). Cf. David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, "The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes," Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 24 (1991). In a more recent popular literature, see Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New 
York: One World, 2019); Wilkerson, Caste: The origins of our discontents. 
6 See Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest," in Passions and Constraint (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995); Sears and Funk, "The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes." That these answers are (now) 
standard is not to deny that self-interest has taken many other forms in its history. See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, The 
Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
7 This may include the interests of one’s group, for example one’s family or wider social group. Here we are just “enlarging 
the self”, so to speak. 
8 Though see Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. See also the papers in Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). See particularly Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory”.  
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This model is not a stupid model. It captures something important about human agency. But 
it may nonetheless be incomplete.9 In addition, perhaps even what it captures – that humans display 
self-interestedness – is not described at a deep enough level by the model. Self-interestedness may be 
a more complicated, and dare I say more interesting, phenomenon than the model describes.  
The Du Bois inspired conception of self-interestedness that I will argue for in this chapter 
departs from the standard conception of self-interestedness in rejecting the two standard answers. For 
Du Bois, self-interestedness is not the idea that everyone acts solely or largely for the purpose of 
getting what is (perceived to be) good for them. It is not reducible to particular self-interested beliefs 
or desires. Rather, self-interestedness is an orientation – a broad way of seeing and engaging with oneself, 
others, and the world that pervades an agent’s entire outlook, gives it a certain shape and form.10 (It is 
in part to emphasise this distinction between particular motivational states and this idea of an overall 
orientation that I have chosen to use the term “self-interestedness” rather than the more usual “self-
interest”.) This orientation may manifest in what we ordinarily call self-interested desires. But self-
interestedness is not reducible just to these desires.  
People are also not naturally self-interested. Rather, self-interestedness is fostered by 
capitalism.11 Du Bois argues that racism and capitalism are systemically interconnected, akin to what Cedric 
 
9 See Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest. For a different line of criticism, see Tversky and Kahneman’s work, e.g. Tversky 
and Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice."; Kahneman, "Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
A perspective on intuitive judgment and choice." 
 
10 I will analyse this notion in more detail in the next chapter. See Brudney, “Styles of Self-Absorption.” 
11 Here Du Bois follows some of his predecessors in what Charles Taylor calls the expressivist tradition, stemming from 
Rousseau through Hegel, with Marx on the one hand and American pragmatism as represented by James and Dewey on 
the other, in claiming that certain seemingly fixed features of human nature express human nature as it is formed by 
particular social forms. See Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Ch 1; Sources of the Self: The making of the 
modern identity (Harvard University Press, 1992), Ch 21; The Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). In addition, to say that self-interestedness is fostered by a particular social structure is not to say that it could not 
also be fostered by other social structures. 
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Robinson would later describe with the term “racial capitalism”.12 Racism facilitates and is in turn 
stabilised by capitalism. Self-interestedness in the larger sense of an orientation is essential to both of 
these relations.13 Du Bois thus develops a more complex moral psychology of racism in terms of self-
interestedness.14 In this way, this chapter bridges the more heavily institutional analyses of the last two 
chapters with the more heavily moral psychological analysis of the notion of orientation that I will 
proffer in Chapter 6. It is indicative of the role that a thicker moral psychology can play in explaining 
the stability of institutions of unfreedom. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 1, I outline the early Du Bois’s moral psychology of racism, 
part of which rests on the standard conception of self-interestedness. This moral psychology is bound 
to an “anomaly” conception of racism, on which racism is not essential to modern society’s basic 
structure. As I argue in section 2, however, Du Bois comes to realise, however, that both of those 
commitments are mistaken. Racism is not an anomaly, but systemically interconnected with capitalism. 
The standard conception of self-interestedness is insufficient to make full sense of the moral 
psychology fostered by racial capitalism. In section 3, I explicate Du Bois’s conception of self-
interestedness in terms of the moral psychological notion of an orientation, an explication that will be 
carried out in further analytic detail in Chapter 6. Section 4 will conclude with some remarks on how 
understanding this moral psychology of self-interestedness sheds light on why Du Bois’s strategies for 
addressing racism took the form they did, even if one disagrees with the strategies themselves.  
 
12 Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The making of the Black radical tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000 [1983]). See also Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994 [1944]); 
Cox, Caste, Class and Race: A study in social dynamics. 
13 “I think it was in Africa that I came more clearly to see the close connection between race and wealth.” W. E. B. 
Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007 [1940]), 65. Cf. Robinson, Black Marxism. See also the notion of laissez-faire racism developed by 
Lawrence Bobo and others, e.g. Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel, and Ryan A. Smith, "Laissez-Faire Racism: The 
crystallization of a kinder, gentler, antiblack ideology," in Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and change, ed. Steven A. 
Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport: Praeger, 1997). 
14 See below, section 1, for an explication and defense of my use “moral psychology of racism” in relation to Du Bois. 
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5.1 The early Du Bois’s moral psychology of racism 
It will be helpful to contrast the role self-interestedness plays in Du Bois’s later (post-WWI) 
moral psychology of racism with his earlier views. The contrast will allow me to bring out the 
distinctive features of his later account of self-interestedness, in particular the essential role it plays in 
stabilising racial capitalism and its formal moral psychological structure as an orientation.  
Before I do that, however, let me clarify briefly what I mean by “racism” in this context, and 
what I mean in ascribing a “moral psychology of racism” to Du Bois. The term “racism” was not itself 
used until the 1930s to refer to Nazi ideologies of Aryan superiority.15 Du Bois himself never used the 
term. So it may be thought to be anachronistic to ascribe to Du Bois a particular moral psychology of 
racism.  
I use the term “racism” to mean “institutional racism”, namely the ways in which social and 
political institutions contribute to various forms of unfreedom, including unjust inequalities and forms 
of group oppression and domination, that occur along racialised group lines. These are forms of 
unfreedom insofar as they constrain the agential capacities of those subject to racism to live their lives 
in fulfilling ways. It limits their options, their possibilities, subjects them to external constraint and 
coercion, and makes difficult certain valuable ways of life – all of what Rawls summed up in his phrase 
“individuals’ life chances”. I understand this conception of racism not as an exercise in boundary 
drawing (to contrast with “individual” racist ill-will), but as a theoretical attention pointer to the role 
that institutions play in maintaining these injustices. As I have argued in previous chapters, institutions 
contribute to these forms of unfreedom in part through fostering ways of thinking, feeling, and seeing 
 
15 The first recorded use of the term is in Magnus Hirschfeld, Racism, ed. and trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1938). See Lawrence Blum, I'm Not a Racist, But... (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3-5. Blum 
notes also that Gunnar Myrdal does not use the term “racism” in An American Dilemma. Thanks to Bob Gooding-Williams 
for pushing me on this point. 
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– namely, a moral psychology.16 And, in turn, institutions rely on certain ways of thinking, feeling, and 
seeing for their persistence.  
Du Bois did think that social institutions played an important role in maintaining racialised 
injustices. And he sought to understand the ways in which that role relied on certain ways of thinking, 
feeling, and engaging with the world. To that extent, it is not anachronistic to treat Du Bois as having 
a moral psychology of racism, where that is understood as a view about how certain ways of thinking, 
feeling, and seeing are part of how social institutions contribute to racialised injustices.17 With that in 
mind, let me turn to the details of the early Du Bois’s moral psychology of racism. 
In section 47 of The Philadelphia Negro, entitled “Color Prejudice”, Du Bois provides a litany of 
cases of exclusion and discrimination, in education, employment, housing, churches, and other social 
institutions, taken to be “the practical results of the attitudes of most of the [white] inhabitants of 
Philadelphia towards persons of Negro descent”.18 “Prejudice”, for Du Bois, just is whatever psychological 
states cause those effects.19 In “The Conservation of Races”, Du Bois describes “race prejudice” as “the 
 
16 On this broad conception of racism, it may be that many individual acts of racial ill-will fall under this notion, blurring 
the lines between “individual” and “institutional” racism. Given that I take the purpose of “institutional racism” to be to 
direct attention towards the role institutions play in maintaining these injustices and not conceptual boundary drawing, 
this is not a problem for me. My account thus shares a similar normative motivation with Tommie Shelby’s account of 
structural racism in Dark Ghettos: Injustice, dissent, and reform. It shares this motivation even if it does not share a focus solely 
on beliefs and ideology with Shelby’s account. 
17 If one wanted to be even more precise, one could attribute to Du Bois a “moral psychology of race”. This moral 
psychology would have two parts. The first is a negative part, just sketched: how racialised institutions of unfreedom both 
create and come to rely for their stability on certain ways of thinking, feeling, and seeing others and the world. The other 
is a positive part: the articulation of different ways of thinking, feeling, and seeing that are able to defend against the ill 
effects of these racialised institutions, to create new and better institutions independent of the racialised ones, and, in the 
long term, to abolish those unjust and unfreedom-embodying racialised institutions. 
18 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1899]), 229. 
19 Du Bois is here utilising what one might call the sociological approach to social problems, of which “the Negro Problem” 
was one. In order to understand any social problem, Du Bois thought, one must carefully gather a wide range of facts, 
understood in their historical context, which can form the basis for inference to the causes of the relevant social problem. 
That causal diagnosis can then be used to create a program for reform. Du Bois inherited this approach from Hart at 
Harvard and particularly from Schmoller in Berlin. See, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Study of the Negro 
Problems," in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: The essential early essays, ed. Nahum Chandler 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 84. “[W]e should seek to know and measure carefully all the forces and 
conditions that go to make up these different problems, to trace the historical development of these conditions, and 
discover as far as possible the probable trend of further development.” See also W. E. B. Du Bois, "A Program for a 
213 
 
friction of races” due to “difference in aim, in feeling, in ideals”.20 The results of this friction, given 
the power differences between whites and blacks, are the exclusionary and discriminatory practices 
that comprise Du Bois’s litany.21 Here again Du Bois provides a broad and formal conception of 
prejudice that can be differently filled in. 
In his early work, Du Bois proposes three candidate accounts of “color prejudice”. The first, 
from the black perspective, is a “widespread feeling of dislike”, a “powerful and vindictive feeling” of 
conscious and active ill-will.22 The second, from the white perspective, is a protectionist belief in the need 
to protect cultural achievements – “the easily explicable feeling that intimate social intercourse with a 
lower race is not only undesirable but impracticable if our [American] present standards of culture are 
to be maintained.”23 The third, which can be found most clearly in the essay “Of Alexander Crummell” 
from The Souls of Black Folk, is a kind of well-meaning acquiescence in existing hierarchical practices on the 
 
Sociological Society," (speech given at Atlanta University to the First Sociological Club, 1897), particularly 14-17. On Hart 
and Schmoller, see David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race 1868-1919 (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 
1993), 142-43; Barrington S. Edwards, "W.E.B. Du Bois Between Worlds: Berlin, empirical social research, and the race 
question," Du Bois Review 3, no. 2 (2006); Robert Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-modern political thought in 
America (Harvard University Press, 2009), Ch 1, particularly 58-65.  
There are two caveats. The first is Du Bois does not take prejudice to be the sole cause of these inequalities. The second 
is that the knowledge gained through social scientific inquiry is not only valuable for this practical purpose. Science aims at 
truth for its own sake. See “The Study of Negro Problems” and Liam Kofi Bright, "Du Bois’ Democratic Defence of the 
Value Free Ideal," Synthese 195, no. 5 (2018). Du Bois’s use of the sociological approach is also inextricably bound up with 
other aspects of his thought that are not so easily shoehorned into the Naturwissenschaften model of cause and effect, 
including a phenomenology of race and a cultural aesthetics of race. I do not address them in detail here. But it is worth 
noting briefly that describing prejudice in causal terms does not mean that Du Bois is committed to determinism about 
human action, even though he does think of “cause” in terms of lawlike regularity. See his remarks on Chance, particularly 
in "Sociology Hesitant." 
20 "The Conservation of Races," 57. 
21 The definition in “The Conservation of Races” implies that racial differences under some circumstances may not cause 
friction, ie may not result in unjust exclusion or discrimination. This view underpins Du Bois’s belief in the gift of black 
folk.  
22 The Philadelphia Negro, 229. 
23 The Philadelphia Negro, 229. Ill-will and the protectionist belief together comprise roughly what David Sears has called 
“old-fashioned” racism in contrast to what Sears and colleagues have called the “newer”, post-Jim Crow, symbolic racism. 
See e.g. David O. Sears and Patrick J. Henry, "Over Thirty Years Later: A contemporary look at symbolic racism," Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (2005). 
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basis of racial distinctions. Those distinctions may fade over time due to the natural intercourse of the 
races, but they are not things to be actively resisted. Du Bois writes of those Episcopalian bishops 
who refused Crummell’s ordination that  
 
[t]hey were not wicked men,—the problem of life is not the problem of the wicked,—
they were calm, good men, Bishops of the Apostolic Church of God, and strove 
toward righteousness. They said slowly, “It is all very natural—it is even commendable; 
but the General Theological Seminary of the Episcopal Church cannot admit a 
Negro… it is impossible,—that is—well—it is premature. Sometime, we trust––
sincerely trust––all such distinctions will fade away; but now the world is as it is.24 
 
The early Du Bois does not think that any of these states are normatively justified, though 
each contains a grain of truth.25 Nonetheless, as a descriptive matter, he thinks that all three of these 
psychological states play a role in continuing racial hierarchies.26 There are three points to be made 
here in relation to my larger argument. Du Bois, I will argue, comes in his later work to reject each of 
these three points. Bringing those points out here in contrast will set up my explanation of the later 
view. 
The first point is that these states are distinct. Ill-will is of course directly inconsistent with well-
meaning acquiescence. One cannot simultaneously mean ill and well towards the same object 
 
24 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Brent Hayes Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1903]), 
147-48. 
25 It is true that whites feel active ill will and that the ill will contributes to the injustices faced by (some) blacks; it is true 
(Du Bois thinks) that a group that has certain cultural cachet ought protect it; it is true (Du Bois thought) that there are 
distinctions between the races in terms of culture and achievement. In the last pages “Of the Sons of Masters and Men” 
chapter of Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois describes what he sees as the “truth” of the protectionist belief: that the “lower 
class” of blacks ought be protected against – “the present social condition of the Negro [of which there are exceptions – 
the Talented Tenth] stands as a menace and a portent before even the most open-minded”. Souls of Black Folk, 126. 
26 While Du Bois, in the paragraph following the one I have cited in The Philadelphia Negro, describes both the “ill will” 
view and the protectionist belief as “extreme”, this is a criticism not, I think, of the claim that those psychological states 
exist in the population, but of the claim that one or other of them is the full content of “prejudice”. 
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consistently. Ill-will is also distinct from the protectionist belief. The former takes blacks as its direct 
object and the latter takes white culture as its direct object (and blacks only as its indirect object). And 
one can wish to protect oneself from something even where one bears no ill-will towards that object. 
Du Bois also construes well-meaning acquiescence as distinct from the protectionist belief. Well-
meaning acquiescence (on Du Bois’s description of the Episcopalian bishops) is a “kindly” and 
“sorrowful” attitude which holds, regretfully and passively, that as much as equality is to be desired, it 
is presently impossible – “now the world is as it is.” It is not the active attitude of maintaining 
something presently valuable. The states are logically distinct and unrelated. 
The second is that the content of self-interest is, for the early Du Bois, limited to the protectionist 
belief. The protectionist belief seeks to protect that which is seen as valuable (i.e. white culture). It is 
in that sense motivated by a concern with one’s own interests. Du Bois is thus assuming here the first 
standard answer: that self-interest is a subjective motivation to act in one’s own interests. Du Bois 
thinks this form of white protectionism is understandable, if not laudable. Though he does not say 
this, one reason why it may be understandable is if it is normal or natural to act in that way. So Du 
Bois may also be committed implicitly to the second part of the standard conception: that self-
interestedness is natural. At least, one can see how the naturalness claim might explain why the 
protectionist belief is understandable. By contrast to the protectionist belief, ill-will is directed towards 
another, not towards oneself, and well-meaning acquiescence in “the world…as it is” does not make 
any explicit reference to interests at all, let alone one’s own. So neither of them are self-interested in 
the standard sense. 
Third, Du Bois gives an explanatory priority to passive ignorance. Both the protectionist belief 
and well-meaning acquiescence rest on passive ignorance, in the sense of a simple lack of knowledge. 
Whites just did not know that (some) blacks were presently capable of the requisite cultural and social 
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achievements to form part of modern civilisation.27 If blacks were to show that capability, and whites 
were to come to know those facts, then both the protectionist belief and well-meaning acquiescence 
would rationally disappear. And, Du Bois thinks, the protectionist belief and well-meaning 
acquiescence are the main parts of prejudice. While conscious white ill-will exists, Du Bois (at this 
early stage) thinks it plays a small causal role in continuing racial hierarchies. Ill-will was not widespread 
amongst whites. Only among the worst of them did prejudice take the form of a “frenzied hatred”.28 
The bulk of the work in stabilising racial hierarchies is thus being done by the protectionist belief and 
well-meaning acquiescence.  
This moral psychology plays a central role in Du Bois’s proposed response to racism. Since 
the protectionist belief and well-meaning acquiescence rest on passive ignorance, they could be 
addressed by a “scientific program” coupled with black uplift. That program would comprise inquiry 
into the facts concerning black society and black culture and education of whites (and blacks) about 
those facts. Addressing the problem of the colour line was essentially “a matter of education… a 
matter of knowledge… of scientific procedure in a world which had become scientific in concept.”29  
Du Bois, at this stage, had what we might call a modernist faith in the power of the new social 
sciences, one which rested on a faith in the powers of human reason on which those sciences rested. 
Du Bois’s modernist faith was of course not absolute or scientistic. The sciences had to be directed 
by moral ideals. They had their limits. Human action was not entirely predictable or law governed. 
There remained an element of what Du Bois called Chance – “human wills capable of undetermined 
 
27 See fn. 25 above for one reference to the early Du Bois’s elitism. I do not address the question of the extent to which 
that elitism remains in the later Du Bois. See Joy James, Transcending the Talented Tenth (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
28 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 115. 
29 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, 2.  
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choices”.30 But this element can be directed. Chance “is as explicable as law”. Reason in its scientific 
form must be entwined with sympathy and fellow feeling, to draw on the springs of human will. These 
human powers, liberated by scientific modernism, were sufficient to overcome these injustices.31  
This modernist faith is closely connected to another feature of Du Bois’s early thought. The 
early Du Bois held what Charles Mills has called an “anomaly” conception of white supremacy, on 
which white supremacy is not an essential part of a society, but an extrinsic anomaly that could be 
removed without changing the society’s basic structure and values.32 Precisely because racism was a 
premodern phenomenon, it could not be an essential part of a modern society that had become 
“scientific in concept”.  
If one holds these two views, then the problem of unfreedom arises only in a minimal form, 
one that can be addressed through reformism and that does not require transformation. The 
procedures of the modern social sciences, when fully actualised and coupled with an educational and 
spiritual uplift program, would undermine white passive ignorance and assimilate blacks into 
mainstream white American society. And this could be achieved without fundamental transformation 
of social institutions. But Du Bois would come precisely to rethink this “anomaly” conception of 
white supremacy in the years around the First World War. This rethinking will require a 
reconceptualisation of the moral psychology of racism and the role of self-interestedness in that moral 
psychology. The standard conception of self-interest, as I will now argue, is insufficient to make sense 
of the systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism. 
 
30 Du Bois, “Sociology Hesitant,” 277. 
31 The connections with Dewey’s thinking in the same period are instructive, as is the change in both of their views toward 
what I would call a more tragic perspective roughly during the same time – Du Bois a little earlier than Dewey. 
32 See Charles W. Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on philosophy and race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Ch 6. Charles 
W. Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) Ch 6; also Gooding-Williams, 
In the Shadow of Du Bois, 15. See also the racial orders thesis in Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, "Racial Orders in 
American Political Development," American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005). 
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5.2 The systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism 
In the first decades of the 20th century, the First World War and events on the home front, 
including Du Bois’s increased consciousness of white supremacist violence and anti-black prejudice 
in the labour movement, shook Du Bois’s modernist faith in the necessity and simplicity of 
scientifically-based social progress.33 Racial prejudice, Du Bois came to think, was not so easily 
addressed through scientific technique, since it was partly constitutive of and essential to European 
modernity. To use Charles Mills’ terms, from the second decade of the 20th century, and particularly 
after the Great Depression when Du Bois begins to engage with Marxist thought, Du Bois moved 
from viewing white supremacy as an “anomaly” to seeing it as “symbiotic” with other essentially 
modern social forms, particularly, as I will argue (here following Cedric Robinson and others), 
capitalism. Racism and capitalism are systemically interconnected, for Du Bois, insofar as racism facilitates 
and is in turn stabilised by capitalism.  
This shift in Du Bois’s conceptual and historical locating of racism comes with a shift in how 
he conceives of its moral psychology. Self-interestedness comes to take on a different formal moral 
psychological structure. Du Bois comes to think of it as an orientation. And it comes to play a more 
central role. It forms an essential plank of his argument for the systemic interconnection of racism and 
capitalism. These two changes are connected. Self-interestedness could not form that essential plank if 
it remained just a distinct subjective motivation. And self-interestedness, since it is fostered by 
capitalism, cannot be natural. In order to get these changes to Du Bois’s moral psychology in view, let 
me first set out his argument about the systemic interconnection between racism and capitalism.  
Racism facilitates capitalism 
 
33 See Du Bois, “Science and Empire,” in Dusk of Dawn, 26-48. 
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The First World War was as significant for Du Bois as it was for other intellectuals of the time. 
For some, including Bertrand Russell and John Dewey on either side of the Atlantic, the war was the 
occurrence of the unimaginable, a colossal break in what had seemed to be the logical progress of 
modernity.34 But for Du Bois, the war revealed simply what was at the heart of white culture all along. 
Rather than being a rupture in the modernist project, the war displayed openly the violence that was 
essential to European modernity: “this seeming Terrible [the war] is the real soul of white culture – 
back of all culture, – stripped and visible today.”35 The war made visible to the white world the violence 
central to the European imperial project that had previously largely been outsourced to the colonies.36 
As early as 1915, in “The African Roots of War”, Du Bois had argued that one root cause of 
the war was the colonial struggle for Africa: “the ownership of materials and men in the darker world 
is the real prize that is setting the nations of Europe at each other’s throats to-day.”37 The expansion 
of rapacious colonialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries was a response to the democratic and 
labour movements in Europe and America.38 Those movements, in pushing for (and partially 
 
34 Bertrand Russell wrote: “The world seemed hopeful and solid; we all felt convinced that nineteenth-century progress 
would continue, and that we ourselves should be able to contribute something of value. For those who have been young 
since 1914 it must be difficult to imagine the happiness of those days.” “My Mental Development”, 13. As for John Dewey: 
“[s]uch an incident as the last war and preparations for a future war remind us that it is easy to overlook the extent to 
which, after all, our attainments are only devices for blurring the disagreeable recognition of a fact, instead of means of 
altering the fact itself.” Experience and Nature, 45. 
35 W. E. B. Du Bois, Darkwater, ed. Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1920]), 19.  
36 At the same time, the changes that followed the war, including the October Revolution, the end of the Ottoman Empire, 
and women’s suffrage in England, were for Du Bois the early springs of possibility, especially for an independent Africa: 
“is it really so far fetched [given those events] to think of an Africa for the Africans, guided by organized civilization?” 
Darkwater, 33. 
37 W. E. B. Du Bois, "The African Roots of War," in W. E. B. Du Bois on Africa, ed. Eugene Provenzo Jr. and Edmund 
Abaka (New York: Routledge, 2012), 59. This essay was originally published in The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 115 (May 1915) 
707-14. This article is one basis for “The Hands of Ethiopia” chapter in Darkwater. Du Bois’s awareness of the global 
nature of the colour line was present at least as early as 1906, when he published a short piece for Collier’s Magazine entitled 
“The Color Line Belts the World”, also available in W. E. B. Du Bois on Africa (2012) 35-36.  
38 “Remember what the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have meant to organized industry in European civilization… 
the dipping of more and grimier hands into the wealth-bag of the nation…With the waning of the possibility of Big 
Fortune, gathered by starvation wage and boundless exploitation of one’s weaker and poorer fellows at home, arose more 
magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad.” Du Bois, “The African Roots of War”, 56. 
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succeeding in achieving) a greater share of resources and power, led to lower profits for capitalist 
interests.39 For industry, maintaining profits thus required further and faster exploitation in areas 
distant from those movements for equality, namely in Asia and in Africa. In the colonies, because of 
prejudice and general ignorance, domination, in the sense of the arbitrary exercise of power, could 
ensure wages and conditions could be kept low: “Thus the world began to invest in color prejudice.”40 
Keeping the colonies unfree and dominated benefited materially the European centre, even as it (as 
Burke and Fanon in their own times differently argued) locked the centre into particular ways of 
thinking and feeling and acting that limited freedom even back “home”. 
Du Bois also argues that it is not merely direct exploitation and dispossession that is facilitated 
by racism. Racism also functions, once direct exploitation has run its course, to facilitate the opening 
up of the colonies as monopolised and protected markets for exploitative investment, the proceeds of 
which returned to capitalist hands in Europe while at the same time extending capitalist social and 
economic structures into the colonies.41 This protectionism (tariffs, special access granted by the 
colonial partners to particular traders) was necessary, as Polanyi would later point out, for the opening 
of new markets. Without this protected access, there would be no benefit to a particular colonial power 
in opening up any particular market, if every other power would have equal access to it. It was this 
zero-sum assumption that led to conflict and to war.42 
 
39 Compare Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 39; 180-81. 
40 Du Bois, “The African Roots of War”, 55. Cf. Darkwater, 23: “the world market most wildly and desperately sought 
today is the market where labor is cheapest and most helpless and profit is most abundant. This labor is kept cheap and 
helpless because the white world despises ‘darkies’.” 
41 See Du Bois’s references to “dog-in-the-manger” trade in “Souls of White Folk”. Compare Lenin’s analysis in Chapter 
4 of Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism (London: Penguin, 2010 [1917]). 
42 Du Bois would later extend this analysis even to conditions where the surface flow of money seems to run from centre 
to periphery. See W. E. B. Du Bois, Color and Democracy, ed. Gerald Horne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1945]). 
See also Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolutions, Ch 9; The Age of Capital, Ch 10; The Age of Empire, Chs 2-3. Contemporary 
theorists have pointed out the ways in which these dynamics have persisted after (indeed, through) the post-WWII 
decolonization movements and the international emphasis on self-determination for the post-colonial states. See, e.g., 
Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
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Du Bois argues that European imperial expansion into the “peripheries” was driven by the 
internal dynamics of capitalism, triggered in Europe by pressure for equality in wealth and power 
arising from the post-French Revolution democratic and workers’ movements of the first half of the 
19th century.43 Explicit doctrines of racial supremacy that were fostered by and supported colonial 
institutions facilitated this imperialist process and the spread of capitalism first by unifying disparate class 
elements within white Europe under the racial banner of whiteness, thereby placating class interests 
by fostering a pan-European, white identity premised on imperial expansion, and second by dividing 
the world along the colour line, thereby justifying differential exploitative and oppressive treatment of 
other races and dispossession of their land and resources.44 By facilitation, I mean that race was the (or 
at least a main) means by which capitalism actually did spread across the world and by which it 
consolidated its hold in Europe and in America. I do not mean the stronger claim that race was necessary 
for capitalism, that there is no possible world in which capitalism became global without race.45 That 
racism facilitates capitalism by extending its reach into the darker world and by consolidating its reach 
in Europe and in America is one half of the systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism. The 
other half is its flipside – that racism is stabilised by capitalism, to which I will turn shortly. 
It is worth noting at this stage that the process Du Bois describes here is not the claim that 
elites foster racial division in order to distract from their own exploitative accumulation. That claim is 
no doubt true and borne out by the cynical use of populist rhetoric by today’s wealthy political leaders. 
 
particularly Chs 4-5; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The making and unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995); Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The rise and fall of self-determination. 
43 I leave aside a comparison of Du Bois’s analysis to those of his contemporary theorists of imperialism: Hobson, 
Luxemburg, Lenin. 
44 Of course, as Said, Fanon, and others have pointed out, it is not only the explicit doctrines of racial supremacy that 
supported the colonial projects. Projects of essentialised racial difference and racial fetishism played distinct roles. I leave 
those aside here for reasons of space. 
45 Compare Olufemi O. Taiwo and Liam Kofi Bright, "A Response to Michael Walzer," Dissent Magazine (August 7 2020). 
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Du Bois’s point is the related but deeper one that the system of capitalism itself fosters a certain moral 
psychology that finds an outlet and a form in racialisation. Elites may play a part in this. But Du Bois’s 
point about the operation of the system should not be reduced to a claim about the actions of particular 
individuals.46 
This difference will become clearer by looking in more detail at the moral psychology that Du 
Bois argues is fostered by racial capitalism. What is essential to the process of racism facilitating 
capitalism, for Du Bois, is that whiteness is conceived of (as Cheryl Harris and Derrick Bell would 
later argue) as a form of entitlement on the model of property rights.47 Whiteness is “the ownership 
of the earth forever and ever, Amen!”, with the idea that the world “is white, and by that token, 
wonderful!”48 This is an expansion and reframing of the protectionist belief, and with it, the idea of 
self-interestedness. Since whites feel entitled to everything, what they are to protect expands to include 
everything. And since the best way to protect something is to possess it, to hold it close, whites feel 
entitled to exploit and to dispossess.49 Note, however, that self-interestedness has now expanded to 
include a kind of self-conception of white entitlement. It is no longer simply a subjective motivation to 
 
46 One importance of this distinction is that it pushes against simple diversification of the elite arguments. If elites were 
the ones intentionally pushing certain dynamics, then changing the composition of the elites may help address this. But if 
the problem is not simply with the elites, but with the system itself, then this move is unlikely to succeed. 
47 Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property," Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (1993); Derrick Bell, "Property Rights in 
Whiteness: Their legal legacy, their economic costs," in Critical Race Theory: The cutting edge, ed. Richard Delgado 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). See also Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," 
Pacific Sociological Review 1, no. 1 (1958). Blumer’s argument mirrors rather exactly Du Bois’s positional analysis as I present 
it here. Cf. Darkwater, 20, after citing Hauptmann on German entry into WWI: “Whither is this expansion? What is that 
breath of life, thought to be so indispensable to a great European nation? Manifestly it is expansion overseas; it is colonial 
aggrandizement… It is the duty of white Europe to divide up the darker world and administer it for Europe’s good.” 
48 Darkwater, 15. 
49 It is only one step further to the claim that Du Bois will later make, that whiteness itself is perceived as valuable property, 
and not merely an entitlement to other property. It is this further step that grounds his argument in Black Reconstruction 
about the “wages of whiteness” to the effect that one reason why the white working class sided with the white capitalist 
class and did not act in solidarity with black workers and slaves against their common exploiters is that they also earnt a 
“public and psychological wage”, in the form of a social status of being above blacks; see “The Propaganda of History” 
chapter, in Black Reconstruction, 711-29. 
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act in one’s own interests, which does not imply any views about entitlement or otherwise (as, for 
example, the difference between Hobbes’s and Locke’s view of human nature shows). 
This conception of whiteness as entitlement functioned to subjectively justify imperialist 
exploitation abroad. Materially, imperialism improved (however slightly) the position of lower class 
whites, allowing them to think they were participating in an historic process of unbounded progress 
– “[h]igh wages in the United States and England might be the skilfully manipulated result of slavery 
in Africa and of peonage in Asia.”50 Ideologically, whiteness as entitlement extended the status (at least 
in potentia) of rights-holder and property-owner, previously reserved to the upper classes, to those 
lower classes insofar as they were white. I say “in potentia” because not all could be property owners 
in fact. But nonetheless all whites, even those who previously “peasants” or “labourers”, could now 
understand themselves as able to become property owners, and indeed, according to this conception 
of whiteness, as entitled to become so.51 In Black Reconstruction, Du Bois captures this new status in 
terms of the “great American Assumption” of “equal economic opportunity”, that “any average 
worker can by thrift become a capitalist.”52 Lower class whites were now equal with upper class whites 
just insofar as they were entitled (“formally”, as it were, though we are here talking about a self-
conception and not of institutionally guaranteed rights) to the same opportunities, namely to have 
money and property.53  
 
50 Darkwater, 23. 
51 Note the important general shift in bourgeois and labouring class self-conceptions between 1858 and 1900, e.g. as 
described by Hobsbawm in The Age of Empire and The Age of Capital. It is instructive that conceptions of upward mobility 
and self-help arrived at roughly the same time in the 1860s. 
52 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 585; 183. 
53 This is one way of putting what Du Bois calls the “wages of whiteness”, see fn. 49. There is a much larger story to tell 
about the relation of European conceptions of social mobility in the 1850s and 60s to the “American Dream”. 
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This notion of whiteness as entitlement extended to the lower classes one important piece of 
bourgeois capitalist ideology: that more is better.54 It is better to accumulate, to have more and to own 
more. Whites were now entitled to accumulate. This more is better assumption means that white 
ownership of the world entails white superiority. Since whites own more (indeed, everything), and 
since more is better, whiteness is better.55 This piece of capitalist ideology is central to self-
interestedness.56 As Hirschman has argued, the word “interest” came to have particular economic 
overtones in the early modern period.57 “Interest” thus comes to connect conceptually an individual’s 
good and the economic structure of capitalist growth. 
The connection of this piece of ideology to individual selves (hence of self-interest) is made 
clear in Du Bois’s use of the phrase “personal whiteness” to describe the form that race takes in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whiteness is personal in the sense that it defines one as a person, that 
is, as someone who can possess rights and property in things. So this term “person” defines both 
whites as those entitled to own and as “individuals” able to achieve their own success through their 
own thrift and hard work. This sense of personal whiteness does not exclude whiteness being a group 
phenomenon. As scholars have made clear, while Du Bois is an individualist of sorts, for him 
individuals are part of racial groups, whatever the basis, biological and/or historico-cultural, of that 
racial grouping (on which I remain neutral).58 Whiteness as entitlement thus forged a racial identity, 
 
54 Compare Marx on accumulation in Capital Vol.1, Chs 23-25. 
55 Cf. Marx’s claim in Capital, 614 that “[a]ccumulation of capital is… increase in the proletariat.”  
56 Of course, there is a long story to tell about the material and cultural conditions for this piece of ideology, involving the 
role of money in commensurating all value, the reach of commodification, including of labour and land, and so on. Du 
Bois gets some of this from his 1930s reading of Marx, but some of it is present in his WWI writings. See, for a more 
detailed historical analysis of Du Bois’s sources, Chs 2 and 3 of Andrew J. Douglas, W. E. B. Du Bois and the Critique of the 
Competitive Society (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2019). 
57 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 58-65. 
58 See Anthony Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race," in "Race," Writing, and Difference, 
ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985-1986); Lucius Outlaw, "'Conserve' Races: In defense 
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one premised on the promise that all individuals could be owners. In this way whiteness was used to 
transcend the class distinctions of the white world.59  
So far I have argued that, for Du Bois, racism facilitates capitalism insofar as it provided a 
hierarchical structure of superiority and inferiority, defined by the right to ownership and to 
accumulation. This hierarchy served to justify the exploitation and dispossession of black, brown, and 
yellow peoples in Africa and Asia. It also served to shore up the home front against the labour and 
democratic political movements by forging a pan-European white racial identity able to negate, by 
redirecting along racial lines, the class politics of those movements. An expanded conception of self-
interestedness is necessary for this claim, namely that self-interestedness includes a conception of 
whiteness as entitlement. I will now argue that an expanded conception of self-interestedness is also 
needed to make sense of how racism stabilises capitalism: the second half of the systemic 
interconnection of racism and capitalism. 
Racism is stabilised by capitalism 
Return to whiteness as entitlement. This conception of whiteness is not simply an objective 
or formal racial hierarchy, comprising white superiority and coloured inferiority in terms of an 
entitlement to own. With that hierarchy of status comes a moral psychological distinction between 
those who have and those who threaten what the first group have, to which they are not entitled.60 In 
Du Bois’s words, racial hierarchy fosters a moral psychology of “jealousies and bitter hatreds… We 
must fight the Chinese… or the Chinese will take our bread and butter. We must keep Negroes in 
 
of W. E. B. Du Bois," in W. E. B. Du Bois on Race and Culture, ed. Bernard W. Bell, Emily R. Grosholz, and James B. Stewart 
(New York: Routledge, 1996); Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-modern political thought in America, 37-53. 
59 Note Du Bois’s critique of the socialist movement: “in Germany and America ‘international’ Socialists had all but read 
yellow and black men out of the kingdom of industrial justice. Subtly had they been bribed, but effectively: Were they not 
lordly whites and should they not share in the spoils of rape?” Darkwater, 23. 
60 Compare the Ambedkarite argument about graded inequality that I made in Chapter 4. It is perhaps worth noting that 
status hierarchies can in principle come without threat. Perhaps the ideal teacher-student relationship is like that. 
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their places, or Negroes will take our jobs.”61 If whiteness consists in ownership (especially if that 
comes only in the form of the entitlement to own, the promise of owning something in the future, if 
you work hard enough, behave yourself, follow the rules and so on), then whiteness is under threat 
from those who seek to take away what you own, or to compete with you for those goods.62 
This moral psychology of jealousy is explicable by reference to another piece of capitalist 
ideology: that not only material resources, but intangibles like satisfaction and power are a zero-sum 
game such that what you have comes at the expense of what I have, such that we must compete for those 
limited resources, satisfactions, and power.63 So, what I have must be protected from others, and what I 
win must come at someone else’s expense. This zero-sum assumption underlies many economic 
anxieties, for example contemporary handwringing about immigrants taking “our” jobs.  
Du Bois argues in Darkwater and later in Black Reconstruction that this zero-sum competitive 
outlook, applied between the colonial powers to the colonised world, was one of the causes of the 
First World War: “The world wept because within the exploiting group of New World masters, greed 
and jealousy became so fierce that they fought for trade and markets and materials and slaves all over 
the world until at least in 1914 the world flamed in war.”64 This zero-sum mentality gets channelled 
 
61 Du Bois, “The African Roots of the War”, 59. 
62 Put like this, it seems to make sense for lower class whites who did not own very much to target those who did, namely 
the upper class. But it is precisely to redirect those class-based energies “outwards” to the “periphery” that Du Bois (and 
Lenin and Luxembourg) see imperialism as arising. Du Bois’s claim here bears similarities to the group threat literature. 
See, for example, Lawrence Bobo’s work cited above. 
63 This point is also made by Douglas, W.E.B. Du Bois and the Critique of the Competitive Society. That it is also a piece of 
capitalist ideology that limitless growth is possible, and hence that resources are not zero-sum, is an interesting 
complication. There is no reason to think that both of these pieces of ideology being contradictory means they cannot 
simultaneously exist within the same ideological system. Ideology is not, for better or for worse, always consistent. But 
there is a story to tell about their coexistence and the differential roles they play. That larger story would have to emphasise 
the extension of the zero-sum mentality beyond material resources (which assuming a closed system, which may be the 
Earth, may be a fact – though notions of stewardship and sustainability and so on may indicate otherwise) to intangibles 
like power and satisfaction. I say some more about the inconsistencies of ideology below in section 4. Compare the double-
sided moral psychology I drew out of Dewey’s analysis in Chapter 3. Thanks to Leif Wenar for discussion on this point. 
64 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 634. See also Darkwater, 22: “It was this competition for the labor of yellow, brown, and 
black folks that was the cause of the World War.” 
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by racism along racialised lines, because, according to whiteness as entitlement, it is people of colour 
who are not entitled to those resources and power.  
Two pieces of capitalist ideology thus underlie racism: more is better and the zero-sum game. 
Undermining racism thus requires undermining these pieces of capitalist ideology.65 Insofar as those 
two pieces of ideology are continually fostered by capitalist structures, then overcoming racism will 
also require overcoming (at least) those two pieces of capitalism.66 So, racism is stabilised by capitalism. 
Contra the anomaly conception of racism held by the early Du Bois, the post-WWI Du Bois takes 
racism and capitalism to be systemically interconnected. 
This systemic interconnection cannot be made sense of on the standard conception of self-
interestedness, for two reasons. The first reason puts in question the naturalness of self-interestedness. 
Self-interestedness includes the two pieces of capitalist ideology. Since they are pieces of capitalist 
ideology and thus time and place specific, self-interestedness is not natural. One may perhaps argue 
that self-interestedness is natural and capitalism merely takes advantage of that bit of human nature.  
One can take this argument in two ways, one blunt and one more subtle. The first and blunt 
way is to argue that self-interestedness is natural in the sense that everyone is actually and necessarily 
motivated primarily by self-interest, so that social forces have and can have no or little role in changing 
 
65 There is a question here about the precise relation between race and capitalism. One might argue, with Adolph Reed, 
that one could undermine racism without undermining capitalism. That is, as Reed argues, it is theoretically possible to have 
an equal racial distribution across class lines. Whether this is materially possible is another question. I leave this question 
aside for present purposes. 
66 Further, if it is the case that capitalism itself has various mechanisms of stability such that those two pieces cannot easily 
be extracted from the system as a whole, then overcoming racism will require overcoming capitalism in its entirety. 
Something like a shift towards this might be seen in Du Bois’s thought between 1920 and the 1930s. In 1920, he can still 
imagine a humane capitalism, one that invests in the colonies for the purposes of education and uplift, protected and 
sanitised by independence and home rule (or, at least in the case of Africa, through the temporary protective leadership of 
African-Americans): “Capital could not only be accumulated in Africa, but attracted from the white world, with one great 
difference from present usage: [namely, non-exploitative conditions],” Darkwater, 35. But by 1945, he had become much 
more sceptical of the possibility of such humane investment: “Not until we face the fact that colonies are a method of 
investment yielding unusual returns, or expected to do so, will we realize that the colonial system is part of the battle 
between capital and labor in the modern economy.” Color and Democracy, 275. 
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or modifying that fact. We have seen that move already in Chapter 3, with Lippmann’s argument 
against democracy. And it is close to the inverse of the revolutionary argument from natural freedom 
examined in Chapters 1 and 2, where human nature was taken to be essentially good, and thus subject 
to the same criticisms articulated of that argument. To sum up, that move here would be precisely to 
parrot the ideology, the force of which consists, in part, in making what is contingent seem necessary. 
Before deciding whether something is or is not necessary, we ought try out other alternatives. 
The second, more subtle way is to argue that self-interestedness is a potential of human nature, 
something which is drawn out and actualised in different ways depending on social and environmental 
factors. Rousseau has something like this argument in respect of the two different forms of self-
interestedness he identifies: amour de soi-même and amour propre. The former is a love of self that 
motivates one to preserve oneself and which can lead to a feeling of a common humanity if one 
recognises that passion, through sympathy, also in others. Amour propre, by contrast, is a self-
interestedness that consists in comparing oneself to others, desiring their esteem and regard. That is 
why Rousseau says that amour propre, while still being part of human nature, is a potential in the sense 
that its specific forms vary according to the kind of society in which one can gain esteem from others. 
Amour propre is “a relative sentiment, artificial and born in society”.67 That view of self-interestedness 
as a potential of human nature, while still meeting the brief of self-interestedness being natural and 
being taken advantage of by capitalism, does not do the work required for the argument. Its social 
malleability may mean that there are forms of it that do not have the kinds of effects with which we 
are concerned here; that it can be put towards better ends.68 
 
67 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 218. 
68 My discussion here is indebted to Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), particularly Ch 2. Thanks to David Hills for pushing me on this point. 
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The second, stronger reason why the standard conception of self-interestedness is insufficient 
concerns the idea that self-interestedness consists solely in a subjective motivation to act in one’s own 
interests. The relevant interest of whites is to maintain the racial hierarchy of exploitation and 
domination. This is an objective interest. It attaches to one’s membership of a group – whites qua whites. 
But that one has an objective interest is not necessarily to say that it is subjectively grasped as 
motivating. I may be wholly ignorant of my objective interests. It may be objectively in my interests 
for me to eat more vegetables and whole grains. But I may not know that fact. Similarly, it may be 
objectively in my interests, given the social facts about class mobility, not to try through thrift to make 
my millions. But I may try to do so anyway. 
That is, to cite a fact at the level of social structure does not yet of itself do any work in 
explaining an agent’s action, since the agent may not grasp that fact or may not act on it. That we have 
a notion of a “class traitor” (or, indeed, the concept of an “ally”) is evidence of this fact. We need, 
that is, to explain how that objective interest comes to be felt subjectively by and to motivate an agent. 
Part of the work here, it is true, is done by invoking the two pieces of capitalist ideology: more is better 
and the zero-sum game. But these are highly abstract pieces of moral psychological theorising. It is not 
immediately obvious that people think explicitly in this way in all or even most cases. So more work 
needs to be done here to explain how these abstract principles manifest subjectively. 
The objective nature of the interest in maintaining racial hierarchy raises another point. The 
racial hierarchy was established by explicit doctrines of white supremacy. Endorsement of those 
doctrines is equivalent to ill-will; it is equivalent to endorsing the ills of exploitation and domination 
inflicted on coloured peoples across the world. But self-interestedness, on the early Du Bois’s account, 
was meant to be distinct from ill-will. So there seems to be a closer connection between self-
interestedness invoked at the level of objective racial hierarchy and ill-will than the early Du Bois 
thought. That connection is entailed by the systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism. 
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So, here are the two problems for the standard conception of self-interestedness when 
combined with racial capitalism. First, we must give an explanation of how an objective interest 
becomes subjectively motivating. Second, we need to clarify the relation between self-interestedness 
and ill-will. The later Du Bois does not attempt to resolve these problems within the standard 
conception of self-interestedness. He chooses to reject that conception, instead conceiving of self-
interestedness as an orientation. I will take a first pass at giving content to this notion here, before 
providing a fuller analysis in the next chapter. 
5.3 Self-interestedness as orientation 
What is an orientation? I take the term from Daniel Brudney’s paper “Styles of Self-
Absorption”. There, Brudney argues that some moral failings consist in an inattention to others and 
the world due to self-absorption. Self-absorption occurs when one’s self gets in the way of seeing the 
world properly, when it distorts or narrows one’s vision. Brudney describes two forms of inattention 
that he finds in J.M. Coetzee’s character David Lurie, from Disgrace, and in Saul Bellow’s titular 
character Moses Herzog. These two forms of inattention, Brudney argues, take the form of a particular 
orientation – in the case of Lurie, an aesthetic orientation, in the case of Herzog, one of theatricality.69  
Brudney uses the term “orientation” in a deliberately broad and gestural sense, to refer to “an 
element of our moral psychology… that includes forms of perception and responsiveness, indeed 
 
69 I leave aside here Brudney’s choice to articulate this notion of an orientation through an analysis of literature. The way 
in which literature is suited as a vehicle to articulate an orientation is an important part of the argument of Brudney’s paper, 
one which bears thinking in relation to the political function that Du Bois gives to aesthetics and rhetoric, as many Du 
Bois scholars have pointed out. Pursuing this further would be part of elucidating the positive sense of Du Bois’s moral 
psychology of racism: the articulation of a moral psychology that can resist the effects of racialised institutions, build new 
institutions, and, in the long run, abolish the unjust ones. See, e.g., Lawrie Balfour, Democracy's Reconstruction: Thinking 
Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois (Oxford University Press, 2011); Eric King Watts, Hearing the Hurt: Rhetoric, aesthetics, and 
politics of the New Negro Movement (University of Alabama Press, 2012), Chs 2 and 6; Paul Taylor, Black is Beautiful: A philosophy 
of Black aesthetics (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016); Melvin L. Rogers, "The People, Rhetoric, and Affect: On the Political 
Force of Du Bois's" The Souls of Black Folk"," American Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (2012); Robert Gooding-Williams, 
"Autobiography, Political Hope, Racial Justice," Du Bois Review 11, no. 1 (2014). 
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one’s general stance toward the world”.70 So, for Brudney, an orientation plays an epistemic framing 
role. It captures “the way one filters the world, sifts it so that it shapes itself in a certain manner.”71 It 
makes sense of our patterns of attention, of what is salient for us, and how we respond to those parts 
of the world. Lurie’s aesthetic orientation, for example, consists in part in “a pervasive tendency to 
register and catalogue people under literary or other artistic descriptions… to have a penchant for 
assessing people and conduct in aesthetic terms.”72 So Lurie’s friend and lover Bev Shaw is seen as 
Emma Bovary or as Byron’s mistress Teresa; Lurie’s apology to the family of the student that he 
coercively seduced is expressed as an apology for “lack[ing] the lyrical”; he searches, like Kierkegaard’s 
seducer in Either/Or, for the “interesting”.73 Brudney argues that it is this aestheticised way of seeing 
the world, one that puts Lurie’s own aesthetic descriptions at the forefront, that stands in the way of 
seeing the world more truly.74 
An orientation, Brudney argues, is one of the “patterning features” of our moral psychology 
insofar as it “fosters patterns of perception, feeling, belief, and conduct.”75 It ties together and makes 
sense of, gives the pattern or shape of, an agent’s particular individual psychological states, their 
feelings, beliefs, and desires. Describing an orientation as “aesthetic” or as “theatrical” provides us 
with a perspicuous presentation of those bits of an agent’s psychology. It shows us how those 
individual psychological states are connected. As such, an orientation is not a particular intentional 
state, a particular belief or desire or emotion (though it may characteristically involve certain beliefs or 
 
70 Brudney, “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 301. 
71 “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 306. 
72 “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 307. 
73 “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 307-8. 
74 This is of course not to say that the category of the aesthetic is necessarily inconsistent with truth. 
75 Brudney, “Styles of Absorption,” 317. 
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desires), but a way of engaging with the world that holds together the particular beliefs and desires 
and emotions that an agent has.76 Indeed, an orientation is in some sense prior to one’s beliefs and 
desires. Brudney suggests that, while central to Lurie’s and Herzog’s specific orientations are certain 
beliefs, “what is at stake is not evidence or arguments pro or con these beliefs but rather a way of 
being in the world. Only a change in orientation would allow evidence and arguments to change their 
beliefs.”77 The thought here is, I think, that if an orientation filters and frames how we engage with 
the world, then it may also filter what counts as evidence or as argument, and how strong particular 
evidence appears or arguments appear to us.78  
While an agent will be aware of the particular intentional states that they have, they are not 
likely to be aware of their orientation as such, since it so thoroughly structures their thinking. An 
orientation “is sufficiently pervasive that its output seems normal, the way things are.”79 It may require 
some serious self-scrutiny to become aware of one’s orientation, especially if part of what it is to have 
certain kinds of orientations is to be liable to inattention and to lack the requisite virtues of self-
awareness and attentiveness. One’s orientation, compared to one’s beliefs and desires, is not so easily 
changed. 
An orientation is thus a part of our moral psychology that is fundamental to our being in the 
world. It frames and filters how we engage with the world and others. It is not reducible to particular 
 
76 Brudney suggests at 318 that having a particular orientation is consistent with various sets of beliefs and desires: “for 
any set of beliefs, more than one orientation will fit; and for any orientation, more than one set of beliefs…a wide array 
of desires… might fit a given orientation… Conversely, having a specific set of desires is likely to be compatible with more 
than one orientation.” 
77 “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 318. 
78 Compare how Elisabeth Camp thinks of “perspectives” as forms of cognition: “modes of interpretation: open-ended 
ways of thinking, feeling, and more generally engaging with the world and certain parts thereof.” Elisabeth Camp, "Slurring 
Perspectives," Analytic Philosophy 54, no. 3 (2013). See also Elisabeth Camp, "Perspectival Complacency, Open-Mindedness 
and Amelioration," in Open-mindedness and Perspective, ed. Wayne Riggs and Nancy Snow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming). 
79 “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 319. 
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psychological states, particular beliefs, desires, or emotions (though it may involve certain of these). It 
connects together and makes sense of those beliefs, desires, and emotions. Because it plays this 
background filtering, structuring, and sense-making role, an orientation, unlike our beliefs and desires, 
is not naturally or easily self-known. We see through an orientation, like the Wittgensteinian pair of 
glasses that we never think to take off, and it is therefore a difficult task to bring it into focus.  
Before turning to Du Bois’s characterisation of self-interestedness as an orientation, I will raise 
two challenges. These two challenges will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter. The first 
is to ask whether an orientation is a third-personal description of an agent’s psychology, one used to 
predict what the agent will do. If so, then it doesn’t do the conceptual work we want it to do of 
explaining an agent’s perspective; how they see the world. So the answer to this challenge is to say that 
an orientation is a first-personal notion. It is a perspicuous presentation of the agent’s way of seeing the 
world. Its functional role is not to predict, but to understand, to make sense of. One’s orientation is 
the kind of thing that one can grasp from the inside. One comes to make sense of how one does 
things and sees things. In doing so, one starts to shift those ways of doing and seeing. Lurie comes to 
change because, in part, he comes to see himself for who he is. The change is part of the seeing 
correctly. 
The second challenge is whether an orientation really exists. Take another similar notion: 
character. While character is third-personal – it is meant to predict what an agent will do – it is similar 
to an orientation insofar as it is captures a certain unity of a person’s moral psychology.80 Many have 
argued that character does not play any useful explanatory role, John Doris and Gilbert Harman 
 
80 Many have argued that character (particularly the Aristotelian conception of character) is not simply a third-personal 
predictive notion. If so, then it does not fall to the Harman-Doris line of criticism. I take no stand on this debate here. See 
Rachana Kamtekar, "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character," Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004); Julia 
Annas, "Comments on John Doris's 'Lack of Character'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, no. 3 (2005). 
234 
 
prominent among them.81 People act out of character all the time, on the basis of situational cues. 
Character thus plays no useful predictive or explanatory role; indeed, the existence of character is 
disconfirmed by the evidence. Similarly, one might question whether an orientation really exists. 
People act differently all the time. What work is an orientation doing?  
My response, briefly, rests on the different explanatory roles of character and orientation. 
Character plays a predictive role. That is why people not acting according to character but in response 
to situational cues means that character is not a useful concept. But an orientation is not meant to 
predict. Its explanatory role is to make sense of, to see in a new light. It affects precisely how one sees 
and responds to situational cues (one may, for example, have a distractible or flighty orientation) and 
thus can be invoked even where there is no principled unity of the sort appropriate to character. The 
first-personal, sense-making role of an orientation is precisely what gives it its moral psychological 
force. I will consider both of these challenges and responses in more depth in Chapter 6. 
Du Bois, I argue, thinks of self-interestedness as an orientation. It frames and filters how 
whites engage with the world and with others. It manifests in a variety of psychological states, 
including generosity, ill will, arrogance, fear, and hope. It is not reducible to particular self-interested 
desires or beliefs, though it may involve them. I argue for this by returning to “The Souls of White 
Folk”. That essay trace the relations and connections between different individual psychological states 
that whites display. These relations and connections display the structure of the orientation of “self-
interestedness”, held together materially by the objective self-interest that whites have in maintaining 
 
81 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and moral behavior (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gilbert Harman, "Moral 
Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
99 (1999); Gilbert Harman, "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000). See 
generally Jay R. Elliott, Character (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017). 
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white supremacy, and which manifests subjectively in a variety of psychological states that are made 
sense of, seen perspicuously, when understood as expressions of a self-interested orientation.82 
Recall that Du Bois, in his early phase, identifies three psychological states that constitute 
prejudice: ill will; the protectionist belief; and well-meaning acquiescence. I argued in section 1 for 
three points regarding this moral psychology: first, that each of those states is distinct; second, that 
only the protectionist belief is self-interested; and third, that there is an explanatory priority to the 
passive ignorance that underlies the protectionist belief and well-meaning acquiescence. As I said in 
section 1, Du Bois modifies his moral psychological analysis on each of these three points. The 
relevant moral psychological states that comprise prejudice, namely those that maintain racial 
hierarchies and inequalities, are not distinct, but tied together in a self-interested orientation. Self-
interestedness, conceived as an orientation, thus turns out to be larger than just the protectionist belief. 
Since this self-interested orientation underpins and gives context to ignorance, ignorance cannot be 
understood simply as a passive not-knowing, but is a result of active inattention.  
I will set out two passages from the opening of “The Souls of White Folk” in which Du Bois 
describes the moral psychological phenomena that comprise the self-interested orientation of white 
folk. He claims a certain epistemically privileged position with respect to these souls. He is “singularly 
clairvoyant” of them; he sees “in and through them”, “undressed and from the back and side.”83 This 
knowledge is one to which whites themselves are not naturally privy, though it is still knowledge of 
something deep and essential to them; as Du Bois writes, “I see the working of their entrails.”84 Whites, 
Du Bois claims, know that he has this insight into their psychology:  
 
82 A fuller analysis would also provide a reading of other Du Bois pieces on whiteness. Particularly appropriate here are 
“The White World”, in Dusk of Dawn, and “Transfiguration of a Poor White”, in Black Reconstruction. I examine the first at 
the start of Chapter 6. 
83 Du Bois, Darkwater, 15. 




This knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now furious. They deny my right to 
live and be and call me misbirth! My word is to them mere bitterness and my soul, 
pessimism. And yet as they preach and strut and shout and threaten, crouching as they 
clutch at rags of facts and fancies to hide their nakedness, they go twisting, flying by 
my tired eyes and I see them ever stripped,– ugly, human.85 
 
Du Bois then makes the claim, adverted to earlier, that whiteness is a form of entitlement. 
After elucidating this claim, Du Bois reiterates some of these phenomena – the “strut of the 
Southerner, the arrogance of the Englishman,” the “dampening of generous enthusiasm” for black 
freedom, the kind of false education that “by emphasis and omission… make[s] children believe that 
every great soul the world ever saw was a white man’s soul”.86 These different phenomena, Du Bois 
clearly thinks, are to be explained, to be made sense of, by seeing them in light of whiteness as 
entitlement. 
The second passage comes immediately after this, in a turn from “comedy” to “tragedy”. Du 
Bois writes that: 
 
The first minor note is struck, all unconsciously, by those worthy souls in whom 
consciousness of high descent brings burning desire to spread the gift abroad, – the 
obligation of nobility to the ignoble… So long, then, as humble black folk, voluble 
with thanks, receive barrels of old clothes from lordly and generous whites, there is 
much mental peace and moral satisfaction. But when the black man begins to dispute 
the white man’s title… when his attitude toward charity is sullen anger rather than 
humble jollity; when he insists on his human right to swagger and swear and waste, – 
 
85 Darkwater, 15. 
86 Darkwater, 16. 
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then the spell is suddenly broken and the philanthropist is ready to believe that 
Negroes are impudent, that the South is right, and that Japan wants to fight America.87 
 
These two passages, together with the claim that whiteness is entitlement and Du Bois’s claim 
to privileged knowledge of that fact, comprise the entire opening of the essay. They contain a list of 
fairly ordinary moral psychological phenomena, from embarrassment to pride and arrogance, 
generosity to hatred and ill-will, self-deception to ignorance, fury to sullenness. This list includes but 
goes beyond the original three psychological states of ill-will, the protectionist belief, and well-meaning 
acquiescence. These phenomena are much more concrete and specific than the more abstracted pieces 
of ideology that I described in section 2 – that more is better and the zero-sum competitive game. They are 
the particular ways in which those abstracted pieces of ideology manifest at the psychological level, 
not simply as “the belief that more is better”, or “the belief that resources, satisfactions, and power 
are a zero-sum game”, but as fury when someone else has something (that should be yours), as generosity 
(because you have more, and showing that you have more is better), and so forth. And, importantly, 
Du Bois now describes transitions between these phenomena, how one and the same person can be in 
turn generous and hateful, embarrassed and furious, ignorant and all too knowing, precisely because 
these phenomena are expressions of this deeper orientation.88  
These transitions, that is, show that the relevant psychological states are not distinct, but tied 
together. There is a logic by which they change into each other, such that they are properly understood 
only when seen in light of each other, as part of a whole. It is this logic of psychological transmutation 
that displays the structure of self-interestedness as an as an orientation towards the world and oneself 
 
87 Darkwater, 16. 
88 There is also other language of psychological transition and movement in these opening pages: the shift from comedy 
to tragedy, the “descent to Hell” and outright white supremacist hatred. 
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that is itself not reducible to those individual psychological phenomena, precisely because one needs 
to see those phenomena together as a connected whole.  
Let us take first the outright hatred and ill-will that Du Bois describes in the first passage – the 
fury, the denial of black right to life. This ill-will and will to dominate, as I argued earlier, is the fully 
articulated subjective counterpart to the objective structure of racial hierarchy. It is that objective fact 
displayed at its starkest and most explicit, when it is brought out into the open. That is why Du Bois 
begins with it. But because of the concurrent self-image that whites have of their cultural supremacy, 
a self-image that consists in generosity and duty to others, that there is this racial ill-will is felt as embarrassing. 
The response to that embarrassment is to seek “moral peace” by covering it over with active ignorance: 
the refusal to know, the “clutching at rags of facts and fancies”. But, when that moral peace is 
disrupted, when “the spell is suddenly broken”, self-interest shifts straight back to violence and 
domination.89  
Here we have an account of how these disparate psychological phenomena are tied together 
by an underlying self-interested orientation that shapes how people with that orientation relate to 
others and the world.90 Self-interestedness can no longer be thought of as just a belief that protecting 
white culture requires discrimination. That belief is merely one manifestation of a deeper orientation 
of self-interestedness which gives rise also (for example) to a desire to help the poor disadvantaged 
people of colour, to make them better off – but only if they are thankful! – or to the self-deception 
and active ignorance that reinforces the thought that whiteness and only whiteness is of value. 
 
89 This analysis bears obvious Nietzschean affinities. For other connections between Du Bois and Nietzsche, connections 
that ought not be surprising if one accepts they bear a common expressivist and Romantic heritage, one filtered through 
Hegel and Emerson, see Gooding-Williams, “Autobiography, Political Hope, Racial Justice.” 
90 Cf. Blumer, “Racial Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position,” 5: “The sense of group position is a general kind of 
orientation. It is a general feeling without being reducible to specific feelings like hatred, hostility, or antipathy. It is also a 
general understanding without being composed of specific beliefs.” Blumer, however, takes orientations to be fluid and 
changed relatively easily through communication. See also Ella Myers, "Beyond the Psychological Wage: Du Bois on White 
Dominion," Political Theory 47, no. 1 (2019). Myers describes whiteness as a “horizon of perception” that also links together 
various material and psychological phenomena that are often taken to be discrete. 
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Self-interestedness thus cannot be thought of as only characterising the protectionist belief. 
That belief must be understood as a manifestation of that deeper self-interested orientation. And that 
is evidence, together with the transitions that Du Bois describes between a wider range of 
psychological phenomena, for the positive claim that self-interestedness describes an orientation. I 
turn now to the third point, about the priority of ignorance. 
Du Bois now treats white ignorance as no longer merely passive. Since it is an expression of this 
self-interested orientation, it is a kind of active ignorance, in something like José Medina’s sense: “an 
ignorance that occurs with the active participation of the subject and with a battery of defense 
mechanisms”.91 Ignorance is not a mere unknowing, but a form of active inattention in Brudney’s sense 
– a way of failing to see the world aright because one’s self gets in the way. 
Du Bois’s shift in how he conceives of white ignorance thus further supports my claim that 
he comes to conceive of self-interestedness as an orientation. In filtering the world through the self-
absorbed idea of entitlement, whiteness as Du Bois conceives it leads one to be inattentive to the 
world and thus to ignore facts that would threaten one’s entitlement.92 And, as an orientation, it is 
 
91 José Medina, Epistemologies of Resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and the social imaginary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 39. Compare Du Bois’s account with the recent literature on white ignorance, e.g. Charles Mills, 
“White Ignorance”, and the other papers in Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, eds., Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007). See, e.g., the editors’ introduction, 1: “Especially in the case of racial oppression, a lack of 
knowledge or an unlearning of something previously known often is actively produced for the purposes of domination 
and exploitation.” But, “[s]ometimes these ‘unknowledges’ are consciously produced, while at other times they are 
unconsciously generated and supported.” Cf. Annette Martin, “What is White Ignorance?” (unpublished paper), and 
“Obliviousness: Racial, Gendered, and Other” (unpublished paper). But see Elizabeth Spelman’s and Robert Bernasconi’s 
contributions to the Sullivan and Tuana volume, which treat white ignorance as a form of self-deception: wanting to 
believe something to be false that you know to be true, or knowing and not-knowing the same thing. 
92 Of course, as Du Bois makes clear, whiteness in his sense is not merely the possession of a particularly pallid shade of 
skin, and the orientation he describes it is not solely the possession of those with that shade of skin. Since it is an effect of 
capitalism, it can be (and is) present in people of colour. Du Bois will later decry the development of a black capitalist class 
characterised by this sort of orientation. See Du Bois, “The Colored World Within,” in Dusk of Dawn, 89-110; W. E. B. 
Du Bois, "Talented Tenth Memorial Address," in The Future of the Race, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1996). See also W. E. B. Du Bois, "One Hundred Years in the Struggle for Negro Freedom," Freedom 
3 (1953). “…an exploiting class is beginning to appear among Negroes. Its extreme development must be opposed.” Cited 
in Manning Marable, W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat (New York: Routledge, 2016), 195. 
240 
 
itself difficult to bring to focus – a difficulty compounded by the inattention that the orientation itself 
fosters.  
Self-interestedness conceived as an orientation answers the two problems facing the 
combination of self-interestedness with racial capitalism. Self-interestedness no longer needs to be 
distinct from ill-will. Ill-will is one of the manifestations of a self-interested orientation. It is the 
subjective correlate of the objective interest that whites have in maintaining racial hierarchies. When 
that objective hierarchy is fully and explicitly endorsed, the person who endorses it will have ill-will 
along racial lines. This is also how the objective class interest of whites is connected to the particular 
psychological states of fear, generosity, fury, and so on. It is the explicit, fully articulated form of those 
emotional states; it is the form they would take if spelled out.93 Recall Du Bois’s claim to epistemic 
privilege at the start of “The Souls of White Folk”: he knows white souls “undressed, from the back 
and sides”. Du Bois articulates the structure of those souls from different angles, making sense of 
their different aspects and how those aspects fit together. 
5.4 Concluding remarks on responses to unfreedom 
I’ve argued in this chapter that Du Bois articulates a distinctive conception of the moral 
psychological role of self-interestedness in stabilising racialised forms of unfreedom. This moral 
psychology is essential to Du Bois’s explanation of how racism facilitates capitalism and is in turn 
stabilised by it: the systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism. Self-interestedness on Du Bois’s 
account is not a set of beliefs or desires, but an orientation – a part of an agent’s moral psychology 
that patterns how we engage with the world and others, what is salient to us, how things appear to 
that agent. This orientation is rightly called self-interested insofar as it structures the world around 
 
93 Compare Michael Hughes’ claim that symbolic racism may be a reflection of group threat in “Symbolic Racism, Old-
Fashioned Racism, and Whites’ Opposition to Affirmative Action.” 
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what that agent feels entitled to, and insofar as it thereby puts the self at the centre of things. This 
centring of self distorts how the agent sees the world, blinding them to how things really are.  
I want to close by thinking about how this understanding of self-interestedness and its 
connection to institutions grounds high-level aspects of Du Bois’s positive response to racism. Like 
with my analysis of Ambedkar’s strategies in the last chapter, I am not endorsing any particular Du 
Boisian strategies, but rather looking at how the moral psychological diagnosis informs the shape of 
his response. 
If we accept the standard conception of self-interest, namely that people are naturally self-
interested and self-interestedness consists of a subjective motivation to act in what one takes to be 
one’s interests, then people’s actions can be changed in two ways. Either one changes what is actually 
in their interests, or one changes what they think their interests are. The first is the path of incentive 
structure shaping; the second the path of rational persuasion or enlightened self-interest.94 The first is 
a version of the structuralist assumption that grounded the revolutionary response – that change to 
structure is sufficient for change in ideas. And the second is a common though not necessary 
concomitant of reformism (one that we saw in the early Du Bois) – that the way in which we bring 
about reforms is through rationally persuading people to support them. 
Conceiving of self-interestedness as an orientation renders more difficult both incentive 
shaping and rational persuasion. It thus provides further arguments against the revolutionary and 
reformist responses to unfreedom. I take them in reverse order. The epistemic filtering role of an 
orientation means that rational persuasion faces an additional barrier. It is not merely that one needs 
to make a rationally convincing argument. That argument must be packaged in a way that gets through 
the filter, metaphorically speaking. It must be acceptable by the agent given their orientation. And this 
 
94 These options exist even if self-interest doesn’t exhaust people’s motivations. Adding other kinds of motivation, for 
example sympathy or the passions, just expands the toolkit. 
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suggests that larger transformative moves may be necessary to bring about that first, negative stage in 
(what in the last chapter I, following Ambedkar, called) conversion. Material change may also not be 
sufficient to shift incentives, again because orientations play this filtering role. A person may be 
inattentive to the features of the objective situation that have changed, or perceive them in a distorted 
way. So even if ideas are initially caused by the material, ideas come to have their own dynamics and 
their own logic. 
These challenges to revolution and reform are part of Du Bois’s larger transformationist 
views.95 If, as I have argued, Du Bois recognizes the systemic interconnection of race, capitalism, and 
moral psychology such that change needs to occur on all fronts, then we would expect to see strategies 
that connect means of change on all those fronts. That is exactly what we see beginning particularly 
from the 1920s onwards. Du Bois proposed a vision of “industrial democracy”, namely a system 
involving democratic control of the market and of industry and the setting of economic priorities by 
democratic means, in accordance with social priorities.96 It is a view of a society that is the inverse of 
Polanyi’s market society that subsumes the political to the economic, recognising (as Dewey did) that 
democracy only on the political level is unworkable without transformation of economic conditions.97  
 
95 See, for Du Bois’s 1920s and 30s charting of this path between revolution and liberal social reform, the “Revolution” 
chapter of Dusk of Dawn. 
96 Du Bois’s particular policy proposals included “public democratic ownership of industry”, an inheritance tax put to 
public use, and citizen co-operatives. Industry must be subsumed to democracy, not to capital. 
97 He also emphasizes, of course, in ways that Dewey does not, the unworkability of political democracy given the colour 
line. Dewey reduces race to economic factors. See, for example (and there are only a few examples of Dewey writing explicitly 
on race) his “Address to the NAACP”, where Dewey, while accepting that blacks had “suffered more than any other, 
more keenly, more intensely”, and were “the first, on the whole, to lose employment and the last to be taken in”, 
nonetheless claims that “the causes from which all are suffering are the same.” (225) Hence, “the things that I should like 
to say to you tonight are the same sort of things that I would say to representatives of any white group that is also at a 
disadvantage economically, industrially, financially, and at a disadvantage politically in comparison with the privileged few.” 
(225-26) Dewey does say, at the end of the address, that he hopes he has not “been unmindful at all of the special disabilities 
which the colored group suffers.” (230) And so, if one were to be (I think overly) generous, one could read Dewey here 
perhaps as making the point I have attributed to Du Bois, that back of racism lies capitalism, and not of reducing racism 
to economic exploitation. 
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But how is industrial democracy to come about, given the vicious circle? Du Bois proposed 
changes to both the political and economic spheres. Politically, civil rights and inclusion in the white 
world were means to larger transformation of white market society.98 Economically, Du Bois proposed 
economic forms of black self-segregation in the form of black co-operatives as an attempt to build 
community and as a means of political education through economic transformation – a kind of “home 
rule” within the larger white state.99 We can also imagine this kind of voluntary economic self-
segregation extending into the international sphere, along lines of later calls for economic delinking 
and decolonisation as economic self-sufficiency.100 But whatever the scale, this project is a community 
building project, for Du Bois – the building of an alternative positive vision of a different society.101 
This kind of co-operation, Du Bois thought, would also address the problems inherent in the 
development of a black capitalist class – a form of graded inequality involving race and class. The 
flowering of such a class, about which he increasingly worried in the 1930s, would just be “a new cause 
of division, a new attempt to subject the masses of the race to an exploiting capitalist class of their 
own people.”102 This would merely “be but replica of the old battle… the old discredited pattern.”103 
 
98 See Dusk of Dawn, 144: “One thing, at any rate, was clear to me in my particular problem, and that was that a continued 
agitation which had for its object simply free entrance into the present economy of the world, that looked at political rights 
as an end in itself rather than as a method of reorganizing the state; and that expected through civil rights and legal 
judgments to re-establish freedom on a broader and firmer basis, was not so much wrong as short-sighted; that the 
democracy that we had been asking for in political life must sooner or later replace the tyranny which now dominated 
industrial life.” 
99 Hence the title of the relevant chapter of Dusk of Dawn – “The Colored World Within”. See also W. E. B. Du Bois, "A 
Negro Nation Within the Nation," Current History 42 (1935). 
100 See Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire; Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization: The management of contemporary 
society (London: Zed Books, 2014); Samir Amin, "A Note on the Concept of Delinking," Review X (1987); Walter Mignolo, 
"Delinking," Cultural Studies 21 (2007); Escobar, Encountering Development: The making and unmaking of the Third World. 
101 Dusk of Dawn, 151-52: “I tried to say to the American Negro: …You must work together and in unison; you must 
evolve and support your own social institutions; you must transform your attack from the foray of self-assertive individuals 
to the massed might of an organized body.” 
102 Dusk of Dawn, 104.  
103 Dusk of Dawn, 105. 
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So, Du Bois’s recognition of the systemic interconnection of racism and capitalism specifically 
undergirded his positive institutional proposals for industrial democracy and economic self-
segregation. 
But given the moral psychology of racism, these institutional proposals could only be half the 
picture. There must also be a moral psychological side dealing with self-interestedness. And Du Bois 
has several proposals here. As I suggested, part of the force of his institutional proposals was to resist 
the spread of an orientation of self-interestedness among blacks, through the development of a black 
capitalist class. Institution-building thus has an inward looking moral psychological aspect of 
protecting against the spread of self-interestedness. But, further, institution-building has an outward 
looking aspect. It would build a political and economic power base that could be put towards cultural 
and moral psychological change to address the “age-long complexes sunk now largely to unconscious 
habit and irrational urge” of the white soul.104 This change would involve exercising power through 
agitation, namely “organized opposition to the action and attitude of the dominant white group”.105  
One important plank of agitation is propaganda, which, for Du Bois, is a non-pejorative term 
denoting the use of the aesthetic for political purposes. One positive role that propaganda can play is 
to reveal one’s orientation to oneself and thereby to enable change in orientation. Propaganda presents 
perspicuously, in an aesthetic form, the shape of an orientation. It allows people to grasp their 
orientations and in doing so to shape them. And given Du Bois’s conception of the relation between 
racist institutions and moral psychology, we can understand why shifting orientations, while not 
sufficient for social change, is necessary. If institutional racism is partly stabilised through how it 
 
104 Dusk of Dawn, 148. The fuller quote is instructive: “we were facing age-long complexes sunk now largely to unconscious 
habit and irrational urge, which demanded on our part not only the patience to wait, but the power to entrench ourselves 
for a long siege against the strongholds of color caste. It was this long-term program, which called first of all for economic 
stability on the part of the Negro”. 
105 Dusk of Dawn, 97. 
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shapes the moral psychologies of agents, then its destabilisation must involve moral psychological 
change. So, for Du Bois, we must attend to the moral psychology of institutional racism – the 
orientations that are fostered by racism and which stabilise it. In the next chapter, then, I flesh out in 
greater detail this notion of an orientation.  
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Chapter 6: What is an Orientation? 
When we apprehend other people we do not consider only their solutions to 
specifiable practical problems, we consider something more elusive which may 
be called their total vision of life, as shown in their mode of speech or silence, 
their choice of words, their assessments of others, their conception of their 
own lives, what they think attractive or praise-worthy, what they think funny: 
in short, the configurations of their thought which show continually in their 
reactions and conversation.1 
 
The preceding chapters have argued that paradigm modern institutions of unfreedom, those 
of political democracy, capitalist markets, caste, and race, shape agents’ moral psychology in a holistic 
way, and in turn rely on that moral psychology for their continued stability. At the heart of each 
analysis lay a complex of moral psychological attitudes and dispositions that together displayed 
something of how the agents within those institutions fundamentally relate to the world, others, and 
themselves.  
This chapter will provide a conceptual explication of this aspect of human moral psychology 
described so aptly by Iris Murdoch in the epigraph as a “total vision of life” – how an agent 
fundamentally sees and engages with the world (or at least some significant part of it), and themselves 
and others in it. It does so as a prolegomena to a further investigation of ways that people can each 
come to self-knowledge of this part of themselves, which I have argued to be a necessary part of 
addressing the problem of unfreedom. That kind of self-knowledge is, as I suggest in the conclusion, 
itself a form of freedom. I will not, however, engage in that longer investigation in this chapter.  
 




I will call this central yet elusive moral psychological notion an orientation. This notion of an 
orientation is intended to capture an agent’s general stance or attitude towards the world; to paraphrase 
Wilfrid Sellars, “how things in the broadest sense hang together in the broadest sense” for that agent.2 
A sense of this notion can be gleaned from the ordinary usages of the term, in such phrases 
as “religious orientation”, “philosophical orientation”, or “sexual orientation”.3 As these uses indicate, 
one’s orientation is something central to who one is, to one’s outlook, how one approaches things 
that matter. The term captures how one situates oneself in a domain, how one makes sense of one’s 
environment, in a way which is in a sense more capacious than the particular attitudes one has, one’s 
particular beliefs and desires. At the same time, one’s orientation is manifested or expressed in those 
particular attitudes. One’s philosophical orientation, for instance, captures how one approaches the 
activity of philosophising, the connections one sees between different philosophical views or theories, 
which of those views or theories one finds congenial or natural and which not, how (and whether) 
one’s philosophising bleeds into the rest of one’s life, and so on. “Orientation” is thus quite an 
ordinary and everyday notion, one that we use when we try to understand ourselves or another person. 
But, as we have seen in previous chapters, one’s orientation is shaped by the social conditions in which 
one finds oneself, without one necessarily knowing how one has been shaped. So one’s orientation is 
simultaneously central to one’s moral psychology and, often, quite unknown to one. 
I will make four points in this explication of the notion of orientation. The first is about the 
metaphysics of orientation. I will argue that an orientation is a general patterning feature of our moral 
 
2 Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (London: Routledge, 
1963). 
3 For some helpful references and debate on the last usage, see the following exchange: William S. Wilkerson, "Is It a 
Choice? Sexual orientation as interpretation," Journal of Social Philosophy 40, no. 1 (2009); Saray Ayala, "Sexual Orientation 
and Choice," Journal of Social Ontology 3, no. 2 (2017); Esa Díaz-León, "Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual desires, 
concepts, and choice," Journal of Social Ontology 3, no. 2 (2017). Thanks to Zoey Lavallee for these references and for 
discussion on this point. 
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psychology, one which makes sense of our particular attitudes, tying them together holistically, and 
which shapes how we perceive and understand the world. One’s orientation is expressed in the particular 
attitudes one has, in how those attitudes fit together in a holistic pattern.  
The second and third points concern the epistemology of orientation. Part of the difficulty of the 
notion is that there are obstacles in the way of knowing one’s own orientation. That is, others may – 
and in fact often do – in some sense see you more clearly than you see yourself. Yet, simultaneously, I 
will argue, an orientation is a first-personal notion, by which I mean that it is part of the agential 
perspective by which an agent actively engages with the world perceived as bearing meaning and 
significance. Many have argued that the first-person perspective is characterised by transparency – that 
if, from the first-person perspective, one holds a particular attitude, then (with certain qualifications) 
one necessarily knows that one holds that attitude. One’s orientation is philosophically interesting in 
this respect, since characteristically one’s orientation is not transparent to oneself. But, I will argue, 
one can come to know one’s orientation, and to know it in a characteristically first-personal sense, 
“from the inside”. That process of coming to know one’s orientation is an exercise in self-interpretation, 
in making sense of oneself.  
The fourth point is in a sense both epistemological and metaphysical. It is that, in making 
sense of oneself, one is also shaping who one is. Self-interpretation is a form of self-determination, an 
exercise of one’s agency. (It is in this way that it might be called a kind of freedom.) And this first-
personal practical task cannot be delegated to someone else, despite the fact that coming to know 
oneself in this way usually involves others. At the same time that it is often in some sense easier for 
others to see one’s orientation and how it is expressed in one’s overt actions and so on, only the agent 
themselves can engage in determining their own orientation through coming to know it. 
In order to bring out these conceptual features of an orientation, let me begin by returning to 
and expanding on the passages from “The Souls of White Folk” that formed part of my reading in 
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the last chapter, in which Du Bois describes a particular kind of self-interested orientation that he 
argues is characteristic of whiteness.4 I am not concerned in this chapter with normative evaluation of 
this orientation, or of arguing for a normatively preferable kind of orientation, as for example Kant 
was in “What is Orientation in Thinking?”. I am concerned to elucidate, through that case study, the 
conceptual features of an orientation in general, the role that it plays in a person’s moral psychology. 
These passages from Du Bois will raise some questions about an orientation to which the four points 
above will serve as answers. 
6.1 Du Bois and the self-interested orientation of whiteness 
Let me begin again where I left off toward the end of the last chapter, with the start of “The 
Souls of White Folk”.5 There, Du Bois describes certain attitudes those souls take. He traces the 
relations and connections between those attitudes in order to provide a perspicuous representation of 
the soul as a whole, of its structure, of what I am calling its orientation. Du Bois claims an epistemically 
privileged perspective on the souls of white folk: “Of them I am singularly clairvoyant. I see in and 
through them… I see these souls undressed and from the back and side. I see the workings of their 
entrails.” Not only does Du Bois know white souls intimately, but  
 
they know that I know. This knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now furious! 
… And yet as they preach and strut and shout and threaten, crouching as they clutch 
 
4 By “whiteness” here, Du Bois means a type of soul, one often and explicably tied to people with certain physical 
characteristics that mark them as “white”. He does not mean that every person with those physical characteristics has that 
type of soul, nor that people who have that type of soul have it solely in virtue of possessing those physical characteristics. 
See the 1910 version of “The Souls of White Folk”: W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Souls of White Folk," The Independent (New 
York), August 18 1910. Du Bois will later suggest that blacks and other people of colour can also have “white souls”, in 
the sense that their orientations can reflect some of these characteristics. (Du Bois is concerned particularly with the black 
bourgeoisie.) The claim here is directly akin to Catharine MacKinnon’s use of “male” and “female” to pick out social and 
not biological kinds in Feminism Unmodified. So, too, I will use the term “whites” and “white souls” interchangeably in this 
sense that is not cognate with the physical or quasi-biological referents of those terms. 
5 The analysis to follow will recapitulate quite closely, at least initially, the analysis I gave in Chapter 5, section 3. I repeat 
some of it here for completeness, but readers who have recently read the end of Chapter 5 should feel free to read more 
quickly through the initial framing. 
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at rags of facts and fancies to hide their nakedness, they go twisting, flying by my tired 
eyes and I see them ever stripped,—ugly, human. 
 
Du Bois lists further characteristic attitudes of these souls, “the strut of the Southerner, the 
arrogance of the Englishman amuck, the whoop of the hoodlum”, the “dampening [of] generous 
enthusiasm” for freedom, “what was once counted glorious”. These attitudes, Du Bois says, are 
“comic”, insofar as they are such obvious manifestations of white supremacy. But “the comedy verges 
to tragedy”: 
 
The first minor note is struck, all unconsciously, by those worthy souls in whom 
consciousness of high descent brings burning desire to spread the gift abroad,—the 
obligation of nobility to the ignoble… So long, then, as humble black folk, voluble 
with thanks, receive barrels of old clothes from lordly and generous whites, there is 
much mental peace and moral satisfaction. But when the black man begins to dispute 
the white man’s title…; and when his attitude toward charity is sullen anger rather than 
humble jollity; when he insists on his human right to swagger and swear and waste,—
then the spell is suddenly broken and the philanthropist is ready to believe that 
Negroes are impudent, that the South is right, and that Japan wants to fight America. 
 
Here we have a list comprising a wide range of attitudinal states of white souls. The list runs 
from embarrassment to pride, fury to sullenness, generosity to hatred, “burning” desires to give 
charitably to beliefs about the “impudence” of other races or nations. It includes very intense attitudes 
like fury and hatred and quieter phenomena like the “dampening” of enthusiasm. These attitudes are 
not merely characteristic but distinct attitudes that different white people may have. These attitudes 
may coexist in one and the same person, as Du Bois makes clear by laying out the philanthropist’s 
transitions between those states in the last quote. So these are not disconnected attitudes, even though 
many of them are so varied as to be in tension, if not directly inconsistent. They bear a pattern; they 
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hang together, make sense together, in a certain way. They form some kind of connected whole in the 
same soul.  
This patterning is the first relevant feature of an orientation. How we are oriented to the world 
reveals itself in the overall pattern of our attitudes. An orientation is not merely one particular attitude 
amongst others, one belief or desire, however central, but a more general feature of an agent’s moral 
psychology that pervades the specific attitudes they have. And, in claiming a singular clairvoyance of 
that patterning, Du Bois is suggesting that he is in a better position somehow to see that pattern than 
whites themselves.  
This patterning, this hanging together of a person’s moral psychology, is made clearer in Du 
Bois’s description of his Second White Friend in “The White World”. Du Bois imagines a conversation 
with a white friend, of indeterminate age, respectable, educated, bourgeois, head of a household with 
wife and daughter, goes to church regularly on Sundays. This friend’s “fault is that he is logical”, unlike 
others who are “deliciously impervious to reason.” Not only is he logical to a fault, but again unlike 
most others, he is extremely apt at articulating his own thoughts. After a spot of introspection and 
self-examination, he comes to Du Bois with a problem: he is committed simultaneously to four distinct 
and inconsistent codes: that of the Christian, the Gentleman, the American, and the White Man. 






















These codes are all present inchoately in the “average reasonable white American”, in the 
disparate attitudes that Du Bois describes in “The Souls of White Folk.” What Du Bois does in the 
figure of his logical white friend is to make them explicit. The white friend gives them full articulation 
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and a “logical”, i.e. a clear and structured, ordering. While the codes are inconsistent (the white friend 
asks, tearing his hair out, “How can they do it? It ain’t reasonable”), they also bear a curious 
psychological logic whereby one leads to another. The Gentleman, which represents the new 
aristocracy of capital, is an imperfective form of the Christian. The white friend’s pastor suggests as 
much – we can’t be expected, in a fallen world, to live up to Christian ideals – so “at least live a 
Gentleman”. Good Will for all and the Golden Rule become Good Will for those who deserve it and 
do unto others as they have done unto you; Poverty becomes comparative – while there are the super-
rich above one, one is effectively poor, so better aim at Wealth; and the Police are necessary to enforce 
Peace.  
The Gentleman leads to the American insofar as “we” (not yet explicitly “whites”, but 
“Americans”) are the exclusive club with Manners and Wealth. The dark peoples of the world, 
although they can perhaps be in principle educated and cultured, as yet are not. They want to “jump 
the queue” and get ahead of themselves, thus “we” must prepare ourselves against them. And the 
code of the White Man follows quickly: what is war but pre-emptive self-defence; if America is best, 
then the rest are hankering in jealousy, and if “we” are the cultured, then we must rule the others so 
they can reap the benefits of culture. And so the dialogue ends as, once again, “[t]he world had gone 
to war… to defend Democracy!” 
Du Bois displays this movement from Christian to White Man through the following chart, 
which I read as showing horizontally how each of the elements of the Christian code transforms step 





















































Let me take just the first of these lines as an example of this horizontal transformation. The 
Christian notion of Peace, under conditions of inequality and difference, requires something like 
Manners to maintain. But the maintenance of Manners too easily becomes itself a form of difference 
and distinction – that which we have and they do not. Manners thus comes itself under threat. And so 
Propaganda is needed to protect and maintain Manners. Propaganda comes to justify the distinctions 
and differences that Manners now embodies, which is to say that it justifies Exploitation. We can, I 
suggest, draw similar trajectories for the other categories in a kind of Kantian deduction of them 
(Good Will, when it becomes Exclusive given the practical impossibility of having Good Will for all, 
falls into Patriotism, which is the extension of Good Will only to one’s fellow citizens, and Patriotism 
in turn is one part of the justification for Empire – the periphery is for the purpose of the centre). But 
instead of pursuing that fuller analysis, I want to emphasise three points.  
The first is that these sets of ideas, Du Bois suggests, bear a pattern. They make sense when 
understood together, even if taken piecemeal they may be logically inconsistent (War and Peace; Good 
Will and Hate; Poverty and Wealth). The second is that understanding these attitudes together involves 
giving them an interpretation. It involves giving an explicit articulation to the more inchoate and 
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indeterminate attitudes that Du Bois describes in “The Souls of White Folk”, as the white friend does 
in “The White World”. That process of articulation is a process of coming to self-knowledge, of 
making sense of oneself. The third (which is only implied) is that this kind of articulation, of making 
sense of oneself, is a difficult one. It is implied in the fact that Du Bois must make his second white 
friend logical to a fault, so that he has by default this kind of self-insight. And it is why Du Bois needs 
to claim his singular clairvoyance vis-à-vis white souls at the start of “The Souls of White Folk”.  
A number of questions arise from this analysis. The first is what exactly the pattern consists 
in. We can call this a question in the metaphysics of orientation. What is the relation between the 
different attitudes that comprise the orientation? And what is the relation between those attitudes and 
the orientation itself? A second question is what the process of interpretation consists in. What is it to 
understand one’s own (or another’s) orientation? What are the standards of correctness, if any? And 
what underlies the difficulty of self-interpretation, of coming to know oneself? These are questions in 
the epistemology of orientation. These questions are of course deeply connected and one’s views on one 
set will shape what views one has on the others. So there are likely to be package deals here, and one 
can come at them from different ends. I will first examine the metaphysical questions and then move 
to the epistemological questions. I will set out my own way of answering these questions without 
adverting too much to other possible answers that might be given. 
6.2 The metaphysics of orientation – patterning, fit, and expression 
An orientation comprises a general pattern that an agent’s particular attitudes bear. This 
pattern, when grasped, makes sense of those attitudes and of that agent. How are we to understand 
that notion of patterning?  
A first step is to distinguish between two aspects of this patterning. Call them the “internal” 
and the “external”. An orientation patterns externally insofar as it shapes how we perceive the world. 
In Daniel Brudney’s words, it captures “the way one filters the world, sifts it so that it shapes itself in 
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a certain manner.”6 It makes sense of our patterns of attention, of what is salient for us, the 
descriptions under which we understand parts of the world and how we respond to those parts of the 
world. The self-interested orientation described by Du Bois, for instance, shapes how whites see 
others, as threats, as jealous, as “needy and deserving”, or as “poor and proud”. It captures how whites 
pay attention to certain attitudes of others according to race, that it matters that blacks are “not as 
agreeable or happy as they used to be”, or that it matters that certain ways of acting “careful, nice, 
‘aristocratic’ in the best meaning of the term” comport with Manners and others do not. 
An orientation patterns internally insofar as it ties together and makes sense of an agent’s 
particular individual psychological states: their feelings, beliefs, and desires. It ties them together 
holistically. An apt description of an agent’s orientation provides an understanding of how that 
person’s actions, thoughts, feelings, etc. all fit together. Du Bois gives an apt description of the 
orientation of whiteness as comprising the notion that “whiteness is ownership of the earth forever 
and ever, Amen!”. Whites own everything; hence blacks ought be thankful for what they are given. 
Whites own everything, and having more is better, hence whites are better than others. Whites own 
everything, and having more is better, so whites should be proud of being white. Whites own 
everything, and so anyone else who wants to own something is impudent or willing to fight 
(unjustifiably) to take what whites own. The notion of “whiteness as ownership” makes sense of the 
otherwise disparate set of attitudes that comprise the orientation by showing how they all hang 
together. 
Seeing these attitudes together under the description of “whiteness as ownership” helps us 
understand the transitions and connections that Du Bois sees between these attitudes. Let us return 
to “The Souls of White Folk” and repackage an analysis I made in the last chapter. Take first of all the 
 
6 Brudney, “Styles of Self-Absorption,” 306. 
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outright hatred with which Du Bois begins – “they deny my right to live and call me misbirth!”. Take 
this as the most explicit form of whiteness “becom[ing] painfully conscious” of itself, of skin colour 
as becoming “fraught with tremendous and eternal significance”. But when coupled with another 
sense of white supremacy as cultural supremacy, and “culture” as embodying Christian values of 
generosity and duty to others, that there is this racial ill-will is felt as embarrassing. The response to that 
embarrassment is to seek “moral peace” by covering it over with active ignorance: the refusal to know, 
the “clutching at rags of facts and fancies”. But, when that moral peace is disrupted, when “the spell 
is suddenly broken”, self-interest shifts straight back to violence and domination. And, of course, these 
two aspects of the patterning are not independent. How one perceives the world will be reflected in 
one’s attitudes. And one’s attitudes in turn themselves affect how one sees the world. So the internal 
and external aspects of how an orientation patterns an agent’s moral psychology are just two parts of 
how an orientation captures that agent’s overall attitude toward the world. 
What does it mean for these attitudes to hang together or make sense together as a whole? 
Answering this question requires spelling out what the “hanging together” relation is and what kind 
of whole is at stake. That is, we want an account of the relations between the parts (the attitudes), and 
the relation between parts and the whole (the orientation). I will suggest that the part-part relation 
consists in what I call fit – how the attitudes fit together to form a whole. The part-whole relation is 
one of expression – an agent’s orientation is expressed in their attitudes. The key idea throughout, taking 
seriously our ordinary notion of an orientation, is that an orientation is a general and holistic aspect 




I will elucidate the notion of fit in stages. Let me begin with an aesthetic analogy as a broad 
illustration of this notion of fit.7 In understanding a work of art, we read parts of the work in light of 
other parts as together comprising that work as a whole. This musical motif makes a different sense 
given the fact that is a transition from A to B; the use of this colour here has to be understood in 
contrast with that colour splotch there. This is not to deny that we can make some sense of the 
particular parts in isolation. It is that heaviness of brushstroke that carries the meaning of sadness; it is 
that transition to the subdominant that begins the resolution. But there ought be similarly no denying 
that there is a certain sense that one gets of those parts only in relation to the other parts. What place 
does sadness have in the work as a whole, and why understand that heaviness as sadness rather than 
anger, or brooding? Does the piece finally get resolved, or is it a false resolution? Similarly, while we 
can have an understanding of an agent’s particular beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on in themselves, 
there is a certain kind of understanding of them that we get only by seeing those parts of their moral 
psychology in light of the others. Fit, as a first gloss, is this kind of relation. 
Now this is of course not yet so much a positive account as a placeholder, or a signpost 
pointing to an account of fit. The New Critic Cleanth Brooks gives an account of the beauty of a 
poem that gets us a step closer. Brooks draws a distinction between “the attractiveness or beauty of 
any particular item taken as such and the ‘beauty’ of the poem considered as a whole.”8 The latter kind 
of beauty, Brooks writes, “is the effect of a total pattern… a kind of pattern that can incorporate 
within itself items intrinsically beautiful or ugly, attractive or repulsive.” So, for Brooks, the beauty of 
 
7 I want to say more: that the use of the aesthetic here is not only an analogy; that the aesthetic is an essential and 
fundamental dimension of human agency and experience. I take Dewey and Du Bois both to think this. But to argue for 
that claim would take me too far afield here. 
8 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the structure of poetry (London: Dobson Books, 1949), 178. In invoking the 
New Criticism, I do not endorse all of its commitments. My point is simply to draw out the analogy between how Brooks 
thinks of the structure of a poem and the structure of an orientation. There is a world beyond the text, like there is a world 
beyond the person. And that world is relevant to understanding the text or the person. But there is a truth to the primacy 
of the text, like there is a truth to the primacy of the individual. 
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the pattern, of the poem considered as a whole, has to be understood in a different way from the 
beauty of a line or a phrase. A beautiful poem may contain ugly or repulsive lines or phrases, which 
nonetheless contribute to the beauty of the patterned whole in which they are placed. The whole (the 
poem) comprises parts (lines) in certain relations, such that understanding the whole requires that we 
understand the relations between the parts, but the relation between the parts is itself informed by 
how we understand the whole.9 
What are those relations between parts that comprise the whole? The beauty of the pattern 
does not consist, Brooks claims, just in conglomerating beautiful items together. Rather, it is a matter 
of “a structure of meanings, evaluations, and interpretations”.10 Brooks is making two claims here. 
The first is an irreducibility claim: that the beauty of the whole poem is not reducible to the sum of 
the beauty of its parts. A poem is not just a heap of lines stacked on top of each other, but a holistic 
structure comprising how those lines balance and contrast and set off and remind us of each other. 
And so the relation those lines bear to each other is not something as simple as similarity. The lines do 
not belong together, let alone in the order they are in, just because they are all beautiful, or are all 
about the same topic, or are similar in some other way (perhaps because they are all written by the 
same author). That is too simplistic a view of how the parts of a poem fit together. So, too, a person’s 
moral psychology, taken as a whole, may bear properties that are not reducible to the sum of the 
properties of its parts.  
 
9 One obvious reference here is to G.E. Moore’s notion of an “organic unity”. But Moore is talking about value in a purely 
objective sense – of which kind, of course, beauty is one – and not of the moral psychological structure of a person 
irrespective of normative evaluation. Moore’s notion is not of course irrelevant to this discussion, but its direct relevance 
is lessened by this fact and also by the fact that the secondary literature on the notion of organic unity has focused also 
almost entirely on the compositionality or otherwise of value. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, 
1903), Ch 1, §§20-23. 
10 Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn, 178. 
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Take, as an example, Vida Yao’s analysis of Marilynne Robinson’s character Jack, from the 
novel Home, which I put to different use here.11 Jack is dissolute, a drunk, a thief, a liar, cowardly, vain, 
predatory, malicious, aware of these failings, and unable and partly unwilling to change. Nonetheless, 
his sister Glory, who has herself suffered because of Jack’s previous moral failings, remarks that she 
likes his soul “the way it is”. That is, despite these vices being in themselves not loveable, in the 
particular combination they take in Jack’s soul, they are (at least Yao, reading Robinson, takes them 
to be) loveable. The whole person is loveable even where his qualities individually (and even in sum!) 
are not. 
The second claim Brooks makes is that this structure is not given by any one kind of purely 
formal relation, but is a matter of meaning and interpretation. Brooks uses the examples of similarity and 
of summation. A poem’s structure, he argues, is given not by “the arrangement of the various elements 
into homogenous groupings, pairing like with like.” Nor is it given by an algebraic or summative 
process, by “allowing one connotation to cancel out another [or] by a process of subtraction.”12 To 
look solely at a poem’s merely formal relations (say, its rhyming scheme, or its metric, or how it 
sequences images) does not get to the heart of the metaphysics here.  
What are the “purely formal” relations in the moral psychological case? The most obvious is 
something like rational consistency. An agent is unified in a purely formal, rational sense where their 
beliefs, desires, etc. are all consistent. But rational consistency is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
an agent’s orientation to hang together. It is not necessary, because an orientation can be expressed 
even in inconsistent items. Recall Du Bois’s second white friend, with directly inconsistent sets of 
 
11 See Vida Yao, "Grace and Alienation," Philosophers' Imprint 20, no. 16 (2020). Yao’s point is that there is a kind of love, 
call it grace, that takes as its rightful object not the good but the human, in all its foibles. I think it is a deep and not merely 
terminological point whether this is so or whether the human, even in its foibles and perhaps with all its evils, can be taken 
to be “good” in some suitably broad sense. But I do not pursue that point here. 
12 Brooks, 178-79. 
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values. Those inconsistent sets of values were nonetheless expressions of his self-interested 
orientation, held together by the kinds of meaningful transitions and connections that Du Bois traces 
in “The White World”. Rational consistency is not sufficient, because it does not capture how those 
states hang together. It is too weak and uninformative a relation.  
To borrow an example of Akeel Bilgrami’s to explain the insufficiency of rational consistency 
for fit, suppose I have a desire to do philosophy and a desire to please my father. These two desires 
fit together in a way which goes beyond the fact that they are consistent. My desire to do philosophy 
is also consistent with my desire to eat plums, but they are hardly related in the same way. It might be 
thought that the desires are related as means to end – doing philosophy is the means to pleasing my 
father. But even where that is not true and I know it is not true, say where my father has no interest 
in philosophy or in me being a philosopher; indeed, where my father thinks that I really should be 
working an “honest job”, there might still be some relation there – that they express an orientation 
towards receiving praise, borne from a distant paternal relationship. (I may see this relation also in my 
desire to gain the approval of my advisor, or in my belief that I can never truly live up to the 
expectations placed on me, for instance.) Fit is thus both a more capacious and a more specific kind 
of relation than rational consistency. 
That rational consistency is neither necessary nor sufficient for an orientation to hang together 
ought be unsurprising when one recalls that rational consistency conceived in the way I have done so 
here is a purely internal notion. In this it is unlike the notion of an orientation, which has both internal 
and external aspects. It is unsurprising that an agent’s general stance to the world is not capturable in 
purely formal terms. That is, whatever “fit” turns out to be, it will be not specifiable in purely formal 
terms, independent of the meaning that a particular agent’s moral psychological states do in fact have. 
So if neither similarity nor rational consistency are the kinds of relation we are looking for, 
what suitably general account can we give of “fit”? All we can say at that level of generality, I think, is 
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that the parts of an orientation fit together when they make sense of each other, when the meaning of 
one is informed by the meaning of others. To understand how exactly they make sense of each other 
in any particular case requires interpretation. One has to look and see, as it were. Since an orientation 
is in the sphere of meaning, the possible relations between the parts are those that hold between 
meaningful entities. Perhaps one belief turns out to be metonymous of some others; perhaps the object 
of one desire is a metaphor for some other cares or values of the agent; perhaps the way an agent sees 
some particular set of events is as part of a narrative, or reflective of an underlying trope. All of these 
kinds of relations are ways in which moral psychological items could fit together, and it is an 
interpretive task to elucidate exactly by which relations a particular whole fits together. Like a poem, 
then, the structure of an orientation is, as Brooks says, a “structure of meanings, evaluations, 
interpretations”. 
Expression 
The parts of an orientation fit together to form a whole. What is the relation between the 
whole and particular parts? I propose that the whole-part relation is one of expression. One’s 
orientation is expressed in one’s particular attitudes, ways of relating to others and the world, and so 
on.13  
The relation of expression is a very general one. Genes can be expressed in proteins, as can 
coffee grounds in coffee, or a function in variables. I do not propose to give an account of expression 
at that level of generality. What I mean by expression is more specific. Following Charles Taylor, for 
X to be expressed in Y is for X to be manifest in Y, such that X can be known as it manifests in Y.14 
 
13 In the background here is an expressivist conception of the human according to which human activity is naturally 
expressive of who we are. This expressivist conception is common to the pragmatist tradition that I am reading here in 
Dewey, Du Bois, and Ambedkar, and is inherited by them from Rousseau and Hegel in particular. See Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The making of the modern identity. 
14 See Charles Taylor, "Action as Expression," in Intention and Intentionality: Essays in honour of G.E.M. Anscombe, ed. Cora 
Diamond and Jenny Teichman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). 
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My trembling hands may express my nervousness. My pursed lips may express my disapproval, or my 
facial expression my anger. A person’s way of dressing might express their identity, their personal 
history, or their “style”. The portrait may express the artist’s ambivalent love of their subject. Or my 
handwriting – small and cramped – may express my boarding school education. In all these examples, 
X is in some sense manifest or shown in Y in being expressed in it.15 And in all of these, X can be 
known as it manifests in Y; one can grasp my anger through my facial expression, or my style in the 
way I dress. 
We can get clearer on this notion of manifestation by a contrast with what we can call mere 
revelation. Mere revelation occurs when something just reveals something else, such as when I pull away 
the curtain to reveal the painting, or when your unexpected presence at a party is revealed in the fact 
that your car is outside. In cases of mere revelation, the thing revealed is distinct from the thing doing 
the revealing. By contrast, in cases of expression, what is expressed is expressed in and not merely 
known through its expression. The musician’s expression is heard in the notes they play; a person’s style 
is expressed in the clothes they wear and how they hold themselves. What is expressed is not entirely 
separable from the expression; it does not make sense to speak of a style of dressing or playing other 
than in terms of the dressing or playing. So, too, an agent’s orientation is not separable from the 
attitudes in which it is expressed. It is not a particular part of their moral psychology like another belief 
or desire, but a general and pervasive feature of their moral psychology as a whole. 
For X to be expressed in Y is for it to be expressed in a particular way. The specificities of the 
medium shape what is expressed. My anger is of that red-faced suppressed kind, not the boorish 
yelling-and-screaming kind; my playing style is refined and delicate, expressed in my soft touch on the 
piano keys. We speak of this phenomenon as one of “giving expression”. The medium concretises 
 




what is expressed, gives it a certain expression. So, one’s particular attitudes give a particular expression 
to one’s orientation. Whiteness can be expressed in white anger, and the more anger is expressed, the 
more the shape of the underlying orientation is given a certain shape. But whiteness can also take 
different form if it is expressed in pity and charity. Those manifestations shed different light on the 
orientation. But they are nonetheless expressions of the same orientation insofar as they fit with other 
elements of that orientation, that there are transitions between these attitudes that make sense of the 
elements together.  
The locution that I just used – “giving expression” – is helpful for understanding the relation 
between what is expressed and its means of expression. There are two misunderstandings one could 
make of the relation between what is expressed and its expressions. The idea of “giving expression” 
avoids both of these.  
The first is to think that what is expressed is there in its entirety, as it were, before being 
expressed. On this misunderstanding, the means of expression is contingent. It is merely the means 
of discovery, the grounds of inference to what already lies beneath. But if what is expressed must be 
given expression, then it cannot exist in its entirety wholly independently of the means of expression. I 
cannot have a refined and delicate playing style unless I play with that soft touch on the keys; or, at 
least, if not through my soft touch, that playing style must be expressed in some other way, perhaps 
through my sensitivity to nuance in volume, or the judicious use of sustain pedal. But it must be 
expressed in some way or other, and the means of expression shapes precisely what is expressed. The 
whiteness of the Southerner is different from the whiteness of the British colonial, precisely because 
they are expressed in these different ways. So too whiteness as it is expressed in the self-hating person 
of colour is different from whiteness as it is expressed in whites’ hatred.16  
 
16 These differences do not negate the fact that the whiteness of the self-hating person of colour is in another sense the 
same as the whiteness expressed in white hatred. Glenn Gould’s abstracted Well-Tempered Clavier is the same but also 
different from Daniel Barenboim’s more Romantic Well-Tempered Clavier. There are thorny issues of individuation here that 
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The second misunderstanding would be to think that a particular means of expression fully 
constitutes what is expressed. Since my refined and delicate playing style could be expressed through 
my judicious sustain pedal use or through my soft touch on the keys, it is not just reducible to either. 
For it could have been expressed in some other way. Or take anger. One’s anger is not reducible to 
its manifestations of red-facedness and yelling and screaming. But it can nonetheless be said that one’s 
anger would be different if it was not given expression in those ways. My anger that is not let out and 
that is suppressed and held in is different from the anger that is given free rein. The anger is shaped 
by its expression, but for it to be so shaped means that it has to have some distinctness from its 
expression. So, too, whiteness is not simply reducible to white rage and the “whoop of the 
Southerner”, because those manifestations are shaped by the fact that whiteness is also expressed in 
white ignorance, pity, and charity. A whiteness that was solely expressed through rage and hatred would 
be very different from a whiteness solely expressed through pity and condescension. 
We tread in difficult terrain here, and one might think I flirt with contradiction. Have I not 
said, simultaneously, that what is expressed cannot be and must be independent of its expression? The 
answer here is to press on the idea of giving expression, of the means of expression as clarifying or 
concretising what is expressed. What is expressed (one’s playing style, one’s anger) exists, prior to its 
expression, inchoately. Prior to its expression, it has a certain indeterminacy, a lack of clarity. The 
expression renders it more determinate, gives it more form. Since what is expressed is inchoate and 
must be rendered determinate through expression, we avoid the first misunderstanding. The fact that 
the means of expression is active in shaping the inchoate orientation that is expressed means that we 
cannot grasp the orientation wholly independently of how it is expressed in our particular attitudes. 
And since one’s orientation is inchoate, and rendered more determinate through the particular means 
 
are partially addressed but not solved by the resort to interpretation (to see them as the “same orientation” helps make 
sense of their relationship) and indeterminacy. I leave these issues aside. Thanks to Andrew Richmond for discussion here. 
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of expression, we avoid the second misunderstanding. While one’s orientation is not wholly 
constituted by its particular expressions, it is not wholly independent of them either. The whole and 
the parts are tied up together. 
We have an ordinary conception of this idea of rendering determinate something inchoate in 
the idea that “talking it out” can help clarify something for ourselves. Through giving verbal and 
explicit expression to what we feel, we make sense of it, render it determinate. We say of this 
phenomenon that the feeling is articulated in the verbal expression. This concept of articulation is 
helpful. To articulate is not only to clarify, to make distinct, but to connect, to join, as bones articulate 
into each other. An orientation, when it is articulated, given expression, is clarified and made more 
distinct by joining that particular mode of expression to others. So seeing whiteness as expressed or 
articulated in pity and condescension as well as in rage and hatred makes more sense of, helps clarify, 
whiteness as an orientation.  
The notions of fit and expression are brought together here. What it is to see those different 
attitudes as expressions of the underlying orientation is to see how they fit together, how they make 
sense of each other as expressions of that orientation. So the more one sees the disparate expressions 
of an orientation together, the more concrete one makes the orientation, the more it is rendered 
determinate. 
Let me recap what I have argued so far about the metaphysics of orientation. For X to be 
expressed in Y is for X to be manifested in Y. This relation of expression is a peculiar metaphysical 
relation. It means that X is not fully distinct from Y, yet neither is X reducible to Y. So for a person’s 
orientation to be expressed in their attitudes is for that orientation to be manifested in, articulated in, 
made clearer and more determinate in those attitudes. An orientation is a general and pervasive piece 
of our moral psychology. It is expressed in many attitudes. So to see those attitudes as expressing the 
same underlying orientation is to see how they fit together in a pattern, how they make sense of each 
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other. In that way the relations of fit and expression are two sides of the same coin. They capture how 
the parts of one’s moral psychology relate to each other to form a whole.17 I turn now to the 
epistemology of orientation, which is an interpretive epistemology. What is interpretation in this area of 
moral psychology? Does it matter who is doing the interpreting? And what are the standards of 
correctness for an interpretation? 
6.3 The epistemology of orientation – interpretation and the priority of self-
knowledge 
Let me begin with the first question. The starting point I drew from Du Bois earlier is that 
there is a particular kind of understanding that one gains of a moral psychology by seeing its parts 
together as a whole. I called this kind of understanding interpretive insofar as it is a matter of making 
sense of a moral psychology as a whole, of making that psychology clearer. In doing so, one sees how 
the meaning of one part is informed by how one sees other parts, and how they together can be 
understood together. That is, in interpretation, one gives articulation to how a person’s attitudes fit 
together and express their orientation. An interpretive epistemology is the natural fit for an expressivist 
and holistic metaphysics. 
Interpretation not prediction 
Let me flesh out this interpretive kind of understanding by contrast with another kind of 
understanding one may have of a person’s moral psychology: the predictive kind of understanding 
associated with some conceptions of character. This is a useful contrast insofar as the notion of 
character might be thought to be similar to that of an orientation. One’s character plays a unifying 
 
17 There are still outstanding questions about this expressivist and holist metaphysics that I do not address here. For 
example, how does expression relate to other metaphysical notions that we would want to apply to a moral psychology, 
like those of causation, normativity, or content? 
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role in holding together one’s actions, thoughts, feelings, and so on.18 It is reflected in those parts of 
our moral psychological lives. It is meant to capture something central to a person – a patterning 
feature of their moral psychology. 
Now, of course, what is meant by “character” is a vexed issue. For dialectical reasons, I will 
rely on a conception of character on which it is predictive and inferential.19 On such a conception, a 
person’s character explains their thoughts and actions insofar as those thoughts and actions flow causally 
from their character. Character traits are dispositions that cause action. As John Doris puts it, 
“[c]haracter and personality traits are invoked to explain what people do and how they live… to 
attribute a character or personality trait is to say, among other things, that someone is disposed to 
behave a certain way in certain eliciting conditions.”20  
Accepting this predictive and inferential notion of character, we have a natural connection 
between the metaphysics of character and the epistemology of character. We come to know a person’s 
character through inference from their outward behaviour. And in turn we can use that inferential 
knowledge to predict their future behaviour. This epistemology of inference and prediction is tied to 
the causal and dispositional metaphysics of character. Character lies behind and causes action. To 
explain a person’s actions by appeal to character is to explain them by appeal to a common 
dispositional source. It is that common source that gives that set of actions (and concurrent thoughts) 
their pattern, their unity, in spite of whatever surface differences the actions may have. Bravery, for 
instance, manifests this way in this situation, that way in that situation. Thus, one infers to the existence 
 
18 Here I use “unifying” in the strong sense to make reference to the unity of the virtues thesis, which situationist critics 
also accept as essential to the concept of character. See, e.g., Doris, Lack of Character. 
19 I invoke this conception for dialectical reasons only since the idea that character is merely (or even primarily?) predictive 
has been challenged by Aristotelians, among others. So as an interpretation of the historical notion of character, this 
predictive conception of character may be inapt. See Annas, "Comments on John Doris's 'Lack of Character'."; Kamtekar, 
"Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.".  
20 Doris, Lack of Character, 15. 
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of the relevant character trait (bravery) from observing outwardly brave behaviour. That is why it is 
not enough that a person act bravely only once in order to be brave. The possession of the character 
trait must be evidenced by consistent and stable thought and action. Character unifies by providing a 
kind of consistency and similarity in amongst the dissimilarities that attend an agent’s thoughts and 
actions. I emphasise here, for the purpose of contrast to orientation, the unity of character, which 
comprises consistency and similarity of behaviour, arising from that common dispositional source. 
Interpretive understanding differs on precisely these points. It does not seek to explain by 
inference, its main goal is not prediction, and its criterion is not similarity or consistency. Let me take 
the criterion of interpretation first. Interpretation involves finding relations of fit between a person’s 
attitudes. An interpretation is better, all other things considered, the more it fits together the parts of 
a person’s moral psychology. As I argued in the previous section, the notion of fit is not reducible to 
rational consistency nor does it necessarily hold only between similar attitudes. Attitudes can fit 
together, as my analysis of Du Bois’s passages showed, even though they are dissimilar and even 
though they are rationally inconsistent. And mere consistency is not enough to show fit. So if 
interpretation involves making sense of how attitudes fit together, then its criterion cannot be 
similarity or consistency.  
What about inference and explanation? An attitude is not explained by interpretation by 
showing how it causally flows from an orientation. For a causal relation to hold, the effect must be 
wholly distinct from the cause. But, as I argued in the last section, an orientation is not wholly distinct 
from its expressions. So one cannot say that one infers to an orientation from attitudes. Instead, one has 
to see the orientation in the attitudes, as expressed in them. Coming to understand an orientation helps 
one understand attitudes like how coming to understand the theme of a poem helps one understand 
particular lines. One interprets the poem by seeing how the parts inform each other, how the use of 
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this word sheds light on the meaning of that line, how one formulation presages another, and thus 
one comes to see better the whole as it is expressed in the parts. 
Finally, the goal of interpretation is not prediction.21 Rather, it is an understanding of the 
person as a whole, their ways of engaging with and seeing the world. This form of understanding is 
concerned with their point of view on the world, and hence with their agency. It treats them as agents 
in the full sense and not merely as dispositional causal loci. That is, the interpretive form of 
understanding is first-personal and not third-personal.  
Interpretation as first-personal 
I need to explain what I mean by this claim. What is a first-personal kind of understanding as 
opposed to a third-personal kind? I will begin with an initial gloss and then spell out my use of the 
first-person by contrast from two other common uses in the literature. 
The initial gloss is that what I mean by the “first-personal” is the agential perspective, to the 
perspective from which an agent engages actively with the world. The relevant contrast is between 
activity and passivity. A third-personal perspective, by contrast, captures that with respect to which 
one is passive. One has a distinctive perspective on the exercise of one’s own agency. One knows it 
“from the inside”, as the agent, precisely because one is performing the relevant activity. If 
interpretation is first-personal, then there is some priority given to self-interpretation, to making sense 
of one’s own perspective. This priority, I will argue, consists in the fact that coming to know one’s own 
orientation necessarily shapes it, insofar as one is making more determinate what was previously 
inchoate in oneself. Self-interpretation is a form of practical knowledge. It shapes the object known. 
One’s own orientation is thus within the sphere of one’s agency. But interpreting another’s orientation 
 
21 Of course, one may use one’s knowledge of an orientation in order to predict another’s (or one’s own) behaviour. So 
too one can treat a person like a machine. It is often useful to do these things. But in neither case does the possibility of 
building a predictive model mean that the relevant notion is a predictive one. People are not machines. 
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does not have this direct practical effect. The other must take up that interpretation for themselves. 
The priority of the first-person consists in this practical difference between understanding one’s own 
orientation and understanding another’s and not any epistemological difference in the ease of access 
that I have to my orientation as opposed to another’s.  
Let me distinguish my broader use of the first-person from two common uses in the literature. 
The phenomenological first-person perspective 
The first use from which it ought be distinguished is the phenomenological perspective: how 
things feel or seem to a creature, the qualitative experience of consciousness. The phenomenological 
perspective is first-personal because it is my subjective experience, the way things feel to me. An 
orientation does not map directly onto the phenomenological first-person perspective because there 
is not necessarily a way that it feels to have a particular orientation. There may of course be 
phenomenological manifestations of an orientation. But these are not definitive of an orientation. 
More broadly, the phenomenological first-person perspective comes apart from the agential 
perspective. It includes things with respect to which we are passive. Some feelings and experiences 
assail us; they are not things that we have any agency over. It also excludes parts of our moral 
psychology with respect to which we are active but which have no, or no necessary, phenomenology. 
My commitments, my exercising my will, making decisions, and so on have no necessary 
phenomenology but are exercises of my agency. So the phenomenological first-person perspective is 
not identical to the first-person perspective conceived in my sense as the agential perspective.  
The deliberative first-personal perspective 
The second use of “first-person perspective” from which my view ought be distinguished is 
the rational or deliberative perspective, all the commitments that an agent draws on when they 
deliberate practically about what to do. This is what is meant by talk of an “evaluative standpoint”, 
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the “standpoint of practical deliberation”, and similar locutions.22 One takes the first-person 
perspective when one deliberates about what one ought do, considering the reasons that weigh in 
favour of and against a particular course of conduct. An extended use of this first-person perspective 
occurs when we treat others as capable of deliberating about what to do, from their own perspective.23 
This conception of the first-person perspective is contrasted with the third-person perspective, which 
one takes when one treats oneself or another not as self-directing agents but as objects determined by 
external causes.24 We do this often, and not always in objectifying or otherwise insulting ways.25 Certain 
thoughts or desires may assail one, they come not as features of our moral psychology that we endorse, 
but as alien stuff to be controlled or formed, or at least predicted and managed, through the exercise 
of one’s rational agency.  
This conception of the first-person perspective as rational deliberative standpoint captures 
rightly a distinction between activity and passivity, according to which our activity comprises what we 
do as agents and our passivity comprises what we undergo as patients. And an orientation characterises, 
in part, how we engage in deliberation. It involves what we see as reasons for a particular action, what 
possibilities are open to us, and so on. But the deliberative standpoint is too narrowly and too sharply 
construed to capture the notion of an orientation. It is too narrow, because an orientation involves 
 
22 This view is prevalent in contemporary metaethics. See, e.g., Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 19-26; Michael E. Bratman, "The Sources of Normativity," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
58, no. 3 (1998); Sharon Street, "Constructivism About Reasons," in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Sharon Street, "What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?," Philosophy 
Compass 5, no. 5 (2010); Smith, "Realism."; Smith, The Moral Problem, 151-77. But cf. Bernard Williams’ wider notion of the 
“subjective motivational set” in “Internal and External Reasons”, in Moral Luck: Philosophical papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
23 We can describe this as the ‘second-person perspective’. Cf. Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, respect, 
and accountability (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). I leave aside the complications of how the second-person 
relates to the first-person. 
24 Compare P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Routledge, 2008), and the consequent 
literature. 
25 Tamler Sommers, "The Objective Attitude," The Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 228 (2007). 
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forms of agential activity other than the deliberative. It is too sharp, because these extra-deliberative 
parts of our moral psychology are nonetheless not alien causal dispositions, matter to be subdued to 
rational form. They form part of our agential perspective. There are thus shades of activity between 
the pure exercise of the will in deliberation and the passive dispositional parts of ourselves.  
Distinguishing my broader first-person perspective from the deliberative conception 
The deliberative conception is too narrow insofar as there are other forms of agential activity 
other than the deliberative. Angela Smith, for example, argues that rational deliberation is not the only, 
nor even the primary, form of agency. Our moral agency is expressed more fundamentally, Smith 
argues, in our evaluative activity, which is why (for Smith), we are properly held responsible for our 
evaluations even where they are not the result of choice or deliberation.26  
This evaluative capacity, for Smith, manifests itself in “what we unreflectively think, feel, 
desire, and notice, as well as in what we reflectively choose, endorse, or reject.”27 These attitudes reflect 
our underlying “evaluative judgments”, which Smith treats not as endorsed propositional attitudes, 
but as “[standing or long-term] tendencies to regard certain things as having evaluative significance”. 
Smith rightly resists conceiving of these evaluative tendencies in third-personal terms.28 Our evaluative 
tendencies, she argues, are distinguishable from the kinds of tendencies that can only be understood 
third-personally, as things that assail us. The latter tendencies include physiological conditions like 
hunger and thirst, and nonintentional mental states like pains and sensations. Evaluations are unlike 
 
26 “the real core of our moral agency resides in our more basic capacity to evaluate—in complex, spontaneous, and 
sometimes even contradictory ways—the world around us.” Angela M. Smith, "Conflicting Attitudes, Moral Agency, and 
Conceptions of the Self," Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1/2 (2004): 340. My concern here is not with the question of moral 
responsibility. 
27 Smith, “Conflicting Attitudes, Moral Agency, and Conceptions of the Self,” 340. 
28 One may want to reserve the word “tendencies” for the purely passive, causally-understood third-personal kind and 
choose some other word for what Smith has in mind – perhaps “habits”. But so long as one accepts that she is using the 
word more broadly, and that evaluative and passive tendencies are not subsets of one larger category called “tendencies” 
I do not think there is anything more than a terminological issue. 
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these passive tendencies because they are intrinsically meaningful and evaluative, and thereby not 
understandable purely in terms of physical causation. Smith points to certain features of these 
evaluative tendencies that explain what she means by calling them intrinsically meaningful and 
evaluative.  
The first relevant feature of these tendencies is that it makes sense to ask the agent for the 
reasons why those things have that significance. Our evaluations are rationally explicable. Suppose I 
unreflectively feel shame at the thought of my family member working in a certain profession, even 
though on reflection I would think that shame unjustified. Nonetheless, it makes sense to ask me why 
I find that profession shameful. And, if I am honest with myself, I can explore why I find it shameful, 
even if those reasons are not ones that I on reflection accept: it is a profession that is unsuitable for 
women; it is a mark on my honour that my sister must work to support our parents; and so on.  
The second feature is that the evaluation is an opportunity for the agent to explore their own 
perspective more deeply. They can use it as an opportunity for self-knowledge. What does it say about 
me that I find this profession shameful? What other values and commitments are involved in my 
finding it so? It may say about me that I am protective of my (younger) sister, that I see her as fragile. 
While I find it shameful for my sister to work in that way, I may not find anything wrong with others 
(perhaps even my brother!) working in that profession, and so on. Both of these questions are 
questions internal to a perspective that ask the agent to go deeper into the kind of significance that 
the object has. The agent can explore their perspective through examining their responses to this 
particular object. 
The third feature is that this kind of exploration presupposes that there is a holistic 
connectedness to the perspective that the agent is exploring. In that exploration, they are making sense 
of their perspective, drawing connections between its different parts. The single evaluation (that it is 
shameful for my family member to be involved in this profession) is not merely a one off, but 
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connected to a pattern of significance and meaning. Smith says at one point that her argument 
presupposes that “a rational creature has a coherent psychology of a certain sort, such that there are 
systematic rational connections between the things that happen in her psychological life and the 
underlying judgments and values that she accepts.”29 This presupposition is grounded in the kind of 
patterning that one’s moral psychology displays, a patterning that one can come to see through a 
certain kind of activity internal to one’s perspective. So, within Smith’s argument about our evaluative 
capacities, we arrive back at the conception of interpretive activity that I proposed on independent 
grounds.  
This is further support, I think, for the claim that human agency includes this capacity to make 
sense of oneself or others, to explore a normative space, to come to understand it, to inhabit it. What 
Smith properly picks up on is that the sphere of meaning and value is larger than the sphere of 
deliberation.30 And that sphere of meaning and value is characterised by a kind of patterning, a way of 
seeing the connections between the parts that deepens one’s understanding of the whole. 
We see here that Smith’s notion of evaluative activity leads directly to the kind of interpretive 
activity that I have argued is how we come to know an orientation. And this kind of interpretive 
activity is first-personal because it can only be grasped from the perspective of an agent. It is 
intrinsically meaningful and value-laden. It expresses how an agent makes sense of things, how they 
come to understand things as hanging together. This understanding cannot be reduced to a third-
personal view of causal relations, understood independently of that agent’s perspective. And an agent’s 
understanding, how they see the world, can come apart from how the world actually is, or how others 
understand it to be. Compare the deliberative perspective. It is first-personal insofar as it is the 
 
29 Angela M. Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life," Ethics 115, no. 2 (2005): 256. I 
disagree with Smith to the extent that the relevant coherence need not consist in rational connections, strictly speaking. 
30 This is so even if it is true that only beings with the capacity for rational deliberation have a sphere of meaning or value. 
I don’t want here to commit myself to any view about how these capacities fit together or which is primary, if any.  
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perspective from which an agent decides what to do. For something (a reason, say) to be properly part 
of that perspective, it must be understood as embedding how the agent sees the world. That clear 
liquid is for drinking because the agent sees it as water, even though it really is clear poison. Mercury 
in retrograde is a reason to double check things from the perspective of a believer in astrology, even 
though it is from a third-personal perspective only an instance of apparent motion. If the deliberative 
perspective is first-personal, then so too is the interpretive perspective. 
I have argued that the epistemology proper to orientation is an interpretive epistemology. It 
involves making sense of a person’s attitudes, how they hang together in a whole. That is, it involves 
tracing the relations of fit between those attitudes, understanding how they are expressive of that 
orientation. Interpretation is a first-personal activity. It is done from one’s perspective on the world. 
But its object is also one’s perspective – how one engages with the world. Interpretation is in this 
sense reflexive. What I want to argue now is that self-interpretation has a certain priority over 
interpreting others, because self-interpretation is a kind of self-determination. Self-interpretation 
shapes oneself in ways that interpreting others does not necessarily change them. Self-interpretation 
has this practical effect on oneself precisely because it is first-personal. Third-personal knowledge, by 
contrast, whether of oneself or of something else, does not directly change the thing known, though 
of course such third-personal knowledge may form the basis for other changes to what is known.31 I 
will come at this priority through a particular puzzle that interpretation raises, a puzzle that arises from 
the conjunction of this priority of the first-person with the fact that others may know my orientation 
better than me. 
 
31 I leave aside the thorny problem of the observer effect in quantum mechanics. In one sense it is thorny precisely because 
it is meant to be merely passive observation. 
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6.4 Hermeneutical self-knowledge 
Here is the puzzle. There is a conceptual connection between the first-person perspective, 
characterised in the deliberative sense, and a particular form of self-knowledge. The contents over 
which an agent deliberates and the results of their deliberation are necessarily self-known by that agent. 
An agent has a certain privilege regarding this part of their mental life. They know it from the inside, 
as it were. That privileged self-knowledge is constitutive of what it is to be a deliberative agent.  
By contrast, an agent’s orientation is not necessarily self-known by the agent. Indeed, the 
opposite is true: there is a kind of self-opacity that characterises an agent’s relation to their orientation. 
It is difficult to self-know. But if privileged self-knowledge is necessarily characteristic of the first-
person perspective, then we might think analogously that some kind of special self-knowledge must 
hold of an agent’s orientation.  
I argue that there is a distinctive kind of self-knowledge that an agent can have of their own 
orientation, one conceptually connected to the kind of interpretive activity it is. Indeed, it is a reflexive 
use of that interpretive activity, one that takes oneself as the object of interpretation. I will call it 
hermeneutical self-knowledge. That kind of self-knowledge is the kind that one gains through making sense 
of oneself. It consists in giving form to the parts of oneself, keeping in mind that what I mean by 
“giving form” is not “imposing a form from without”, but “making proper sense of what is there”. 
Making sense of oneself is neither constituting oneself ex nihilo nor coming to grasp oneself as an 
already existing fully formed object. It is a form of self-constitution that involves realising (in the full 
sense of that word) what is there inchoately, in a not fully-formed state. In Nietzsche’s words, it is to 
“become what one is”.32 
 
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: how to become what you are (Oxford University Press, 2009), "Why I Am So Clever," §9. 
See, for useful exegesis of that saying of Nietzsche’s that is not too far from the point I am making here, Alexander 
Nehamas, "Nietzsche, Intention, Action," European Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2018).  
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Let me begin by setting out two standard forms of self-knowledge in the literature, one 
distinctly first-personal and connected to the deliberative first-person perspective and one third-
personal that is usually taken to be the converse of the first-personal kind. I will contrast these to 
hermeneutical self-knowledge. 
First-personal practical self-knowledge 
With the deliberative conception of the first-person perspective comes a particular form of 
practical self-knowledge, one that is transparent and groundless. An agent deliberates in order to act; that 
is, to bring about intentionally some change in the world that the agent sees as valuable. The 
deliberative agent thus has a purpose in acting, and some conception of how so acting will bring about 
that end. The agent’s conception of their action is captured theoretically in the agent’s intentional 
states: the beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth that provide the grounds (from the agent’s 
perspective) for what they are doing and why they are doing it. The deliberative conception of the 
agential perspective thus implies that an agent necessarily self-knows their intentional states, since they 
are what define the agent’s action as such. An agent’s intentional states, we could say, are transparent 
to them.33  
This kind of self-knowledge is essentially knowledge “from the inside”. It is non-observational 
and non-inferential. It is these two features that comprise what Crispin Wright calls the groundlessness of 
first-personal self-knowledge.34 It is not self-knowledge that is grounded in some other phenomenon. 
If an agent had to observe or infer to what their reasons for action were, then such reasons could not 
explain, from that agent’s perspective, why that agent acted. At best, they would be post-hoc 
rationalisations. So if we are to treat agents as agents, as acting according to their own conception of 
 
33 I leave aside the usual and contested qualifications to do with self-deception and so on. 
34 Cf. Crispin Wright, "Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy," in Knowing Our Own Minds, ed. Crispin Wright, Barry 
Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Annalisa Coliva, The Varieties of Self-Knowledge 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 52-58. 
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what is to be done, then we must also attribute to them this kind of groundless self-knowledge. 
Groundlessness is essential to the self-knowledge being agential, from the inside. Suppose it were not. 
Then it would be based on some kind of observation or evidence. In observing myself, I would be 
taking a position outside myself. So it could not be knowledge from the inside.35 
Third-personal inferential self-knowledge 
This is of course not to say that we cannot or do not have knowledge of ourselves in this 
observational way. We can and often do treat ourselves as objects. We use our “inner eye” to look 
inwards. When we do so, we come to know ourselves third-personally, just like other objects or events 
in the world. These parts of us are causal dispositions (or, perhaps, are treated like causal dispositions) 
to be known just like other causes in the world, through observation and inference. We come to know 
ourselves 1) as objects to be predicted and 2) as others know us, from the objective point of view, not as 
we know ourselves as agents from the inside.36  
For example, from observing how I act around certain groups of people, I can come to know 
that I seek attention, and infer that I am lonely. Or from turning my attention to that strange 
stomachache that I have before I give a presentation, I can infer that I am nervous. There are other, 
less mundane examples. I can discover that I have certain implicit biases through taking an IAT test. 
Or I may come to note certain associations between one passing thought and another, like with 
Proust’s madeleine. These are forms of third-personal knowledge of dispositions that I have. These 
are perfectly normal and everyday ways of coming to know oneself. 
 
35 Exactly how to spell out this idea of being “from the inside” is a difficult matter. It is, of course, a metaphor, though a 
powerful one, and so it perhaps can only be analysed through articulating surrounding concepts and ideas. 
36 See, e.g., Akeel Bilgrami, Self-Knowledge and Resentment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), particularly Appendix 
I; Coliva, The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, 71-74. The phrase “as others know us” arguably includes more than the objective 
form of knowing (for example “second-personal” knowledge), and there are complications even within the notion of the 
“third-person”. I leave aside those complications here. 
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These two forms of self-knowledge are often taken to be exhaustive. And it makes sense, from 
within a certain conception of agency, that they are so. In deliberating, I constitute myself. I determine 
which of my dispositions I will take to embody my true commitments and values. This deliberating 
self is free in the sense that it is unbound by the mere matter with which it is confronted.37 In respect 
of those dispositions, we are, as Harry Frankfurt put it, merely “locales in which certain events happen 
to occur.”38 What we must do here is to take this matter into ourselves, to make it our own, or to reject 
it.39 We impose a form on that matter. Our third-personal knowledge of the causal mechanisms in us 
serves this top-down process of self-determination in the same way that causal knowledge of the 
external world does. It provides us with a greater grasp of how to do what we decide to do, which 
levers to pull, what to control within ourselves. Once I come to know that I am lonely, I can seek to 
rectify that in healthy ways rather than by attention-seeking. Once I know that I am nervous, I can 
practice public speaking, to discipline myself so that I am better able to do what I want to do. Third-
personal self-knowledge and first-personal practical self-knowledge work together to enable a familiar 
top-down kind of self-determination. They fit into a common modern view of who we are and how 
we see ourselves. 
Hermeneutical self-knowledge 
Where does self-knowledge of one’s own orientation fit in here? It seems it cannot be either 
of these two forms of self-knowledge. It is not third-personal, for it is not known observationally or 
inferentially. I do not observe my orientation, nor do I infer to it from its parts, namely my attitudes 
 
37 Cf. “When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something which is you, 
and which chooses which desire to act on.” Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 100.  
38 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), ix. 
39 See, e.g., Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” in The Importance of What We Care About. One can find this Kantian 
strain also in philosophers like Korsgaard and R. Jay Wallace. 
280 
 
and evaluations. This is to repeat that, in the case of one’s orientation and its parts, there is not a 
strictly vertical distinction between evidence base and thing inferred to from that evidence base, where 
those two must be wholly distinct. Rather, knowing an orientation is to see the connections between 
the parts, to see how they all hang together. In any case, it would be incorrect to reduce it to third-
personal self-knowledge, for it is not knowledge of ourselves as objects, as subject to external whims 
and forces, but properly first-personal knowledge of ourselves as agents.40 An orientation is a first-
personal, agential phenomenon – not something with respect to which we are passive. But an 
orientation is not transparent to us. On the contrary, it is difficult to come to self-know. It requires 
work. So it cannot be first-personal knowledge of the standard kind that is constitutive of our 
deliberative agency. 
In order to get hermeneutical self-knowledge in view, we must disaggregate two features of 
first-personal self-knowledge as traditionally construed. We must separate transparency (that what is 
part of the first-person perspective is necessarily self-known) from groundlessness (that it is self-
known non-observationally and non-inferentially). These two features are tied together in the case of 
an agent’s intentional states by the explanatory function of such states, that they are to capture the 
agent’s conception of their action. But once we have accepted that there is a different kind of agential 
activity, namely interpretive activity, then, with respect to that activity, the two features do not 
necessarily have to go together. Our self-knowledge of that interpretive activity can be groundless (and 
therefore first-personal and agential) without being transparent. Indeed, since interpretive activity 
involves making sense of something, getting clear about it, the subject matter of interpretation cannot 
be fully known prior to interpretation, else there would be no need for it. So it is intrinsic to the nature 
of interpretation that groundlessness and transparency come apart. 
 
40 One can of course know that one or another is an agent third-personally, as a mere fact. And one can even infer to it 
from looking at the effects of your or another’s agency. But this is clearly not knowledge of one’s agency from the inside. 
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This is the kind of self-knowledge that I call hermeneutical. It consists in seeing the connections 
between the parts of one’s moral psychology. This process is a process of interpreting oneself; that is, 
turning one’s interpretive capacities on oneself and one’s way of seeing things. One grasps the 
significance of one’s beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on by grasping them in their relations to each 
other as a whole. It is groundless, because it is non-inferential and non-observational. But it is not 
transparent, since it involves seeing the relations between items in our moral psychology and not simply 
the items themselves. 
Let me explain this kind of self-knowledge through drawing on Naomi Scheman’s wonderful 
analysis of feminist consciousness-raising and anger.41 Scheman’s analysis is of an emotion – anger. 
One may worry that an emotion is too narrow a moral psychological phenomenon to carry the same 
weight as an orientation. But the particular kind of anger that Scheman describes is one that goes deep 
in the way a person sees the world. It is not merely an episode of anger, but, as we shall see, a moral 
psychological phenomenon that colours an agent’s entire attitude towards the world. It is akin to an 
orientation in that respect and the kind of self-knowledge appropriate to it characterisable in the same 
terms.42 
Scheman argues against the view that emotions such as anger exist as pre-existing objects in the 
mind, to be discovered through their surface manifestations like “submerged leaves” under the stream 
 
41 Naomi Scheman, "Anger and the Politics of Naming," in Engenderings: Constructions of Knowledge, Authority, and Privilege 
(Routledge, 1993). 
42 Brudney makes a similar point when he distinguishes an orientation from emotions. He notes in a footnote that Robert 
Solomon’s work on the emotions shares many features with his analysis. But that is because Solomon is concerned with, 
in his own words, “not in those brief ‘irruptive’ reactions or responses but in the very long-term narratives… I am 
interested in the meanings of life, not short term neurological arousal.” Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions, Thoughts, and 
Feelings: Emotions as engagements with the world," in Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions, ed. Robert 
C. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 78-79. Brudney takes this to show that “the phenomena on which 
Solomon focuses are not the usual ones for theorists of the emotions.” (“Styles of Self-Absorption,” fn. 63.) Whether or 
not this is so, Brudney quite correctly accepts that some emotions can play the deep patterning role that he attributes to 
an orientation.  One could perhaps speak of the anger that Scheman describes as an “angry orientation”, though one would 
no doubt want to qualify that description further to avoid certain connotations that arise with that description. 
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of consciousness are discovered by the disturbances they cause.43 She claims rather that coming 
through consciousness-raising to realise that one is angry involves seeing various parts of oneself 
together under the name of anger. It is “to put a name to a mass of rather disparate stuff, to situate the 
otherwise inchoate “inner” in a social world… to note a meaningful pattern.”44 These parts of oneself, 
for Scheman, comprise both one’s explicitly held beliefs and desires and what Smith called one’s 
evaluative tendencies. The former include one’s guilt because of one’s belief that one’s time ought not 
be one’s own, because it belongs to one’s husband or children, one’s beliefs that certain feelings 
(moodiness, waves of sadness) were not justified, were mere passive dispositions that overcome one 
because of, perhaps, parts of one’s biology, the corresponding desires not to give in to those feelings, 
and so on. That is, those parts of oneself include moral psychological items that would be part of 
one’s deliberative point of view. The latter (Smith’s evaluative tendencies) include one’s snapping at 
one’s family members; one’s general exhaustion; one’s crying and moodiness. Seeing these all together 
under the name of anger is a matter of understanding how they all fit together to comprise one’s anger. 
Pulling together explicitly these threads of oneself, Scheman argues, changes the anger itself: “We 
begin to see things differently, as it were through the anger; it colors our world, both inner and 
outer…Our feelings, judgments, and behaviour become organized around the fact of our anger.”45 
Seeing these parts of oneself as cohering under the concept of anger is thereby to constitute oneself in 
a particular way; it is to give those parts meaning as angry.46 That interpretation makes sense of oneself; 
without such an interpretation, Scheman writes, “they [my feelings, judgments, behaviour] are likely 
 
43 Scheman, “Anger and the Politics of Naming,” 25.  
44 Scheman, “Anger and the Politics of Naming,” 22. 
45 Scheman, “Anger and the Politics of Naming,” 26-27. 
46 “As men are ordinarily, it is the name that first makes a thing at all visible to them.” (“Wie die Menschen gewöhnlich 
sind, macht ihnen erstder Name ein Ding überhaupt sichtbar.”) Translation slightly modified from Friedrich Nietzsche, 




to be both odd and erratic, and therefore less coherent”.47 Failing to get this interpretation right, for 
Scheman, is therefore not a matter of failure of correspondence to what is independently the case, but 
of a failure to bring oneself together: “If we are confused about our emotions, those emotions 
themselves are confused.”48  
As Scheman makes clear, self-interpretation is not a matter of getting right what is already 
determinately there. Hermeneutical self-knowledge is not just a matter of description, of 
correspondence with a prior given fact. Our orientation does not consist of submerged leaves, to be 
known through inference from their manifestations.49 Rather, it is inchoate in the sense that it can be 
given greater determinacy through interpretation. In coming to this particular kind of self-knowledge, one 
constitutes oneself, not in the Korsgaardian or Frankfurtian sense of bringing already fully existing 
desires into oneself through endorsing them, but through clarifying who one already is. 
6.5 Hermeneutical self-knowledge and the problem of unfreedom 
I have provided an account of the kind of self-knowledge that one can come to have of one’s 
orientation. This self-knowledge has the potential to help address the problem of unfreedom by 
comprising (part of) the moral psychological half of the virtuous cycle.  
Hermeneutical self-knowledge involves coming to know that and how institutions of 
unfreedom have shaped one’s orientation, and that they continue to foster that orientation. One’s 
moral psychology is bound up with those institutions. Since that is the case, transforming one’s 
orientation (and maintaining that change), and even more so, supporting others in transforming their 
 
47 Scheman, “Anger and the Politics of Naming,” 27. 
48 Scheman, “Anger and the Politics of Naming,”  27. 
49 Cf. certain interpretations of the nature of the unconscious in Freud – e.g. in Sebastian Gardner, "The Unconscious 
Mind,"  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jonathan Lear, Freud (Routledge, 2005). Thanks to Francey 
Russell for these connections. 
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own orientations, requires transforming those institutions.50 So hermeneutical self-knowledge may 
carry with it a particular motivation – to change institutions in order to change oneself. (Of course, 
this motivation is neither necessary nor sufficient to engage in political action.) In coming to know 
one’s orientation, one becomes more aware of how that orientation is expressed in the particular 
attitudes one has, for example the resentment that one feels towards others who have more than you 
and the pity and generosity one feels towards those who have less. Seeing those particular attitudes in 
light of one’s orientation begins already to shift those attitudes. One’s resentment may, for example, 
begin to fade under that new light, further shifting one’s overall orientation. 
Hermeneutical self-knowledge may also help one to see the same or similar orientations in 
others. It may help one talk to those others in ways which more fully speak to them, to help them 
come to the same self-knowledge. Such conversation needs of course to be supported by relations of 
solidarity and fellow-feeling, and exercised virtuously and with proper respect, to avoid an externalist 
replicating of material hierarchies in epistemic terms (“I can tell you who you really are”). 
But hermeneutical self-knowledge is not without its dangers and limits. It is not a panacea, and 
there are no guarantees of any kind of success. Let me sketch a couple of these dangers and limits 
here, before returning to some of the issues concerning unfreedom, internalism, and externalism with 
which I began the dissertation.  
The first limit is that self-knowledge is not sufficient for institutional transformation, which 
requires action. That much is obvious. But a more important limitation is that self-knowledge is not 
even sufficient to motivate action. It may result in a kind of quietistic resignation – withdrawing from 
the world and politics into the self. This may seem to be the best, indeed the only achievable, option 
in the face of the scope and stability of unfreedom. I don’t think there is any knockdown rational 
 
50 It may be psychologically possible to change one’s orientation against the force institutions exert. But it is difficult work, 
hence the need to build community that is a space set against those institutions to support that change. 
285 
 
argument against this quietism. All I can point to is the hope in the capacities of others that I argued 
for in Chapters 1 and 2 – that the problem of unfreedom has been created by humans and thus it can 
be addressed by human action. Here all that can really be said in the abstract is to point to the 
important role of other agents and of bonds of solidarity, and of the important role of a positive 
imaginative vision. In practice, articulating this vision and building these bonds can help move others 
from resignation to action. So while hermeneutical self-knowledge may be a first step, it is only at best 
that first step. 
A deeper danger is that self-knowledge is risky, both personally and politically. It is personally 
risky because the possibility of self-knowledge comes with the possibility of self-deception, even more 
so when one is coming to know something so fundamental and often challenging about oneself. One 
can deceive oneself as to how one is, to continue to blind oneself to how the parts of one’s moral 
psychology fit together, to misinterpret one’s orientation. One might shy away from a fuller self-
understanding because one cannot bear to see oneself in that way – a kind of bad faith.51 Lacking 
something like Keats’ “negative capability”, one may sit satisfied with some surface interpretation of 
oneself that doesn’t threaten one’s self-conception, but also thereby does not properly or fully make 
sense of oneself.  
In the case of race, this might be something like a post-racial interpretation of one’s orientation. 
Taking again Du Bois’s “very tremendous and puzzling dilemma” from “The White World” between 
the “Christian Gentleman” and the “American White Man”, such an interpretation might capture the 
more palatable aspects of the Christian and Gentleman codes while refusing to see those aspects of 
oneself more akin to the American or White Man codes.52  
 
51 See Lewis R. Gordon, Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1995). 
52 Compare Robert E. Birt, "The Bad Faith of Whiteness," in What White Looks Like: African-American philosophers on the 
whiteness question, ed. George Yancy (Routledge, 2004). 
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So self-knowledge is personally risky, insofar as it comes with the possibility of bad faith and 
self-deception. But, more deeply, self-knowledge is politically risky because it can take the form that 
Du Bois worried about with his second white friend. One can come to know oneself fully, as (say) 
one’s self-interested orientation is shaped by racism, and accept that as the best way one can be. One 
may fully endorse that version of oneself, and choose (say) the “American White Man” side of the 
dilemma over the “Christian Gentleman” side. Du Bois allows for that possibility at the end of the 
dialogue with the second white friend, although it is important (I think) that their conversation is 
interrupted by the news that the world has once again gone to war. We may read the implication of 
the interruption as being that the second white friend’s “working through” of the parts of his 
psychology had not yet been completed, and that, but for the interruption, perhaps some possibility 
for conversion remained. But, still, Du Bois’s point is that there are no guarantees here. Self-knowledge 
can be misused as it can be used. 
While there is no guarantee against this misuse, one can mitigate somewhat the possibility 
through recalling the holistic and interpretive structure of an orientation. How hermeneutical self-
knowledge is gained, and the form in which it is gained, matter. The results are not independent of the 
procedures. That is why Du Bois speaks of the need for “carefully planned and scientific propaganda”, 
and why his texts have the aesthetic form they do, including dialogue, autobiography, rich prose, and 
moments of poetry and narrative.53 The use of aesthetic devices and aesthetic form here is an attempt 
to work on readers’ orientation at the right level, since, as I have argued, an orientation is structured 
 
53 See, on Darkwater, Watts, Hearing the Hurt, 27: “Darkwater performed an artistic practice that disrupted the aesthetic 
practices of emergence and circulation of contemporary racist propaganda… Darkwater represented moments of ‘truth’ 
where persons sense that they might have been wrong, agonizing moments where previously neglected or despised beings 
were perceived as participating in the beautiful… these moments were always affective and invoked ethical imperatives.” 
And, on Dusk of Dawn, see Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction, 90: “In the dialogic passages of Dusk of Dawn, especially, Du 
Bois uses imaginative reconstruction to provoke his readers in ways that straightforward exposition might not. Insofar as 
these creative efforts are directed toward effecting changes in his readers, they might be described as micropolitical 
techniques of multiracial citizenship.” These techniques, Balfour argues, aim to “dislodge hierarchical commitments from 
those deeper layers of being [those below the level of conscious conviction alone].”  
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(through fit and expression) much like aesthetic objects. So such self-knowledge, as I have argued, is 
not knowledge of an independent fact in the world later to be normatively evaluated, but knowledge 
of oneself under a thick description already normatively imbued – under an interpretation.  
Take again Du Bois’s interpretation of the self-interested orientation of whiteness in the two 
texts with which I began this chapter. Part of what it is, as a reader, to take that interpretation of 
oneself seriously and fully is to see it as something shameful and petty, to see the depth of its tensions 
and contradictions and to see it all in a negative light, as something about oneself that ought be resisted 
and changed. Its being shameful and petty and full of contradictions and tensions is part of seeing the 
orientation under that interpretation. It is difficult to imagine someone reading “The Souls of White 
Folk” and saying “yes – that is exactly who I am, and that is exactly who I want to be.” If one sees 
oneself in the fullness of that light, it would be at the very least strange (though of course theoretically 
possible) to endorse that interpretation of oneself as how one ought to be. 
But why can’t the interpretation that one settles on be evaluatively laden in the exact opposite 
direction and affirm one’s existing self-conception rather than challenging it? Some demagogue or 
sophist might suggest to one an inverted interpretation that is appealing in just that way, and which 
might in many respects closely resemble a more accurate self-understanding. We can imagine 
interpretations that are normatively inverted while structurally similar, perhaps analogously to how 
certain tropes and narratives can be appropriated for exactly opposite ends (an example being “reverse 
racism”, perhaps). Such an interpretation could make sense of one’s fears and anxieties and inchoate 
hatreds, but see them as entirely justified. For example, a particular kind of neo-conservatism could 
see society as afflicted by widespread moral psychological failings, aided and abetted by certain 
fundamental social institutions (perhaps even “race” and “democracy”), in a way which is in some 
sense structurally similar to the kind of reorientation Du Bois (for example) is calling for, but with 
vastly divergent substantive content.  
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This situation is describable with Emerson’s words in “Self-Reliance”: “Their every truth is 
not quite true. Their two is not the real two; their four not the real four; so that every word they say 
chagrins us, and we know not where to begin to set them right.”54 Emerson quite correctly here 
suggests that there is something true about the way in which these people see the world. That is why, he 
says, “their every truth is not quite true.” They recognise truly that something is deeply awry, and that 
they have been affected deeply by it. This colours their orientation to the world. Yet they see things 
entirely falsely (say, through a narrative of white victimhood). Such cases are less a matter of being 
“false in a few particulars”, as Emerson puts it, but rather of all particulars being askew, slightly rotated 
off centre, underlain by that deep structural similarity in the ways of seeing the world.  
The fact that orientations are interpretive moral psychological phenomena means that this 
more complex possibility cannot be avoided. But there are two things to say. The first is that this is 
precisely the battleground on which our practical engagements ought occur and not a matter to be 
sorted out or ruled out theoretically. The second is that the deep structural similarities are not 
necessarily to be regretted or bemoaned, even as they render far more thorough and more fundamental 
the problem. Rather, they can be bridges to be used, possibilities for the right kind of engagement.  
I will close this chapter by returning to the distinction between internalism and externalism as 
responses to the problem of unfreedom that I first outlined in Chapter 1. Recall that my call for 
internalism was set against the possibility of a wholesale externalism which resulted from treating the 
problem of unfreedom as a paradox or as unsolveable, therefore requiring that there were some 
untouched by unfreedom who could be the means of freedom for everyone else. Internalism, by 
contrast, was the view that resulted from showing both the undesirability and the impossibility of that 
 
54 Emerson, "Self-Reliance," 137. 
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kind of externalism. For the internalist, those who are unfree, despite their unfreedom, can make 
themselves freer. 
I left open in Chapter 1 the possibility of a more limited externalism – that there would be 
some role for those outside a particular mode of unfreedom to play in changing that particular mode 
of unfreedom. For example, is there a role for upper-caste Hindus in annihilating caste? The extended 
argument of the last few chapters suggests that there is, thus in a sense allowing for this limited 
externalism (though in another sense, as we shall see, it vindicates a fuller internalism). 
I have argued that deliberately constraining institutions of unfreedom like caste and race foster 
a self-interested orientation (including now group interest within self-interest) among those who in 
some way benefit materially from those institutions, and that this moral psychology in turn stabilises 
those institutions. Further, it is up to each agent practically to come to know and thereby to change 
their own orientation. So it is up to (say) Brahmins and to whites to self-know their orientation and 
no-one else can do it for them. So it seems that, since the moral psychology of the oppressor plays a 
stabilising role in unfreedom, and changing that moral psychology is practically up to the oppressor, 
then there is a necessary role for those who are not oppressed in making others freer – a form of 
externalism. 
There are two points to make here from the side of internalism. First, as Du Bois and 
Ambedkar argued, there are incentives for a certain self-blindness for those higher in the hierarchy, 
various difficulties of the will in seeing themselves clearly. It is those who suffer materially from the 
hierarchies who have clearer insight into that moral psychology, who are, in Du Bois’s words, 
“singularly clairvoyant” of it, most familiar with it. And that is why both Du Bois and Ambedkar 
claimed a certain insight into the moral psychology of whites and caste Hindus. That is, those most 
subject to hierarchical forms of unfreedom cannot wait for those at the top of the hierarchy to see the 
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error of their ways. And so they must find ways of and techniques for revealing their oppressors to 
themselves. It is the agency of the oppressed that practically must take the lead. 
Second, a key difference between the language of oppression and the language of unfreedom 
here comes to light. It may sound strange to say that the oppressors are also oppressed.55 But it is not 
so strange to say that the oppressors may also be unfree (though, of course, not in the same way as 
those who are oppressed). There are forms of unfreedom that those higher in the relevant hierarchy 
suffer, in this case self-blindness – the inability to see themselves clearly. This is part of what Rousseau 
meant when he said that “even he who thinks himself the master of others is no less a slave than 
they.”56 Since this unfreedom is to be overcome by self-knowledge, it is up to each person who is 
unfree to make themselves free.  
There is thus a trivial and wholesale sense in which internalism is true, assuming that there are 
forms of unfreedom that afflict everyone (albeit differentially), and that those forms of unfreedom are 
systematically interconnected with the more particular forms of unfreedom that afflict specific groups 
of people. If this assumption holds, then, trivially, freedom must come from within unfreedom, for 
there is no outside to the whole system. The conclusion is trivial because of the wholesale nature of 
the claim made in the antecedent – that everyone is unfree (albeit differentially).  
But theoretically trivial points may have important and non-trivial practical consequences. 
Here, the important consequence of the trivial claim comes out of the systematic interconnection with 
the more particular forms of unfreedom. It is a point articulated most pithily by Fannie Lou Hamer, 
 
55 Compare Ann Cudd, who holds that only those who are not oppressed can oppress: “for every social group that is 
oppressed there are correlative social groups whose members benefit, materially or psychologically, from this oppression… 
To be an oppressor… one needs to be a member of a privileged group, to gain from oppression of another social group, 
to intend to so gain, and to act to realize that intention by contributing to the oppression of the oppressed group from 
whose oppression one gains.” Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford University Press, 2006), 25. 
56 There are of course other unfreedoms that afflict oppressors, including incapacities to act in concert with others, the 
inability perhaps to imagine other ways of being, perhaps more deeply (though I’ve not argued for it here), the unfreedom 
of being unable to do what is right without it being bad for one, and so on, all of which Rousseau captured by saying that 
people give up their freedom for the sake of vanity. 
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that “nobody’s free until everybody’s free”.57 The point put less pithily is that people’s unfreedoms are 
bound together, caused by the same institutions operating differentially, and therefore that if part of 
how unfreedom is sustained is to divide and to separate, then it is even more important to realise these 
connections and to draw on them to build solidarity and resistance. If our unfreedoms are bound 
together, then coming to know those unfreedoms together is one first step toward greater freedom. 
It is in this vein that Du Bois closes “The White World” not only with a call “to listen to the 
complaint of those human beings today who are suffering most from white attitudes, from white 
habits, from the conscious and unconscious wrongs which white folk are today inflicting upon their 
victims” – that is, a call to focus on the agency of those rendered most clearly unfree by whites, but 
also with a claim that such a call is necessary for the whole world:  
 
The colored world therefore must be seen as existing not simply for itself but as a 
group whose insistent cry may yet become the warning which awakens the world to 
its truer self and its wider destiny.58  
 
57 Fannie Lou Hamer, “Nobody’s Free Until Everybody’s Free,” speech delivered at the Founding of the National 
Women’s Political Caucus, Washington, July 10, 1971, in Maegan Parker Brooks, Davis W. Houck, and Fannie Lou Hamer, 
The Speeches of Fannie Lou Hamer: To tell it like it is (University Press of Mississippi, 2011). 




This dissertation has analysed some different manifestations of the problem of unfreedom in 
modernity. I have argued through those analyses that it is possible for those who are unfree, by their 
own agency, to make themselves freer. That argument has involved understanding the way in which 
those institutions of unfreedom shape the moral psychologies of agents who live in and under those 
institutions, which in turn supports the institutions. The task of the unfree making themselves freer 
involves changing together the institutional structure and the associated moral psychology – a virtuous 
cycle of freedom to resist the vicious cycle of unfreedom.  
Chapter 1 set out the methodology by which I approached the problem of unfreedom in this 
dissertation, and categorised responses to that problem along two dimensions: 
internalism/externalism and revolution/reform. Methodologically, I approached the problem of 
unfreedom as a practical problem faced by agents and not a theoretical problem. Drawing on the 
pragmatist method and non-ideal theory, I proposed to begin by looking at particular cases of 
unfreedom rather than by identifying a concept of freedom. I defended my initial formulation of the 
problem of unfreedom against what I called the externalist challenge: that the problem of unfreedom 
can be side-stepped or avoided because there are always free agents who can bring freedom to those 
who are unfree. Our desire to side-step this problem, I suggested, is stronger the more seriously we 
take the problem; that is, the more seriously we take the stability of unfreedom. In contrast, I proposed 
a methodological internalism on which those who are unfree can make themselves freer. Such an 
internalism is consistent with treating the problem of unfreedom as a practical problem faced by 
people who are unfree, one that is to be faced directly on its own terms rather than by positing some 
prior concept of freedom.  
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I argued against two kinds of response to the problem of unfreedom – revolution and reform. 
The revolutionary wants to overturn everything all at once, whereas the reformist thinks that freedom 
comes from bringing out the principle of freedom already implicit in our fundamental social 
institutions. Instead, I suggested, we should pursue a middle path, a transformationist approach to 
unfreedom. Transformationism accepts that the fundamental institutions need to be transformed, but 
recognises that this cannot be done all at once, because of the systematic interconnection between 
these institutions and the deep connection between those institutions and agents’ moral psychology 
that cannot be simply and quickly undone. I situated these two dimensions of externalism/internalism 
and revolution/reform in an intellectual history of the revolutions of the eighteenth century that 
explains their appropriateness for the problem at hand.  
Chapter 2 took up again the externalist challenge in one of its forms in the metaphysicalising 
of unfreedom in human nature through tragedy. A metaphysical understanding of the tragic nature of 
things conceives of human agency as doomed to failure, as self-defeating. Despair or a revolutionary 
raging against the dying of the light are two natural responses to this understanding of the limits of 
human agency. I argued that naturalising tragedy through a reading of Dewey’s understanding of the 
tragedy of the human condition could take the deep insight of that form of the challenge and redirect 
it from despair to hope.  
The tragedy of the human condition, on my reading of Dewey, is that we are limited creatures 
whose agency is constituted and constrained by a world that is often hostile, hazardous, perilous, and 
uncertain. Our agency is necessarily limited; freedom and constraint come together. So there can be 
no final overcoming of unfreedom. It is also characteristic of human agency that we tend to forget 
this fact and try to come up with some technique for transcending these limits – a kind of hubris. I 
suggested that revolution and reform are both hubristic; revolution insofar as it conceives of human 
agency as capable of a final and complete overcoming of unfreedom; reform because it posits a 
294 
 
teleological principle that is to guide human agency similarly to a final form. Against hubris and also 
against pessimism and quietism, a proper recognition of the tragedy of the human condition, I argued, 
grounds a practical hope in the capacities of human agents to address together the problems that face 
them. 
Chapter 3 drew on Dewey’s critique of political democracy to argue that the institutions of 
political democracy have fallen into oligarchy. That oligarchy both serves unjustly only the interests of 
the very few and renders ordinary citizens unfree and unable to change that state of affairs. Political 
democracy’s fall into oligarchy is due to the way that it functions given a moral psychology fostered 
by capitalist market society. That moral psychology is double-sided. It comprises a positive side of 
hope and desire for individual success and achievement, and a negative side of fear of government 
and of others, anxiety over one’s status, and conformity to mass culture. Yet, I argue, the moral 
psychology is unstable. The positive side will fade as the promises of freedom are not met, and the 
negative side by itself is insufficient (in the absence of other mechanisms) to ensure the stability of the 
system. So such a system must come to depend on (some would say, has always depended on or has 
always been a cover for) the creation of explicit hierarchies, of more direct forms of violence, coercion 
and oppression, and various forms of redirection of agential powers within the system. 
Chapter 4, drawing on Ambedkar’s analysis of caste, analysed how the structure of explicitly 
hierarchical institutions – a structure of graded inequality – stabilises itself through fostering a moral 
psychology of group interest and through “hardening” that structure into a legalistic, deontic structure. 
The moral psychology of group interest sets groups within the hierarchical structure against each 
other, rendering solidarity difficult and thus keeping energies within the system that could be used to 
destroy the system. That structure of graded inequality is additionally stabilised through interaction 
with the law. The law both gives caste a legalistic structure (necessary for law to “make sense” of 
caste), and, in giving caste that kind of formalised structure, separates it from the informal social 
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mechanisms of change and pressure to which it otherwise might be subject. I used this analysis to 
draw out certain features of Ambedkar’s response to caste, involving building political institutional 
power for the larger purpose of annihilating caste as a social structure and as a moral psychology. 
Chapter 5 articulated a conception of self-interestedness as an orientation drawing on Du 
Bois’s mid- and late-period work that plays an essential role in how Du Bois sees the relationship 
between racism and capitalism. Self-interestedness in this larger sense is not merely a particular 
motivation to act in one’s self-interest, but a complex of attitudes comprising how white souls relate 
fundamentally to themselves and the world. Self-interestedness is fostered by capitalism, and is 
directed along racialised lines in order to facilitate capitalism’s spread across the world and stability. 
In turn, that means capitalism stabilises racism, insofar as racism plays this role in protecting 
capitalism. If Ambedkar proposes building political power in order to bring about social change, Du 
Bois proposes building economic and social power to change the orientation of self-interestedness 
that underpins racial capitalism. 
Chapter 6 provided an account of this moral psychological notion of an orientation that has 
played a consistent role in this dissertation, beginning from two passages in which Du Bois 
characterises the moral psychology of whiteness. An orientation, I argued, is a holistic and general 
patterning feature of an agent’s moral psychology. Metaphysically, I analysed an orientation in terms 
of two relations: fit and expression. An orientation comprises how an agent’s moral psychology fits 
together, and the different particular attitudes an agent has express that agent’s orientation. 
Epistemically, while an orientation is a first-personal notion and has a certain first-personal privilege 
insofar as it captures how an agent on a fundamental level sees and engages with the world, it is not 
necessarily self-known by that agent – indeed, it is difficult to know and in some sense may be better 
known (though differently known) by others. The relevant first-personal privilege is, rather, practical: 
one’s coming to self-knowledge of one’s orientation already itself begins to shape and change that 
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orientation in ways that others’ knowledge of it do not, though not necessarily in directions that are 
morally or politically laudable. Nonetheless, that self-knowledge of one’s orientation is a kind of 
change to it means that there is always a possibility by which people who are unfree can move from 
unfreedom to some greater freedom, even if there are significant barriers to that possibility becoming 
actualised. 
Forms of unfreedom 
I want to draw this dissertation to a close by pulling together some of its strands, and by 
gesturing towards some directions for thought left unfollowed. In particular, I want to say something 
on a more general level about how we might categorise kinds of unfreedom and to make a suggestion 
about what those general comments might say about a possible conception of freedom. Such an 
conception will not be an ideal conception of freedom of the traditional sort. Rather, it will be one 
which is tied to unfreedom, which arises from and is a response to it. Here I follow Dewey: 
 
Liberty in the concrete signifies release from the impact of particular oppressive forces; 
emancipation from something once taken as a normal part of human life but now 
experienced as bondage.1 
 
In Chapter 1, I gave a very general definition of unfreedom in terms of “impoverishment of 
the exercise of agential capacities”. From the preceding analyses of democracy and market society, 
caste, and race, I think we can say something more about the forms such impoverishment might take. 
One useful distinction is between unfreedom that consists in the denial of the effectiveness of the exercise 
of agential capacities and unfreedom that consists in an undermining or other kind of restrictive 
shaping of the capacities themselves.  
 
1 Dewey, Liberalism as Social Action, 35. 
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Let me begin with that first category, where the exercise of agential capacities are rendered 
ineffective. We have seen a few forms of unfreedom that fit this category. One kind is the setting of 
agents against each other so that competition and conflict triumph over co-operation. In such cases, 
the agency of some is mobilised to frustrate that of others, rendering the agency of the latter 
ineffective. This can occur at the level of groups, such as in the case of graded inequality and caste 
hierarchies, or at the level of individuals, like in the case of the competitive zero-sum game fostered 
by capitalist market society. This kind of unfreedom involves both a structural element and a moral 
psychological element. Structurally, this kind of unfreedom involves a positional conflict, which in 
turn fosters various moral psychological attitudes, including resentment and fear of those who occupy 
other positions, self-interestedness, and desires or hopes for self-advancement.  
Another kind involves rendering the exercise of agential capacities ineffective through 
channelling (or, in some cases forcing) that agency through or into hardened institutional structures 
that have an inertia of their own. Cases here include the way in which caste was formalised and given 
legal deontic structure by the operation of colonial law, or the way in which constitutional rights 
discourse was mobilised to prevent the regulation of labour contracts in the Lochner-era United States. 
This hardening increases the effort needed to change these structures, both because of the hardening 
itself and because of the way in which that hardening has a tendency to separate out the formal part 
of the structure from the informal part, which is then left more or less independent of and therefore 
more or less untouched by whatever formal reforms are achieved.  
Unfreedom can also consist in undermining or otherwise shaping agents’ capacities and not 
merely the results of their exercise. Ways in which agential capacities can be undermined include the 
anxiety and apathy fostered by the competitive nature of market society, the debilitation of fear and 
self-doubt that comes from having the exercise of one’s agency rendered constantly ineffective, or the 
internalisation of a sense of inferiority from racial or caste hierarchies. Contrastingly, agential capacities 
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(say, the capacity for hermeneutical self-knowledge and self-examination, or the capacity to imagine 
other ways of being) can also be undermined by a sense of superiority fostered by those same 
hierarchies, or by the hubris of thinking one’s individual capacities not to be subject to the limitations 
that others face.  
Forms of unfree shaping of capacities include the fostering of hopes and desires that serve to 
stabilise institutions of unfreedom, like the hopes for individual success and desires for conformity 
fostered by the market, or the hopes for group upward mobility or inclusion fostered by caste and 
race. So too anger can be channelled into group resentment rather than anger at the system itself. 
These capacities are shaped, by which I mean given particular objects and particular connections to 
other attitudes (we could say: given an orientation), in ways which stabilises institutions of unfreedom 
rather than transforming them. I have focused in this dissertation on this wide set of moral 
psychological attitudes in order to bring out more forcefully the breadth of institutional shaping of 
moral agency. I have tried to capture this breadth with the notion of an orientation. But there are of 
course other kinds of undermining and shaping of bodily and intellectual agency that occur through 
the denial or corruption of education, or through institutionalisation of the carceral or medical kind 
that Foucault and others have studied in detail. 
From unfreedom to freedom 
These are different kinds of unfreedom that have surfaced in the preceding analyses. What is 
traditionally called oppression or domination may involve certain of these forms of unfreedom (as 
well as perhaps being defined by particular forms of injustice), but the language of unfreedom is, as I 
suggested in Chapter 1, both broader than these terms and carries a different focus, on the 
impoverishment of agential capacities rather than what is due as a matter of justice to agents. One 
reason to use that broader language of unfreedom is its direct linguistic link to freedom. That is what 
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I want to turn to now. I am not going to provide a theory of freedom. That would take another work 
of this length. I will, rather, identify a direction that such a theory might take. 
One way to understand the problem of unfreedom is as consisting in the interaction between 
these different kinds of unfreedom, so that the agential capacities needed to remedy one form are 
undermined or rendered ineffective by others. That is one way of putting the vicious cycle of 
unfreedom – that forms of unfreedom compound and exacerbate each other. This compounding 
occurs through institutions. Institutions are the means by which these different kinds of unfreedom 
are drawn together and stabilised. Institutions provide a kind of focal point for unfreedom. That 
should be unsurprising, since one thing institutions do is combine and co-ordinate human agency. 
And if they can do that task well and for good ends, then so too they can do it for ill, turning human 
agency against itself, as it were. We can say that this is one form of the tragedy of human action. 
But by identifying and disambiguating (some of) the mechanisms by which these institutions 
stabilise themselves, there is a hope that we together may be able to respond to them. There is thus a 
movement from understanding unfreedom toward a conception of freedom. Such a conception of 
freedom would have some particular significance insofar as it is a conception of freedom from within 
unfreedom, and not an ideal of absolute freedom that is separated from the problems that agents 
presently face. The lessons of the tragedy of the human condition identified in Chapter 2 are important 
here. We don’t want a merely theoretical ideal of freedom, developed and conceived without regard 
for the existing forms of unfreedom. That would be an expression of hubris, of our “desire to get 
above and beyond ourselves”. Instead, we want a conception of freedom that can guide us in 
addressing these forms of unfreedom. 
So what can be said about freedom? As a first stab, we might take freedom to be the contrary 
of unfreedom. If unfreedom consists in impoverishments of agential capacities, then freedom (in the 
sense in which I am interested in here) consists in enriching, in developing and fostering, those 
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capacities which are denied and constrained. So if unfreedom consists in self-blindness, then the 
capacity to know oneself is a form of freedom. If it is to have one’s capacities for hope and desire to 
be channelled towards unachievable and meaningless objects, then to be able to channel those 
capacities toward meaningful and possible objects is a form of freedom. If unfreedom consists in 
hierarchical and oppressive relations with others that inhibit possibilities for collective agency, then 
creating non-hierarchical and non-oppressive relations with others that enable collective agency is a 
form of freedom. And so on.  
It's important here, I think, that we take freedom to be the contrary of unfreedom (the active 
development of certain capacities) and not simply its negation (merely the absence of the overt 
restrictions and constraints on those capacities).2 This is for two reasons. First, given the long-lasting 
psychological and material effects that institutions of unfreedom have, freedom conceived merely as 
the absence of unfreedom will not actually redress the problems of unfreedom. Active redress is 
necessary and not simply removal of obstacles. Second, it is politically important to have a positive 
vision of better modes of social life and not simply a criticism of what exists. (That is the important 
insight that drives many idealised conceptions of freedom, even if they can too easily fall prey to hubris 
and insensitivity to actual conditions.) A positive program and alternative visions are important 
especially given the moral psychological difficulties in change in orientation that I discussed in Chapter 
6 and the possibility of quietistic resignation. The difficulties of self-knowledge are exacerbated if there 
is no alternative sketched; after all, what reason do I have to change if there is no alternative? Better 
to work on myself, and conform myself to the constraints under which I must live. Sour grapes is 
 
2 I am unclear whether this claim commits me to a “trivalent” conception of freedom, on which freedom and unfreedom 
do not exhaust the logical space. In some minimal sense it does, but insofar as one concern in making this point is that 
the middle space (given that existing conditions are conditions of unfreedom) essentially reproduces and does not rectify 
unfreedom, it may be that the “neither free nor unfree” space really does just reduce to unfreedom. See Matthew H. 
Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2003). Another worry I have about placing myself in the tripartite 
camp is that such accounts usually treat freedom not as a quality of agency but merely in terms of quantity. 
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often a rational response to unfreedom. And perhaps the sketching of alternatives itself is an exercise 
in freeing the imagination from the constraints under which it normally labours. 
What can we say, still in the form of a general sketch, about the shape this conception of 
freedom might take? Unfreedom as I have analysed it in this dissertation has an institutional part and 
a moral psychological part. So freedom, conceived as the contrary of unfreedom, will also have those 
two parts. Let me take them in turn.  
First, insofar as unfreedom consists in institutions that constrain human agency, freedom 
consists in the transformation of those institutions and the building of new ones that create new ways 
of combining and co-ordinating agency. Freedom has a social aspect, comprising open and flexible 
social institutions that better enable agents to pool and direct their agency in concert with others. Set 
against a larger institutional context of unfreedom, this social aspect of freedom fosters a capacity to 
resist those larger tendencies. This is why Du Bois and Ambedkar focused so heavily on building 
power within institutions of unfreedom. Wider transformation of institutions requires building and 
institutionalising power that can then be mobilised for that task.3  
Existing views of freedom recognise, in different ways, this social aspect. Positive liberty views 
of course recognise it in terms of the ideal relations that hold between agents and which are necessary 
for their flourishing. But neo-republican views of freedom and the negative liberty tradition also 
recognise this social aspect, if only simply in negation – freedom (for these traditions) consists in the 
absence of certain social relations (of coercion, of domination). The conception of freedom I sketch 
here departs from all of these. As compared with the positive liberty tradition, it treats the relevant 
social relations not as a fixed ideal but as targeted toward changing and as set against existing relations 
 
3 It should go without saying here that by “institutionalised” I don’t mean any particular institutional structure, say 




of unfreedom. In contrast to the negative liberty tradition and the neo-republican tradition, which are 
both in principle sensitive to (at least some) kinds of unfreedom, it treats freedom not merely as the 
negation or absence of these forms of unfreedom but also as comprising what is substantively 
necessary to resist and challenge those forms of unfreedom.  
Second, insofar as unfreedom consists in the undermining and shaping of agential capacities, 
freedom consists in developing and reshaping those capacities. Freedom has an individual aspect, 
comprising the development of the agential capacities that can be utilised to change things in the 
world, to transform conditions of unfreedom. Again, this individual aspect has been recognised in 
different ways by existing views of freedom. But it gains a new significance when seen in the light of 
unfreedom.  
Some positive liberty views recognise this individual aspect of freedom under the guise of self-
actualisation.4 The quibbles that I have with this language I expressed obliquely in Chapters 1 and 2 
in my comments on the revolutionary conception of human nature.5 To speak of a human nature that 
is actualised is either unhelpfully broad (insofar as there are potentials in human nature that we would 
not want actualised) or overly narrow (insofar as it limits human nature to what is good).6 Taking this 
quibble into account, the conception of freedom sketched here is similar to such positive liberty views 
 
4 See Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom; Neuhouser, Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: 
Reconstructing the Second Discourse. In a different vein, see John Christman’s individual positive liberty view: "Freedom in 
Times of Struggle: Positive Liberty, Again," Analyse & Kritik 37, no. 1-2 (2015); "Liberalism and Individual Positive 
Freedom," Ethics 101, no. 2 (1991); "Saving Positive Freedom," Political Theory 33, no. 1 (2005). 
5 There are other quibbles to do with particular forms of the positive freedom tradition that I cannot get into in detail 
here, quibbles to do with conceptions of the person. 
6 Of course, as I said in Chapter 1, one may have a capacious conception of human nature as comprising all the 
potentialities (and not actualities) of what humans are capable. I have no qualms with such a conception of human nature, 
but it doesn’t do any of the grounding work that is necessary to speak of “self-actualisation”. The pragmatists I draw on 
in this dissertation arguably have such an open-ended conception of human nature. See, for example, Du Bois’s continual 
reference to the infinitude of human nature, e.g. in “Of the Ruling of Men” in Darkwater, 68: “Infinite is human nature. 
We make it finite by choking back the mass of men, by attempting to speak for others, to interpret and act for them, and 
we end by acting for ourselves and using the world as our private property.” Du Bois begins that work with a Credo, the 
first belief of which is in “the possibility of infinite development” of “all men”. 
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in taking seriously the importance of developing individual agential capacities. But it reconceives what 
those capacities are and their place in a larger scheme of freedom in light of the particular forms of 
unfreedom that agents face. The relevant capacities are not an actualisation of human nature for all 
time as part of a final overcoming of unfreedom. They are those capacities that are now denied or 
constrained and which, in order that the unfree can become freer in this circumstance, ought be 
developed.  
For example, if one’s capacity for anger is unfree because directed toward other groups within 
the system who are not responsible for the ills one faces, and this anger is tied up with all sorts of 
other affective capacities (inability to sympathise with members of those groups, an inability to see 
past one’s self-interest, the acceptance of certain desires for superiority as natural and so on), then 
freedom in this case perhaps consists in being able to redirect one’s anger toward the relevant 
institutions, to develop that capacity for wider and expanded sympathy and other-identification, to 
come to recognise how those desires for superiority in oneself are encouraged by our conditions and 
thereby to change them, and so on. But these capacities are not necessarily those that are required in 
other situations, for example if one’s unfreedom consists in uncritically accepting the perspective of 
dominant groups because one is too sympathetic, and in suppressing one’s anger because anger is seen to 
be inappropriate for people like you. In such cases, freedom might consist in becoming more 
independent, in resisting the relations imposed upon you, in feeling more strongly certain negative 
emotions denied to you. And neither position says anything about what kinds of capacities ought be 
developed in the ideal society where there is no unfreedom against which one must fight.  
There is of course much more to be said if one were to turn this sketch into a fully fledged 
theory. But already we can see what a theory might amount to – the specification of a set of institutions 
and a moral psychology that together form a virtuous cycle by which people who are unfree can resist 
the vicious cycle of unfreedom. There are limits to be identified and challenges to be faced in 
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articulating such a theory. In particular, one would have to contend with the liberal challenge to 
conceptions of positive liberty: that they are not value neutral and presuppose contentious conceptions 
of what matters. Some headway can be made against this concern by accepting that what relevantly 
constitutes unfreedom is a matter for normative argument and not to be identified in some pre-
normative space, and by the situation of this conception of freedom in the non-ideal space in which 
people who are unfree are trying already to become freer. So any such theory in this space would be 
bound to a particular set of social conditions and would change as those conditions change, though 
given the systematic nature of unfreedom, no doubt there will be connections and analogies with the 
situation of others in other conditions. Freedom need not look the same everywhere. 
An important part of this picture will be not only the substantive content of freedom, the 
institutional forms and associated moral psychology, but also a deeper understanding of how moral 
psychological change in orientation occurs. One part of this is institutional; no doubt there are 
institutional conditions under which people are more self-knowing of and more open to their own 
orientation, more capable of self-examination and more supported by others in doing so. Dewey 
thought that the institutions of democracy as a social idea, particularly the educational institutions of 
a society that is structured around that idea, would comprise such institutional conditions. But the 
other, larger part, involves a philosophical understanding of human psychology. More can be said 
about the methods and techniques that can help an agent to self-knowledge, including by disrupting 
false self-conceptions and self-security. And more needs to be said about the metaphysics of 
orientation and how the expressivist and holistic metaphysics I began to articulate in Chapter 6 
connects to other important moral psychological concepts like those of content, causation, 
normativity – perhaps also other, less common concepts like those of habit and the unconscious. I 
take it to be the case that a study of the methods and techniques of change in orientation and a study 
of the metaphysics of orientation are necessarily connected. They are both part of what Du Bois calls 
305 
 
in Dusk of Dawn “the scientific task of the twentieth century”, namely “to explore and measure the 
scope of chance and unreason in human action”.7 
That task is a humanist task insofar as it is part of treating the human being in its fullest. It is a 
study of the human being not simply as a rational self-determining agent, though we are that. Neither 
is it to treat the human being just as a locus of tendency and an object of prediction, nor merely as a 
cipher for social forces larger than oneself. These forms of understanding no doubt have their place. 
But human beings are not merely clusters of tendency nor ciphers.8 We are creatures that express 
ourselves through all of our variegated activities. To treat the human being in its fullest is to see the 
relationships between these activities, to try to understand the form of those activities in a way that 
helps individuals understand themselves better, as the creature that expresses itself in those ways.  
It is also to try to see how those different ways of understanding ourselves fit together, how 
what seems like mere tendency might be an expression of something deeper about one or about one’s 
society, how through our agency we take up those social forces that shape us and can articulate and 
transform them in ways that do not merely replicate those forces. It is to see each part of the human 
being and its world as insightful in its own right into who we are. That humanism is the broader 
philosophical frame in which one can locate the problem of unfreedom. The problem of unfreedom 
is a central part of the human condition in modernity. It is important in itself. But it is also a locus for 
understanding, and a lens by which we can understand, how the things we do and the forms we create 
work their way back through us, transmute us, form us in ways which may render us unrecognisable 
to ourselves, but which we can come to recognise. So in that way this dissertation is itself one small 
part of coming to freedom.  
 
7 Dusk of Dawn, 3. 
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